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Abstract
During the conflict and war in Croatia and Bosnia, Serb leaders frequently 
emphasised the need for unity: the need for homogeneity in the face of impending 
challenges. However, disunity and rivalry prevailed among the Serb leaders and only 
became more acute as the conflict intensified. This intra-Serb competition has 
received little attention in the literature on the Yugoslav conflict and competition 
within groups is furthermore under-analysed in the theoretical literature on ethnic 
conflicts. But intra-ethnic competition significantly affects the positions adopted by 
ethnic leaders and parties, and an examination of these dynamics is therefore 
important for the study of ethnic conflicts and wars. Through an in-depth analysis of 
intra-Serb elite rivalry in Croatia and Bosnia, this thesis explores the impact of intra­
ethnic competition. It argues that intra-Serb competition constituted a significant 
independent dynamic in the Yugoslav conflict and without it one cannot fully 
understand the escalation of the conflict, the outbreak of war and the continuous 
rejection of peace settlements. The Serbian regime played a significant role through 
the supply of resources, but the thesis will find that Slobodan Milosevic was not 
always able to control the local Serb leaders. The victory of hardliners was the 
prevalent, but not the only, dynamic in the intra-Serb competition. Hardline 
dominance was generally contingent on the control of economic and coercive 
resources, and not based on appeals to popular sentiments; it was not about elites 
successfully ‘playing the ethnic card’. Based on these findings a preliminary theory 
of the impact of intra-ethnic competition in inter-ethnic conflict will be suggested. As 
a corrective to existing theorising, it will argue that intra-ethnic competition does not 
necessarily lead to radicalisation, not even in a situation of war and polarisation. 
Popular support is, moreover, not the only resource of importance for the competing 
elites and radicalisation need not be driven by popular demands.
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Introduction
‘Only unity saves the Serbs’ is the famous call for unity in the Serb nationalist 
doctrine.1 But even though this doctrine was ideologically adhered to by most of the 
Serb leaders in Croatia and Bosnia, disunity was, in the period 1990-95, the 
dominant characteristic of Serb politics: divisions between leaders, between 
competing Serb parties and eventually also between leaders in the Serb statelets and 
in Belgrade. The call for unity is not only found in Serb nationalist discourse, but is 
an integral part of nationalist ideology: the claim to homogeneity, the claim that the 
nation is, or should be, a unitary actor with a single goal. However, the reality in 
situations of national and ethnic conflicts is often contrary to such claims: it is not a 
question of unitary nations in a conflict solely spurred by conflicting group needs and 
interests. As Milton J. Esman argues, “Factional conflict is inherent in ethnic 
politics”? Intra-ethnic elite rivalry should be expected and this not only contradicts 
the nationalist claim to homogeneity and unity, but also affects the political positions 
adopted by the leaders and thereby the development of the conflict. Without the 
recognition of such divisions there is no understanding of more moderate voices, of 
hardliners breathing down the neck of incumbent leaders, of processes of outbidding. 
Intra-Serb rivalry was pervasive in both Croatia and Bosnia and this significantly 
affected the positions adopted by the victorious Serb leaders and parties: moderates 
were marginalised and radicalisation predominated. This intra-Serb competition, 
constituted an important dynamic in the Yugoslav conflict, but it has, nevertheless, 
been afforded little attention in existing literature.
The same lack of attention is characteristic of the theoretical literature on ethnic 
conflicts: while intra-ethnic elite competition may be recognised, it is very rarely 
made the object of analysis and the effect of divisions within groups on the relations 
between groups is genuinely under-analysed. The decisive role of elites in national 
and ethnic conflicts has on the other hand long been acknowledged: they are the sine 
qua non of conflict regulation and will, furthermore, often have had more than a little 
to do with causing the conflict in the first place. But, however powerful these elites 
may be, they will rarely be monoliths: competition is the norm and this can either 
emanate from within the leader’s own ranks or from competing political parties and
1 “Samo Sloga Srbina S p a sa v d the so-called ‘ocila’ can be traced to St Sava, who in the 12th 
Century, called for Serb unity in an independent Orthodox Church.
2 Esman, Milton J., 1994, Ethnic Politics. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, p. 248.
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movements. Such competition, or even the anticipation of its potential emergence, 
will significantly affect the positions in the conflict that a leader is willing and able to 
take. The dynamics of internal competition, therefore, ought to be an integral part of 
the study of ethnic conflict but, in reality, very little theorising exists. One theoretical 
assumption is, nevertheless, often adhered to: intra-ethnic competition will lead to a 
radicalisation of the dominant position due to processes of outbidding based on elite 
appeals to mass extremism. But this assumption requires further analysis: how will 
leaders react to intra-ethnic challenges? Are popular attitudes decisive in intra-ethnic 
competition?
This thesis, therefore, undertakes an in-depth analysis of intra-Serb competition in 
Croatia and Bosnia with a view to building a theory in this relatively undeveloped 
area of ethnic conflict studies. Intra-ethnic competition influences what strategies are 
adopted and the political position that emerges victorious; and the purpose of this 
thesis is to analyse these dynamics of competition and its effect on the positions 
adopted by the Serb leaders in Croatia and Bosnia. I am not primarily interested in 
why elites choose a certain position but will analyse how the political positions 
adopted by the Serb leaders were affected by intra-ethnic rivalry, including the effect 
of the increasingly strenuous relations between the local Serb leaders and the Serbian 
President, Slobodan Milosevic. This thesis, moreover, asks how the more moderate 
forces were marginalised and why the hardliners proved victorious. The empirical 
findings will, to some extent, depart from existing theoretical assumptions of 
outbidding and the analysis will be used to suggest a new way of theorising about 
intra-ethnic competition.
There already exists a vast literature on the causes of the Yugoslav disintegration but 
the aim of this thesis is not to provide an alternative explanation of its fundamental 
causes. Four main explanations for the disintegration can be identified: the ‘ancient 
hatred’ explanation; the ‘national ideologies’ explanation; the structural explanation; 
and the ‘political elites’ explanation. Due to its focus on intra-ethnic divisions and 
the crucial role ascribed to elites, the analysis is clearly at odds with the ‘ancient 
hatreds’ explanation, which is anyway almost uniformly rejected in the academic 
literature. The framework is, however, not incompatible with the three other 
explanations; although the findings will depart from explanations focusing on elites
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mobilising antagonised populations by playing the ‘ethnic card’. The analysis takes a 
later starting point than these explanations, a situation that is already conflictual, and 
analyses one aspect of the disintegration: the intra-Serb elite competition in Croatia 
and Bosnia. This represents an underdeveloped but important aspect of the Yugoslav 
disintegration that should be included in order to fully understand the development of 
the conflict, the outbreak of war and the persistent rejection of peace settlements. The 
changing relations between Milosevic and the Serb leaders in Croatia and Bosnia are 
frequently cited in the literature and conflicts among the local Serb leaders are also 
mentioned, but mostly in passing. Actual analysis of the effect of intra-Serb rivalry 
and of the variables influencing it is decidedly lacking. The aim of this thesis is 
therefore to fill this important gap in the literature: to analyse the extent of Serb 
disunity and its effect on the positions adopted by the Serb leaders; their acceptance 
or rejection of compromise solutions and the use of peaceful or violent means. It will 
also critically assess the widely held assumption that Milosevic was always able to 
control the Serb leaders in Croatia and Bosnia.
In addition to the empirical goal of analysing the effect of intra-Serb rivalry in the 
Yugoslav conflict, an auxiliary purpose is theory-building or, in the words of Arend 
Lijphart, to “develop theoretical generalizations in areas where no theory exists 
yet”.3 Presently no theory exists on the variables that affect the impact of intra-ethnic 
competition: when will it lead to radicalisation? When are popular attitudes decisive? 
Based on the empirical analysis, a preliminary theory of these dynamics will 
therefore be suggested. A comparative approach is well-suited for this purpose since 
by comparing, both within and between cases, the effect of the differing variables 
can be analysed: it allows for greater variance. A comparative study can, furthermore, 
yield initial clues about the generalisability of conclusions, which a single-case study 
cannot.4 The two cases were republics in the same state and they can, therefore, be 
seen as ‘comparable cases’ that are similar on a large number of variables but 
nevertheless differ on variables hypothesised to be of importance. Both conflicts 
were conflicts over statehood, there was a sizeable Serb minority in the republics,
3 Lijphart, Arend, 1971. “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method”. American Political 
Science Review LXV(3): 682-693. p. 692.
4 Eckstein, Harry, 1975. “Case Study and Theory in Political Science”. In: Fred I. Greenstein & 
Nelson W. Polsby (eds.). Handbook o f Political Science vol. 7. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. p. 
107.
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Belgrade played a significant role and the dominant Serb party had the same name 
and similar policies. However, the degree of ethnification of the party systems 
differed in the pre-war period; the organisations of the main parties were not equally 
strong; there was variation in the institutional framework; the link between political 
and (para)military elites was not of equal strength; kin-state involvement had 
different degrees and forms; and the relative position vis-a-vis the other ethnic 
group(s) differed. The resulting ‘most similar cases’ design is suitable for theory 
development in an area where little theorising presently exists but it is important to 
note that the generalisability of the findings is limited due to the low number of cases 
and their many similarities. The dynamics of intra-ethnic competition will in 
particular be affected by the transitional context and by the highly unstable 
institutional framework that were common to both cases. Multiparty elections were 
held before the war but democratic credentials became increasingly problematic and 
transition ultimately failed with the outbreak of war. During the war the Serb 
statelets, Republika Srpska and Republika Srpska Krajina, were characterised by 
authoritarian regimes, but another transition was attempted following the end of the 
war; this time in the context of still ethnicised politics. This context of transition and 
state collapse results in different dynamics of intra-ethnic competition than in a more 
stable political context and the effect of this contextual variable will, therefore, be 
afforded particular importance in the analysis.
Specifically, the following questions will be addressed:
• How does intra-ethnic elite competition affect the dominant elite position in a 
conflict?
• What influences whether intra-ethnic competition fosters centripetal or 
centrifugal dynamics?
• Is there a difference between inter- and intra-party competition?
• To whom do the elites direct their competition? Whose support is crucial?
• What effect does ethnification have on political competition?
• What impact will a transitional situation have on these dynamics?
• How important is the position o f ‘opposing ’ ethnic leaders?
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This thesis analyses intra-Serb competition in different phases of the conflict and this 
also includes analysis of a situation in which political competition was not yet 
limited to an ethnic cleavage and dominated by ethnic parties. The analysis focuses 
on the effect of ethnification as well as on the dynamics of intra-ethnic competition 
once politics has become ethnicised. The dependent variable is the position of the 
Serb leaders in Croatia and Bosnia, i.e. the dominant elite position within an ethnic 
community: is the leader or the dominant party willing to accept inter-ethnic 
accommodation and compromise? Or do they insist on maximalist demands and 
violent strategies? The independent variable, and the main focus, is intra-ethnic elite 
competition: rivalry between Serb parties and leaders over power and policies. When 
analysing the intra-Serb elite competition, three audiences must be included. These 
audiences are significant in all phases of the conflict, although their relative 
importance varied significantly. Their significance stems from the resources they 
supplied the rivalling elites with: resources that were needed to emerge victorious 
from the competition, such as economic and coercive resources. Some of these 
resources can also be regarded as goals, in particular the economic resources, but 
their primary function is as means in the competition. The first audience is found 
within the party/movement or linked organisations and resources include party 
membership, party structures, financial resources, media access and control of the 
military. Secondly, what will be termed the kin-state should be considered. Belgrade 
exerted considerable influence over Serb politics and it is even often argued that the 
influence was to such an extent that local Serb leaders should not be regarded as 
independent actors. Intra-ethnic competition differs from conventional political 
competition since claims are made on behalf of the ethnic group and the kin-state 
leader is consequently afforded at least symbolic importance and can furthermore 
supply valuable resources. Finally, the general population is an important audience to 
the competition and popular support can prove a powerful resource for competing 
elites. In existing theories, outbidding is about “mass responsiveness to playing the 
ethnic card',5 but the general population is not the only audience of importance for 
the rivalling elites. The relative importance of these three audiences is expected to 
vary in different phases of the conflict and this will inter alia affect the significance
5 Sisk, Timothy, 1996. Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts. Washington 
DC: United States Institute of Peace, p. 17.
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of the position of ‘opposing’ ethnic leaders: does the politically relevant audience 
have to be convinced that the nation is under threat?
As a significant addition to existing literature on the Yugoslav disintegration, the 
empirical analysis will point to the very high level of Serb disunity throughout the 
conflict and war. This disunity, at times, included the inability of Milosevic to 
control the local Serb leaders. It will be concluded that the dominance of hardline 
Serb forces, which proved so important in the development of the conflict and the 
outbreak of war, was not based on the overwhelming power of ethnicity; it was not 
based on elites successfully playing the ethnic card. Resources other than popular 
support proved crucial and the dynamics of intra-ethnic competition were largely 
decided by control of coercive resources. The theory of outbidding holds that 
radicalisation is the preferred response to intra-ethnic challenges but the analysis will 
find that radicalisation or defeat were not the only options available to challenged 
leaders: intra-ethnic competition can also have no effect on the dominant elite 
position or can even lead to relative moderation. Furthermore, the effect of the 
position of ‘opposing’ ethnic leaders will be found to vary considerably in different 
phases of the conflict and the intra-Serb competition was never only an 
epiphenomenon of inter-ethnic relations. Finally, it will be argued that the dominance 
of the ethnic cleavage was the result of a political struggle, not an almost automatic 
outcome resulting from a largely voter-driven process. It was not inevitable, but 
depended, in particular, on the distribution of resources between ethnic and non­
ethnic parties. The empirical analysis will, therefore, demonstrate the importance of 
intra-Serb competition for the development of the Yugoslav conflict and its findings 
will question or add to existing theorising in the field, in particular the widely held 
assumption of outbidding based on elites playing the ethnic card.
Before embarking on the empirical analysis, a theoretical framework for the analysis 
will be developed. Due to the lack of theorising on the topic, the thesis is primarily 
inductive but a theoretical framework is nevertheless necessary: firstly, to define and 
relate concepts and, secondly, to identify variables that are likely to affect the 
dynamics of intra-ethnic competition. In Chapter 1, important concepts will be 
defined and existing theorising on intra-ethnic elite competition will be briefly 
reviewed and discussed. This forms the basis for the development of a framework
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for the subsequent analysis. The empirical analysis begins in Chapter 2 with a brief 
overview of the conflict in the two cases, a discussion of the literature on the 
Yugoslav disintegration and an analysis of background events and factors. The main 
empirical analysis in Chapters 3-7 is structured according to the different phases of 
the conflict and each phase is analysed in terms of the different audiences to which 
the competing parties and leaders addressed their appeals: party/movement forces, 
kin-state leaders and the general population. For each phase the impact of relations 
between groups, the inter-ethnic interplay, is also analysed. Chapter 3 and 4 analyse 
and compare intra-Serb competition in pre-war Croatia and Bosnia. Chapter 5 and 6 
cover the wartime period, while Chapter 7 tracks post-war developments in both 
cases and concludes on the findings from the previous chapters. Chapter 8 
summarises the conclusions and suggests a preliminary theory of the impact of intra­
ethnic elite competition in inter-ethnic conflicts.
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Part I: Theoretical Framework
Chapter 1
Ethnic Elites and Intra-Ethnic Competition
The importance of elites in the Yugoslav conflict and war is widely acknowledged, 
and political leaders such as Slobodan Milo§evic, Franjo Tudman and Alija 
Izetbegovic were often portrayed in the media as synonymous with the people that 
they vowed to represent. The underlying media assumption of homogenous, 
monolithic communities was a convenient myth rather than reality, but the great 
significance of elites nevertheless remains and it is generally accepted in the 
academic literature on the Yugoslav disintegration.1 In the theoretical literature the 
crucial role of elites in conflict regulation is likewise emphasised and there is also 
increasing evidence of elite initiated conflicts.2 But even though they are crucial 
actors in situations of conflicts, these leaders are rarely unconstrained: they will more 
often than not find themselves constrained by competing elites or by the fear that 
such rivals will emerge. Serb leaders were, in both Croatia and Bosnia, constrained 
by competition from oppositional elites, who often perceived radicalisation as a fast- 
track to power, and this consequently limited the positions that the leaders could take 
without jeopardising their hold on power. In order to study the development of the 
Yugoslav conflict, and inter-ethnic conflicts in general, one therefore needs to 
analyse these dynamics of intra-ethnic competition.
The framework for the empirical analysis of intra-Serb competition in Croatia and 
Bosnia will have a fairly open and general character: it will be structured around 
variables hypothesised to be of importance but the more substantive conclusions will 
be arrived at inductively. Due to lack of theorising on intra-ethnic elite competition 
in ethnic conflicts, this framework will be developed using inputs from a variety of 
different theories such as theories of party competition, democratic transition and 
conflict regulation. By identifying dimensions of analysis and hypothesised variables
1 See e.g. Andjelic, Neven, 2003. Bosnia-Herzegovina: the end o f a legacy. London: Frank Cass. p.
27.
2 Reilly, Benjamin, 2001. Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering fo r Conflict 
Management. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 177.
Nina Caspersen: Intra-ethnic competition and inter-ethnic conflict 14
Chapter 1 -  Ethnic Elites and Intra-ethnic Competition
of importance in the theoretical discussion, the aim is to overcome Duverger’s 
vicious cycle: the impasse between theory and practice and the difficulty of data 
collection without the guidance of a suitable theory.3 After outlining and discussing 
the theoretical framework, its application in the empirical analysis will be discussed. 
Firstly, this chapter will however address some preliminary issues: what is meant by 
elites; how is intra-ethnic elite competition addressed in existing theories; which 
overall dimensions of analysis should be included in the framework?
1.1 Definitions
By now I have already entered into a minefield of contentious concepts such as 
‘ethnic’ and ‘elites’ and before proceeding any further, I should make my usage 
clear.
Ethnic: In my usage the term ‘ethnic’ does not signify anything inherent or 
permanent. What is decisive are the labels used, the way in which the conflict is 
legitimised. For example, if the dominant discourse is one of a conflict between 
Croats and Serbs, then I will characterise it as an ethnic conflict regardless of 
whether its actual causes are found elsewhere and/or it lacks majority backing.4 
Especially in early phases of a conflict, a great degree of fluidity in ethnic identities 
is to be expected, but as conflicts intensify there is a tendency for ethnicity to 
become reified: its proponents seek to make it static and rigid, thereby lending it a 
homogenising quality that it did not possess to being with. What is ‘ethnic’ and, 
therefore, what is ‘intra-ethnic’ should not be regarded as static: it is likely to change 
with the course of the conflict and may very well reflect the interests of sub-groups 
within the delineated ethnic groups.
Ethnification: When politics is ethnicised, the dominant cleavage in the political 
competition is the national or ethnic cleavage and this takes precedence over all other 
cleavages. For example, a process of ethnification had taken place in the first 
Bosnian multiparty elections in November 1990 and the dominant cleavage was an
3 Biezen, Ingrid van, 2003. Political Parties in New Democracies. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.
p-6-
In the Yugoslav context, the most appropriate term to use would be ‘national’ rather than ‘ethnic’, 
but this presents some linguistic problems when referring to dynamics within and between the 
national communities: intra-ethnic or inter-ethnic is less open to misunderstandings than intra-national
or especially inter-national.
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ethnic cleavage, whereas the Croatian elections six months earlier were primarily 
fought on the issue of Yugoslavia’s future.
Intra-ethnic elite competition is defined as elite competition over dominance within 
an ethnic group. The boundaries of this competition are not static and it encompasses 
competition both within and between political parties/movements, as well as 
competition with non-ethnic parties over the definition of politics. Intra-ethnic 
competition does not necessarily differ from ‘conventional’ political competition in 
terms of its goals: competition over power, status and policies. However, one of the 
issues concerned is the claim to authenticity: the claim to being the legitimate 
representative of the ethnic group. The broader term intra-ethnic dynamics refers to 
both relations between elites as well as elite-mass linkages.
Dominant elite position in ethnic conflicts: By dominant elite position is meant the 
position adopted by the leader of a community or the strongest party, i.e. the winner 
of the intra-ethnic elite competition. This position should be seen as the standpoint 
taken on the ethnic conflict: are they willing to accept inter-ethnic accommodation 
which entails some form of compromise? Or do they insist on pursuing maximalist 
goals using all possible means? In both cases a process of radicalisation took place: 
initially the dominant Serb leaders adopted a relatively moderate position and were 
willing to accept compromises, whereas the wartime, radical leaders insisted on 
joining the territory under their control with Serbia and were willing to use military 
means to achieve that goal.
Who are the elites?
The actors of importance in the intra-ethnic competition are characterised as elites 
and the elites of primary interest for my focus are political elites. The concept used is 
based on influence on the policy process: the elites have significant influence over 
policies directly affecting the development of the conflict. Non-incumbent elites are 
encompassed insofar as they constitute a threat to the current leaders or possibly a 
potential threat in case of a significant change in position. The elites most important 
to ethnic conflicts are found in the political and possibly the military realm. National 
and ethnic conflicts are primarily cast in terms of political rather than economic goals: 
which state is the territory to be part of? How do we protect our identity? This does 
not mean that economic interests will not influence the conflict but it does mean that
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the conflict will primarily be fought in the political or military arena. The cases in 
this analysis are both offspring of a communist system which was characterised by 
the dominance of politics over all other spheres of social life. An analysis of major 
political actors is therefore necessary in order to understand the direction of societal 
developments.5 Political elites are in a position to take authoritative decisions 
regarding peace and war: will war be declared; will a peace settlement be accepted? 
It may, however, also be necessary to include actors exerting their influence from 
behind the scenes: people who have significant influence on political outcomes 
without being in formal positions of power. Moreover, despite the predominance of 
politics, the army in the former Yugoslavia was accustomed to relative independence 
from civilian leaders6. Civilian leaders may lack control of military leaders who can 
consequently act as effective veto holders when it comes to issues of peace and war. 
As we will see in the empirical analysis, the rivalling elites were furthermore highly 
dependent on coercive resources and their links with military and paramilitary 
leaders were, therefore, crucial for the outcome of the intra-Serb competition. 
Civilian control over military and paramilitary leaders should be regarded as a 
variable, especially following the collapse of the state and the outbreak of war.
This definition with its focus on political power does not mean that the broader 
conception of elites, which also focuses on societal position, is without relevance.7 
Serb leaders in Croatia and Bosnia were ‘new elites’ who lacked the societal position 
of the ‘old elite’ which can lead to greater insecurity and different political behaviour 
than with elites who are not only elites in the narrower sense.8 Leaders coming to 
power on the back of nationalism will, furthermore, likely have different linkages 
with the general population than elites with different bases of power.9
An additional group of actors that can be termed sub-elites should also be considered 
since their support is often crucial for a leader’s hold on power. Such actors include
5 Male§evic, Sinisa, 2000. “Ethnicity and Federalism in Communist Yugoslavia and Its Successor 
States”. In Yash Ghai (ed) Autonomy and Ethnicity: Negotiating Competing Claims in Multi-ethnic 
States. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 149.
6 Gow, James, 2003. The Serbian project and its adversaries: a strategy o f war crimes. London:
Hurst, p. 53.
7 E.g. the elite concept used by classical elite theorists such as Vilfredo Pareto.
8 Thanks to Eric Gordy for making this point.
9 Knight, Alan, 1998. “Historical and Theoretical Considerations”. In Mattei Dogan & John Highley 
(eds.) Elites, Crises and the Origins o f  Regimes. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, p. 40.
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party officials and higher-ranking military officials: actors who are not leaders but 
who form part of an audience to which the competing elites must appeal. As Timothy 
Sisk argues, these actors can be of great importance in conflict development,10 they 
affect the positions that the leaders are willing and able to take.
1.2 Literature on intra-ethnic competition and ethnic conflict
The position adopted by ethnic leaders is crucial for the success of conflict regulation, 
but conflict regulation theories usually afford little analysis to the impact of intra­
ethnic competition, beyond some general assumptions. This is especially the case in 
one of the most influential theories: Lijphart’s consociational democracy. The 
consociational approach argues that given elite willingness to co-operate in a power- 
sharing government, mass antagonisms and polarisation can be overcome and 
stability can be fostered.11 Consociational theorists therefore assume that elites are 
driven by motivations that differ from those of their more radically inclined mass 
publics.12 However, despite the importance afforded to elite motivations, the 
consociational theory lacks a theory of these motivations. And not only that: it tends 
to assume that leaders are entirely voluntaristic actors, unconstrained by competing 
elites or by the general population. There is a working assumption of monolithic 
representation and deferential masses, and the theory therefore overestimates the 
latitude enjoyed by leaders in situations of ethnic conflict.13 In Donald Horowitz’s 
words: “Compromisers can readily be replaced by extremists on their flanks”.14
Other theorists acknowledge the importance of intra-ethnic elite competition and 
regard such competition rather than the ethnification of politics as the main barrier to 
moderation: if the elites were monolithic within their own ethnic groups, then an 
ethnic party system need not be debilitating for the prospect of conflict regulation. 
As Paul Mitchell argues: “ethnically exclusive but stable party segments could be the
10 Sisk, 1996: 84.
11 E.g. Lijphart, Arend, 1977. Democracy in Plural Societies. New Haven: Yale University Press.
12 Tsebelis, George, 1990. Nested Games: Rational choice in comparative politics. Berkeley and Los 
Angeles, CA: University of California Press, p. 162.
13 Horowitz, Donald, 1985. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 
p. 574. Barry, Brian, 1975. “Review article: Political Accommodation and Consociational 
Democracy”. British Journal o f Political Science 5(4): 477-505. p. 500.
14 Horowitz, Donald, 1997. “Self-determination: politics, philosophy, and law”. In Ian Shapiro and 
Will Kymlicka (eds.) Ethnicity and Group Rights. New York, NY: New York University Press, p. 
439.
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building blocks for a negotiated resolution o f conflict'}5 Sisk similarly asserts: 
“cohesive and confident ethnic groups - with clearly legitimate and broadly 
supported leadership - can deliver at the bargaining table".16 But monolithic 
representation is not the norm in situations of ethnic conflict: leaders will usually 
face intra-ethnic competition or at least be aware that such competition may
1 7emerge. Horowitz therefore argues: “a principal limitation on interethnic co­
operation is the configuration o f intraethnic competition, both present and 
anticipated' and leaders therefore have to be concerned with both political
1 ftcompetition and mass sentiments.
The most commonly held view is that this intra-ethnic elite competition will lead to 
radicalisation and that it will therefore render conflict regulation profoundly 
difficult.19 The proponents of this view contend that in an ethnic party system, the 
most effective political strategy will be to adopt extreme positions that play into mass 
antagonisms.20 Leaders willing to compromise will face outbidding by more extreme 
rivals and therefore not have the necessary leeway: they will either have to radicalise 
or face defeat. The emphasis is thus on the destabilising aspects of intra-ethnic 
competition, and Mitchell argues that the more intra-segmental party competition, 
the less likely is the ability to co-operate inter-segmentally.21 This argument is also 
often found in empirical literature. For example, James Fearon and David Laitin in 
their review of Gerard Prunier’s The Rwanda Crisis assert, “It is thus hard to 
imagine a coherent account o f the genocide and the fragility o f all peace accords
15 Mitchell, Paul, 1995. “Competition in an ethnic dual party system”. Ethnic and Racial Studies 
18(4): 773-796. p. 776.
16 Sisk, 1996: 16.
17 See e.g. Esman, Milton, 2000. “Ethnic Pluralism: Strategies for Conflict Management”. Paper 
presented at the conference, “Facing Ethnic Conflicts”, Center for Development Research, Bonn, 14- 
16 December; Horowitz, 1985: 343, 574-9.
18 Horowitz, 1985: 574. Horowitz, Donald, 2000. “Some Realism about Peacemaking”. Paper 
presented at the conference, “Facing Ethnic Conflicts”, Center for Development Research, Bonn, 14- 
lb December, p. 6.
19 See e.g. Rabushka, Alvin; Shepsle, Kenneth, 1972. Politics in Plural Societies; A Theory o f 
Democratic Instability. Columbus, OH: Merrill. Pappalardo, Adriano, 1981. “The Conditions for 
Consociational Democracy: A Logical and Empirical Critique”. European Journal o f Political 
Research 9(4): 365-390. p. 369-70. O’Leary, Brendan, 1989. “The Limits to Coercive 
Consociationalism in Northern Ireland”. Political Studies 18(4): 562-588. p. 575, 579. Horowitz, 
1985: 359. Mitchell, 1995: 779.
20 Horowitz, 1985: 331, 346. Reilly, 2001: 9-10. Sisk, 1996: 17. Mitchell, 1995: 777.
21 Mitchell, 1995: 779.
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that does not analyse how the divide between moderate and extremist ethnic leaders 
drove both into violent actions against the ethnic other*'.
However, other consequences of intra-ethnic competition are sometimes 
acknowledged. Sisk argues that strong intra-ethnic splits can actually facilitate inter- 
ethnic accommodation since it fosters incentives for cross-ethnic alliances. 
Horowitz, similarly, asserts that intra-ethnic competition can both lead to 
radicalisation and to cross-ethnic alliances.24 Intra-ethnic divisions are, furthermore, 
crucial in his prescription of the Alternative Vote system for conflict regulation. 
Horowitz’s theory implicitly relies on the existence of cross-cutting cleavages and he, 
like Seymour M. Lipset, emphasises their moderating influences since they create the 
basis for cross-ethnic interests and alliances. In the theory of cross-cutting cleavages, 
the moderating character stems from the mediating effect cross-cutting cleavages 
have on divisions between groups.26 However, the existence of cross-cutting 
cleavages also results in divisions and likely competition within the groups. Intra­
ethnic competition is two-sided and given the prevalence of such competition in 
ethnic conflicts, it is an important task to analyse its dynamics. Such systematic 
analysis of intra-ethnic competition is presently lacking and it is the objective of this 
thesis to provide it.27
Based on the dominant theoretical assumption of outbidding, one would expect that 
the intra-Serb competition in the two cases led to a radicalisation of the Serb position 
and that this radicalisation, and hence hardline dominance, was founded on appeals 
to mass antagonisms. But the argument for outbidding rests on a rather simplified 
view of political competition and depends on the overwhelming power of ethnicity: 
intra-ethnic competition is determined by appeals to extreme popular sentiments and
22 Fearon, James D.: Laitin, David, D., 2000. “Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic 
Identity”. International Organization 54(4): 845-877. p. 866
23 Sisk, 1996: 16.
24 Horowitz, 1985: 359-60. Horowitz, Donald, 1990. “Ethnic Conflict Management for Policy- 
Makers”. In Joseph V. Montville (ed) Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies. Toronto: 
Lexington, p. 122.
25 See e.g. Horowitz, Donald, 1991. A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a 
Divided Society. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Ch. 5.
26 See e.g. Lipset, Seymour M. 1960. Political Man: The Social Bases o f  Politics. Garden City, NY: 
Doubleday. p. 88-9.
27 As Esman argues the implications of intra-ethnic divisions '‘'have not been examined sufficiently or 
systematically in the literature on ethnic politics'’. Esman, 1994: 20.
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the only direction of such competition is therefore radicalisation. According to 
Chaim Kaufmann, ethnic leaders are unlikely to be receptive to compromise under 
conditions of violence and hyper-nationalist mobilisation, and even if they were, they 
cannot act without being discredited and replaced by hardline rivals.28 This argument, 
however, raises the question of what will happen if ethnification is not dominant 
and/or if the conflict is not violent, such as in the pre-war period in the two cases. 
The approach, moreover, regards the mass population as the only audience to intra­
ethnic elite competition and popular support as the only resource of importance.
Part of the strategy for political elites focuses on authenticity -  it is a struggle over 
what defines a real Serb, a real Croat etc. -  and this, by implication, determines who
OQhas the right to speak for the ethnic group. This struggle involves issue of 
representativeness, i.e. who has the support of the community, but it also involves a 
struggle over political positions: which interpretation is the ‘true* representation of 
the interests of the ethnic group? Hence, not only effectiveness in appeals to the 
general population matters in the competition. The general population may not even 
be the most important audience when it comes to securing and maintaining power 
since resources other than popular support can be more effective and, furthermore, 
readily available. The Serbian regime was, in both Bosnia and Croatia, a very 
significant additional audience to the intra-Serb competition and Belgrade provided 
the rivalling elites with, especially, economic and military resources. These elites, 
furthermore, had access to resources emanating from within their own party or 
movement and the party/movement therefore constituted another important audience. 
In the conflict literature, there is increasing emphasis on resources when explaining 
the outbreak of violent conflict; Fearon and Laitin, for example, stress the 
importance of opportunities for insurgency and argue that state collapse is an 
important factor in the outbreak of war.30 Their analysis is, however, mostly focused 
on the distribution of resources between different groups, in particular the state and 
insurgents, whereas this analysis mainly focuses on the distribution of resources 
within ethnic groups: the relative power of moderates and extremists. Resources used
28 Kaufmann, Chaim,1996. “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Wars”. International 
Security 20(4): 136-75. p. 156.
29 Gagnon Jr., V.P. 1995. “Ethnic conflict as an intra-group phenomenon: A preliminary framework.” 
Revija za sociologiju 26(1-2): 81-90. p. 88.
30 Fearon, James D.; Laitin, David D., 2003. “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War”. American 
Political Science Review 97(1): 75-90.
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in such rivalry can also be regarded as goals in themselves, as argued in the literature
5 1
that emphasises the importance of ‘greed’ in ethnic conflicts. But the focus of this 
analysis will be on resources used as means', it is not primarily concerned with elite 
motivation but rather with the dynamics of their competition and its outcome.
Thus, the different audiences to which the leaders owe their power should be 
included in an analysis and they will consequently form the basis of the theoretical 
framework. These audiences provided the competing Serb elites with both political 
and non-political resources but the effectiveness and availability of these resources 
varied in different phases of the conflict and were in particular influenced by the 
outbreak of violence. In addition to the three audiences -  party/movement forces, 
kin-state leaders and the general population -  the intra-Serb competition was, 
therefore, also affected by the conflict situation as well as by the position of leaders 
from the other ethnic group(s). The final part of the theoretical framework will 
address this inter-ethnic interplay.
1.3 Theoretical framework:
Intra-ethnic competition and inter-ethnic conflict
The purpose of this theoretical discussion is to develop a framework for the empirical 
analysis: it will be used to identify variables that are likely to affect the direction and 
outcome of intra-Serb competition. The framework is based on the different 
audiences to which the elites appeal: the audiences that supply them with resources 
needed in the competition. The first part of the framework considers the dynamics of 
competition within and between parties: the internal workings of such competition, 
the impact of institutional factors and the importance of state, party and movement 
resources.
Competition between and within parties
Intra-Serb competition was rife in both cases and involved competition within and 
between parties, as well as with military leaders and independents. In the pre-war 
period this also encompassed competition between ethnic and non-ethnic parties,
31 E.g. Collier, Paul, 2000. “Doing Well out of War”. In Mats Berdal & David M. Malone (eds.) 
Greed & Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars. Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner.
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which was crucial for the ethnification of politics and for the subsequent 
radicalisation of the dominant position. The intensity of competition was even 
greater during the war when there was an array o f competing parties, factions, 
independent candidates and (para)military leaders. Competition between parties will 
often have a significant influence on competition within parties and in a very fluid 
political environment it can be difficult to make a clear distinction, but the two forms 
of competition should nevertheless be treated as separate since their audiences differ. 
Competition between parties will, at least nominally, be about appeals to the general 
population whereas intra-party rivalry will be directed at party officials and members. 
Attitudes among these audiences is, nevertheless, not the only variable of importance 
for the direction and outcome of intra-ethnic competition.
Competition between parties/movements
Competition between parties or between movements is competition over power: 
competition over the authority to make binding decisions and over access to the 
spoils of power. However, the dynamics of this competition depend crucially on the 
political system: support from which audiences and access to which resources is 
decisive for gaining power? One of the primary means to gaining power is the 
maximisation of popular support. But how is this most effectively accomplished if 
the ethnic cleavage dominates political competition?
The competition for votes in an ethnic party system takes on a distinct character: due 
to the near absence of floating voters between ethnic parties, political competition is 
argued to be about mobilising the faithful. The best way to do so, Horowitz argues, is 
by using inflammatory and polarising rhetoric.32 But party competition in pre-war 
Croatia and Bosnia was not dominated by these dynamics: the newly established 
Serb parties were faced with significant competition from non-ethnic parties and the 
strategies used in the competition differed from the extreme strategy outlined by 
Horowitz. The marginalisation of the non-ethnic rivals, furthermore, proceeded at 
different speeds in the two cases and was far from an inevitable outcome. In order for 
the Serb parties to emerge victorious, the ethnic cleavage had to become dominant,
32 Horowitz, 1985: 331.
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and ethnification of political competition therefore constitutes an important variable 
in the analysis of intra-ethnic elite competition.
The argument of outbidding is based on this ethnification of politics and it, 
furthermore, regards popular attitudes as the driving force behind intra-ethnic 
competition: gaining power depends on securing popular support and in order to 
achieve this goal, the elites will take the most extreme positions and play into mass 
antagonisms. But the importance of popular attitudes should be regarded as variable, 
and one of the decisive factors influencing its importance is the regime type, which 
may well change during the course of the conflict. The regime underwent a 
considerable change in both Croatia and Bosnia with the intensification of conflict 
and the outbreak of war: from a transitional system increasingly marred by 
undemocratic tactics, to an authoritarian system in the two Serb statelets during the 
war, to a second democratic transition in the post-war period. Party competition 
persisted throughout, but the incumbent party will, in a context of flawed democracy, 
be able to use the state apparatus to manipulate elections or even repress challengers, 
so that the risk of defeat is reduced significantly. Control of state resources can 
decisively tilt the competition in one party’s favour; above all in a situation of 
authoritarianism and warfare, but even in nominally democratic systems. The 
distribution of resources may be highly skewed towards one party thereby giving it 
an advantage in the intra-ethnic competition and greater leeway in inter-ethnic 
relations. Resources of importance in party competition include resources such as 
effective party organisation, campaign money and access to the media, but in a non- 
democratic setting these may be surpassed by control over the police and other 
coercive resources. Depending on the regime type and the distribution of resources, 
intra-ethnic competition will, therefore, not necessarily reflect popular attitudes and 
due to the potential importance of the above-mentioned resources, the competing 
elites will also have to consider attitudes found within the party/movement or linked 
organisations, including the army.
In addition to the regime type, other aspects of the institutional framework will also 
influence the dynamics of intra-ethnic competition. The electoral system is one such
33 Laver, Michael, 1975. “Strategic Campaign Behaviour For Electors and Parties: The Northern 
Ireland Assembly Election of 1973”. European Journal o f Political Research no. 3: 21-45.
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factor that Horowitz argues can influence whether moderates or hardliners will be 
victorious.34 Furthermore, the configuration of competition also affects the direction 
and outcome of intra-ethnic rivalry: how many parties are there, what is their relative 
size, what is the ideological distance between them?35 If the opposition is highly 
fragmented, this will prove much less of a challenge to an incumbent party and have 
less influence on its position. Finally, it matters what issues the incumbent party is 
challenged on: is it only the national or ethnic issue or are other issues salient in the 
competition? And can challenges therefore be pre-empted through radicalisation?
Intra-ethnic party competition will consequently not only be influenced by popular 
attitudes but also by the context in which the competition takes place: by the degree 
of ethnification of the party system; the institutional framework and the distribution 
of resources, including links with military forces; as well as by the number of 
competing parties and the issues of salience. These factors will influence the 
direction of competition and its outcome: how will an incumbent party react to 
challenges? Which strategies will the opposition use? Who will win in the 
competition?
Competition from within the party/movement
With Eric Nordlinger as a notable exception,36 the theories of conflict regulation that 
pay some attention to intra-ethnic competition usually limit themselves to a focus on 
competition between parties. However, in certain situations, the issue of party or 
movement cohesion can surpass it in importance and the main threat to a leader often 
comes from within his/her own ranks: from the party, the movement as such, or the 
state apparatus. Processes of outbidding can occur within, as well as between, parties 
and in the two cases the former often proved to be the more significant challenge.
Due to the threat from hardline elements in the party or movement, Nordlinger 
argues that structured elite predominance is a necessary condition for conflict
34 Sisk, 1996: 16. Horowitz, 1991: 196.
35 E.g. Sartori argues that in case of polarised pluralism, the distance between the extreme parties and 
the emergence of the centre as an additional pole make it irrational for the parties to moderate; they 
will simply lose out in the electoral competition. Sartori, Giovanni, 1976. Parties and Party Systems. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 135-6, 349-50.
36 Nordlinger, Eric, 1972. Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies. Cambridge, MA: Center for 
International Affairs, Harvard University, p. 64-68.
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regulation: the top leader must be able to control the party and have the political 
security to risk engaging in inter-ethnic compromise.37 Such control will be strongly 
influenced by organisational variables: how strong are the central party structures? 
What kind of authority does the leader have over the party? In a transitional situation 
the party apparatus is generally weak and the leader correspondingly strong,38 and 
one could therefore expect the threat of reduced party cohesion to be a problem of 
minor importance to the leader. However, if the leader is challenged from within, he 
or she will lack the organisational apparatus that would strengthen an incumbent 
leader in a more developed party system. Moreover, newly created parties are 
generally more vulnerable to intra-party conflicts since initial consensus on the 
party’s position can quickly be undermined.39
In a situation of weak party structures and increasingly tense conflict, a particularly 
important resource in intra-party struggles is control over military or paramilitary 
forces. In Rodney Barker’s words: “Tank-commanders, after all, not only have guns: 
they have the state’s guns, and their defection places those whom they previously 
served in double jeopardy”.40 Barring the possibility of persuading the military of the 
sense in the leader’s position, its loyalty is crucial. Such loyalty can have different 
bases and may reflect calculated self-interest, but the key is that the control of 
resources, including coercive resources, is of great significance for the dynamics of 
intra-party competition.
Fractionalisation characterised both the Croatian and Bosnian version of the Serb 
Democratic Party (Srpska demokratska stranka, SDS), which became the dominant 
party in the Serb community. However, this fractionalisation only led to a leadership 
change in the Croatian case. One of the reasons for this difference in outcome was 
the different strength of the factions facing the two leaderships, as well as the 
organisational structure of the parties. Moreover, the issues on which the factions 
challenged the leadership also differed and this influenced the leadership’s ability to 
respond: if factions are based on more than one cleavage, it opens up for different 
ways of accommodating the challenge. As Sartori argues, one should, therefore, not
37 Nordlinger, 1972: 56, 73.
38 Biezen, 2003: 205-6.
39 Ibid 216.
40 Barker, Rodney, 1990. Political Legitimacy and the State. Oxford: Clarendon, p. 111.
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only consider the size and stability of a faction and the organisation of the party as 
such, but also the ideological or political conflicts underlying the division.41 In 
addition, the faction’s control of resources will be of great importance for the 
challenge that it is able to mount. These variables will influence how a leader 
responds to intra-party challenges: whether or not it will be necessary to radicalise 
the party’s position in order to retain control or if other means are available. The 
question of party cohesion is consequently not a simple question of control or no 
control, nor does it simply depend on attitudes among party members.
In this section, I have sought to argue that intra-ethnic competition is affected by a 
number of variables found within the realm of this competition itself; it is not 
necessarily led by popular attitudes as argued in the theory of ethnic outbidding.42 
What kind of regime is it? What is the nature of competition faced by the incumbent 
party? Is the leader challenged by internal dissent? How many resources do the rivals 
possess? Different forms of resources are available to the competing parties and 
leaders: democratic resources such as support from the general population or from 
party members; other political resources such as party organisation and media access, 
which can be unfairly distributed; economic resources such as campaign finances or 
assets that can be used to establish patron-client linkages43 or buy support in other 
ways; and coercive resources which can, to some extent, be acquired if the elites 
posses economic resources and include military, paramilitary and police resources.
Kin-state involvement
In the literature on the Yugoslav disintegration, the Serbian regime is usually 
assigned overwhelming influence over the Serb leaders in Croatia and Bosnia who 
are consequently relegated to the role of puppets. Sisk emphasises the importance of 
such transnational, or rather transstate, linkages since through these linkages “many 
ethnic groups derive critical moral and material support\ 44 When the elites make 
claims to speak for the ethnic group, this group is not necessarily delineated by state 
borders, and another state whose majority shares ethnicity with one of the groups
41 Sartori, 1976: 76-80.
42 Elite autonomy from popular attitudes will be further discussed below.
43 Kitschelt, Herbert; Mansfeldova, Zdenka; Markowski, Radoslav; T6ka, Gabor, 1999. Post- 
Communist Party Systems. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, p. 48, 57.
44 Sisk, 1996: 19.
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may choose to become involved or may even have initiated the conflict. Since the 
ethnicity is shared, this state and its leader are part of the intra-ethnic dynamics of the 
conflict and this gives a potentially significant role to the kin-state leader who may 
be recognised as the legitimate leader of the whole ethnic group or at least afforded 
great importance. In his theory of nationalism, Brubaker sets up a triadic structure of 
relational fields: a nationalising state, a minority and a kin-state, which he terms 
ethnic homeland.45 The kin-state asserts “the right, even obligation, to defend’ the 
interests of its co-ethnics, and Brubaker highlights its importance in the emergence of 
extreme nationalism and ethnic conflicts 46
Belgrade, frequently, functioned as a very tangible and active influence on the intra- 
Serb competition in the two cases and provided both rhetorical and material support. 
The Serbian President was consequently an audience to which the rivalling elites had 
to appeal. Despite the gradual cooling of relations between Milosevic and the leaders 
in the Serb statelets, which occurred during the war, many local leaders continued to 
recognise the authority of the Serbian President and often referred to him as their 
president. Relations with Belgrade, however, became a salient issue in the intra-Serb 
competition, which Milosevic thus participated in by proxy, insofar as local elites 
with differing views on relations with Belgrade fought his political battles. Brubaker 
emphasises that the three fields are not fixed or given, but nevertheless conceives of 
them as separate fields. This, however, overlooks the possibility that the leaders of 
the ‘ethnic homeland’ can be directly part of the intra-ethnic competition and not just 
be an external influence. The separation between the local minority and the ethnic 
kin-state should be seen as a matter of degree: the local leaders are more or less 
autonomous from the kin-state and the spectrum would be from mere puppets to 
autonomous actors who are in explicit conflict with the kin-state. The extent and 
degree of kin-state involvement can itself be a matter of divisions and therefore form 
part of the political struggle.
45 Brubaker, Rogers, 1996. Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the national question in the New 
Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
46 Ibid. 57.
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Elite-mass relations
Despite occasionally asserting Milosevic’s overriding legitimacy, as the ‘President of 
all Serbs’, the competing elites in Croatia and Bosnia frequently made claims to be 
speaking for the local Serbs, to being their true representative. But to what extent 
were the elites constrained or led by the general population, by the people that they 
claimed to represent and protect?
If the elite is completely united, the general population will have great difficulty 
influencing elite positions, or as Robert Putnam argues, elite integration is a 
sufficient condition for oligarchy.47 Elite competition, on the other hand, raises the 
possibility of mass influence: popular support is a resource that will in some 
situations be decisive in the competition. Sisk argues that outbidding refers to mass 
responsiveness to playing the ethnic card,48 but this responsiveness and its 
significance in intra-ethnic competition will depend not only on attitudes in the mass 
population but also on who is playing the card and in which situation. The 
importance of popular attitudes will vary in different conflicts and its importance is 
arguably greatest if the conflict has not turned violent and is fought with political 
means. In Croatia and Bosnia one would consequently expect popular attitudes to be 
of greatest significance in the pre-war and post-war period, although there will also 
be limitations in these phases.
Elections were part of the intra-Serb competition in the pre-war and the post-war 
period in both cases, and in the Serb-controlled areas in Croatia during the war. But 
despite the holding of elections the importance of popular attitudes is not a given and 
the impact of popular attitudes is generally debatable, even in a situation of electoral 
contestation. At one extreme, elite theories assert elite influence over the general 
population to be substantial: masses are prone to the ‘heard instinct’ and politicians 
can, therefore, easily lead them by the nose 49 The opposite pole of the discussion 
would argue that elites will always ‘follow their followers’ and popular sentiments 
are therefore the only factor of importance for elite competition and its outcome. The
47 Putnam, Robert D., 1976. The Comparative Study o f Political Elites. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice 
Hall. p. 131.
48 Sisk, 1996: 17.
49 Dunleavy, Patrick; O’Leary, Brendan, 1987. Theories o f the State: The Politics o f Liberal 
Democracy. Houndsmills and London: MacMillan, p. 154.
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polar views of elites ‘following their followers’ or ‘leading them by the nose’ are 
echoed in the original versions of rational choice and party identification theories of 
party competition, as formulated by Anthony Downs and Donald Stokes.50 The 
scholarly debate has, however, converged somewhat between these two extremes and 
attempts have been made to synthesise the theories.51 The specifics are not essential 
for our purposes, but the key is that party identification is a variable and the 
autonomy the elites have from popular attitudes is also a variable.
But how relevant is party identification and elite-mass linkages in a transitional 
context? Most commentators of post-communist systems contend that due to the 
recent emergence of party alternatives, party identification has not had a chance to 
develop.52 The political situation must, therefore, be expected to be highly fluid and 
volatile, parties may lack a clear idea of voter preferences and, therefore, only to a 
limited extent be guided by these. This is put even stronger in the ‘tabula rasa’ view 
of post-communist systems, which holds that due to the atomisation of society and 
lack of social class relations, parties that engage in programmatic competition are 
unlikely to emerge.54 Such views, however, exaggerate the lack of differentiation in 
post-communist societies and furthermore presuppose a radical split with the 
communist past which cannot necessarily be taken as a given.55 In terms of elite- 
mass linkages in a transitional situation there are, moreover, alternatives to 
programmatic appeals. Kitschelt et al point to the possible importance of charismatic 
leadership or clientelistic exchanges, i.e. linkages not based on programmatic appeals 
but still of a recent origin.56 Nationalism is one basis on which such linkages can be 
built and this is frequently argued to have been the basis of the Serb leaders’ popular 
legitimacy. But these linkages will not leave the leaders unconstrained. As David 
Beetham argues: given power relationship is not legitimate because people
50 Downs, Anthony, 1957. An Economic Theory o f Democracy. New York, NY: Harper Collins. 
Campbell, Albert Angus; Converse, Philip E.; Miller, Warren E.; Stokes, Donald E., 1960. The 
American Voter. New York, NY: Wiley. Stokes, Donald E., 1963. “Spatial Models of Party 
Competition”. American Political Science Review 57: 368-377.
51 See e.g. Laver, Michael; Hunt, W. Ben, 1992. Policy and Party Competition. New York, NY: 
Routledge. Kamieniecki, Sheldon, 1985. Party Identification, Political Behavior and the American 
Electorate. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
52 Kitschelt et al, 1999: 6. Biezen, 2003:44.
53 Gunther, Richard; Sani, Giacomo; Shabad, Goldie, 1986. Spain after Franco: The making o f  a 
competitive party system. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, p. 4.
54 Kitschelt et al, 1999: 391.
55 Lewis, Paul G., 2000. Political Parties in Post-Communist Eastern Europe. London: Routledge
56 See e.g. Kitschelt et al, 1999: 6.
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believe in its legitimacy, but because it is justified in terms o f their beliefs”. If 
legitimacy is based on exogenous beliefs and values in the general population, such 
legitimacy also constrains the leaders since it will be eroded if they depart from these 
beliefs and values. Legitimacy based on nationalist mobilisation consequently puts a 
limit on the policy shifts that the leader can make without losing the support of the
58mass population: “legitimacy can constrain as well as sustain elite power”. Or as 
Horowitz argues: ‘Wo doubt politicians will later find that it is easier to kindle a fire 
than to quench one”.59
Such linkages with the general population can, therefore, provide the elites with a 
certain measure of autonomy from popular attitudes, but they are not left 
unconstrained. There are, however, a number of other factors that can weaken the 
link between the elites and the general population, even in a situation of electoral 
choice. As already mentioned, a highly fragmented opposition will find it difficult to 
beat an incumbent party regardless of popular attitudes. Information is, moreover, 
essential for the voters to be able to influence elites in line with their preferences, 
but, in some situations, information can be obstructed to such an extent that it is 
difficult to speak about elite-mass linkages at all.60 The choice for the voters is 
furthermore limited to the parties that choose to contest elections and these will also 
be motivated by goals other than vote maximisation thereby not fully reflecting voter 
preferences.61 Finally, more than one cleavage can be politically salient and elites 
can, to some extent, ignore voter distribution on one political dimension by 
competing on another.62
Even in a fairly free electoral situation, limitations on the impact of popular attitudes 
on intra-ethnic competition are consequently expected. One of the most important 
factors influencing the significance of the general population is the distribution of 
resources: the level of resources available to different parties will affect how
57 Beetham, David, 1991. The Legitimation o f Power. London: MacMillan, p. 11.
58 Putnam, 1976: 137.
59 Horowitz, 1985: 332.
60 Putnam, 1976: 150.
61 For party goals and strategies in different arenas see e.g. Sjoblom, Gunnar, 1968. Party Strategies in 
a Multiparty System. Lund: Studentlitteratur.
62 Evans, Geoffrey, Duffy, Mary, 1997. “Beyond the Sectarian Divide: The Social Bases and Political 
Consequences of Nationalist and Unionist Party Competition in Northern Ireland”. British Journal o f 
Political Science 27(1): 47-81.
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dependent they are on securing popular support as well as their possibility for 
manipulating the expression of popular attitudes. Such tendencies will naturally be 
even more pronounced in a non-democratic regime, where the leaders have 
additional means at their disposal for countering opposition and rendering popular 
attitudes unimportant. Through control of the media an authoritarian leader will, 
moreover, have greater possibility for manipulating mass sentiments. The importance 
of popular attitudes will, therefore, vary in different contexts, in different phases of 
conflict, and is not necessarily significant for the strategies adopted in intra-ethnic 
elite competition or for the outcome of this competition. Its importance is influenced 
by the regime type, by the configuration of competition and by the nature of elite- 
mass linkages.
Outbidding and radicalisation
The varying importance of popular attitudes is significant since the theoretical 
assumption of outbidding and radicalisation rests on the ability of elites to appeal to 
mass antagonism in their struggle for power. But the general population is not the 
only politically relevant audience and popular support is not the only resource of 
which the elites can make use. Competing elites at least have to take into 
consideration attitudes found within their parties or movements when deciding what 
position to adopt, and for the Serb elites in Croatia and Bosnia the kin-state was also 
a decisive audience. The relative importance of these different audiences and the 
resources they supply will be greatly affected by the political system in place, as well 
as by the conflict situation, to which I will turn shortly. As a consequence the 
direction of intra-ethnic competition is not determined solely by popular attitudes and 
playing the ethnic card will not guarantee victory, even in case of antagonised mass 
sentiments. To put it in simple terms: given the possession of significant resources 
the leader can take a position that runs counter to popular opinion. This option is 
made even more possible in cases where the opposition is fragmented and therefore 
weak. Moreover, if issues or cleavages other than the conflict and war become 
politically salient, the leaders can more easily manoeuvre on the ethnic issue without 
finding themselves outrivaled. Even if extreme popular attitudes are, erroneously, 
assumed a priori, radicalisation is therefore not the only possible outcome of intra­
ethnic competition.
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The preceding focus on intra-ethnic dynamics -  on elite competition between and 
within parties, kin-state involvement and elite-mass relations -  does not imply that 
the development of the conflict and the intra-ethnic dynamics themselves are not also 
influenced by relations with the other ethnic groups. In fact, I would argue that there 
is a complex interplay between intra-ethnic elite competition and inter-ethnic 
relations.
Intra-ethnic competition and inter-ethnic interplay
Intra-ethnic competition was a constant feature of Serb politics in Croatia and Bosnia 
in the period 1990-1995 but its degree and severity varied considerably. Horowitz 
argues that one of the most important factors accounting for the degree of such 
competition is the “collective sense o f how many parties an ethnic group can afford 
without weakening itself in ethnic conflict’. According to this argument, the 
position of the group and the perceived need for unity are consequently crucial and 
intra-ethnic competition is, to a large extent, determined by the inter-cthnic interplay, 
or it at least provides a bottom-line.
A related argument is often heard from national and ethnic leaders who claim that 
their radicalisation is but a response to the radicalisation of their opponents. As the 
Serb leaders in Bosnia argued, they had tried everything to find a peaceful solution, 
but the Bosniak and Croat leaders were unwilling to compromise and their co­
operation threatened the Serb people.64 Changes in the position of the leaders are 
thereby argued to be a reactive response to the conflict situation, driven by the 
proclaimed motive of defending the nation. Arguments for viewing ethnic conflict as 
the rational pursuit of organised group interest are also widespread in the theoretical 
literature, e.g. the interconnectedness of disadvantaged minorities and nationalist 
mobilisation is stressed.65 In line with this argument, Esman holds that the power of 
ethnic leaders rests on the existence of actual threats posed by another ethnic group 
and that the collective interests of the community limit intra-ethnic competition.66
63 Horowitz, 1985: 349
64 See e.g. Butorovic, N., 1992. “Vise nema jedinstvene BiH”. Borba, 6 March, p. 3. Pejanovic,
Mirko, 2002. Through Bosnian Eyes: The political memories o f a Bosnian Serb. Sarajevo: TKD 
§ahinpa§ic. p. 63, 65.
65 See e.g. Gurr, Ted Robert, 1993. Minorities at Risk: A Global View o f Ethnopolitical Conflicts. 
Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace.
66 Esman, 1994: 28, 248-9.
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Likewise, theories that emphasise situations of stalemate as the main incentive for
f n
elites to moderate also point to the importance of inter-ethnic relations. The relative 
position of the ethnic groups would, therefore, be expected to influence the strategies 
adopted by the leaders and, in this respect, there are important differences between 
the two cases. In the Bosnian case there are three significant ethnic groups, while 
there are only two in the case of Croatia. A tripartite relationship opens up for 
shifting alliances, which is generally held to have a moderating effect on elite 
positions, while the bipartisan constellations is held to be the least stable.68 The 
relative size of the groups also differs. The Serb community in Bosnia constituted 31 
per cent of the 1991 population and even though the Bosniaks were the largest group 
with 44 per cent, the Serbs were not faced with an ethnic majority group. In Croatia, 
on the other hand, the Serbs constituted 12 per cent of the 1991 population and were 
faced with a dominant Croat majority of 78 per cent.69
If national interests are the primary motivation for elite positions, then inter-ethnic 
relations will be decisive for intra-ethnic competition: how is ‘our’ nation threatened? 
What can be achieved in negotiations, etc? The perceived position of the opposing 
group and expectations of future moves affect the positions that the leaders are 
willing and able to take, and a useful argument found in both theoretical and 
empirical literature is that radicalisation on one side breads radicalisation on the
nc\other side and that we can, therefore, observe spirals of radicalisation. But although 
this is indeed often the case, one should not overlook the instances when 
radicalisation is not reciprocated or when radicalisation occurs without prior 
radicalisation of the other side, or is primarily caused by other factors. As will be 
shown in the empirical analysis, there are examples of this in both cases and the 
dynamics are more complex than a spiral of radicalisation would suggest. The elites 
are faced with constraints and opportunities emanating from within their own groups: 
they have to focus their attention on two fronts and cannot refrain from dealing with
67 See e.g. Zartman, I. William, 1995. “Dynamics and Constraints in Negotiations in Internal 
Conflicts”. In his (ed.) Elusive Peace: negotiating an end to civil war. Washington DC: The 
Brookings Institution.
68 Lijphart, 1977: 55.
69 According to the 1991 Yugoslav census.
70 See e.g. Woodward, Susan, 1995. Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and dissolution after the Cold War. 
Washington DC: Brookings Institution, p. 354. Hislope, Robert, 1997. “Intra-ethnic conflict in Croatia 
and Serbia: Flanking and die Consequences for Democracy”. East European Quarterly xxx(4): 471- 
494. p. 472.
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intra-ethnic competition. John Darby and Roger MacGinty argue that the loss of 
followers is a greater threat to political leaders than the collapse of a peace process: 
“fr is in the nature o f political leadership”.11 Or rather: support from politically 
relevant audiences will have to take priority. The situation is thereby one of what 
George Tsebelis terms “nested games”: the elites are both actors in the inter-ethnic 
and intra-ethnic arenas and may, therefore, pursue seemingly irrational behaviour in 
one due to constraints in the other.72 Consequently, intra-ethnic competition will not 
merely be an epiphenomenon of relations between ethnic groups.
The importance of the position of ‘opposing’ leaders is arguably greatest if popular 
attitudes are of significance for the intra-ethnic competition: the elites will have to 
persuade the general population that their position is justified in view of the threat, or 
lack thereof, posed by the other group. The other audiences may, on the other hand, 
be influenced by other incentives, e.g. material benefits, and hence be in less need of 
such persuasion. But the relative importance of these audiences is, in turn, affected 
by the phase of the conflict and hence by the inter-ethnic interplay: popular attitudes 
are expected to be of greater importance in a non-violent conflict than in a violent 
conflict. Moreover, there are different forms of interplay: the intra-ethnic 
competition can be influenced by the policy of the ‘other side’, by the military and 
demographic balance and by the phase of the conflict. The result is a complex 
interplay between intra-ethnic competition and inter-ethnic relations: dominant elite 
position is the dependent variable of the study, while inter-ethnic relations can be 
described as an intervening variable. Inter-ethnic relations will not only be affected 
by intra-ethnic competition but will, in turn, affect this competition. The argument of 
this thesis is thus that intra-Serb competition had a significant impact on the 
development of the conflict in Croatia and Bosnia, but this competition was itself 
influenced by inter-ethnic relations: by the phase of the conflict, by the military and 
demographic balance, and by the position of Croat and Bosniak leaders.
71 Darby, John; MacGinty, Roger, 2000. “Conclusion: the Management of Peace”. In their (eds.) The 
Management o f Peace Processes. Houndmills: MacMillan, p. 257.
72 Tsebelis, 1990: 164-72.
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Conclusion
The purpose o f this theoretical discussion has been to develop a framework for the 
empirical analysis and identify variables hypothesised to affect the impact of intra­
ethnic elite competition. Intra-ethnic competition is the independent variable o f the 
analysis, and the primary focus, while the dominant elite position is the dependent 
variable. The leaders owe their power to intra-ethnic dynamics and in their rivalry 
they must consider the reaction of different audiences. In the two cases, the rivalling 
Serb elites had to consider the following audiences that supplied them with resources 
needed in the competition: forces within their party or movement; the general 
population and the kin-state. The relative importance of these audiences will differ in 
different institutional contexts, in different conflict situations and with different 
degrees o f ethnification of political competition, and is therefore expected to differ in 
the different phases o f the conflict in Croatia and Bosnia.
Figure 1.1 Intra-ethnic competition and dominant elite positions
DOMINANT ELITE POSITION
RELATIONS
BETWEEN
GROUPS
INTRA-ETHNIC ELITE 
COMPETITION
resourcesresources resources
As an important corrective to existing theorising, I hypothesise that intra-ethnic elite 
competition will not necessarily be characterised by ethnic outbidding based on 
appeals to extreme popular attitudes and I have identified a number o f variables that 
are expected to affect intra-ethnic competition: its direction and outcome. The 
audiences and variables will help structure the empirical analysis and will assist the 
building of a preliminary theory of intra-ethnic competition in ethnic conflicts. The 
first two variables, issues in the competition and configuration of competition, are
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hypothesised to influence the dynamics o f  competition, while the institutional 
framework and the two context variables, ethnification and violence, are 
hypothesised to affect the relative importance of different audiences and the 
resources they supply.
Figure 1.2 Audiences and variables influencing intra-ethnic competition
Audiences: Variables:
• Party/movement, incl. military • Issues in the competition
forces • Configuration of competition
• Kin-state leaders • Institutional framework
• General population Context variables:
• Violence
• Ethnification
In addition to these audiences and variables, the interplay with the position of 
‘opposing’ ethnic leaders will be analysed, and since the dynamics are hypothesised 
to differ in different phases o f the conflict, the empirical analysis will be divided into 
different phases: the pre-war and wartime phases will be analysed in depth and post­
war developments will briefly be tracked to identify continuity and change.
Figure 1.3 Relational fields and intra-ethnic competition
Elite
positions Elite><Elite
Mass population
MAJORITY
Mass population
minoritV Inter-ethnic
relations
KIN-STATE
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1.4 Empirical analysis: 
Serb elites in Croatia and Bosnia, 1990-1995
By comparing intra-ethnic competition among the Serb elites in Croatia and Bosnia, 
some variables can be held constant since the elites belong to the same ethnicity and 
since Serbia is the kin-state in both cases. Both conflicts were, furthermore, conflicts 
over statehood and the Serb minority was sizeable in both Croatia and Bosnia. While 
the cases are therefore similar in many ways, the dynamics of intra-ethnic elite 
competition nevertheless differed between them and they differed on some of the 
variables hypothesised to be of importance: ethnification did not proceed at equal 
speed; there were differences in party structures; kin-state involvement had different 
degrees and forms; and the relative strength of the ethnic groups differed. Within the 
cases the hypothesised differences in different conflict phases can also be analysed. 
The timeframe of the analysis is 1990 to 1995. In 1990, the first Serb parties were 
formally established and the first multiparty elections were held; it therefore seems 
an appropriate starting point for the analysis of political competition, even if 
preceding developments will also be considered in the analysis. 1995 marks the end 
of the war and consequently an obvious endpoint, although post-war developments 
will also briefly be analysed.
Each of the empirical chapters covers a different phase of the conflict and is 
structured according to the dimensions identified above: 1) Intra- and inter-party 
competition. This part of each chapter will analyse the form and direction of the 
competition: what were the dominant dynamics? What state/party/movement 
resources dominated? The process of ethnification will, in the pre-war period, be 
afforded particular importance: how did the ethnic cleavage become dominant? 2) 
Kin-state involvement. This section will analyse the changing forms of Serbia’s 
involvement and its impact on the local dynamics of intra-ethnic competition: how 
was it linked with ethnification and the phase of the conflict? Did local divisions 
augment Belgrade’s influence? Could its support be substituted for other resources in 
the political competition? 3) Relations between the elites and the general population. 
In existing theorising, intra-ethnic competition is held to be decided by elites playing 
the ethnic card and appealing to radical mass sentiments. This section will critically 
analyse this argument and the importance of popular attitudes for intra-Serb
Nina Caspersen: Intra-ethnic competition and inter-ethnic conflict 38
Chapter 1 -  Ethnic Elites and Intra-ethnic Competition
competition in Croatia and Bosnia: was it fundamentally driven by popular demands? 
Under what circumstances did popular attitudes have the greatest effect on the 
direction and outcome of elite competition? 4) Inter-ethnic interplay. The conflict 
situation and the position of ‘opposing’ ethnic leaders are expected to affect attitudes 
found among the three audiences, the relative importance of these audiences and, 
more directly, the strategies chosen by the leaders. This section will analyse how the 
interplay thereby affected the direction and outcome of the competition: how did it 
impact on the ethnification of politics? Was support from some audiences more 
influenced by the position of ‘opposing’ leaders than others? Why did the Serb 
leaders sometimes not respond to changes in the position of the opposing leaders? 
When was simultaneity in either radicalisation or moderation observed and when did 
the patterns diverge? The influence of international factors will also be included in 
this section, since the changing policies of the international community impacted on 
the military balance and the space for manoeuvre available to the Serb leaders. It 
consequently influenced the strategies adopted. International factors also had a 
significant impact on Belgrade’s changing position and its influence will therefore 
also be analysed in the sections on kin-state relations. Finally, in the post-war phase 
international authorities became an important additional audience which directly 
influenced the distribution of resources between competing elites, and this will be 
covered in the concluding empirical chapter.
Methodology
The empirical analysis is based on a number of different sources reflecting the 
complexity of intra-ethnic elite competition. There are few secondary sources 
available and most of the analysis is consequently based on primary sources. The 
positions of the elites are assessed by analysing political programmes, public 
statements, actual actions, second-hand accounts of negotiations as well as 
interviews. The same sources are used to analyse the dynamics of elite competition, 
but they are supplemented by analysis of electoral results, transcripts from the trials 
at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), interviews 
with local observers as well as analyses and reports from local media. Surveys and 
electoral results are used in the analysis of popular attitudes. A caveat is, however, in 
order: the data needed for analysis of popular attitudes could largely be obtained for
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the pre-war and post-war period, but for the wartime period it is scarce at best, which 
of course limits the analysis somewhat. Instead, I have mostly had to focus on the 
forms of constraint that popular attitudes could pose rather than on the actual 
attitudes.
The analysis relies heavily on interviews with key actors in the two cases. The 
shortages of other sources necessitated such an approach, but it also provided an 
opportunity to obtain information on the inner workings of elite competition among 
the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia that is not otherwise publicly available. The 
assessment of elite divisions and competition is made difficult by the ambiguities and 
secretiveness that is an integral part of the political game, especially in the case of a 
violent conflict, and interviews are a way of getting closer to uncovering the publicly 
unknown conflicts, divisions and alliances. Aside from this ‘objective* function of 
the interviews, there are also ‘subjective* benefits: interviews are the best way to 
obtain information on the motives underlying elite behaviour. However, the more 
subjective side to interviews also presents methodological problems since the 
interviewees may have an interest in presenting themselves in a more beneficial light 
or be more or less creative with the truth. To avoid this risk, information obtained 
from interviews was checked with other interviewees and/or secondary sources. In 
total the interview material consists of 44 interviews: 27 related to Croatia and 17 
related to Bosnia.74 The interviewees were mostly political leaders, but a few 
interviews were with journalists, academics and international officials. The key 
selection criterion for political leaders was that they had been involved in, or 
witnessed, the intra-Serb competition and therefore had personal knowledge of 
events taking place. Some former leaders were, for rather obvious reasons, not 
available for interviews since they are presently in custody of the ICTY, are in hiding 
or have passed away, while others have retired from public life and are not to be 
found. Despite these constraints, it was possible to interview several actors who took 
part in the events from very high positions and who, if anyone, must have intimate 
knowledge of the events.
73 Dogan, Mattei, Highley, John, 1998: “Elites, Crises and Regimes in Comparative Analysis”. In their 
(eds.) Elites, Crises and the Origins o/Regimes. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, p. 19.
See the bibliography for a full list of (attributable) interviews. The larger number of interviews in 
Croatia is primarily based on the relative lack of secondary sources compared with the Bosnian case 
and consequent greater need for other sources. In addition, the former and current Serb elites in 
Croatia were more willing to accommodate my requests for interviews.
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For the purpose of theory building, case studies are well-suited,75 especially the ones 
using ‘most similar cases’ design.76 One problem with small-N studies is, however, 
that one has many variables but only few cases and, therefore, risks losing sight of 
the most important variables while being enmeshed in details. This problem is partly 
addressed by the ‘most similar cases’ design, which reduces the number of relevant 
variables since the variables that are constant in the two cases can be excluded or 
controlled for. In addition, the theoretical discussion was used to identify what I 
hypothesise to be key variables and this will enable the empirical analysis to be more 
focused and structured.77Another risk associated with case studies is selection bias, 
which impacts on the generalisations that can be made from the analysis. A common 
mistake is to select the cases on the dependent variable and conclusions resulting 
from analysis of such extreme cases cannot be generalised.78 This risk is however 
mostly associated with ‘most different cases’ design, and the Croatian and Bosnian 
cases have not been selected on the dependent variable: the position of leaders in 
ethnic conflicts. They were selected because the impact of intra-ethnic competition 
among the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia has received little attention in existing 
literature on the Yugoslav disintegration and as ‘comparable cases’ they, moreover, 
constitute a good basis for theory-building. The risk of selection bias is, furthermore, 
reduced by the significant variation in the dependent variable in the different phases 
of conflict. But the ‘most similar cases’ design does, however, also result in limited 
generalisability, due to the limited variance in potential independent variables. The 
transitional context and the collapsing state are likely to have significantly influenced 
the dynamics of competition and due to the lack of variance in these variables, the 
concluding chapter will only suggest a preliminary theory: a basis for further 
empirical analysis in this under-analysed field.
75 Ragin, Charles C., 1987. The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative 
Strategies. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, p. 16.
76 Karl, Terry Lynn; Schmitter, Philippe C., 1995. “From an Iron Curtain to a Paper Curtain: 
Grounding Transitologists or Students ofPostcommunism”. Slavic Review 54(4): 965-978. p. 971.
77 Lijphart, 1971: 690.
78 Collier, D.; Mahoney, J., 1996. “Insight and Pitfalls: Selection Bias in Qualitative Research”. World 
Politics, 49(1): 56-91. p. 59, 67.
Nina Caspersen: Intra-ethnic competition and inter-ethnic conflict 41
Chapter 2 -  Conflict and War in Croatia and Bosnia
Part II: Comparative Study
Chapter 2 
Conflict and War in Croatia and Bosnia
Ever since the creation of the Kingdom o f Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918, Serb 
elites have played a crucial role in Yugoslav political developments. This is, of 
course, no coincidence given that the Serbs constituted the largest ethnic group in 
both the first and the second Yugoslavia. As an independent state pre-1918 Serbia 
had, moreover, played a decisive role in the unification of ‘South Slav lands’ and 
some members of the Serbian elite in the first Yugoslavia had a preference for 
viewing Serbia as Yugoslavia’s Piedmont, with the accompanying added legitimacy 
of the Serbian position. The importance of the position of the Serb elites, however, 
does not only stem from the Serb demographic strength or from Serbia’s role in the 
creation of the Yugoslav state and subsequent dominance of the first Yugoslavia but 
also from the existence of a considerable Serb population outside the borders of 
Serbia proper. In both Bosnia and Croatia, there was a sizeable Serb minority: 31 per 
cent of the 1991 population in Bosnia and 12 per cent in Croatia.1 The Serbs in 
Croatia and Bosnia not only affected political life in these republics but also in 
Yugoslavia more broadly, and they ultimately played a critical role in the 
disintegration of the second Yugoslavia.
1 According to the 1991 Yugoslav census.
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Map 2.1 Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (1981)
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Adapted from Cohen, Lenard, 1995. Broken Bonds: The Disintegration o f  Yugoslavia. Boulder, CL: 
Westview. p. 141.
Although the Serbs in the two republics were in many ways, different from the Serbs 
in Serbia, they also encompassed a large segment that harboured wishes for stronger 
links with the Republic of Serbia.2 Such sentiments were augmented by the atrocities 
committed against Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia by the pro-Nazi Independent State of 
Croatia (Nezavisna drzava Hrvatska, NDH) during the Second World War. NDH’s 
leader, Ante Pavelic, institutionalised a genocidal regime in which the Serbs in the 
Krajina region especially suffered3 and the Second World War memories created a 
perception o f being a people under threat, o f being the most vulnerable o f all Serbs.4 
Tito’s Yugoslavia was created as a communist state based on the Partisans’ struggle 
against the Nazis. The political and military ranks of this second Yugoslavia were 
consequently dominated by Partisans and, since the Serbs from Croatia and Bosnia
2 Cohen, 1995 : 127.
3 Brubaker, 1996: 72. Most of the victims of the UstaSa-regime were Serbs but they also included 
Jews and Romas as well as dissidents of all nationalities.
4 Silber, Laura; Little, Alan, 1996. The Death o f Yugoslavia. London: Penguin, p. 93.
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had been over-represented in the Partisan army, also by Serbs.5 In times of crisis the 
over-representation of Serbs provided fertile ground for resentment and hence 
provided Croat and Bosniak leaders with a measure of ammunition for nationalist 
agitation. As Cohen points out, there were, therefore, three major background factors 
that made the ‘Serb question’ in Croatia and Bosnia potentially explosive: historical 
yearnings among the Serbs for closer ties with Serbia, the Second World War 
genocide and the relatively privileged position of the Serbs.6
The importance of the Serb elites for Yugoslav political development does, on the 
other hand, not mean that all conflicts in Yugoslavia took an ethnic dimension, that 
ethnicity was constantly conflictual or even central. Both inter-ethnic co-operation 
and conflict characterised Yugoslav history and political conflicts were, furthermore, 
often characterised by intra-ethnic divisions since ideological issues were primary.7 
However, the above-mentioned background factors did mean that if ethnicity became 
conflictual in Yugoslavia, then the issue of the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia would 
invariably become central. A further factor which adds to the centrality of Serb elite 
positions was the perception of Serb unity: Serbs have more than any other nation in 
Yugoslavia been regarded as monolithic. Such perceptions are paradoxical since the 
Serbs have arguably been the nation most prone to internal divisions, both 
historically and in the recent conflict, and as Ivo Banac points out, there are “vast 
cultural -  not just linguistic - differences between the Serbs o f the Habsburg
Q
Monarchy and those o f the Ottoman Empire”. Likewise, Tim Judah argues that Serb 
politicians are “adepts at backbiting and flaunting their divisions, especially when 
the times call for unity".9 The intra-Serb divisions in 1990-1995 actually share many 
similarities with earlier intra-Serb rivalry, such as in the inter-war period when “the 
Yugoslav political scene continued to be cross-cut by inter- ‘tribal’ as well as by
5 Pavlowitch, Stevan K., 2003. “Serbia, Montenegro and Yugoslavia”. In Dejan Djokic (ed.) 
Yugoslavism. London: Hurst, p. 66. Banac, Ivo, 1992. “The Fearful Asymmetry of War: The Causes 
and Consequences of Yugoslavia’s Demise”. Daei/a/ws 121(2): 141-174. p. 154.
6 Cohen, 1995: 127.
7 Jovic. Dejan, 2003. “Yugoslavism and Yugoslav Communism: From Tito to Kardelj”. In Dejan 
Djokic (ed.) Yugoslavism. London: Hurst, p. 161,167.
8 Banac, Ivo, 1996. “Foreword: The Politics of Cultural Diversity in Former Yugoslavia”. In Sabrina 
P. Ramet. Balkan Babel. Boulder, CL: Westview Press, p. xiii.
9 Judah, Tim, 2000. The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction o f  Yugoslavia. New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, p. 253.
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intra- ‘tribal’ contests between political parties 10 Serb politics was in the inter-war 
period, just as in the 1990s, characterised by internal divisions and shifting positions, 
and significant Serb forces existed that opposed Belgrade’s centralisation.11 Some of 
the actors from the 1990s explicitly acknowledge these similarities and both the 
Yugoslav Independent Democratic Party (Jugoslavenska samostalna demokratska 
stranka, JSDS) and the Independent Democratic Serb Party (Samostalna demokratska 
srpska stranka, SDSS) argued that they followed the tradition of Svetozar 
Pribicevic’s Independent Democratic Party (Samostalna demokratska stranka, SDS), 
which was founded in 1924 and espoused a position that was independent from the 
Belgrade Government.12 Pribicevic’s party, furthermore, shares acronym with the 
dominant Serb party in Croatia and Bosnia in 1990-1995, the Serb Democratic Party 
(Srpska demokratska stranka, SDS). Intra-Serb divisions have, at times, created 
incentives for inter-ethnic co-operation, such as when Pribicevic joined forces with 
Stjepan Radic’s Croatian Peasant Party in the Peasant Democratic Coalition,13 but 
have, at times, also led to radicalisation. In Yugoslav history and in the conflict of 
the 1990s, the position of the Serb leaders as well as their internal divisions have 
played a decisive role, and one cannot understand the development of the conflict 
and the outbreak of war without analysing the position of the Serbs.
The status of the Serbs in Croatia had already been at the centre of the conflict 
surrounding the ‘Croatian Spring’ in 1970-1: as demands radicalised, anti-Serb 
sentiments and calls for Croatian statehood were increasingly heard and the Serbs in 
Krajina began taking up arms and demanding extensive autonomy.14 However, at 
that time the Yugoslav state was not on the brink of collapse and a solution was 
found -  with a not insignificant use of strong-arms tactics by Tito. But history 
repeated itself with a vengeance in 1990 with many of the same actors, same 
demands and same means. And this time there was no Tito to quell dissatisfaction; 
Yugoslav institutions were deadlocked and radicalisation was egged on by Slobodan
10 Djokic, Dejan, 2003. “(Dis)integrating Yugoslavia: King Alexander and Interwar Yugoslavism”. In 
his (ed.) Yugoslavism. London: Hurst p. 145.
11 Ibid. 144-5.
12 Interview Milorad Pupovac, co-founder of the SDSS. Zagreb, 11 August 2003. Zone, Vukasin.
1990. “JSDS je jugoslavenska”. Danas, 27 March, p. 6.
13 Djokic, 2003: 145.
14 Judah, 2000: 165. Isakovic, Zlatko, 2000. Identity and Security in the Former Yugoslavia.
Aldershot: Ashgate. p. 62. Ramet, Sabrina P. 1992. Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia 1963- 
1983. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, p. 112,117-8.
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Milosevic. The Serb nationalist movements in Croatia and Bosnia emerged in the late 
1980s in the swell of Milosevic’s ‘anti-bureaucratic revolutions’. The first 
murmurings began in Croatia, in February 1989, when the Serbs of Knin organised to 
protest against Slovenia’s and Croatia’s support for the Kosovo Albanians.15 In July, 
the same year, the Serb cultural society, Zora, was re-established and it helped 
organise a mass rally in Krajina to celebrate the Battle of Kosovo. Following this 
rally, the president of Zora, Jovan Opacic, was arrested and sentenced to three 
months in prison. This further strengthened the momentum of the emerging 
movement and in February 1990 the SDS was founded. In Bosnia, the establishment 
of a Serb movement proceeded more slowly since the Bosnian authorities were 
cautious not to allow expressions of nationalist sentiments given the ethnic make-up 
of the republic. Thus, Kosovo mass rallies were not allowed16 and an institutionalised 
Serb nationalist movement only emerged with the re-establishment in June 1990 of 
the Serb Cultural Society, Prosvjeta, and with the formation of the SDS the following 
month.
The period from the first multi-party elections until the outbreak of war saw an 
increasing build-up of tensions and radicalisation on all sides. The SDS in both cases 
adopted progressively more radical positions spurred on by their own internal rivalry, 
by pressure from Belgrade and by the interplay with the radicalising positions of 
other ethnic leaders. Following a 10-day war in Slovenia, Croatia was the first 
republic to descend into open warfare in the late summer of 1991. In Bosnia a 
precarious partnership between the three nationalist parties kept war at bay for longer, 
but the Serb leaders were charging an increasingly separate and radical course and, 
following a last attempt to reach a solution with the Cutilheiro peace plan, war broke 
out in earnest the day after Bosnian independence had been internationally 
recognised. In Croatia the radical Serb leaders established the Republic of Serb 
Krajina (Republika srpska krajina, RSK) while their counterparts in Bosnia 
proclaimed the Serb Republic (Republika srpska, RS). During the war, several 
attempts were made at reaching an agreement but most proved futile, often due to the 
intransigence of the Serb side. In January 1992 the so-called Vance Agreement was,
15 Dragovic-Soso, Jasna, 2002. Saviours o f the Nation: Serbia’s Intellectual Opposition and the 
Revival o f Nationalism. London: Hurst, p. 234.
16 A major celebration of the Battle of Kosovo was, nevertheless, held on Mount Romanija on 16 
August 1989. Andjelic, 2003: 111.
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however, reached in Croatia and although it took direct Belgrade intervention to 
secure RSK acceptance, it succeeded in at least freezing the situation. Proceeding 
further than a frozen situation nevertheless proved difficult. The RSK leaders refused 
to budge from their uncompromising position but they were playing a losing hand, 
which became clear in August 1995 when Krajina was retaken by the Croatian Army. 
Only in Eastern Slavonia was an agreement reached on peaceful reintegration. 
Similar intransigence was found among the Serb leaders in Bosnia and this led to a 
break with Milosevic: first over the rejection of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan in May 
1993 and then more forcefully following the rejection of the Contact Group Plan in 
August 1994. It was not until the late summer of 1995 when the RS leaders were 
cornered by internal divisions, Belgrade pressure, NATO bombings and changing 
military balance, that intransigence finally gave way to greater willingness to accept 
a compromise solution. Finally, in November 1995, Milosevic on behalf of the RS 
leaders accepted the Dayton Agreement.
In the literature on the Yugoslav disintegration the Serbian regime is commonly 
assigned decisive influence over the Serb leaders in Croatia and Bosnia, whose status 
as independent actors is consequently questioned. However, relations between 
MiloSevic and the Serb leaders in Croatia and Bosnia underwent a considerable 
change from 1990 until 1995: Belgrade distanced itself, while the local leaders were 
able to curtail Milosevic’s influence and became increasingly independent from the 
Serbian President. In the pre-war period Milosevic’s role was mostly that of an 
uncontested leader who was not in competition with the local leaders and had a very 
important symbolic role as the ‘President of all Serbs’. But as the local leaders took 
turns falling out with their protector in Belgrade, rivalry began over who was the true 
interpreter of Serb interests and goals. In this competition disgruntled leaders in the 
RSK and the RS sought co-operation with opposition forces in Serbia, while 
Milosevic found other players more willing to follow his tune. The influence of 
Belgrade over Serb politics in Croatia and Bosnia was, however, not limited to 
political quarrelling over claims to authentic representation of Serb interests. 
Especially in the immediate pre-war period and in the first years of war, Belgrade’s 
influence was indeed very tangible and helped strengthen the radical forces through 
the use of media propaganda as well as through the arming and funding of 
extremists. Moreover, after relations became less cordial, Milosevic sought to utilise
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the existence of divisions and competition among the local Serbs and, therefore, 
continued to have a significant impact on the dynamics of intra-Serb elite 
competition. The relationship between Serbs from Serbia and the Serbs outside 
Serbia is complex and partly based on a flexible definition of national identity. On 
one level there is a widespread belief that the two groups constitute one national 
community, they are all Serbs; but at the same time there exists a belief in strong 
differences in character and interests between the two groups.17 Both of these beliefs 
were used at various times by political actors to expand or reduce the sphere of their 
own or other actors’ influence.
Belgrade’s influence on the intra-Serb elite competition in Croatia in Bosnia, 
therefore, took different forms and varied greatly in its significance. The effect of 
these fluctuations in the link between Belgrade and the local Serb leaders will be 
analysed in Chapters 3-7, but it is worth dwelling for a while on the developments in 
Serbia proper that affected Milosevic’s attitude towards the Serbs outside the 
republic.
2.1 Milosevic and political competition in Serbia
In his speech at the 1989 Kosovo celebrations, Milosevic reinstated the Serb 
nationalist call for unity when he argued that the Serbian defeat in 1389, as well as, 
later Serbian failures, had occurred owing to a lack of unity within the ranks of the 
Serb elite.18 Following from that sentiment, Milosevic later that year adopted the 
cause of the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia and increasingly cast himself in the role of 
their protector and the guarantor of them remaining in Yugoslavia.19 Since Milosevic 
had consolidated his power on nationalism’s back, the Serbs outside Serbia were of 
at least some importance for his continued hold on power, and Milosevic could 
expect constraints, even from his own ranks. As Mihaljo Markovic, who became
vice-president of Milosevic’s Socialist Party of Serbia (Socijalisticka partija Srbije,
20SPS), said: “/  got involved in politics to save the Serbs o f Eastern Croatia”.
17 Thomas, Robert, 1999. Serbia under Milosevic. London: Hurst, p. 205-6.
18 Cohen, Lenard, 2002. Serpent in the Bosom: The Rise and Fall o f  Slobodan Milosevic. Boulder, CL: 
Westview Press, p. 145.
19 See e.g. Sell, Louis, 2002. Milosevic and the destruction o f  Yugoslavia. Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, p. 108-110.
20 Cohen, 2002: 167.
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Nevertheless, Milosevic’s relations with the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia underwent 
considerable changes over the years, and these changes were affected by 
developments in Serbia, especially by challenges to Milosevic’s powerbase and the 
increasing dissatisfaction brought on by international isolation and sanctions.
Cutting the puppets ’ strings
In the deepening Yugoslav crisis, Milosevic’s hold on power initially seemed secure. 
This dominance was aided, in no small way, by changes to the Serbian Constitution 
which were enacted prior to the first multi-party elections in December 1990 and 
which would allow Milosevic’s SPS to continue with a one-party system under the 
guise of a formally democratic structure. The electoral system translated the SPS’s 
plurality of votes into an absolute majority in Parliament, and parliamentary 
resistance was, therefore, not of great concern. Extra-parliamentary opposition did, 
however, prove of greater concern when the opposition arranged a mass 
demonstration in Belgrade on 9 March 1991 against Milosevic’s authoritarian rule. 
These demonstrations were led by Vuk Draskovic, leader of the Serb Renewal 
Movement (Srpski pokret obnove, SPO), who, from a continued nationalist 
viewpoint, accused Milosevic of war-mongering and called for negotiations in order 
to realise the interests of the Serbs.22 The Serbian state-controlled media fought back 
by carrying articles quoting Serbs from Croatia who warned that they would be left 
at the mercy of Croatian nationalists if the Serbian Government continued being 
undermined.23 One of the upshots of the demonstrations was the adoption of a dual 
strategy: MiloSevic officially espoused a more moderate line and accepted the 
principle of a confederation but behind the scenes he promoted a crisis atmosphere in 
order to deflect attention away from the challenge to his position.24 The increasingly 
tense situation in Croatia and the eventual outbreak of war reinforced the call for 
unity and consequently strengthened Milosevic’s hold on power.
21 Cohen, 2002: 162 . See also Gordy, Eric, 1999. The Culture o f  Power in Serbia. University Park, 
Pa: Pennsylvania State University Press, p. 37.
22 Gagnon Jr., V.P., 2004, The Myth o f Ethnic War: Serbia and Croatia in the 1990s. Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, p. 102.
23 Thomas, 1999: 83.
24 Gagnon, 2004: 103-4. Sell, 2002:137-8
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Despite obvious evidence to the contrary, the Serbian government vehemently denied 
that Serbia was at war. But the consequences of war could not be denied and they 
were strongly felt in Serbia. The lack of popular enthusiasm for the war was 
illustrated in 1991 when the Yugoslav People’s Army (Jugoslovenska narodna armija, 
JNA) had great difficulty mobilising soldiers and draft dodging and desertion took 
place on a significant scale.25 The opposition was still weak but it gradually began to 
condemn the war. DraSkovic had abandoned his staunchly nationalist position and in 
October 1991 he criticised the Serb leaders outside Serbia: “It is not the first time ... 
that the heart o f the nation ... finds itself in disagreement with the nation’s 
periphery”. At the same time, however, DraSkovic still supported the involvement 
of the SPO-linked paramilitary, the Serbian Guard, which he considered to be 
protecting the Serbs in Croatia.27 A more clear anti-war position was taken by the 
Democratic Party (Demokratska stranka, DS) which stated: “We want to stop this 
shameless and senseless war immediately”. Nevertheless, the outbreak of war had 
greatly aided Milosevic’s strategy of destructing alternatives and the opposition 
lacked influence.29 At the time, the position of the regime was that Serbia was 
defended in Knin but despite such assertions, Milosevic -  probably realising that the 
war did not gain him many popularity points -  did not act as a typical war-leader and
- JA
he, for example, never visited Serbian forces at the front.
One of the political actors who was more than willing to defend Serbia outside the 
republic was DraSkovic’s former colleague in the SPO Vojislav SeSelj, leader of the 
Serb Radical Party (Srpska radikalna stranka, SRS). Officially the Belgrade 
Government distanced itself from SeSelj *s radicalism and his Serb Radicals, therefore, 
performed the function as a more extreme opposition to Milosevic. In reality, 
however, SeSelj was useful for Milosevic. Until the war in Croatia started SeSelj was 
a marginal political figure but following expressions of support for Milosevic, he 
became the “officially acceptable extremist’ in the Serb-controlled parts of Croatia 
and he was given unprecedented prime time in the Serbian state media. Milosevic
25 Cohen, 2002: 197.
26 Svarm, Filip, 1994. “Kidnappers and Hostages”. Vreme News Digest, no. 142,13 June.
27 Thomas, 1999: 108.
28 Ibid. 107.
29 Gordy, 1999: 24. Gagnon, 2004: 107-8.
30 Sell, 2002:150.
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could use someone to do his dirty jobs31 and his co-operation with the radical SeSelj 
provided protection against any risk of outbidding.
Although Milosevic was not challenged by significant opposition on the war issue, it 
nevertheless began to be a liability. The failure of the JNA to win decisively, the 
threat of international sanctions against Serbia and the looming war in Bosnia made 
Milosevic willing to accept the Vance Plan in late 1991. This brought about an 
unexpected conflict with the President of the RSK, Milan Babic, but after 
successfully orchestrating his ousting, the Belgrade Government could focus its 
attention on Bosnia. Meanwhile, the opposition parties used the end of fighting in 
Croatia to launch a renewed offensive against the Milosevic regime but when war 
broke out in Bosnia, the call for unity for a while dampened their fervency.
It would, however, not be long before MiloSevic was to encounter the first significant 
opposition against the war, and this came from people whom MiloSevid had expected 
to be his loyal supporters. In April 1992, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was 
established and, as its President, MiloSevic appointed the former dissident and 
famous nationalist author, Dobrica Cosic. As Prime Minister, Milan Panic, a rich 
American businessman of Serb origin, was chosen. Milosevic hoped that by 
appointing these two figures he would be able to broaden his appeal and present a 
more moderate image at home and abroad.32 But the Cosic-Panic team was not 
content with being Milosevic’s lapdogs and they increasingly asserted their 
independence. Panic even launched a peace offensive and became a rallying point for 
Serbia’s otherwise divided democratic opposition, and he decided to challenge 
Milosevic in the December 1991 Serbian presidential elections. To make matters 
worse for the Serbian President, he was also faced with rifts within his own party and 
in June 1992 a reformist faction broke away from the SPS.33 This opposition did not, 
however, make Milosevic abandon his projects in Croatia and Bosnia. On the 
contrary, he began taking a harder line and boycotted reconciliation talks with 
Croatia that Panic had promoted and, in his fight against Panic, he aligned himself 
with the Radicals. During the election campaign MiloSevic, however, adopted a more
31 Svarm, Filip, 1995. “Of love and hate”. Vreme News Digest, no. 182,27 March.
32 Thomas, 1999: 122.
™ Ibid. 122.
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moderate rhetoric and stressed the need for ethnic tolerance.34 This vague positioning 
and use of repressive measures proved successful: MiloSevic defeated Panic in an 
election marred by great irregularities and, by May 1993, he had also managed to rid 
himself of Cosic.35 The opposition from Panic and Cosic, therefore, did not alter 
Milosevic’s relations with the Serbs in Knin and Pale: if anything, it strengthened his 
resolve.
The holding of elections in late 1992 had greatly increased the strength of the 
Radicals whose support became vital for the SPS’s hold on power and the two parties 
entered into a formal coalition. Such co-operation could be expected to lock the 
Serbian President into an uncompromising position, but MiloSevic was faced with 
cross-pressure since the situation in Serbia was deteriorating: economic sanctions 
had been imposed in May 1992 and the economic crisis was approaching 
catastrophic proportions. Therefore, beginning in the spring of 1993, MiloSevic cast 
himself in the new role as peacemaker and increasingly distanced himself from the 
leaders in the two Serb statelets. But the new peace-promoting image led MiloSevid 
on collision course with his supporters in the SRS who vehemently opposed the 
Vance-Owen Peace Plan. When the strategy to coerce the Pale leaders into 
acceptance failed, MiloSevic consequently had to consolidate his power in Serbia 
knowing that this humiliation could be utilised by the opposition. In alliance with 
SeSelj, MiloSevic, therefore, went against the individuals in Serbia who had 
supported the plan.
This renewed alliance and the reversion to radicalism was, however, short-lived and 
the Serbian President soon began distancing himself from SeSelj, who was no longer 
of use. In September 1993 the main committee of the SPS attacked SeSelj’s 
“primitive chauvinism” and stated: “We care about Bosnia-Hercegovina, the 
Republika Srpska and the Serbian people outside Serbia, but that is no reason for a
\s  q o
politico from Sarajevo, such as Seselj, to preach to Serbia”. Thus the leader of the 
Radicals was not only attacked for his radicalism but his legitimacy to have a say in
34 Gagnon, 2004: 114.
35 Cohen, 2002: 209-214.
36 Thomas, 1999: 136.
37 Ibid. 156.
38 Ibid. 178-9.
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Serbia was also rejected due to his origins outside Serbia proper. The SPS had 
thereby made a decisive move away from its previous ideology and the fear of 
outbidding from the increasingly popular Radicals was not decisive for the strategy 
chosen by Milosevic, although he had initially been forced to reverse his position. 
However, in order to make sure that the opposition, from one or the other side of the 
political spectrum, would not capitalise on the Belgrade-Pale rift, the Serbian 
Government renewed its campaign against the independent media and stepped up its 
attacks on all oppositional forces.39
The cooling of relations between Belgrade and the leadership in Knin and Pale led to 
a marked change in the rhetoric used by official Belgrade when describing the Serbs 
outside Serbia. When relations were still unproblematic, the need for assisting them 
was stressed and it was emphasised that this was also Serbia’s fight. However, 
Milosevic later accused the local Serbs of taking Serbia hostage and of being 
responsible for the hardship suffered in Serbia due to international sanctions.40 In her 
public diary Mira Markovic, Milosevic’s wife, in May 1994 wrote: “...the 
representatives o f those Serbs (mainly outside Serbia) who think that the war is their 
only option... should not impute that option to the whole o f the Serbian people”.41
Once Milosevic had abandoned the Greater Serbia project, it was in his interest to 
have as little focus on the Serbs outside Serbia as possible and, when the Croatian 
forces retook Western Slavonia and Krajina, it was all but ignored by the Serbian 
Government. Nevertheless, the anger and humiliation caused by Operation Flash and 
Operation Storm seriously concerned Milosevic, who allegedly confessed to the 
Croatian envoy, Hrvoje Sarinic, “the situation [in Serbia] is very difficult and I  will 
soon be unable to control i f \ 42 The Dayton Agreement, therefore, came as a 
welcome lifeline to MiloSevic and he made sure to describe it as a great vindication 
of his position. Within his own party, MiloSevic ensured, by expelling possible vocal 
critics, that significant critique would not surface and that his rule would remain 
unchallenged 43 But despite such moves, the failure of Milosevic’s project of the late
39 Ibid. 223-4.
40 Svarm, Filip, 1994. “Kidnappers and hostages”. Vreme News Digest, no. 142,13 June.
41 Ibid.
42 Sell, 2002: 243.
43 Thomas, 1999: 245-6.
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80s and early 90s was apparent: he had failed to unify the Serbs, Serbia was isolated 
internationally and the economic situation remained disastrous.44
Milosevic’s popularity had declined considerably, especially in urban areas, and this 
became clear in the local elections in November 1996 when Milosevic’s SPS lost 
Belgrade and more than a dozen other cities to the coalition of opposition parties, 
Zajedno 45 When MiloSevic arranged for the courts to annul the results, this triggered 
mass demonstrations and Milosevic’s power was, for the first time since 1991, 
significantly challenged, and this time there was no looming war to distract anyone’s 
attention. MiloSevic eventually had to give in and recognise the election results but 
he managed to secure his own political survival. The Serbs outside Serbia were far 
from prominent in Zajedno’s political rhetoric but, following the setback over the 
1996 elections MiloSevic, nevertheless, returned to a more nationalist position. 
Members of the ‘nationalist’ wing in the SPS, who had earlier been pushed aside, 
found their way back and MiloSevic emphasised the need for links with the Serbs 
beyond the Drina. Consequently, on 28 February 1997 an ‘Agreement on Special 
Relations’ was signed between the FRY and the RS 46 MiloSevic was at this point 
adverse to any opposition that might emerge and if he could not ignore the Serb 
leaders in Croatia and Bosnia, he at least wanted leaders he could control and who 
would not add to the opposition against him.
Thus, the kin-state leader’s relations with the local Serbs were, in all three phases of 
the conflict, significantly affected by political competition in Serbia. Changes in 
Milosevic’s relations with the leaders in Knin and Pale were brought on by the 
shifting strength of the opposition, by international involvement or by other factors 
that could serve to weaken or strengthen Milosevic’s hold on power. Outbidding 
from more extreme rivals was, however, not Milosevic’s greatest concern: his 
strategy was to destruct alternatives47 and as long as more extreme rivals could not 
be considered such threatening alternatives, their outflanking was not of immediate 
concern. MiloSevic was not unconstrained when it came to abandoning the Serbs in 
the neighbouring republics: their fate was of least symbolic importance for the
44 Cohen, 2002: 250.
45 Ibid. 251.
46 Thomas, 1999: 326, 331.
47 Gordy, 1999: 7.
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Serbian President and the local leaders could, therefore, seek to make Milosevic 
responsible. The Belgrade Government could, on the other hand, point to the 
prevalent Serb infighting and stubborn intransigence and claim that it could do 
nothing in the face of such irresponsibleness. Furthermore, it systematically changed 
the rhetoric used when referring to the leaders of the Serbs outside Serbia and denied 
their legitimacy to have any influence in Serbia proper. Moreover, Belgrade was 
aware that it was one of the most decisive ‘audiences’ to which the rivalling elites 
could appeal and this provided the Government with considerable means for 
influencing or ousting obstinate local leaders. Despite Belgrade’s considerable 
influence on intra-Serb rivalry in Croatia and Bosnia, the local leaders should not be 
regarded as mere puppets. The leaders in the RSK and the RS played an increasingly 
independent role and the deteriorating relations between Belgrade, Knin and Pale 
significantly affected the dynamics of intra-ethnic competition in the two statelets. 
As an important addition to existing literature on the Yugoslav disintegration and 
war, the following chapters will show how Milosevic was at times unable to control 
local Serb leaders: his support was initially the sine qua non of political power but 
his influence was reduced during the war.
2.2 Explaining the Yugoslav disintegration
To describe the literature on the Yugoslav disintegration as vast would be an 
understatement. There is a plethora of books from the whole range of social science 
disciplines that analyse the disintegration or various aspects of it. Some common 
trends can, nevertheless, be detected and in terms of identifying the main causal 
factors, there seems to be four main explanations. These can be characterised as: the 
‘ancient hatred’ explanation; the ‘national ideologies’ explanation; the structural 
explanation; and the ‘political elites’ explanation. The first, the ancient hatred thesis, 
has been almost uniformly rejected by scholars but, nevertheless, enjoyed great 
prominence in the media and allegedly also among certain policy makers. The 
explanation focusing on national ideologies is primarily associated with Ivo Banac 
and his analysis of conflicting Serbian and Croatian visions of Yugoslavia.48 
Contrary to this ideological focus, the structural explanations have a much more 
material basis and primarily focus on the 1974 constitution and/or the underlying
48 Banac, 1992. Banac, Ivo, 1984. The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics. 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
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systemic decay and economic crisis. Finally, the ‘political elites’ explanations take 
their starting point in the late 1980s and attribute the primary reason for Yugoslav 
disintegration to the self-interested behaviour of a few political elites, in particular 
MiloSevic.49
Intra-ethnic elite competition as under-analysed aspect 
Although this thesis will invariably be influenced by competing explanations of the 
Yugoslav disintegration, I do not wish to offer an alternative explanation and, 
therefore, will not engage directly in the above debate. First of all, my analysis starts 
at a later point than would an analysis aiming to explain the disintegration. The 
starting point of my research is a situation that is already conflictual and it would 
therefore be erroneous to claim to be explaining the root causes of this conflict. 
Furthermore, I analyse one aspect of the disintegration and the war: the intra-Serb 
elite competition in Croatia and Bosnia. While the positions of the Serb leaders in 
Croatia and Bosnia represent an important factor in the Yugoslav disintegration, it is 
not claimed to be the only factor of importance. The research also includes an 
analysis of the interplay with Belgrade and with the rhetoric and actions of other 
ethnic leaders, but these factors are largely treated as intervening variables and, 
therefore, not analysed in their own right. Hence, I will not claim to identify a causal 
explanation for the disintegration as such.
What I am arguing is that intra-Serb elite competition is an under-analysed aspect of 
the Yugoslav disintegration; an aspect which is needed in order to fully understand 
the development of the conflict: the radicalisation of positions, the outbreak of war 
and the continuous rejection of settlements. It will consequently fill an important gap 
in the literature on the Yugoslav disintegration and provide a corrective to some 
common assumptions. This is, however, not to say that analysis of intra-ethnic elite 
competition is entirely absent from existing literature and it has been used to explain 
political developments in both Croatia and Serbia. For example, Susan Woodward 
attaches great importance to political competition within the national communities as
49 This categorisation is strongly influenced by a typology presented in Devic, Ana, 1997. “Anti-War 
Initiatives and the Un-Making of Civic Identities in the Former Yugoslav Republics”. Journal o f  
Historical Sociology 10(2): 127-156. p. 140-142.
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a cause of radicalisation.50 As Fearon and Laitin put it in their review of Woodward’s 
Balkan Tragedy “the political dynamics between moderates and extremists are an 
important part o f Woodward’s story”.51 Similarly, Eric Gordy in his The Culture o f 
Power in Serbia analyses how MiloSevic maintained power through the destruction 
of alternatives.52
Even though, intra-ethnic competition is decisive in these analyses of political 
developments, they are not primarily concerned with the dynamics of intra-ethnic 
competition, or rather with the variables influencing intra-ethnic competition and its 
effect on the dominant elite position. Moreover, such attention to intra-ethnic 
competition is decidedly lacking when it comes to Serb politics in Croatia and 
Bosnia, including analysis of relations between the local Serb leaders and the 
Government in Belgrade. There is a pronounced tendency to view the Serbs as 
monolithic and hence afford little attention to internal divisions. Moreover, there is a 
lack of focus on internal republican developments since most analysis is centred on 
the Belgrade-Zagreb-Sarajevo axis. The increasingly strained relations with Belgrade 
are frequently cited in the literature and the rivalry among the local Serb leaders is 
also mentioned, although mostly in passing, but it is not made the object of in-depth 
analysis. With two partial, but important, exceptions: the work of Robert Hislope and 
V.P. Gagnon Jr. In his two articles on intra-ethnic competition, Hislope analyses 
outbidding affecting Milo§evic and Tudman, and, more briefly, outbidding within the 
Croatian SDS.53 Hislope’s analysis, however, falls short of identifying variables 
affecting this outbidding and does furthermore not touch on intra-ethnic competition 
among the Bosnian Serbs or on relations with Belgrade. In his excellent analysis of 
‘demobilisation’ in Croatia and Serbia, Gagnon affords some space to intra-Serb 
rivalry in Croatia when he argues that violence was a strategy used by the elites to 
“silence, marginalize, and demobilize challengers and their supporters in order to 
create political homogeneity at home”. 54 While Gagnon and I reach similar
50 Woodward, Susan, 1995. Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and dissolution after the Cold War. Washington 
DC: Brookings Institution, p. 353-4.
51 Fearon; Laitin, 2000: 867
52 Gordy, 1999.
53 Hislope, Robert, 1997. “Intra-ethnic conflict in Croatia and Serbia: Flanking and the Consequences 
for Democracy”. East European Quarterly xxx(4): 471-494. Hislope, Robert, 1998. “The Generosity 
Moment: Ethnic Politics, Democratic Consolidation and the State in Yugoslavia (Croatia), South 
Africa and Czechoslovakia”. Democratization 3(1): 64-89
54 Gagnon, 2004: xv.
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conclusions concerning the lack of importance of popular attitudes, my analysis 
differs in important respects. Firstly, our starting points are different: Gagnon’s 
analysis is, contrary to this thesis, not primarily concerned with intra-ethnic 
competition, but rather with the link between elites and the mass population, and 
with countering approaches that place primacy on popular mobilisation in explaining 
the Yugoslav conflict. Secondly, while this thesis will argue that intra-Serb rivalry 
was not primarily decided by elites ‘playing the ethnic card’, I do not discount the 
importance of popular support to the same extent as Gagnon does, but qualifies its 
importance in different phases of the conflict. Finally, Gagnon’s analysis does not 
include the Bosnian Serb rivalry or the link between the local Serb leaders and 
Belgrade. It does therefore not offer a full analysis of Serb disunity in the Yugoslav 
conflict.
In terms of the rivalling explanations of Yugoslavia’s disintegration, most are 
compatible with a focus on intra-ethnic elite divisions, since the analysis takes as its 
starting point a situation that is already conflictual. The aim is to analyse an 
important aspect of the further development of the conflict: the intra-Serb 
competition and the effect this had on the position of the Serb leaders. The analysis 
is, nevertheless, leaning towards a combination of two types of explanations: firstly, 
the structural explanation in order to explain the power of republican elites, their 
incentives to focus on the republic as their locus of power, as well as the economic 
crisis and the effect this had on popular sentiments. Secondly, the analysis 
unsurprisingly presupposes the importance of political elites: their interests, 
constraints, deliberate choices and miscalculations are regarded as crucial for the 
development of the conflict. This elite focus is shared by the majority of the literature 
on the former Yugoslavia. Neven Andjelic argues that, since the Yugoslav system in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s was still tightly controlled from above, much of what 
happened will have to be explained in terms of elite behaviour.55 During the war, this 
elite control only became stronger and the influence of popular attitudes in war- 
affected areas was almost non-existing: a continued elite focus, therefore, seems 
defensible. Such a focus should, nevertheless, not descend into reductionism and an 
argument that only the elites should be analysed. On the contrary, the degree and
55 Andjelid, 2003: 27.
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form of elite predominance should be established empirically and this research will 
question the proposition that the dominant elites were the ones who most effectively 
appealed to mass antagonisms. This thesis clearly departs from the ‘ancient hatred’ 
explanation but the findings are also at odds with an explanation much more 
prevalent in the academic literature: that the conflict was driven by elites ‘playing the 
ethnic card’.
An aspect of the structural explanation which is not generally afforded a prominent 
position in the literature on Yugoslavia is the transitional context. However, the 
emergence of ethnic parties, the first multiparty elections, the ethnification of politics 
and political competition in general were bound to be affected by the transition from 
a communist system: it affected party developments, party competition and linkages 
between the elites and the voters.
Communist legacy and political competition
Kemal Kurspahic argues that, due to Yugoslavia’s better standard of living, more 
open borders and greater freedom of the press, its citizens were less enthusiastic 
about dramatic changes.56 He argues, in other words, that the communist system 
enjoyed greater legitimacy in Yugoslavia than in other East European countries. The 
legitimacy of the system was, however, far from undamaged and the 1990 elections 
were not only characterised by an ethnic cleavage, or by a cleavage based on the 
future of Yugoslavia, but also by a reformed communists vs. anti-communists divide. 
Moreover, the League of Communists had, in Bosnia, experienced a marked decline 
in support since the so-called Agrokomerc scandal in 1987. This corruption scandal 
penetrated the highest echelons of the League of Communists of Bosnia and almost 
all high-ranking officials were replaced within a year.57 But the scandal also had 
longer-term consequences: the new leadership was weak and inexperienced and the 
legitimacy of the party and the system was irreparably weakened.58 Although the 
erosion of support was most marked in Bosnia, republican leaderships elsewhere also 
faced uncertainty when contemplating a transition to democracy. But the League of 
Communists in both Croatia and Bosnia were nevertheless convinced that they could
56 Kurspahic, Kemal, 2003. Prime Time Crime: Balkan media in war and peace. Washington DC: 
United States Institute of Peace, p. 24.
57 Andjelic, 2003: 61.
58 Ibid 64, 69. Kurspahic, 2003: 8-9.
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win freely contested elections and, in Croatia, they even designed the electoral 
system so that a plurality of the votes would translate into an absolute majority and 
thereby, supposedly, ensure communist dominance. Even though they failed to 
achieve these expected victories, the reformed communists in Bosnia and Croatia 
provided a non-ethnic alternative to the emerging ethnic parties and together with 
other left-leaning parties they made the ethnification of politics far from a foregone 
conclusion. In Serbia, on the other hand, the League of Communists of Serbia under 
the leadership of MiloSevic chose to reform itself with a strong nationalist touch and, 
rather than countering the nationalist forces, it promoted and encouraged them and, 
therefore, helped foster the ethnification of politics.
More broadly, the transitional situation had a strong impact on political competition. 
Political parties were not formed until late 1989 or early 1990 and they were 
primarily formed on an ethno-national basis. Most of the ethnic parties were political 
movements rather than conventional political parties: they lacked cohesion and had 
weak programmatic identities, undeveloped party organisations and weak societal 
linkages. The significance of the ethnic cleavage was strongly influenced by the 
Yugoslav institutional structure and the already conflictual relations between the 
republics, but it also reflected a lack of well-defined socio-economic cleavages, 
which is a common trait in post-communist transitions.59 Moreover, Yugoslavia 
lacked well-organised anti-communist opposition parties, or opposition alliances, as 
existed in other East European countries such as Poland, Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia.60
It is often argued that communist and nationalist ideologies share many similarities 
and that a post-communist transition therefore favours nationalist and ethnic parties. 
Thus, Zivko Surculija argues that nationalism can serve as a substitute for communist 
utopia since both ideologies are collectivist, nationalism offers peoples a new utopia 
and communist elites will find nationalism attractive as a way of retaining power.61 
While one should not overestimate the legitimising function of the communist utopia, 
this argument points to important aspects of the attractiveness of nationalism both for
59 Kitschelt et al, 1999: 391.
60 Radosevic, Slavo, 1996. “The collapse of Yugoslavia: Between chance and necessity”. In David
Dyker & Ivan Vejvoda (eds.) Yugoslavia and After. London and New York: Longman, p. 76.
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the elite and for the general population. For the elite it offered an opportunity to gain 
or stay in power, a way of providing a “quasi-democratic” authorisation for 
authoritarian rule.
In terms of mass political culture, the communist legacy also left its imprint and 
facilitated the victory and dominance of nationalist parties and leaders. The 
population was used to one-man, one-party rule and unfamiliar with democratic 
competition, and Ivan Vejvoda argues that the communist monopoly had created a 
sense of political impotence and futility in the population, which barred political 
engagement.63 Consequently an authoritarian political culture is often held to prevail 
in the former Yugoslavia:64 an expectation that elites are supposed to lead and the 
population supposed to follow. In an oft-quoted story, the Serbian politician Vuk 
Draskovic met a peasant who expressed great enthusiasm for him and vouched that if 
Draskovic became president then he would surely vote for him!65 Yugoslavia in 1990 
was, in many ways, still a traditional patriarchal society, which privileged the 
populist and nationalist movements since they could draw on the tight connection 
with primary groups, including the ethnic group.66 Although pre-established ties 
between elites and the general population in a transitional situation would be 
expected to be negligible,67 a strong acceptance of authority can, nevertheless, 
hamper the development of pluralistic politics and encourage a tendency to close 
ranks behind an emerging leader. Mirjana Kasapovic uses the term “plebiscitary 
emotionalism” to describe political competition in which support and loyalties are 
linked to the character of candidates and not to actual political context. This was
61 SurCulija, Zivko, 1996. “Nationalism and the Destruction of the Former Socialist Federation”. In 
Stefano Bianchini & Du§an Janjic (eds.) Ethnicity in Postcommunism. Belgrade: Institute of Social 
Sciences, p. 113-4.
62 Tomanovid, Velimir, 1996. “Nationalism, Transition and Democracy”. In Stefano Bianchini & 
DuSan Janjic (eds.) Ethnicity in Postcommunism. Belgrade: Institute of Social Sciences, p. 156. See 
also Kaldor, Mary, 1993. “Yugoslavia and the new nationalism”. New Left Review no. 197: 96-112. p. 
109.
63 Vejvoda, Ivan, 1996. “Yugoslavia 1945-91: from decentralisation without democracy to 
dissolution”. In David Dyker & Ivan Vejvoda (eds.) Yugoslavia and After. London and New York, 
NY: Longman, p. 22.
64 See e.g. Kasapovic, Miijana, 1992. “The structure and dynamics of the Yugoslav political 
environment and elections in Croatia”. In: Seroka, Jim; Pavlovic, Vukasin (eds.) The Tragedy o f  
Yugoslavia: the failure o f  democratic transformation. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, p. 28.
65 Sell, 2002: 127.
66 Golubovic, Zagorka, 1996. “The causes of ethno-mobilisation in the Former Yugoslavia”. In 
Stefano Bianchini & Dusan Janjic (eds.) Ethnicity in Postcommunism. Belgrade: Institute of Social 
Sciences, p. 162.
67 Biezen, 2003: 44.
Nina Caspersen: Intra-ethnic competition and inter-ethnic conflict 61
Chapter 2 -  Conflict and War in Croatia and Bosnia
reflected in a Croatian survey from 1990, in which 75 per cent of those interviewed 
said that they sought “a brave, tireless and true leader in whom the people could 
trust” 68 Such an authoritarian political culture will limit the influence popular 
attitudes have on the position of leaders and hence increase their room for manoeuvre. 
While the deference of the mass population should not be exaggerated, the post­
communist transition, therefore, must be taken into account when discussing elite 
autonomy and the ethnification of politics.
2.3 Ethnic conflict?
In the subsequent chapters, the Yugoslav conflict will, as a convenient shorthand, be 
described as national or ethnic. This usage is by no means meant to identify the 
causes of the conflict; what it does address is the legitimation used by the leaders: 
they claimed to represent ‘their’ nation and argued that it was threatened and in need 
of protection. The Croats, Serbs and Muslims were recognised as nations in the 
Yugoslav Constitution and the most appropriate term to use, therefore, would be 
‘national’ rather than ‘ethnic’ conflict. However, this presents some linguistic 
problems when referring to dynamics within and between the national communities: 
intra-ethnic or inter-ethnic is less open to misunderstandings than intra-national or, 
especially, inter-national. While it presents some conceptual problems, the term 
‘ethnic’ will, therefore, mostly be given preference. But, as Mary Kaldor has pointed 
out, the national identities in the former Yugoslavia became ethnic in the sense that 
people were bom into them and could not change them;69 influenced by the conflict 
and the politics of radicalisation they became exclusive and ascriptive.
The use of the term ‘national’ or ‘ethnic’ should, nevertheless, not blind us to the fact 
that these divisions were, at times, still fluid and that the groups were internally 
divided. In terms of the Serb elites, it is, for example, striking how reluctant the
70urban elite was to define itself in ethnic terms. Other divisions continued to be of 
importance and one should not forget that there were Serbs fighting in both the 
Croatian and the Bosnian army. Only a few years before the outbreak of war, ethnic
68 Kasapovic, 1992: 42.
69 Kaldor, 1993: 108.
70 See Chapters 3-4.
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tensions and ethnic divisions were difficult to register in Yugoslav surveys.71 As late 
as 1989, researchers concluded that ethno-centrism was not widespread, with 90 per 
cent of Bosnian respondents describing inter-ethnic relations as ‘good* or ‘very 
good’.72 In surveys covering the whole of Yugoslavia, the ethnic distance between 
Serbs and Croats was found to be particularly low: only 7 per cent mutual rejection 
in 1985.73 Nevertheless, even if relations were generally not conflictual, divisions 
still remained, especially in rural areas far away from the more multi-ethnic Belgrade, 
Zagreb and Sarajevo. In the case of Bosnia, Andjelic even speaks of two parallel 
worlds, while Sumantra Bose asserts that several Bosnias co-existed in the pre-war 
period.74 Although the characteristics of urban Bosnia might have dominated public 
rhetoric, rural Bosnia was demographically more significant: Bosnia’s five largest 
towns accounted for barely 25 per cent of the population in 1992 and outside these 
towns attitudes and inter-community relations were of a markedly different 
character.75 Moreover, the Yugoslav institutional structure was from the late 1960s, 
built on national identity, and Woodward argues that people in 1990 voted in terms 
of the politically relevant categories of this system, since they did not have time to 
shape new political identities.76
The pre-1989 existence of national divisions should therefore not be overlooked, nor 
should the collective Serb memories from the Second World War, the Yugoslav 
institutionalisation of national identity and the resentment against alleged Serb 
dominance. These factors facilitated the ethnification of politics and provided 
ammunition for extremists. However, ‘nationality’ or ‘ethnicity’ is, in the following 
analysis, not ascribed much independent explanatory value. Intra-ethnic elite 
competition is the main variable of interest and the focus of the research is the effect 
this had on the position of the leaders. It is argued that the ethnification of political 
competition was not a given in the first multiparty elections; it was part of the 
political struggle. Nor was the radicalisation of the dominant forces and the 
marginalisation of the moderates an inevitable outcome. The background factors
71 Gagnon, 2004: 34.
72 Malesevic, 2000: 163; Golubovic, 1996: 161.
73 Markovic, Vera, 1996. “Three misconceptions of nationalism as revealed through empirical 
experience”. In Stefano Bianchini & DuSan Janjid (eds.) Ethnicity in Postcommunism. Belgrade: 
Institute of Social Sciences, p. 167.
74 Andjelid, 2003: 134. Bose, Sumantra, 2002. Bosnia after Dayton. London: Hurst, p. 17.
75 Bose, Sumantra, 2002. Bosnia after Dayton. London: Hurst p. 14.
76 Woodward, 1995: 124.
Nina Caspersen: Intra-ethnic competition and inter-ethnic conflict 63
Chapter 2 -  Conflict and War in Croatia and Bosnia
outlined above are, nevertheless, of importance as background conditions: they affect 
the nature of political competition, the development of political parties and linkages 
between the elites and the general population.
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Chapter 3
Intra-Serb Competition in Pre-War Croatia* 
Ethnification and radicalisation
The introduction of multipartism launched a new Serb elite onto the political scene in 
Croatia; an elite which claimed to represent the homogenous interests of the Serbs. 
However, disunity prevailed and became even more dominant as the conflict 
intensified. In their quest for power, the Serb elites, moreover, had to compete with 
non-ethnic parties and, in this competition, the nature of ‘the political’ was at stake.1 
The Serb Democratic Party (Srpska demokratska stranka, SDS) managed to achieve 
dominance in the Serb community and subsequently radicalised its position but the 
ethnification of politics was necessary for this victory and the outcome depended on 
the dynamics of political competition. This chapter will analyse how the ethnic 
cleavage became dominant, how the process of ethnification affected political 
competition and why radicalisation ensued. The SDS itself was plagued by intra­
party strife that led to a radicalisation of the party and the ultimate takeover by 
hardliners who pursued a policy more in tune with Belgrade’s wishes. The dynamics 
of this competition and the audiences decisive in the hardline takeover will also be 
analysed: was it a question of hardliners more successfully playing the ethnic card?
Theoretically, the emergence of ethnically defined parties is generally held to lead to 
a radicalisation of politics; a radicalisation which is primarily voter-driven. Horowitz 
argues that once an ethnic mass party is created, other parties will be pressured to 
define themselves in ethnic terms in order to compete effectively and, in the resulting 
ethnic party system, the most successful parties will be those who use inflammatory 
and polarising rhetoric.2 An ethnic party system is, furthermore, seen as being prone 
to politics of centrifugal outbidding, since leaders who choose to moderate risk being 
branded with the stigma of betraying the nation by more extreme leaders who can 
successfully appeal to the general population. However, Horowitz takes as his 
starting point an already successful ethnic party, a party that has managed to become 
a mass party, and such success cannot be taken as a given. Ethnic parties will face
1 ‘Non-ethnic parties’ are defined as parties that do not compete on the ethnic cleavage and direct their 
appeals to all ethnic groups. ‘Non-ethnic forces’ include these parties as well as intellectuals and party 
deputies who insist on retaining a non-ethnic definition of politics.
2 Horowitz, 1985: 306, 331, 333.
3 Hislope, 1997: 472.
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competition from non-ethnic parties and this competition needs to be analysed in 
order to understand the impact of ethnic parties on the radicalisation of politics. 
Moreover, resources other than popular support can be used in this competition and 
be decisive for both ethnification and radicalisation.
The pre-war phase was a transitional phase and this influenced the nature of political 
competition: the parties were newly established, weak party structures were the norm 
and political positions and programmes were yet to be consolidated. Societal 
groupings were restructured, while new parties were searching for their social bases 
and programmatic profiles, and this transitional context facilitated electoral 
mobilisation along ethno-national rather than socio-economic lines.4 The transition 
from communism weakened the non-ethnic parties and strengthened the ethnic ones. 
Even before violence broke out, the situation was, therefore, far from conventional 
political competition and as sporadic violence began, coercive resources gained 
importance in the political competition. In addition to competition with non-ethnic 
parties, the main challengers for the Serb leaders came from within their own ranks 
and intra-party struggles intensified as ethnification of political competition 
progressed and the non-ethnic alternatives became marginalised. The intra-Serb 
competition reflected different views of the goals and strategies in the inter-ethnic 
conflict, ideological differences as well as personal power ambitions. Such 
competition would be expected to lead to a radicalisation of the political competition 
and this was, indeed, what happened. But this still leaves some questions: what were 
the factors causing this radicalisation? What resources were used by the winning 
forces in the party? How were they able to marginalise more moderate factions?
After analysing the dynamics of competition, the ethnification of politics and the use 
of party and movement resources, this chapter will turn its attention to the other 
audiences of importance for the intra-Serb competition: the kin-state and the general 
population. Given the ethnification of politics and the casting of the conflict in ethnic 
terms, the kin-state cannot be ignored and, furthermore, it possessed resources 
needed by the rivalling SDS elites. Belgrade intellectuals had played an important 
role in the political organisation of the Serbs in Croatia, in particular Dobrica Cosic
4 Siber, Ivan; Wenzel, Christian, 1997. “Electoral Behaviour in Croatia”. In Ivan Siber (ed.) The 1990 
and 1992/3 Sabor Elections in Croatia. Berlin: Sigma, p. 80-1.
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who helped organise the SDS in both Croatia and Bosnia and handpicked their 
leaders.5 However, for the further development of Serb politics, political and military 
leaders played a more important role than these intellectuals: they were better able to 
supply the resources most needed in the intra-Serb competition, especially coercive 
resources. The influence of kin-state leaders can be predominantly based on their 
position as leaders of the kin-state or as leaders of the kin -state, i.e. it can be mostly 
symbolic and closely linked with the process of ethnification or it can primarily be 
based on the state resources to which they have access. Both forms of influence 
proved important in the pre-war intra-Serb competition in Croatia. Theoretical 
discussions of intra-ethnic elite competition are usually focused on the issue of 
outbidding, which is argued to be about mass responsiveness to playing the ‘ethnic 
card’. But was popular support that important in the intra-Serb competition? Or was 
its importance dwarfed by other resources and hence other audiences to which the 
rivalling elites addressed their appeals? Finally, inter-ethnic relations are often seen 
as the primary cause of elite positioning in ethnic conflicts. The chapter will 
conclude with an analysis of this interplay with inter-ethnic relations and its effect on 
the direction and outcome of the intra-Serb competition. How was the process of 
ethnification affected? Was radicalisation a response to radicalisation of the ‘other 
side’?
3.1 Ethnification of politics and marginalisation of moderates
The clear winner of the first Croatian multi-party elections in April-May 1990 was 
the Croatian Democratic Community (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica, HDZ). But 
despite the victory of a predominantly ethnically defined party, non-ethnic parties 
still played an important role: the SDS only won a minority of the Serb votes and the 
issue of the future of Yugoslavia did not merely reflect an ethnic cleavage. The 
ethnification of politics did, however, gain speed after the elections and both non­
ethnic parties as well as more moderate voices within the SDS became increasingly 
marginalised.
5 Dragovic-Soso, 2002: 237
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Gradual ethnification o f politics: the 1990 elections 
The SDS was founded in Knin in February 1990 under the leadership of psychiatrist 
Jovan RaSkovic. Initially the party took a fairly moderate position and in its 
programme it advocated democracy, human rights, national equality as well as 
cultural autonomy for the Serbs and the re-drawing of administrative borders to 
create Serb-majority regions and municipalities. The SDS clearly supported the 
continued existence of the Yugoslav Federation and vowed to protect the interest of 
the Serbs in Croatia.6 However, since the national cleavage was not the only political 
cleavage of importance, the SDS would, in the competition for the Serb vote, face 
significant competition from non-ethnic parties.
The SDS and its non-ethnic rivals
Anticipating such competition, the leader of the SDS, Jovan RaSkovic, agreed with 
Mile Dakic that the latter would form a nominally non-ethnic party, the Yugoslav 
Independent Democratic Party (Jugoslavenska samostalna demokratska stranka, 
JSDS), which would appeal to Serbs who would otherwise vote for the reformed 
communists.7 This agreement was not publicly known and the official policies of the 
parties differed, although they both supported the preservation of the federal 
structure: the JSDS denied being a Serb party and it presented itself as a Yugoslav 
party open to all nations. It also did not share the SDS’s staunch anti-communist
O
stand and was more based in the Yugoslav Partisan tradition. The co-operation 
between these two parties reflected the incomplete ethnification of politics and the 
SDS knew that it would have problems capturing the non-ethnic ground. Constituting 
the ethnic cleavage as the dominant cleavage was, thus, part of the political struggle.
The reformed communists in the League of Communists of Croatia -  Party for 
Democratic Changes (Savez komunista Hrvatske -  Stranka demokratskih promjena, 
SKH-SDP) emphasised their determined resistance to Milosevic and independence 
from the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, but at the same time advocated the
6 Srpska demokratska stranka, 1990. “Programski ciljevi”. Nase Teme xxxiv (3-4): 774-781.
7 Interview Mile Dakic, Belgrade, 29 August 2003.
* Babic, Jasna, 1990. “Mile Dakic: Zamjena za savez komunista”. Danas, 13 March, p. 15. Zoric, 
Vukasin, 1990. “JSDS je Jugoslavenska”. Danas, 27 March, p. 6. Jugoslavenska samostalna 
demokratska stranka, 1990. “Politidki program -  deklaracija”. Nase Teme xxxiv (3-4): 747-751.
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preservation of the federal structure.9 The party had, contrary to Belgrade’s 
expectations, not split along ethnic lines10 and it could, therefore, still appeal to the 
Serbs in Croatia who were opposed to the prospect of Croatian independence. In its 
appeal the party was, furthermore, assisted by fielding some well-known candidates 
of Serb ethnicity. In an attempt to counter the strength of the incumbent party, both 
the SDS and the JSDS accused the SKH-SDP of being a ‘Croat-centric’ party,11 
thereby insisting on imposing an ethnic cleavage. But this strategy was largely to no 
avail. The SKH-SDP was very successful in its appeal to the Serb voters: the SDS’s 
support was concentrated in Krajina (in Knin, Donji Lapac and Gratae)12 and the 
majority of the Serbs in Croatia supported the SKH-SDP, while the SDS only won 
13.5 per cent of the Serb vote.13 The JSDS had never been accepted as a non-ethnic 
party by the media and it fared even worse than the SDS, winning less than 0.5 per 
cent of the total vote. In the SKH-SDP the significant support among Serb voters, 
however, raised concerns among some factions who rejected that the party should 
become the representative of the Serbs in Croatia.14 Conflict within the SKH-SDP 
was increasing and this helped the SDS strengthen its position.
The SDS becomes dominant
Due to the SDS’s poor showing in the elections, the large majority of Serb 
representatives in the Croatian Parliament were from the SKH-SDP. This minority 
position was probably one of the reasons why the five SDS representatives staged a 
walkout shortly after the constitution of Parliament.15 However, from what was now 
its extra-parliamentary position, the SDS noisily advertised itself as the only 
representative of the Serbs.16 The party was aided in its efforts by Franjo Tudman’s 
Government which, from the beginning, recognised the SDS as the representative of
9 ZakoSek, Nenad, 1997a. “Political Parties and the Party System in Croatia”. In Ivan Siber (ed.) The 
1990 and 1992/3 Sabor Election in Croatia”. Berlin: Sigma, p. 42. Savez komunista Hrvatske:
Stranka demokratskih promjena, 1990. “Za miran, sretan zivot u suverenoj i demokratskoj Hrvatskoj”. 
Nase Teme xxxiv (3-4): 622-647.
10 Interview DuSan Ple6a§, Secretary of the SKH-SDP’s Council. Zagreb, 26 March 2004.
11 Srpska demokratska stranka, 1990. Babic, Jasna, 1990. “Mile Dakic: Zamjena za zavez komunista”. 
Danas, 13 March, p. 15.
12 Grde§ic, Ivan; Kasapovic, Mirjana; Siber, Ivan; Zako§ek, Nenad, 1991 .Hrvatska u izborima. 
Zagreb: Naprijed. p. 224, 229.
13 Gagnon, 2004: 35.
14 JajtSinovid, Milan, 1990. “Lineja koja dijeli”. Danas, 5 June, p. 18-19.
15 This followed an incident when the president of SDS Benkovac was allegedly assaulted with a 
knife. Thompson, Mark, 1992. A Paper House: The Ending o f Yugoslavia. London: Vintage, p. 260.
16 Culic, Marinko, 1990. “Pohod udruzenih vozdova”. Danas, 10 July, p. 13-15.
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the Serbs in Croatia. This strengthened the party, which also became stronger due to 
growing institutionalisation: at the time of the elections the party was only properly 
organised in the Knin area,17 but this was now extended to Western and Eastern 
Slavonia.18
In its struggle to achieve dominance in the Serb community, the SDS was, 
furthermore, greatly aided by the growing conflict within the SKH-SDP. Since the 
party decided to reform in 1989, there had been some divisions between the stronger 
reformers in the SDP-faction and the more hesitant ones in the SKH-faction of the 
party. But as the conflict intensified, these divisions began to overlap with divisions 
between Croat and Serb officials, with the latter accusing the leadership of being too 
willing to co-operate with the HDZ Government. This led to attempts in June 1990 
by the local party committee in Petrinje to distance itself from the central leadership 
in an initiative which the party’s leader, Ivica Racan, characterised as an attempt to 
break up and divide the SKH-SDP on national grounds. The conflict persisted and, in 
September 1990, the Petrinje committee dissolved itself and the majority of the 
members joined the Socialist Party of Croatia (Socijalistidka partija Hrvatska).19 The 
conflict in the SKH-SDP and the view of many Serb party officials that it was 
becoming a Croat party led a large number of Serbs to leave the party, including 
most of the Serb Members of Parliament. However, some stayed in Parliament and 
continued to seek to influence the SKH-SDP leadership. Simo Rajic, a prominent 
Serb MP, became Deputy Speaker of Parliament in September 1990 but resigned 
after only four months on the post, citing the impossibility to promote Serb-Croat 
relations in Croatia.20 Rajic also left all posts in the SKH-SDP and criticised Radan 
and the party for not supporting his efforts.21 These internal divisions severely 
weakened the party in the struggle over ethnification and its initial greater possession 
of resources did not prove significant in the competition with the SDS. Finally, the
17 Kovadevic, Drago, 2003. Kavez: Krajina u dogovorenom ratu. Belgrade: Srpski demokratski forum, 
p. 29-30.
8 Interview Veljko Dzakula, SDS leader in Western Slavonia. Zagreb, 12 August 2003
19 Marinkovid, Gojko, 1990. “Raskol Hrvatskih Komunista”. Danas, 12 June, p. 10-12. “SKH-SDP 
vi§e ne postoji”. Borba, 14 September 1990, p. 3.
20 Rajid, Simo, 1991. Resignation letter to the Sabor Presidency, 4 January 1991. Author’s copy. 
Maloca, Mladen, 1991. “Odlazak usamljenog jahada”. Danas, 8 January, p. 16-17.
21 Interview Simo Rajic, Zagreb, 19 March 2004.
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SDS strengthened its position vis-a-vis the SKH-SDP by employing a range of non- 
democratic measures and pressuring local SKH-SDP officials out of public office.22
From a minority position in the Serb community, at the time of elections, the SDS 
was thus strengthened in the subsequent months by a combination of factors: by the 
increasing weakness of its rival, by actions of the Croatian Government, by the 
improved institutionalisation of the SDS and by the use of non-democratic pressures. 
As a result, the SKH-SDP was marginalised and the SDS found itself in a 
progressively more comfortable position, close to achieving monolithic status within 
the Serb community. Goran Hadzic, who was later to become president of the Serb 
Republic of Krajina, argues that, in 1990-91, there was no alternative to the SDS for 
the Serbs in Croatia and people would support the party whoever its leaders were. 
But the party still suffered from poor organisation: it was more a political movement 
than a structured political party24 and, after the de facto defeat of the SKH-SDP, it 
soon came to open conflict between the SDS’s factions. This internal competition 
strongly affected the position adopted by the party.
Intra-party outflanking
During 1990 and culminating in early 1991, the leader of the SDS, Jovan Raskovic, 
became increasingly constrained by hardliners in the party who forced him to take an 
ever more uncompromising position and attacked his willingness to negotiate with 
the Croatian Government. Therefore, from its formation in early 1990, the demands 
made by the SDS underwent a gradual radicalisation. In late June 1990 the
•ye
Community of (Serb) Municipalities of Northern Dalmatia and Lika was founded, 
and on 25 July the so-called Serb Assembly was held in Srb in Krajina. The 
Assembly constituted the Serb National Council (Srpko nacionalno vijece, SNV) as 
its executive body and the gradual change in demands was reflected in the 
Declaration on Sovereignty and Autonomy o f the Serb People which was adopted by 
the assembly. The declaration stated, “... the Serb people in Croatia have the right to 
autonomy. The content o f that autonomy will depend on the federal or confederal
22 Gagnon, 2004:145-6.
23 Interview Goran Hadzic, Belgrade, 30 October 2003.
24 Interview Veljko Dzakula, Zagreb, 12 August 2003.
25 “Odluku o osnivanu i konstitusanju Zajednice opcina sjeveme Dalmacije i Like”. Dakic, Mile,
1994. The Serbian Krayina: Historical Roots and Its Birth. Knin: Iskra. Enclosure no. 3.
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structure o f Yugoslavia”. The degree of autonomy demanded therefore depended on 
the future status of Yugoslavia: “ 7 k  case o f a confederal state structure o f Yugoslavia, 
the Serb people in Croatia have the right to political-territorial autonomy”. In his 
book Luda Zemlja, Ra§kovi6 stated that territorial autonomy would also be 
demanded in case Yugoslavia ceased to exist.27 However, the declaration stated that 
the future of Yugoslavia could not be determined without the participation of the 
Serb people and Raskovic the following day declared: “/« the event that Croatia 
secedes, the Serbs in Croatia have a right to decide in a referendum with whom and 
on whose territory they will live”. It was, therefore, unclear what would be 
demanded in case Yugoslavia dissolved.
The assembly also decided to hold a referendum on the declaration of autonomy. 
This referendum was, however, declared illegal by the Zagreb Government and 
following rumours that its holding would be prevented, roadblocks were mounted by 
cutting down trees, which effectively barricaded the Knin region; an event which 
came to be known as the ‘log revolution*. The referendum went ahead on 19 August 
and close to 100 per cent of the Serb voters supported the proposal for autonomy. 
Subsequently, on 30 September, autonomy was declared.
Despite this radicalisation, Ra§kovic’s position in the party was by no means secure. 
He had failed to build a cohesive core of leaders and two of the founders of the party, 
Jovan Opacic and Du§an Zelembaba, became dissatisfied early on with what they 
regarded as their lack of power in the party.29 They were, furthermore, known as 
hardliners and their dissatisfaction was also with Raskovic *s political stance. The 
fallout therefore reflected both personal ambitions and political differences, and 
furthermore also regional differences between Serb majority areas in Krajina and the 
rest of Croatia. Raskovic had already, in May 1990, been pressured by hardliners to 
suspend relations with the Croatian Parliament,30 but the pressure increased 
exponentially when Tudman’s adviser in late July 1990, decided to leak a transcript 
of secret negotiations between Tudman and Raskovic. This transcript was seriously
26 “Deklaracija o suverenosti i autonomiji Srpskog naroda u Republici Hrvatskoj”. Author’s copy.
27 RaSkovic, Jovan, 1990. Luda Zemlja. Belgrade: Akvarijus. p. 251.
28 Woodward, 1995: 120.
29 Radulovid, Srdan, 1991. “Ko rezira deobe: Sta se dogadu Kninu”. Vreme, 25 February, p. 26-27.
30 Jajcinovic, Milan, 1990. “Linija koja dijeli”. Danas, 5 June, p. 18-19.
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damaging to Raskovic since it portrayed him as weak and confused, and he, 
furthermore, reiterated his moderate demands, described the Serbs as a crazy people 
and admitted having difficulty controlling hardliners in the party.31 Raskovic denied 
the authenticity of the transcript and sought to bolster his position within the party by 
making more uncompromising statements. But this did not suffice to quell the 
criticism and in September 1990 an extraordinary meeting of the SDS main board 
was called. At this meeting Opadic and Zelembaba made an attempt to replace 
Raskovic as party president but they failed to win sufficient support and 
consequently resigned from their party functions. Although he survived this attack, 
Raskovic was obviously weakened and Milan Babic, who was the Mayor of Knin, 
pressured Raskovic to leave Croatia and go on a support-raising tour in the US.34 
Babic would then take over the de facto leadership of the party.35
One of the causes of Opacic’s and Zelembaba’s discontent had been the number of 
influential posts given to the party’s new de facto leader.36 RaSkovic saw Babic as an 
ally and promoted his comet-like career within the party: Babic became president of 
the SNV and RaSkovic transferred significant authority to him.37 However, giving 
Babic that much power turned out to be fatal since Ra§kovic’s protege eventually 
decided to turn against his mentor. Babic was, in the beginning, careful not to make 
extreme public statements and he even managed to reach some local agreements with
■JO
the Croatian authorities, but he made no secret of his demands for more extensive 
autonomy and, with the purpose of defeating Raskovic, he began to build an 
alternative power base. The territorial autonomy that he demanded was given its first 
form when SDS-dominated municipalities were joined together in the Community of
31 Transcript published in “Cija je Hrvatska”. Danas, 31 July 1991, p. 12-15. See also Lovric, Jelena, 
1990. “Bitka za Hrvatsku”. Danas, 7 August, p. 10-12.
32 Lovric, Jelena, 1990. “Bitka za Hrvatsku”. Danas, 7 August, p. 10-12. Lovric, Jelena, 1990. “Srpski 
puc u Hrvatskoj”. Danas, 21 August, p. 7-9.
ICTY, 2002a. ‘Transcripts: Prosecutor vs. Slobodan Milosevic (IT-02-54)”. Transcripts from Milan 
Babic’s testimony, 18 November-9 December 2002. p. 13563. Opacic left the party as such, while 
Zelembaba remained a member. At the same meeting, the vice-president of the main board, Branko 
Peric, also resigned. “Ostavke Zelenbabe i Perica”. Borba, 19 September 1990, p. 4. Stamatovic, S., 
1990. “Ostavke nisu pobuna”. Borba, 20 September.
34 Radulovic, Srdan, 1991.”Ko rezira deobe: Sta se dogadu Kninu”. Vreme, 25 February, p. 26-27.
35 Interview Filip Svarm, journalist Vreme. Belgrade 13 September 2004.
36 Radulovic, Srdan, 1991.”Ko rezira deobe: Sta se dogadu Kninu”. Vreme, 25 February, p. 26-27.
37 Culi6, Marinko, 1990. “Rob drzave u drzavi”. Danas, 21 August, p. 16-17. Babic, Jasna, 1990.
“Cije je oruzje”. Danas, 18 September, p. 13-15.
38 See e.g. Stamatovic, S., 1990. “Gradanski ili etni£ki suverenitet”. Borba, 5 July, p. 14. Modric, S., 
1990. “KrCenje staza za buduce pregovore”. Borba, 12 September.
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Municipalities. Babic was to use this Community as a powerbase and he extended it 
by persuading or even forcing other municipalities to join. Moreover, he started 
building a loyal militia.39 Letting Babic acquire that much power could, therefore, be 
seen as a grave mistake by RaSkovic but it may conceivably have been a political 
strategy gone wrong. The existence of hardliners gave Raskovic an excuse for the 
radicalisation of the party and also gave him bargaining power since concessions 
were necessary to avoid “the collision o f two flocks o f haws”.40
Babic was, however, not easy to control and he was strengthening his power behind 
the scenes. Raskovic had support in the central structures of the party, especially in 
the main board which comprised the founders of the party. Babic, on the other hand, 
relied more on local structures of power centred round Knin: the local SDS 
committee, the Knin municipal council, the Community of Municipalities and the 
SNV. This control was enhanced by imposing a hard line on the local SDS 
organisations and forcing out SDS moderates.41 During Ra§kovic’s stay in the US, 
Babic radicalised the position of the SDS and its executive board decided that 
territorial and political autonomy would be demanded even if Croatia accepted a 
continuation of the Yugoslav federal structure 42 In late October 1990, it came to the 
first open conflict between the two leaders: Vojislav Vukcevic, who was a close 
associate of Raskovic, vice-president of the SDS and one of the founders of the party, 
took part in negotiations with the Croatian Government. But when these negotiations 
were made public, the SDS in Knin denied the legitimacy of Vukcevic to act as a 
negotiator. It was stated that no one but the president of the SNV, Milan Babic, had 
the right to negotiate on behalf of the Serb people 43 In response, Raskovic issued a 
letter affirming that Vukcevic was the legitimate representative of the SDS and was 
authorised to negotiate.44 The conflict further escalated in connection with the 
December 1990 elections in Serbia, which RaSkovic wanted the SDS to contest. 
Babic was against this and in a main board vote on 22 November he beat Raskovic 
with the smallest possible margin: one vote.45 Less than a month later, the Croatian
39 Glenny, Misha, 1996. The Fall o f Yugoslavia. London: Penguin, p. 17.
40 Culi6, Marinko, 1990. ’’Intervju: Jovan Raskovic”. Danas, 29 May p. 13-15.
41 Gagnon, 2004: 143, 146.
42 Jajcinovic, Milan, 1990. “Stvaranje zapane Srbije”. Danas, 30 October, p. 26-27.
43 Vasic, Milo§, 1992. “Babic’s Swan Song”. VremeNews Digest, no. 20,10 February.
44 Raskovic, Jovan, 1990. “Mi§ljenje”. Document dated 29 October 1990. Author’s copy.
45 Radulovic, Srdan, 1990. “Sokolovi u jatu”. Vreme, 31 December, p. 26.
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Parliament enacted a new Constitution, which included cultural autonomy for the 
Serbs (art. 15) but deprived them of their position as a constituent people. This was a 
severe setback for RaSkovic. The day before the Constitution was enacted, the Serb 
Autonomous Region (Srpska autonomna oblast, SAO) of Krajina was declared by 
the Community of Municipalities and with this step Babic had once again 
demonstrated his strength. The SDS in Knin subsequently launched a campaign 
against RaSkovic and his ally in Slavonia, Vojislav Vukcevic, in an attempt to deliver 
the final blow to the beleaguered party leader.46
Opacic and Zelembaba had, meanwhile, returned to the SDS and, despite their 
hardline reputation, they were expected to strengthen RaSkovic due to their antipathy 
towards the Knin Mayor.47 Consequently, RaSkovic decided to challenge Babic 
directly at a meeting of the SDS main board in mid-February 1991. The issues under 
discussion were the removal of two Babic loyalists from the main board, changing 
the SDS statute and Babic’s proposal for the creation of an SDS party organisation in 
Krajina.48 On the issue of the statute, Babic advocated making joining Serbia the 
official goal, whereas Raskovic supported the preservation of Yugoslavia as the 
official party policy.49 In the vote, which was perceived as a vote for or against Babic 
and his policies, the Knin Mayor was clearly defeated: 38 out of 42 members of the 
board supported Ra§kovic.50 Vukcevic argues that at that point Babic was “politically 
dead'.51 However, the moment of triumph was short-lived, since the main board 
lacked the power to implement its decision. The Babic-led SNV had, for several 
months, not adopted a single proposal bearing Raskovic’s seal53 and, exactly one 
month after the main board defeat, Babic went on to form a separate party 
organisation, the SDS of Krajina. While this could be seen as the formation of a new 
party, the divide between the two parts of the SDS was fluid and Babic argued that 
he, as leader of the SDS Krajina, spoke for the SDS as a whole. Formal institutions
46 “SDS se ograduje od Raskovica”. Vjesnik, 1 February 1991, p. 8. Radulovic, Srdan, 1991. “Ko 
rezira deobe: Sta se dogadu Kninu”. Vreme, 25 February, p. 26-27.
47 Radulovic, Srdan, 1990. “Sokolovi u jatu”. Vreme, 31 December, p. 26.
48 Radulovic, Srdan, 1991. “Ko rezira deobe: §ta se dogadu Kninu”. Vreme, 25 February, p. 26-27. 
Vresnik, Victor, 1991. “Raskovic izjavluje da ce se ‘Krajina’ prositi na Slavoniju i Baranju!”. Vjesnik, 
19 February, p. 4.
49 Interview Vojislav Vukcevic, Belgrade, 7 August 2003.
50 Radulovic, Srdan, 1991. “Ko rezira deobe: §ta se dogadu Kninu”. Vreme, 25 February, p. 26-27.
51 Interview Vojislav Vukcevic, Belgrade, 7 August 2003.
52 Interview Filip Svarm, Belgrade, 13 September 2004.
53 “Borba za SDS-prijestolje”. Vjesnik, 20 February 1991, p. 7.
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were at this point not of great importance and despite Babic’s defeat in the ‘main* 
SDS he was barely weakened. Events unfolded quickly and polarisation was 
increasing.
Violence first broke out in the Western Slavonian town of Pakrac in early March 
1991 when Serb militias confronted the Croatian police.54 Even though the rebellion 
failed, the arrest of 400 Serbs still threatened to bring an end to the more moderate 
SDS leadership in this part of Croatia. The local leader of the SDS, Veljko Dzakula, 
feared that if the arrests were upheld, the local SDS leaders would be killed by the 
relatives of the people arrested.55 In order to avoid complete marginalisation by the 
hardliners, the Slavonian leaders therefore decided to go to Zagreb to seek a solution 
with President Tudman and, as a result of these talks, the Croatian authorities 
released the 400 people. The crisis was, therefore, temporarily suspended.
SDS faction seeks co-operation with non-SDS Serbs
These talks between the Slavonian leaders of the SDS and the Croatian Government 
coincided with the submission of three proposals for cultural autonomy to the 
Parliament’s special commission on inter-ethnic relations. The most comprehensive 
of these proposals suggested ‘maximalist’ cultural autonomy as well as the creation 
of a Club of Serb Deputies in Parliament. At the meeting, the SDS leaders also 
proposed the creation of a Club of Serb Deputies and, furthermore, indicated that the 
SDS deputies might return to Parliament.56 So, therefore, it seemed that a 
rapprochement between the SDS and the nine remaining Serb deputies was possible57 
and this could potentially strengthen the moderate faction of the SDS. Such an 
alliance, however, never materialised: the SDS moderates were becoming 
increasingly marginalised and, furthermore, co-operation could have met resistance 
from the leader of the SKH-SDP, who was wary of his party being perceived as the 
representative of the Serbs.58
54 Daskalovid, Zoran, 1991. “Rat u Pakracu”. Danas, 5 March, p. 28-29.
55 Interview Vojislav Vukcevid, Belgrade, 7 August 2003.
56 Kru§elj, Zeljko, 1991. “Srbi u Banskim Dvorima”. Danas, 19 March, p. 22-23
57 Number based on list of MPs in Sabol, Zeljko, (ed.) 1992. Sabor Republike Hrvatske 1990-1992. 
Zagreb: Hrvatski Sabor. In addition to the nine remaining Serb MPs, there were nine other MPs who 
did not declare their nationality and three MPs of other nationality. 28 Serb MPs had left Parliament, 5 
of whom were from the SDS.
58 Interview Simo Rajic, Zagreb, 19 March 2004.
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In April 1991, a new explicitly Serb party was formed: The Serb National Party 
(Srpska narodna stranka, SNS) under the leadership of Milan Bukic.59 The party 
supported a moderate stance, but its ability to serve as an alternative to the SDS was 
seriously undermined by its close relations with the Croatian authorities and it was 
regarded as little more than Tudman’s mouthpiece. As late as July 1991, when 
violence had already broken out in parts of Slavonia, the Serb Democratic Forum 
(Srpski demokratski forum, SDF) was founded. The then president of the SDF, 
Milorad Pupovac, argues that the SDF was formed by a group of Serb intellectuals 
when they realised that the conflict would take “explicit extreme ethnic dimensions” 
and that the non-ethnic parties were not doing anything to stop the conflict.60 The 
SDF supported the independence of Croatia within its existing borders61 and argued 
for autonomy as a solution to the conflict.62 Among the founders of the SDF were 
Raskovic and other members of the SDS, and one of those SDS members, Veljko 
Dzakula, argues: “we wanted to create a large front, where the voice o f reason could 
be heard”.63 The SDF constituted the first significant ‘ethnic’ alternative to the SDS 
and it tried to prevent the radicalisation of the dominant Serb forces in Croatia but 
when the initiative was finally under way, when former non-ethnic forces had 
accepted that this conflict was centred on an ethnic cleavage, the conflict had already 
spiralled out of control and the SDF was no match for the Knin faction of the SDS.
The hardline SDS had consolidated its position when on 18 March 1991, the 
Municipal Assembly of Knin adopted the decision to separate SAO Krajina from 
Croatia and two weeks later it was decided to join Serbia. Similarly, in Eastern 
Slavonia, the SNV decided in late March 1991 that Vukcevic should no longer 
represent the region and it was declared that the region had joined Serbia. The leader 
of the Serb Radicals, Vojislav Seselj, subsequently arrived in Baranja to support the 
separation from Croatia and he declared that Vukcevic should be shot: “Shoot him 
down in front o f his house like a dog”6A This finally led Vukcevic to resign from the
59 Podgomik, Branko, 1991. “Osniva se Srpska Narodna Stranka”. Vjesnik, 6 April, p. 5.
60 Interview Milorad Pupovac, Zagreb, 11 August 2003.
61 Promitzer, Christian, 1992. “Political Parties in Croatia”. Labour Focus on Eastern Europe 43(3): 
41-45. p. 45.
62 In 1992 Milorad Pupovac wrote, “the Serb minority must be allowed to develop its own territorial, 
political and cultural autonomy”. Pupovac, Milorad, 1992. “A settlements for the Serbs in Croatia”. 
Labour Focus on Eastern Europe 43(3): 46-47. p. 46.
63 Interview Veljko Dzakula, Zagreb, 12 August 2003.
64 Interview Vojislav Vukcevic, Belgrade, 7 August 2003.
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SDS leadership later stating: “7 stepped aside in order not to be killed*’.65 With this 
leadership change in Eastern Slavonia, Babic was further strengthened as he won 
over another SDS faction. In the summer of 1991, the moderate wing of the SDS still 
had considerable support in the central structures of the party but the hardliners were 
in firm control in Knin and Eastern Slavonia. The hardliners achieved their victory 
through their support in local and regional party structures and through their control 
of economic, political and especially coercive resources. One audience was crucial in 
the supply of these resources: Slobodan Milosevic, the ‘President of all Serbs’.
3.2 Kin-state involvement: Building up and arming extremists
Belgrade’s dominant rhetorical response to the HDZ’s electoral victory was to argue 
that the new Croatian authorities had nothing but harmful intentions towards the 
republic’s Serb population. This undoubtedly aided the more extreme forces among 
the rivalling Serb leaders, but Belgrade’s involvement was not limited to this more 
general fanning of flames, and the Serbian authorities took an active part in the SDS 
infighting.
Support for radical wing o f the SDS
During the course of 1990 and early 1991 Milosevic was becoming increasingly 
frustrated with Ra§kovic and Babic argues that the Serbian President, in early 1991, 
told him to replace the SDS leader.66 RaSkovic had not only showed willingness to 
negotiate but he also distanced himself from the Serbian President whom he opposed 
in public and even described as “a great Bolshevik’ and a “tyrant’.61 Raskovic, 
furthermore, decided to let the SDS’s branch in Serbia run against Milosevic’s SPS
fret
in the Serbian elections in late 1990, thereby challenging Milosevic directly. Babic, 
on the other hand, had no problems expressing his unreserved support for the Serbian 
President: on the eve of the Serbian elections he sent a letter of support to Milosevic 
and, after the demonstrations on 9 March 1991, he reiterated his support and
65 Svarm, Filip, 1996. “Interview Vojislav Vukcevic: Unlearned lessons”. Vreme News Digest, no. 
253,10 August.
66 ICTY, 2002a: 13565.
67 RaSkovic 1990: 328. Culic, Marinko, 1990. “Pohod udruzenih vozdova”. Danas, 10 July, p. 13-15. 
Lovric, Jelena, 1990. “Bitka za Hrvatsku”. Danas, 7 August, p. 10-12.
68 Radulovic, Srdan, 1991. “Ko rezira deobe: Sta se dogadu Kninu”. Vreme, 25 February, p. 26-27.
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described DraSkovic as Tudman’s “cat’s paw”.69 These letters demonstrate that the 
Serb leaders in Croatia were not merely passively following Belgrade’s moves; 
Babic was very actively wooing for Milosevic’s support knowing that it could prove 
decisive in his rivalry with Raskovic. Babic was willing to follow Belgrade’s lead 
and in his efforts to make Milosevic start betting on a different horse he was, 
furthermore, aided by being less anti-communist than RaSkovic who often denounced 
Milosevic due his believe in socialism.70
Belgrade’s involvement in the internal SDS rivalry was of two main forms: arming 
of the paramilitary police and support for Babid through the state-controlled media. 
In the Belgrade media, a public profile was created for the formerly relatively 
anonymous Mayor from Knin; an image of him as a champion of Serb patriotism, the 
undisputable leader of Serbs in Croatia and a key figure for implementing the ‘all 
Serbs in one state plan’.71 The military side of the involvement started earlier with 
the radical elements in the Serb movement being armed and organised by the Serbian 
security service and the Serbian Ministry of the Interior, by the JNA and by semi-
n*yprivate channels organised by retired generals like Dusan Pekic. In this aspect of 
Belgrade’s involvement, the then police inspector in Knin, Milan Martic, played a 
key role and from the log revolution and until the JNA began interfering in March 
1991, his police represented the only law in Krajina.73 These so-called Marticevi 
were organised by the Serbian security service and came to function as a form of 
parallel structure in Krajina: they were never subjected to the JNA’s control and took 
dictate directly from Belgrade.74 The military side of Belgrade’s involvement may 
not have been directly targeted to assist Babic but to strengthen radical elements in 
general and to ensure control over developments. However, through an alliance with 
Martic, Babic had access to military resources and, therefore, was considerably 
advantaged in his competition with RaSkovic, who only possessed resources of a 
political nature.
69 Svarm, Filip, 1993. “Love that’ll never die”. Vreme News Digest, no. 113, 22 November.
70 See e.g. Lovric, Jelena, 1990. “Raskovic u kucinama”. Danas, 7 August, p. 11.
71 Cerovid, Stojan, 1992. ‘Troubles with a bit player”. Vreme News Digest, no. 16,13 January.
72 Svarm, Filip, 1993. “Love that’ll never die”. Vreme News Digest, no. 113, 22 November. Vasic, 
Milo§ et al, 1995. “The Fall of Western Slavonia”. Vreme News Digest no. 188, 8 May. Sell, 2002:
116.
73 Svarm, Filip, 1993. “Milan Martic’s Flying Circus”. Vreme News Digest, no. 116,13 December.
74 Gow, 2003: 80. Svarm, Filip, 1993. “Milan Martic’s Flying Circus”. Vreme News Digest, no. 116,
13 December.
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Through the supply of resources necessary in the intra-SDS competition, Belgrade 
played an important role in Babic*s victory and in the marginalisation of the more 
moderate faction of the SDS. Babic realised the importance of Belgrade’s support 
and actively pursued it, emphasising the special position enjoyed by the Serbian 
President. RaSkovic, on the other hand, attempted to become directly part of the elite 
competition in Serbia thereby clearly overstepping Milosevic’s limits and provoking 
his anger. Despite deliberately seeking Belgrade’s support, Babic turned out to be 
harder to control than Milosevic had anticipated. After consolidating his power 
within the SDS, Babic also began asserting his independence, and he already in 
March 1991, challenged Milosevic’s right to reach agreements on behalf of the 
Krajina Serbs and reminded the public that Milosevic was the President of Serbia, 
not of Krajina.75 For a while though, the mutual mistrust seemed to evaporate after 
the JNA intervened on behalf of the Serbs in late March 1991, thereby giving Knin a 
sign that they would get the needed support from Belgrade.76 At the time, the stance 
of the international community also still seemed to favour the Serb position: in 
March 1991, both US and EC leaders expressed their support for the territorial 
integrity of Yugoslavia.77 But over the next year, the international position changed
7ftconsiderably, which caused a change in Belgrade’s strategy and consequently a rift 
with the Serb leaders in Croatia.
In conclusion, Belgrade’s involvement was very significant for the direction and 
outcome of intra-Serb competition in Croatia. But it was not only one-sided: the 
hardliners were actively seeking Belgrade’s support and were, furthermore, asserting 
their independence following their victory. The process of ethnification was, as 
expected, accompanied by the symbolic importance of the kin-state leader, but the 
importance of kin-state involvement increased significantly when non-democratic 
resources became of greater importance in the competition. The great significance of 
such resources would suggest the limited importance of popular attitudes in the intra- 
Serb competition.
75 “Milan Babic: Hrvatska nema suverenitet”. Danas, 26 March 1991, p. 24. Radulovic, Srdan, 1991. 
“Nedosledni Babic”. Vreme 1 April, p. 11.
76 Silber; Little, 1996: 145.
77 Burg, Steven L.; Shoup, Paul S., 1999. The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and 
International Intervention. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, p. 80.
78 Ibid. 84.
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3.3 General population: Radicals lacking popular support
The SDS managed to achieve dominance from a minority position at the time of the 
elections. Was this change in the party’s fortunes driven by changing popular 
attitudes? Was its subsequent radicalisation?
1990 elections: Support for non-ethnic alternative
At the time of the 1990 elections, ethnic divisions were still not dominant and most 
of the Serb voters supported the SKH-SDP. According to a poll conducted shortly 
before the elections, 44 per cent of the Serb voters would support the SKH-SDP, 22 
per cent the SDS and 14 per cent the JSDS.79 This even overestimated the support 
enjoyed by the SDS since, at the elections, only 2 per cent of all voters supported the 
party, which translates into around 13.5 per cent of the Serb vote.80 It would seem, 
therefore, that a part of the Serb electorate decided in the last minute to close ranks 
behind the SKH-SDP or refrained from voting. This indicates a fairly low level of 
polarisation or ethnification.
Due to this incomplete ethnification of politics, the SDS knew that it would have 
problems capturing the non-ethnic ground and the JSDS was, therefore, designed to 
attract Serb voters who would otherwise be more inclined to support the reformed 
communists. Judging from pre-elections surveys, this profiling of the parties was 
successful and the supporters of the two parties differed significantly in their political 
attitudes (Table 3.1). While the SDS was an all-Serb party, the JSDS also attracted 
other nationalities: 23 per cent Yugoslavs, 5 per cent Croats and 5 per cent Muslims. 
Among the Serb respondents the JSDS supporters were, furthermore, markedly less 
religious than the supporters of the SDS. In terms of political attitudes the Serb JSDS 
supporters were more inclined to advocate the preservation of the existing federal 
structure, whereas the SDS’s supporters advocated a more centralised federation or 
even a unitary state. In addition, the majority of the JSDS’s Serb supporters did not 
feel that Serbs were discriminated against, whereas the majority of the SDS’s 
supporters argued this to be the case and consequently regarded inter-ethnic relations 
in Croatia as the most important election issue.
79 Pre-election survey “Anketa: Izbori 1990.” Fakultet politidkih znanosti, SveuCilista u Zagrebu. This 
and the following datasets were kindly given to me by Professor Ivan Siber.
80 Gagnon, 2004: 35.
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Table 3.1 Serb supporters of the SDS, the JSDS and the SKH-SDP
SDS JSDS SKH-SDP
Percentage of Serbs among 
supporters 100 pet 66 pet 28 pet
Percentage who are not religious* 35 pet 69 pet 79 pet
Support for preservation of federal 
structure* 16 pet 46 pet 36 pet
Percentage who agree that Serbs 
and Croats are equal* 14 pet 56 pet 63 pet
♦Only Serb respondents. The differences between the parties are all significant at the 0.001 level (the 
two latter at the 0.000 level). Data from “Anketa: Izbori 1990”.
As the leaders o f the two parties had expected, the supporters o f the JSDS were, 
therefore, closer to the attitudes o f SKH-SDP supporters. There were, however, 
important demographic differences between the two groups with the SKH-SDP’s 
Serb supporters being more urban and better educated. The Serbs who supported the 
SDS and the JSDS were generally less urban and less educated than the Serbs who 
supported the reformed communists (Table 3.2). This suggests that socio-economic 
differences were o f significance, even if an actual cleavage was not well-established 
and socio-economic issues were not prominent in the campaign.
Table 3.2 Demographic characteristics of SDS, JSDS and SKH-SDP supporters
SDS JSDS SKH-SDP
Residence in rural areas 48 pet 50 pet 33 pet
Education: 8 years or less 19 pet 28 pet 16 pet
Education: University degree 13 pet 6 pet 18 pet
Only Serb respondents. The differences between the parties are all significant at the 0.000 level. Data 
from “Anketa: Izbori 1990”.
The JSDS had only managed to attract Serbs who, in terms of demographic 
characteristics, were closer to the SDS’s voters but who supported a non-ethnic 
position. Judging from the election results, these voters were few and far between. 
The SDS’s supporters expressed views that could be difficult to accommodate but 
the party’s poor showing in the elections suggested that such attitudes would not 
present a significant problem. One must, however, consider that the disappointing 
result for the SDS was partly explained by its poor organisation: the party was only 
properly organised in the Knin-area and this naturally hampered its electoral
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performance elsewhere.81 Moreover, even though the SDS had not performed well, 
the election results did not signify that a socio-economic cleavage dominated 
political competition;82 and the ethnic cleavage was to become increasingly more 
important after the elections. The transitional situation and the lack of a well- 
established socio-economic cleavage therefore aided the SDS.
Post-electoral ethnification
After the elections, the SDS loudly questioned the SKH-SDP’s right to represent the 
Serbs in Croatia. The SDS’s assertions were mostly based on the SKH-SDP’s co­
operation with the new Croatian authorities and on it being a non-ethnic party, but 
the SDS leaders, furthermore, pointed to declining Serb support for the reformed 
communists. Based on this alleged alteration in support, the SDS demanded new 
elections in order to demonstrate their legitimacy as the Serb representative. Such 
elections were never granted but the reduced support for the reformed communists 
was not just dreamed up in the SDS headquarters, and surveys point to a sharp 
decline in support for the SKH-SDP among Serbs. Thus, in August 1990, only 24 per 
cent of the surveyed Serbs had a positive view of the party’s leader, Ivica Racan, 
compared with 47 per cent in June and 33 per cent in July. From being the staunchest 
supporters of the SKH-SDP, the Serbs had become the group with the least positive 
view of the party’s leader. At the same time, 75 per cent of the Serb respondents 
had a positive view of Raskovic and 67 per cent indicated their support for the SDS- 
organised referendum on Serb autonomy.84
But what caused this rapid decline in support? Unfortunately, it has not been possible 
to obtain any surveys of dissatisfied SKH-SDP supporters, but attitudes among the 
party’s Serb supporters shortly before the elections, nevertheless, give an indication. 
Most of the party’s supporters said that they would vote for the party due to its 
programme and when asked to list values of importance to them in the election 
campaign, three were clearly predominant: Yugoslav community (76 per cent), peace
AC
and security (61 per cent) and national equality (59 per cent). By August 1990 the
81 Kovadevic, 2003: 29-30.
82 Siber; Wenzel, 1997: 83.
83 Jovic, Dejan, 1990. “I Tudman i RaSkovic rastu”. Danas, 28 August, p. 30-33.
84 Ibid.
85 “Anketa: Izbori 1990”.
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Serb voters could increasingly argue that the SKH-SDP had failed on all three 
accounts. The preservation of Yugoslavia was looking less likely, peace and security 
was seriously under threat and national equality was undermined by the new 
Croatian authorities with whom many Serb SKH-SDP voters felt that their party was 
working too closely. The party’s support for the amendments to the Croatian 
Constitution especially proved highly unpopular. The SKH-SDP, on the other hand, 
argues that the main problem was that many of the Serb party members could not 
accept that the party had reformed, that it was no longer the League of 
Communists.86 They, thus, argue that it was mainly an ideological cleavage rather 
than a national one.
While the support for the SKH-SDP among the Serb voters therefore declined 
markedly over a very short period of time, the increased support for the SDS was 
never tested at the polls and the SDS’s removal of local SKH-SDP councillors was 
certainly not given a democratic mandate. The SDS, moreover, underwent a 
considerable radicalisation from the elections and until the outbreak of war. Did this 
change in the party’s position enjoy the support of the Serb voters? If we compare 
Raskovic’s support in June 1990 with his support in August 1990, i.e. after the 
referendum on autonomy, then we find a small increase: in June, 69 per cent had a 
positive view of him but, in August, this had risen to 75 per cent. But this increase in 
support was accompanied by a growing number of Serbs who had a negative view of 
the SDS leader: from 3 per cent in June to 14 per cent in August. It is, moreover, 
not clear that support for RaSkovic should be interpreted as support for a more 
radical course. The August survey was conducted after the leaking of talks between 
Raskovic and Tudman, which in the eyes of SDS hardliners revealed the party leader 
as being too moderate. Also, support for the referendum (67 per cent) was lower than 
the support for Raskovic.
Judging from the available survey data, it does appear that the Serb electorate 
abandoned the SKH-SDP; they abandoned the main non-ethnic party which seems to 
indicate that ethnification was also characteristic of the general population and not
86 Interview Du§an Plecas, Zagreb, 26 March 2004.
87 Jovid, Dejan, 1990. “Uglednovih voda”. Danas, 26 June, p. 14-17. Jovid, Dejan, 1990. “I Tudman i 
RaSkovic rastu”. Danas, 28 August, p. 30-33. In the latter survey the number of respondents from 
Knin was lower, which could cause an underestimation of the radicalisation.
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just of elite competition. However, there is no clear evidence that support was 
transferred to the SDS in the same proportions or that the continued radicalisation of 
the SDS was supported. It should be recognised that there was no real alternative to 
the SDS: the JSDS was marginal and the SKH-SDP made clear its disinclination to 
be the representative of the Serbs in Croatia. But the SDS was eager to legitimise 
their radicalisation and one way of doing so was through referenda.
Referenda in support o f  radicalisation
In July 1990, the SDS leadership decided to hold a referendum on autonomy, partly 
to counter claims that the Serb Assembly did not represent the opinions of the Serbs
oo
in Croatia. The result showed overwhelming support for autonomy and this gave 
added impetus to the continued radicalisation of the party. The exercise was repeated 
by Babid in the spring of 1991, when Serb voters were asked to vote on joining SAO 
Krajina with Serbia and remain in Yugoslavia. Again, the result was overwhelmingly 
supportive: according to the Krajina authorities, 93 per cent supported the proposal
Q Q
and in the Knin-area the turnout was reported to be a staggering 99.7 per cent. With 
this result, Babic’s hardline faction could point to increased legitimacy for their 
position. These referenda, however, should not be seen as a perfect test of public 
opinion: the democratic credentials were doubtful,90 the ‘urban Serbs’ did not take 
part and the voters, therefore, only represented a minority of the Croatian Serbs. 
RaSkovic explained the absence of the ‘urban Serbs’ with the greater fear that he 
argued existed in the cities91 but, if previous patterns are anything to go by, less 
support could have been expected from the Serbs in the cities. Babic’s support base 
was in the Knin region and this was also the centre of his 1991 referendum. But even 
though the referenda cannot be seen as a precise reflection of popular opinion, they 
do indicate that the SDS was supported by a large part of the Serb population and 
they played an important role in strengthening the party. In the increasingly tense 
atmosphere and with the successful elimination of alternatives, the SDS hardliners 
managed to take the voters along, but this does not mean that the process was driven 
by popular demands.
88 Interview Vojislav Vukcevic, Belgrade, 7 August 2003.
89 Stamatovic, S., 1991. “Za prisajedinjenje -  93 od sto”. Borba, 14 May, p. 4.
90 There were no voter registers and in August 1990,48,000 people are reported to have voted in 
Belgrade. Goldstein, Ivo, 1999. Croatia: a history. London: Hurst, p. 219.
91 Lovric, Jelena, 1990. “Jovan Raskovic: To se ne moze zaustaviti”. Danas, 21 August, p. 8.
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Popular attitudes and marginalisation o f moderates 
The clearest example of the lack of importance of popular attitudes for the 
radicalisation of the Serb position is the leadership rivalry within the SDS. 
Raskovic’s popularity among the Croatian Serbs and among SDS supporters was 
unmatched but it was not enough for him to hold on to power. His popularity 
remained intact after the leaking of his talks with Tudman but it was not sufficient 
when Babic enjoyed the support of local and regional party structures, paramilitary 
formations and Belgrade.
When Babic began his assent to the top of the SDS, his ratings approached those of 
the party leader, but never surpassed them: in September 1990, 84 per cent of the 
SDS’s supporters had a positive view of RaSkovic, while 76 per cent held that 
opinion of Babic. Similarly, in November 1990, 71 per cent of the Serbs had a 
positive view of Babic and 76 per cent had a positive view of Raskovic.92 However, 
as their internal rivalry became public and Babic radicalised his position, his support 
among the Serbs plummeted. Thus, in December 1990, only 54 per cent of the Serbs 
had a positive view of Babic compared with Raskovic’s 86 per cent. This meant that 
Babic was less popular among the Serbs than the federal PM, Ante Markovic and 
Ivan Zvonimir Cicak, then president of the Croatian Peasant Party, both of whom 
were Croats.93 Therefore, not only the popular support for radicalisation but also the 
dominance of the ethnic cleavage among the general population can be questioned. 
While Babic could not match Raskovic’s popularity he, as the Mayor of Knin, 
nevertheless had a popular mandate that Raskovic lacked. This may have earned him 
support in the Knin-region that he could use in the challenge against the party’s 
leader. But while such local popularity may have played some role in the elite 
competition, the outbidding that took place within the party was not based on greater 
support in the Serb population: Raskovic continued to be more popular than Babic 
among the Serbs in Croatia and non-ethnic alternatives also seem to have enjoyed 
popular support, despite declining faith in the SKH-SDP. Babic’s victory and the 
radicalisation of the party was, therefore, based on the availability and effectiveness
92 Jovic, Dejan, 1990. “Jastrebovi nize lete”. Danas, 2 October, p. 16-19. Jovid, Dejan, 1990. “Slavlju 
je kraj”. Danas, 4 December, p. 7-9.
3 Jovic, Dejan, 1991. “Cemu se nadaju”. Danas, 1 January, p. 28-31.
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of other resources: localised party support, non-democratic resources -  especially 
(para)military resources -  and kin-state support.
Even in the pre-war period, when elections were held and violence was still not the 
defining characteristics of politics, intra-ethnic competition was consequently not 
voter-driven, it was not about who could most successfully play the ethnic card. One 
of the consequences of this was the use of a vague position by the SDS: a position 
from which the party could appeal to the middle ground while at the same time 
seeking to increase tensions. Thus, while the demands were moderate and the need 
for peaceful means was stressed, the rhetoric was often inflammatory, designed to 
create inter-ethnic tensions. This brings us to the final aspect of the analysis, the 
inter-ethnic interplay. Theoretically this is expected to be important, but how 
significant was it for the pre-war intra-Serb competition in Croatia and the resulting 
ethnification and radicalisation of politics?
3.4 Inter-ethnic interplay: Lost moments of generosity?
One factor which is often pointed to when explaining the marginalisation of the 
moderate Serb forces and the SDS’s increasing radicalisation is the actions of the 
HDZ-led Croatian Government. This argument is both straightforward and 
compelling. In their election campaign the HDZ had targeted the over-representation 
of Serbs in official positions, and following the election victory many Serbs were 
fired from their jobs or forced to sign loyalty oaths.94 In July 1990, amendments to 
the Constitution were passed which replaced the five-pointed star on the Croatian 
flag with the sahovnica symbol, which the Serbs associated with the pro-Nazi 
Independent State of Croatia. The ‘Croatian literary language’, moreover, became the 
sole official language and the requirement of a two-thirds majority in decisions on 
inter-ethnic issues was removed.95
Robert Hislope argues that through these actions, the Croatian Government helped 
fuel Serb radicalism and strongly contributed to the ousting of Raskovic from the 
SDS’s leadership: it was a case of lost generosity moments.96 Mark Thompson
94 Silber; Little 1996: 108.
95 Hislope, 1998: 73-4.
96 Ibid. 75.
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similarly argues that the actions of the Croatian authorities made the moderate Serbs 
look implausible and provided ammunition for the extremists.97 This argument is 
also echoed by Susan Woodward, who asserts that the failure of Tudman to meet the 
initial demands for cultural autonomy led to a radicalisation of demands and 
ultimately the change of leadership in the SDS.98 The question is, however, how 
decisive these actions were in the competition between Raskovic and Babic: was it a 
case of radicalisation breeding radicalisation? It would, furthermore, be a mistake to 
view the HDZ or the Croatian Government as wholly unified; there were, in fact, 
great divisions. How did this fractionalisation of the ‘opposing side’ affect Serb elite 
competition? Finally, one more issue must be considered when analysing the 
interplay: how did it contribute to the ethnification of politics? How did it influence 
the dominance of the ethnic cleavage?
Ethnification o f politics
The victory of the HDZ was a shock to most Serbs and resulted in increased support 
for the SDS,99 but the new Croatian Government also aided the party in a more direct 
way: RaSkovic was considered the main interlocutor when Serb issues were 
concerned and, in October 1990, the SDS became formally recognised as the 
legitimate representative of the Serbs in Croatia. This recognition and the willingness 
to engage in dialogue with the SDS was obviously influenced by the hesitancy or 
unwillingness of the SKH-SDP to take on the role as the representative of the 
Croatian Serbs. However, by negotiating with the SDS and recognising its legitimacy, 
the Croatian Government also reinforced its own position and its ethnic definition of 
politics; like the SDS it had an interest in the dominance of the ethnic cleavage. The 
HDZ was still facing competition from the SKH-SDP and, therefore, also sought its 
marginalisation. As a consequence of this convergence of interests, the SDS and the 
HDZ even co-operated on the local level to force SKH-SDP deputies out of office.100 
The interplay between the HDZ-led Croatian Government and the SDS thereby 
helped reinforce the ethnic cleavage and served to weaken non-ethnic alternatives.
97 Thompson, 1992: 269.
98 Woodward, 1995: 170.
99 Kasapovi6, Mirjana, Zakosek, Nenad, 1997. “Democratic Transition in Croatia: Between 
Democracy, Sovereignty and War”. In Ivan Siber (ed.) The 1990 and the 1992/93 Sabor elections in 
Croatia. Berlin: Sigma, p. 24.
100 Gagnon, 2004: 145-6.
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While the interests of the ethnic leaders therefore overlapped on the issue of 
ethnification of politics, there was not unanimous backing for this policy within the 
HDZ. In negotiations with Raskovic, Tudman argued that he had problems justifying 
to HDZ deputies why he negotiated with the SDS and not with the other Serb 
deputies who were more numerous.101 RaSkovic became increasingly unpopular with 
Croatian voters and persistently rated as the least liked of all politicians in Croatia, 
only challenged by Opacic, Babic and other Serb leaders. Furthermore, even though 
the hawks within the HDZ certainly supported the ethnic conception of politics, they 
opposed contacts with the SDS leader. Although radicals benefit from the existence 
of another ethnic party -  it legitimises their existence -  co-operation is precluded by 
their hard-line position: if it were possible to co-operate, then a radical stance would 
not be needed. Therefore, it may paradoxically have been the greater strength of the 
more moderate wing of the HDZ that helped the SDS obtain the dominant position in 
the Serb community: its willingness to recognise the SDS as a negotiating partner 
aided the ethnification of politics.
Weakening of SDS moderate wing
Negotiations with Tudman were, however, not always to Raskovic’s benefit: the SDS 
leader was persistently criticised by hardliners in the party for his alleged softness. 
Their critique was strengthened by the leaking of the transcript from the Tudman- 
Raskovic talks, which the hardliners used to support their claim that Ra§kovic did not 
represent the interest of the Serbs in Croatia, that he was, in fact, playing a double 
game.102 The transcript severely weakened RaSkovic and he never managed to regain 
his former position of strength. His position was even further weakened when it 
became clear that the Croatian Government would not meet his demands. One of the 
biggest failures for Raskovic’s more accommodating course was the passing of the 
new Croatian Constitution in December 1990. Although it contained provisions for 
cultural autonomy, the preamble declared that Croatia was the national state of the 
Croats and Raskovic had thereby failed to achieve his most important demand: that 
the Serbs retained their constituent status in Croatia. The SDS officially maintained 
that its position was contingent on the policies pursued by the Croatian Government;
101 “Cija je Hrvatska”. Danas, 31 July 1990, p. 12-15.
102 Interview Drago Hedl, journalist Feral Tribune. Osijek, 11 September 2003.
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that the extent of demands depended on the future status of Yugoslavia. It was, 
therefore, at least nominally, dependent on the position of the Croatian side.
Tudman’s adviser who decided to leak the transcript argues that this decision was 
based on Raskovic’s public statements in which he argued that President Tudman 
was taking an extreme position. The motive behind making the talks public was 
thereby to demonstrate the willingness of the Croatian Government to negotiate and 
to reach a compromise. This was the official position of the Government: they 
stressed their willingness to find a negotiated solution and, furthermore, argued that 
the majority of the Serbs in Croatia did not support the radical stance espoused by 
some Serb leaders.104 However, there were limits to their willingness to negotiate and 
this struck at the heart of Raskovic’s demands: they would not concede constituent 
status to the Serbs, since this was felt to undermine Croatian sovereignty.105 
Furthermore, while cultural autonomy and, later, some degree of self-government for 
Knin and Glina were acceptable, more extensive autonomy arrangements were not. 
On this basis, therefore, it was very difficult to reach a compromise which would 
have helped Raskovic bolster his position within the SDS. Once it became clear that 
Raskovic was no longer in control of the SDS, incentives to negotiate were 
diminished since Babic was not interested in negotiating a solution within the 
framework of a Croatian state. At this point, the position of the Croatian Government 
became increasingly irrelevant for intra-Serb competition.
HDZ factions and Serbs politics
When analysing the inter-ethnic interplay, not only must the actions and rhetoric of 
Tudman be considered, but also those of the different factions within the HDZ and 
the assessment by Serb leaders of their relative strength. Like the SDS, the HDZ was 
far from unified: it was more a political movement than a political party and despite 
Tudman’s cohesive power, it contained a number of different factions. These 
divisions fed into the Government which was prone to constant ministerial
103 Interview Slaven Letica, Zagreb, 18 September 2003.
104 Mesic, Stipe, 2004. The Demise o f Yugoslavia: A Political Memoir. Budapest: CEU Press. E.g. p. 
13,143.
105 Interview Slaven Letica, Zagreb, 18 September 2003.
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changes.106 In interviews, Ra§kovic warned against the extreme HDZ factions and 
argued that they were a reason for his ambivalent position: for his willingness to 
negotiate, while at the same time using inflammatory rhetoric.107 Furthermore, 
Raskovic continuously emphasised that his problem was not with Tudman and he 
asked the President to publicly distance himself and the HDZ from the hawks.108 
After the elections in 1990 the more moderate wing of the HDZ seemed to be 
stronger109 but the radical wing gradually asserted its position. One of the turning 
points in Eastern Slavonia came when the moderate regional police chief, Josip 
Riehl-Kir, was murdered by HDZ extremists in July 1991. With this murder, hardline 
HDZ officials gained the upper hand in both the police and in the civil 
administration.110 Similar, if less violent, strengthening of the hardliners was also 
taking place elsewhere in Croatia.
The existence of the hardliners in the HDZ, their extreme public statements and the 
possibility that they might become more powerful further weakened the position of 
more moderate forces in the SDS thereby adding to the party’s radicalisation. The 
existence of hardliners within the SDS and their apparent increasing strength 
likewise bolstered the HDZ hardliners and facilitated the radicalisation of the party. 
Fractionalisation on one side risks spurring radicalisation of the other side, since it 
provides the radicals with ammunition in the internal rivalry, and a spiral of 
radicalisation may, therefore, result.
Lost moments o f generosity?
The position of the Croatian Government, as well as the divisions in the ruling party, 
therefore affected intra-ethnic competition in the SDS: the radicals could use the 
alleged extremism of the ‘other side’ to legitimise their own position and discredit 
attempts to find a negotiated solution. However, the question is to what extent Babic 
and his followers needed the extra ammunition. They were already in a good position
106 Kasapovid, Mirjana, 1997. “Parliamentary elections in Croatia: Electoral models and their effects”. 
In Ivan Siber (ed.) The 1990 and the 1992/93 Sabor elections in Croatia. Berlin: Sigma, p. 57. Silber; 
Little, 1996: 96.
107 Like the SDS, the HDZ employed a dual strategy: it generally portrayed itself as a moderate party, 
but also made use of more extreme rhetoric. Gagnon, 2004: 137-8.
108 E.g. “Raskovic u kucinama”. Danas, 1 August 1990, p. 11. Culid, Marinko, 1990. “Intervju: Jovan 
RaSkovic”. Danas, 29 May, p. 13-15.
109 See e.g. Gace, Nadezda, 1990. “Na rubu pameti -  opet”. Borba 15-16 September, p. 5.
110 Silber; Little, 1996: 140. Interview Drago Hedl, journalist, Feral Tribune. Osijek, 11 August 2003.
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to outbid Raskovic and prevent agreements from being made through the use of 
intimidation, blockades or even physical assaults. The audience to which the 
hardliners appealed were intra-party forces as well as the kin-state leader. The latter 
was not interested in a solution within the framework of a Croatian state and the 
intra-party forces that mainly mattered were radicalised forces in Krajina, as well as 
various paramilitary forces who were early on espousing an extreme position. The 
attitude of the Serb general population was not the driving force in the radicalisation 
of elite positions and the impact of lost generosity moments, therefore, should not be 
sought in their influence on mass antagonisms. That said, a more accommodating 
course from the Croatian Government would likely have reduced the number of 
followers that the extremists could take along and, furthermore, have strengthened 
the moderate forces.111 But it appears unlikely that this would have prevented the 
radicals in the SDS from becoming dominant: the interplay with the Croatian 
Government and the HDZ, while certainly important, was not the decisive variable 
for the intra-Serb competition. Thus, the inter-ethnic interplay had a very significant 
impact on the ethnification of politics and the dominance of the SDS, and it also 
affected Babic’s ability to oust Raskovic without it being solely, or even primarily, 
about ‘lost generosity moments’.
3.5 Pre-war ethnification and radicalisation
The ethnification of politics in Croatia had as its starting point a Serb party that only 
received a minority of the Serb votes: the SDS had not succeeded in ‘ethnicising’ 
politics prior to the elections and the main cleavage was the future status of 
Yugoslavia. However, due to internal divisions in the SKH-SDP, actions of the 
Croatian Government, institutionalisation of the SDS and its use of non-democratic 
tactics, the reformed communists soon lost their advantage. As a result, the SKH- 
SDP became increasingly marginalised and the SDS achieved near-monolithic status 
in the Serb community. Non-SDS Serb representatives only briefly increased their 
influence when the moderate wing of the SDS sought co-operation. An ethnically 
defined alternative to the SDS was not created until violence had already broken out 
in parts of the country and the alternative lacked the geographically concentrated 
support on which the SDS had built its power.
111 Goldstein, 1999: 217.
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Ethnification of politics was part of the political struggle and the speed of 
ethnification was, therefore, influenced by factors of strength in political competition, 
which, in this transitional and increasingly tense context, included the use of non- 
democratic tactics. The dominance of the ethnic party was not due to the 
overwhelming power of ethnicity; it was not a voter-driven process, although the 
voters did abandon the main non-ethnic party which had increasing difficulty 
presenting itself as such an alternative. One important factor in the ethnification of 
politics, which sets it apart from conventional political competition, was the inter­
ethnic interplay. The Croatian Government’s recognition of the SDS as the legitimate 
Serb representative and the local co-operation between the SDS and the HDZ greatly 
strengthened the ethnic definition of politics. The inter-ethnic interplay also 
influenced the SDS’s radicalisation although the ‘lost generosity moments’ should 
not be regarded as the primary factor in the victory of the hardliners.
Within the SDS there was a continuous process of outbidding in the sense that Babic, 
from a more radical position, sought to undermine Raskovic’s position. Their rivalry 
was fuelled by their different positions on the inter-ethnic conflict, by ideological and 
regional cleavages and, finally, by personal power ambitions. Babic lacked popular 
support but by building an alternative power base he managed to wrest power from 
Raskovic, resulting in a new leadership with a more extreme position. Babic lacked 
support in the central structures of the SDS but he relied on support in the local and 
regional party structures and ensured such support by imposing a hard line from 
above and removing party moderates. Ra§kovic failed to build a cohesive leadership: 
he alienated Opacic and Zelembaba, who had the public profile, the hardline 
reputation and the support in Knin that could have proved decisive in an attempt to 
defeat Babi6. Ra§kovic’s intention might have been to give Opacic and Zelembaba 
posts in the central authorities: they were both elected to the Croatian Parliament and 
Opacic was supposed to have become deputy speaker of Parliament. But when 
radical forces compelled RaSkovic to stage a walkout from Croatian institutions, an 
imbalance in power was introduced and Raskovic did not reconcile with the two co­
founders until Babic was already too strong. In addition to support from party 
structures, the resources of importance in the competition were largely of a non­
political nature: Babic controlled the coercive resources and could use these to 
enforce control. The main audience for the intra-party outbidding was consequently
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not the general population: it was local and regional party structures, paramilitary 
formations and, above all, Belgrade. In Knin, Babic was in full control: he ensured 
the cohesion of the Serb political scene by keeping people under constant tension and 
by frequently changing the political framework to suit his needs.112 Babic knew how
1 1 1
to hold on to power in a state of increasing lawlessness. For his hold on power, 
however, he relied on a very militaristic wing of the SDS, and he therefore likely 
found himself constrained in the positions he was able to adopt.114
One consequence of the gradual ethnification of politics, of the inability of the SDS 
to successfully play the ethnic card, was the strategic value of a vague position. A 
position that would not drive away the Serbs still unconvinced by the ethnic 
definition of politics but would, at the same time, heighten tensions and serve to 
satisfy hardliners. However, such a vague position also left Ra§kovic open to 
outbidding. Cultural autonomy in Raskovic’s demands had no territorial dimension 
but as the conflict intensified and Ra§kovic became pressured from forces within the 
party and from Belgrade, territorial autonomy entered the agenda as a demand in 
case the federal structure of Yugoslavia was altered. In December 1990, Vukcevic 
and Ra§kovic proposed changes to the draft Constitution that would affirm Croatia as 
part of a federal Yugoslavia and included provisions for cultural autonomy. It, 
however, also suggested that the Constitution provided the possibility for territorial 
autonomy in Serb-majority areas.115 In addition, RaSkovic in the summer and autumn 
of 1990 advocated the unification of Croatian and Bosnian Krajina as Serb-majority 
areas.116 The demand for autonomy was therefore marked by a considerable 
ambiguity when it came to the territorial dimension. Even though Babic, before 
openly clashing with Ra§kovic, also vacillated between antagonistic and moderate 
rhetoric, he could take advantage of Raskovic’s vagueness on the issue of autonomy; 
he strengthened the territorial dimension, thereby creating an alternative power base 
in Knin, and the ambiguity of RaSkovic’s demands made it difficult for him to
112 Vasic, Milos, 1992. “Babic’s Swan Song”. Vreme News Digest, no. 20,10 February. Cerovic, 
Stojan, 1991. “Ko je prvi po£eo”. Vreme, 22 April, p. 28-29.
113 Cerovic, Stojan, 1992. “Troubles with a bit player”. Vreme News Digest, no. 16, January 13.
114 Daskalovic, Zoran, 1991. “Kula od karata”. Danas, 26 March, p. 23-24.
115 Vukcevic, Vojislav, 1990a. “Misljenje i prijedloge u vezi sa izradom i sa-sadrzajem nacrta Ustava 
Republike Hrvatske”. Osijek, 2 November 1990. Vukcevic, Vojislav, 1990b. “Primedbe nanacrt 
Ustava Republike Hrvatske”. Osijek, 11 December 1990. Author’s copies.
116 “Cija je Hrvatska”. Danas, 31 July 1990, p. 12-15. Jajdinovic, Milan, 1990. “Ispit za Jugoslaviju”. 
Danas, 2 October, p. 12-13.
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counter these moves. An intentional strengthening of the radical option may also 
very well have been part of Raskovic’s strategy, since the existence of hardline 
forces within the SDS was something he repeatedly used to improve his own 
bargaining position.
Intra-Serb competition in pre-war Croatia was, thus, marked by a gradual 
ethnification of politics, by intra-party outbidding and by the increasing dominance 
of coercive resources, especially those supplied by Belgrade.
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Chapter 4
Intra-Serb Competition in Pre-War Bosnia: 
Cohesive, radicalising nationalists
The Bosnian and the Croatian cases share many similarities in the pre-war period: the 
dominant Serb party had the same name; their policies were almost identical; and the 
leader of the SDS in Croatia, Jovan Raskovic, helped establish the SDS in Bosnia 
and also helped choose its leader, fellow psychiatrist Radovan Karadzic. Their 
strategy in radicalising the position of the party, furthermore, followed the same 
pattern. Initially the position of the party was fairly moderate, if rather vague; the 
first step in their radicalisation was the establishment of an association of SDS- 
dominated municipalities; then a Serb Assembly was set up and Serb Autonomous 
Regions were created; finally a Serb Republic was proclaimed. Despite these obvious 
similarities, the two parties faired differently in their competition with non-ethnic 
parties. The Serb nationalists in Bosnia were, from the outset, in a stronger position 
than their counterparts in Croatia: they could feed off the increasing tensions in the 
Yugoslav Federation and they were quicker to establish a well-organised party. This 
position of strength became clear in the first multi-party elections: while the Croatian 
SDS had only secured a minority of the Serb votes, seven months later the Bosnian 
SDS won more than 85 per cent of the Serb vote. Ethnification proceeded at different 
speeds in the two cases and the Bosnian SDS was much more successful in the 
electoral competition with the non-ethnic parties. This chapter will analyse the 
reasons for this difference in dynamics.
The dynamics within the SDS were, moreover, also different and the causes and 
consequences of these differences will also be analysed. The Bosnian version of the 
SDS was, from the beginning, less based on its leader’s charisma, but was 
nevertheless a very cohesive party that was not plagued by the leadership struggles 
that characterised its sister party. Such cohesiveness would theoretically lead one to 
expect the SDS in Bosnia to be less influenced by radicalising dynamics, but even 
though the party’s organisation provides some explanation for its cohesiveness, 
another reason is to be found in the ever-increasing radicalisation of its position.
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In addition, there was a significant difference in the relative demographic strength of 
the two communities, which affected the strategies of the Serb leaders as well as 
those of the other ethnic leaders: in Bosnia, the Bosniak and Croat leaders knew that 
they could only ignore the Serbs at their peril, whereas the relatively small size of the 
Serb community in Croatia seems to have led some Croatian leaders to believe that 
they would not constitute a significant obstacle to a Croatian nation-state. The 
resulting differences in the inter-ethnic interplay are marked: the SDS in Bosnia 
formed an unofficial coalition with the Bosniak SDA and the Croatian HDZ, while 
the SDS in Croatia was faced with a Parliament with an absolute HDZ majority and a 
Government which proved highly reluctant to accommodate Serb demands. Finally, 
the outbreak of war in Croatia, in the summer of 1991, had a significant impact on 
Bosnian Serb politics and led to a hardening of positions. The outbreak of war was 
accompanied by a change in the position of the international community; the 
‘international audience’ while not directly supplying resources to the competing 
elites influenced the Serb leaders through the kin-state and through inter-ethnic 
relations.
4.1 Serb nationalists become near-monolithic
Most of the Serb voters in Croatia had voted for the reformed communists in the 
SKH-SDP and support for this party only declined after the elections. But the 
reformed communists in Bosnia, the League of Communists -  Party for Democratic 
Change (Savez komunista -  Stranka demokratske promjene, SK-SDP), found 
themselves in a weaker position. As described in Chapter 2, the League of 
Communists of Bosnia had been significantly weakened by the Agrokomerc scandal 
and this was one of the reasons for the SDS’s clear victory. The SK-SDP represented 
a system in collapse and, even more importantly, lacked experienced leaders.1 
Although the party had distanced itself from the Bosnian Government, it was still 
blamed for all the wrongs of the system, and it was not sufficient for the party to be 
the only party with an organised network throughout the republic.2 In the competition 
with the SDS, it also mattered that the SK-SDP lacked Serbs among its top-
1 The former director of Agrokomerc, Fikret Abdid, nevertheless received the highest number of votes 
in the 1990 presidential elections, when he ran for the SDA. This would indicate that it was not so 
much the corruption scandal that weakened the reformed communists, but rather the way it was 
handled by the League of Communists as well as the resulting inexperienced leadership.
2 Andjelic, 2003: 159,174.
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candidates.3 This made it more difficult for the party to counter the nationalist claim 
that a non-ethnic party could not protect Serb interests.
The SK-SDP was, however, not the only non-ethnic competitor to the SDS. Of other 
non-ethnic parties should be mentioned the Democratic Alliance of Socialists 
(Demokratski socijalisticki savez, DSS) and the League of Reform Forces of 
Yugoslavia (Savez reformskih snaga Jugoslavije, SRSJ). The DSS suffered from the 
same problems as the SK-SDP: its roots were in the Socialist Alliance of Working 
People and it was too closely associated with the old regime. But the Reformists, 
formed by the then federal Prime Minister, Ante Markovic, were dangerous for the 
SDS: they could not be directly identified with the previous regime, Markovic’s 
economic programme was successful and he was very popular in Bosnia.4 Most of 
the party’s leaders in Bosnia were, furthermore, ethnic Serbs. But despite these 
factors of strength, the Reformists had problems organising themselves and the party 
lacked a leader in Bosnia who was strong enough to match Markovic’s popularity.5 
Prominent political actors had declined heading the party and no leader was elected 
at the party’s founding congress, which was held only two months before the 
elections.6 It took almost another fortnight before the then Rector of Sarajevo 
University, Nenad Kecmanovic, was finally named party president. The Reformists, 
moreover, covered an array of political opinions and crucially failed to take a clear 
position on the issue of Yugoslavia’s future.7 Nevertheless, the nationalist parties 
recognised the potential danger of the Reformists and chose to fiercely attack the 
party in a bid to undermine its popular appeal.8
The non-ethnic parties, on the other hand, primarily directed their competition 
against each other and consequently augmented their already pronounced weakness, 
as they failed to provide a unified, viable alternative to the nationalist parties. Some 
of the leaders were aware of this problem and on 25 October 1990 the leaders of the 
SK-SDP and the Reformists, Nijaz Durakovic and Nenad Kecmanovic, signed a 
secret deal. But when this became known to the Reformists, the most anti-communist
3 Prstojevic, Miroslav (ed.) 1990. BiHIzbori '90. Sarajevo: Oslobodenje public, p. 77-79.
4 Andjelic, 2003:160.
5 Ibid. 162.
6 Demirovic, E., 1990. “Reforma -  uslov pobede”. Borba, 6 September, p. 1.
7 Prstojevic, 1990: 85. Andjelic, 2003: 161-2.
8 Demirovic, E., 1990. “Reforma -  uslov pobede”. Borba, 6 September, p. 1. Andjelic, 2003: 162
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elements of the party rebelled and the deal was called off. The political differences 
between the two parties were small, but personal grievances and fear of being drawn 
into the communist collapse proved decisive.9 The SK-SDP and the DSS managed to 
form a pre-election coalition, but the then leader of the DSS, Mirko Pejanovic, 
argues that the Reformists were ordered not to have anything to do with the two other 
parties.10 The existence of an additional salient cleavage, an anti-communist cleavage, 
therefore, further weakened the non-ethnic alternatives. The non-ethnic parties were 
finally weakened by an electoral system that inflated the majority won by the 
nationalist parties.
SDS’s strength vis-a-vis its non-ethnic rivals
The SDS’s victory was, however, not only based on the weakness of the non-ethnic 
rivals, and one of the factors that strengthened the party was the strong organisation 
that had been established prior to the elections. The SDS had a wide range of local 
branches and, by September 1990, the party claimed to have as many as 350,000 
members.11 This building up of the party was significantly assisted by the SDS in 
Croatia and, more covertly, by the Belgrade Government. The SDS, furthermore, 
followed the strategy used by its sister-party in Croatia and established a Serb 
National Council, but before the elections: on 13 October 1990 in front of 30,000 
people in Banja Luka. The council in Banja Luka was followed by the establishment 
of Serb councils in Tuzla and Trebinje.12 In its campaign against the non-ethnic 
parties, the SDS continuously sought to undermine their credibility and Karadzic 
warned the Serb voters that it would be dangerous to vote for the SK-SDP since they 
would not represent Serb interests.13 Outside of the official campaign the tone was 
even harsher. In Banja Luka, material was distributed announcing: “We will not 
betray you -  the League o f Communists and the leftists will betray you! The Ustasha 
knife awaits you again”} 4
9 Andjelic, 2003: 180-1; Pejanovic, 2002: 30.
10 Pejanovic, 2002: 30.
11 ’’Veliki skup SDS”. Borba, 1-2 September 1990, p. 12.
12 Andjelic, 2003: 178.
13 Vucelic, Milorag, 1990. “Srbi se najsporije bude”. Borba, 23 July, p. 5.
14 Pejanovic, 2002: 37.
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The failure of the non-ethnic parties owed much to their internal squabbles and the 
weakness of the League of Communists following the Agrokomerc scandal but the 
main obstacle for the non-ethnic parties was that the elections were fought on an 
ethnic cleavage. The non-ethnic parties did not succeed in focusing the campaign on 
other issues: in the Croatian elections the most salient cleavage had been the fixture 
of Yugoslavia but in Bosnia all major parties professed their support for 
Yugoslavia’s preservation and, with the HDZ as the only significant exception, they 
all advocated a federal structure.15 The nationalist parties, moreover, consciously 
sought to ethnify politics and they succeeded in doing so through the combination of 
co-operation and the use of inflammatory rhetoric. They prevented the issue of 
Yugoslavia’s fixture from becoming dominant by focusing on the need for ethnic 
representation. The nationalist parties were, fixrthermore, strongly supported in their 
endeavour by the progressively tenser atmosphere in the Yugoslav Federation. 
Politics had consequently become ethnicised prior to the elections but this was 
reinforced and augmented by the weakening of the non-ethnic parties.
Lack o f significant Serb challengers
The main rivals for the SDS in the pre-war period were the non-ethnic parties, but 
the party was also faced with competition from another Serb party: the Serb Renewal 
Movement (Srpski pokret obnove, SPO) led in Serbia by Vuk Draskovic. This party 
was, however, never a serious rival to the SDS and apparently did not intend to be 
since DraSkovic, before the elections, rejected calls for increasing the activities of the 
party as this would serve to divide the Serb vote.16 Unsurprisingly then, the SPO only
1 7won one seat in Parliament and never really entered political life in Bosnia. It was, 
anyway, difficult to notice any difference between the two parties before the 
elections, 18 although the SPO’s programme was more unashamedly Serb 
nationalist.19 The differences only became visible when the SPO in Belgrade took a 
moderate turn and began criticising the war in Croatia and accused the nationalist 
parties in Bosnia of not trying hard enough to prevent war from also breaking out in
15 Electoral programmes from Prstojevic, 1990. The position of the Reformists was somewhat vague 
but their programme could only be realised in a federal context. Andjelic, 2003: 161-2.
16 Thomas, 1999: 56.
17 Andjelic, 2003: 167.
18 Interview Slobodan Nagradic, Professor in political science. Sarajevo, 19 November 2003
19 Electoral programme in Prstojevic, 1990: 118-120. See also Tanjug, 1990. “Srbi prijete 
pripajenjem”. Vjesnik, 26 October, p. 3.
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Bosnia.20 Such critique, however, did not find resonance with the SPO deputy in 
Bosnia, who had all along acted like a member of the SDS and finally chose to join 
the party.21 Only immediately before the outbreak of war did the SDS therefore face 
a more moderate Serb party, but this party was without influence and even lacked 
control over its own deputy.
The SDS’s near monolithic status was strengthened by the almost complete 
marginalisation of non-ethnic parties following the elections. The nationalist parties 
made sure to exclude all other parties from influence and the opposition was too 
weak to have any impact. The Serb representatives from the non-ethnic parties were, 
furthermore, increasingly pressured by the SDS to join their ranks, and many non- 
SDS Serb deputies voted with the SDS on the issue of Bosnian sovereignty.22 In late 
February 1992, when the constitution of the Serb Republic was proclaimed, a 
significant number of Serb representatives from non-ethnic parties were present at 
the session and communication was discontinued with those who refused.23 The 
marginalisation of non-ethnic rivals and the absence of other Serb parties meant that 
challenges to the SDS leadership would have to come from within the party.
A radicalising SDS remains cohesive
Whereas the SDS in Croatia was formed around the charismatic leadership of Jovan 
Raskovic, the SDS in Bosnia lacked a similar personality to attract popular support. 
The party was initiated by a group of Serb academics from Sarajevo and Radovan 
Karadzic was an l l th-hour choice as leader after other better-known Serbs had 
declined. One of the people whom the Serb academics had unsuccessfully tried to 
persuade was Nenad Kecmanovic, who instead became leader of the Reformists.24 
Karadzic’s role as leader was only supposed to be temporary: he should set the 
tempo in the first few months and then cede his place to a more influential and 
politically experienced leader.25 Even shortly before the SDS’s founding session,
20 Milosevic, Milan, 1991. “See you in the next war”. Vreme News Digest, no. 10,2 December.
21 Interview Slobodan Nagradic, Sarajevo, 19 November 2003. See also, Curak, Nerzuk, 1992. 
“Clanovi SPO u BiH nemaju ni cakije”. Slobodna Bosna, 10 January, no. 12, p. 7.
22 Tomic, Manoljo, 1991. “Istorijsko ‘Ne’ Bosni”. Slobodna Bosna, no. 2, 7 November, p. 3.
23 Pejanovic, 2002: 50.
24 Kecmanovic, Nenad, 1992. “Cas anatomija Nenada Kecmanovica”. Dani, 17 December p. 44-47.
25 Stefanovic, Nenad, 1993. “A Political Portrait of Radovan Karadzic”. Vreme News Digest, no. 84, 3 
May.
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Karadzic publicly declared that he was exhausted and would not stand for the party 
presidency.26 Karadzic and the rest of the SDS leadership were, at the time, not well- 
known27 and Andjelic argues that Karadzic initially lacked control over the party: the 
actual decision-making body of the SDS was the party’s political council, which 
consisted of Serb academics and some party officials.28 In the pre-election period the 
real power, therefore, seems to have been behind the scenes; not with the official 
party leadership that was still establishing its public profile.
Karadzic was consequently not a strong leader to begin with; he served the party 
rather than the other way round. But Karadzic’s image was gradually built up and the 
official leadership became more influential in the decision-making process after the 
elections. The intellectuals behind the party became increasingly divided when 
positions of power had to be allocated and greater political differences also surfaced 
as the inter-ethnic conflict intensified.29 In this development, the structure of the 
party became increasingly authoritarian and Karadzic began exerting greater 
control. Of some importance for Karadzic’s hold on power was also the fact that he 
was the president not only of the SDS but also of the Serb National Council; a 
rivalling leader with an institutional base was, therefore, less likely to emerge. 
Despite Karadzic’s rising star, the situation was very different than in Croatia where 
the SDS was founded by and around Ra§kovic and functioned more as a political 
movement led by a charismatic leader. One might have expected Karadzic’s weaker 
leadership to give rise to greater ffactionalisation than Raskovic’s charismatic 
authority, but actually the opposite was the case: for the first many years the Bosnian 
SDS remained a fairly cohesive party with only few factional disputes.
At its foundation, the SDS did, however, announce the formation of a more radical
youth wing called Mlada Bosna (Young Bosnia), led by the writer Vladimir 
1Srebrov. Mlada Bosna was an officially sanctioned faction but its militarism 
quickly became too much for the SDS leadership, which, at the time, tried to portray
26 Pejanovic, 2002: 17.
27 Kecmanovic, Nenad, 1992. “£as anatomija Nenada Kecmanovica”. Dani, 17 December, p. 44-47.
28 Andjelic, 2003: 166. Prstojevic, 1990: 115. The considerable influence of the SDS’s advisory 
council made up of Serb intellectuals is, however, denied by one of its former members. Interview 
Predrag Lazarevic, Banja Luka, 12 November 2003.
29 Interview Predrag Lazarevic, Banja Luka, 12 November 2003.
30 Andjelic, 2003: 169.
31 Lu<5ic, M., 1990. “Nema vodecih i pratecih naroda”. Borba, 13 July, p. 3.
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itself as a moderate party. Thus, Srebrov was expelled shortly after the party’s 
foundation subsequent to inviting the JNA to take power in Bosnia and promising 
assistance from his militants. Karadzic declared that the "para-militaristic, almost 
militant outbursts o f M.A. Vladimir Srebrov are incompatible with the spirit o f the 
Serb people” and he consequently disbanded Mlada Bosna. The leadership had no 
problems quelling this attempt at radicalising the party at a moment when the party’s
'X'Xpublic position was more moderate. The creation of the faction may in fact have 
been a purposeful attempt by the SDS leadership to demonstrate its moderate stance, 
while at the same time use Mlada Bosna* s radicalism to stir up ethnic tensions.
After the elections, other divisions emerged in the leadership over which position the 
party should adopt in the intensifying inter-ethnic conflict but these divisions never 
developed into actual fractionalisation. In October 1991, after the Bosnian 
Parliament adopted the Declaration on Sovereignty a meeting of the SDS main board 
brought out these divisions. Some members wanted SDS deputies to remain in the 
official bodies whereas others advocated a walkout. Radovan Neskovic declared: 
“Since they will not revoke their decisions, I  suggest that a parliamentary crisis be 
provoked”. But Rajko Dukic, a senior member of the board, urged calm stating: “We 
cannot leave the assembly or any other body”.24 The outcome of the discussion was 
that the deputies stayed in the Parliament, but this decision was qualified by the 
formation of the Serb Assembly on 24 October 1991. In the decision to form the 
assembly, it was declared that the validity of enactments from the Bosnian 
Parliament would only be recognised if they were not contrary to the interests of the 
Serb people.35 Furthermore, it was declared that the Serb nation would stay in what 
remained of Yugoslavia and that this decision would be sent to a referendum.36 This 
cleverly crafted compromise served to avoid further divisions in the party leadership. 
When the Serb Republic was proclaimed in January 1992, Nikola Koljevic, one of 
the leaders of the SDS, urged the deputies in the Serb Assembly: “Please vote
32 Anastasijevic, Dejan, 1995. “Vladimir Srebrov”. Vreme, 30 October, p. 17.
33 Vukovic, Zeljko, 1990. “Dobavljanje nekorisnih mentora”. Borba, 22-23 September, p. 3.
34 Minutes from the SDS main board meeting presented at the ICTY. ICTY, 2002b. ‘Transcripts: 
Prosecutor vs Radoslav Brdjanin and Stojan Zupljanin (IT-99-36)”. Transcripts from Robert Donia’s 
testimony, 29-31 January 2002. p. 1115, 1117.
35 “Odluka o osnivanju skupstine srpskog naroda u BiH”. In Kuzmanovic, Rajo, 1994. Konstitutivni 
akti Republike Srpske. Glas Srpski: Banja Luka.
36 “Odluka o ostajanju srpskog naroda u Bosni i Hercegovini u Zajednickoj Drzavi Jugoslaviji”. 
Kuzmanovic, 1994.
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unanimously”. The leadership was aware that if the party could present itself as 
unified, it would be in a stronger position, and the statement also conveyed that 
Koljevic had backed down on his earlier demands. When the establishment of the 
Serb Republic was first discussed, Koljevic and the speaker of the Serb Assembly, 
Momcilo Krajisnik, were against enforcing the decision immediately in case the 
appeal for international recognition of Bosnia was withdrawn. However, Karadzic 
at this point declared: “There is no going back to the united B&H”.39 Koljevic and 
Kraji§nik, although high-standing in the party, were alone with their position and 
ultimately had to back down.
The Krajina faction
While the divisions in the leadership of the party were fairly muted, significant 
regional factions existed and, especially, the strong Bosnian Krajina faction, centred 
on Banja Luka, posed a potential threat to the leadership. This rivalry reflected a 
regional cleavage as well as different views of the appropriate strategy in the inter­
ethnic conflict. SDS moderates who had won the elections in Banja Luka had been 
pressured by the leadership to radicalise their position or be replaced40 but this 
engineered radicalisation almost backfired. The Krajina faction already in early 1991 
criticised what they regarded as Krajisnik’s too moderate reaction to the Declaration 
on State Sovereignty presented in Parliament by the SDA and the HDZ.41 Soon after 
this demonstration of radicalism, they began demanding a more autonomous role for 
the region. The Bosnian Krajina region was of great importance for the SDS 
leadership: Banja Luka was central to the party’s strategy and Bosnian Krajina, 
moreover, bordered on the equally radical Krajina region in Croatia. The central SDS 
leadership was aware of the dangers of regional centres of power and, at the above- 
mentioned main board meeting, Milorad Ekmedic, the grey eminence of the SDS, 
warned: “The Serbs have created regions which are not connected, and these regions 
must not be allowed to establish their governments which would not be connected'142 
But the Autonomous Region of Krajina (Autonomna regija Krajina, ARK) was, 
nevertheless, able to charge a separate course and, in the autumn of 1991, they began
37 Isakovic, Zehrudin, 1992. “Another Serbian State”. Vreme News Digest, no. 16, 13 January.
38 6amo, Mensur, 1992. “Pucanje srpskog monolita”. Slobodna Bosna, no. 12,16 January, p. 5.
39 Isakovic, Zehrudin, 1992. “Another Serbian State”. Vreme News Digest, no. 16, 13 January.
40 Gagnon, 2004: 50.
41 Preradovic, R., 1991. “Bez Jugoslavije nemani BiH”. Oslobodenje, 11 February, p. 3.
42 Minutes from SDS main board meeting presented at the ICTY. ICTY, 2002b: 1114.
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challenging Karadzic’s leadership. Woodward argues that the rebellion followed a 
finance scandal in which Karadzic was accused of imposing a surcharge on gas sold 
in the autonomous regions, thereby robbing local leaders of profitable revenue.43 In 
addition, strong forces in Bosnian Krajina wanted unification with Kninska Krajina. 
This was supported by Babic but was rejected by Karadzic and the latter, in October 
1991, expressed concern that the Bosnian Krajina leaders were listening more to 
Babic than to him.44 The conflict came to a head at the 13th session of the ARK 
Assembly in late February 1992 when an ultimatum was passed which demanded 
that Banja Luka become the capital of the Serb Republic and that cantons with the 
highest degree of autonomy should be established 45 If these demands were not met 
in the constitution for the Serb Republic, then “Krajina should be proclaimed a 
sovereign republic which will establish relations directly with other parts o f BH”.46 
Although this ultimatum was clearly radical and a direct challenge to the Sarajevo 
leadership, it indicated that the most radical wing in Bosnian Krajina was no longer 
dominating: this wing had demanded immediate unification of the two Krajinas 47
Shortly after this session in Banja Luka, Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic rejected 
the Cutilheiro peace plan, which would have divided Bosnia into ethnic territorial 
units. In his rejection, he referred to the assembly in Banja Luka and the discussion 
of a constitution for the Serb Republic. This led Karadzic to attack fiercely the 
autonomous direction of Banja Luka: ‘7  promise you, Bosnian Krajina must not 
become an issue... We cannot allow that five people with personal ambitions destroy 
our chances.” “We are very close to achieving our strategic objectives”.48 As a 
response to this situation, the SDS club of deputies decided to blame five or six 
individuals who were second-tier members of the Krajina assembly and then to adopt 
the constitution of the Serb Republic with Sarajevo as its capital. The constitution, 
however, did not specify that the territory was indivisible and it assigned the regions 
certain functions. To reinforce their position the top brass of the SDS, Karadzic, 
Kraji§nik, Koljevic and Ostojic attended the next session of the Krajina assembly
43 Woodward, 1995: 511, n45.
44 “Ako hoce rat -  imace ga,” Slobodna Bosna, 7 November 1991, p. 5.
45 Ruzic, Elmer; Zorici, Brane, 1992. “KrajiSki ultimatum Karadzidu”. Slobodna Bosna, no. 18, 27 
February, p.5.
46 Minutes from the assembly session presented at the ICTY. ICTY, 2002b: 1145.
47 Ruzic, Elmer; Zorici, Brane, 1992. “Tri varijante za razbijanje Bosne”. Slobodna Bosna, 23 
January, no. 13, p. 10.
48 Minutes from a session of the Serb Assembly presented at the ICTY. ICTY, 2002b: 1148.
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clearly indicating that further maverick behaviour would not be tolerated.49 While the 
Krajina leaders were still not satisfied with the leadership or its centralisation, these 
steps proved sufficient to make them backtrack from their more radical demands.50 
The SDS leadership, thus, decided to act decisively against any attempts at 
fractionalisation that could undermine their authority and, crucially, the Krajina 
faction did not penetrate the party leadership, as it did in the Croatian SDS. Another 
factor that weakened the Bosnian Krajina leaders was their internal divisions: they 
were not united and the Sarajevo leadership could take advantage of this to regain 
control. Thus, following the backtracking on demands, Radoslav Brdanin, the deputy 
speaker of the ARK assembly, blamed the conflict on non-SDS elements in the 
assembly.51 Notwithstanding these points of weakness, the Banja Luka faction forced 
upon the SDS leadership a more radical position than it had intended during the 
Cutilhiero negotiations. But the reaction of the central party was fairly mild: only 
second-tier local leaders were removed and the Krajina leaders were even given 
some concessions. This could indicate that the more radical position was not truly 
contrary to the interests of the leadership and they, furthermore, needed a stable, 
cohesive leadership in place in Banja Luka for what was to come.
The relative weakness of the Krajina faction was caused by its lack of foothold in the 
SDS leadership, by its internal divisions and lack of resources. But what were the 
general reasons for the relatively few factions found in a party that was led by 
Karadzic who at least initially lacked the necessary charisma and authority to exert 
full control over the party? First of all, the SDS in Bosnia was better organised than 
the SDS in Croatia: it had built a stronger party organisation and Karadzic was 
backed by influential forces working behind the scenes; it was not just him fighting 
possible factions. These people were not interested in power for themselves but were 
interested in a leader who could realise their political objectives and, to this end, they 
needed an undivided party. Divisions were not accepted but were dealt with 
immediately, if need be by making concessions as long as unwanted departures from 
the official policy ceased. Secondly, the SDS in Bosnia was in a stronger position 
politically: it won a landslide victory in the elections and consequently did not have
49 ICTY, 2002b: 1150-3.
50 Marie, M., 1992. “Nema raskola -  ima razlika”. Borba, 17 March p. 8.
51 Ibid.
Nina Caspersen: Intra-ethnic competition and inter-ethnic conflict 106
Chapter 4 -  Intra-Serb Competition in Pre-W ar Bosnia: Cohesive, radicalising nationalists
to continue fighting non-ethnic parties. The dominant trend of the party was, finally, 
one of increased radicalisation and this helped pre-empt challengers.
Post-electoral radicalisation
Before the elections, the SDS’s position was rather vague: it wanted to stir up 
tensions but at the same time present itself as a party capable of finding a solution by 
representing the Serbs in Bosnia. At the party’s founding session, Karadzic 
consequently pledged his support for democracy, national equality and human 
rights.52 Pejanovic, then leader of the DSS, argues: “At this stage Karadzic was
53planning a profile for the SDS that would require its members to be democrats”. 
Rajko Kasagic, who was prime minister of Republika Srpska in 1995-6, contends 
that the SDS in 1990 was a very different party from what it later became: “...a 
centrally oriented party,... a party o f private business, freedom o f the press and 
democracy”. 54 In addition to the professed support for democracy and national 
equality, the SDS did, however, also make clear that in case the goal of a continued 
Yugoslav federation could not be achieved, then the party would demand a 
referendum for the Serbs.55 Furthermore, moderate rhetoric was not always 
dominating at SDS rallies. At one such rally in Banja Luka, Karadzic famously 
encouraged people to “sell your cow and buy a gun”56 and the SDS used the 
experience of Croatia’s Serbs to increase tensions. But at no rally did Karadzic ever 
call for dividing Bosnia or for war.57 The party’s official policy was the preservation 
of Yugoslavia and the survival of Yugoslavia, possibly without Croatia and Slovenia, 
was not impossible at the time. Furthermore, Karadzic continuously stated that the 
Bosniaks and Croats were not the SDS’s opponents and he stressed the need for 
partnership.58 This resulted in a vague or ambivalent position, similar to the one used 
by SDS in Croatia, and one effect of this was to avoid the creation of a more 
moderate ethnic alternative.
52 LuCic, M., 1990. “Nema vodecih i pratecih naroda”. Borba, 13 July, p. 3. See also the SDS’s 
electoral programme in Prstojevic, 1990: 113-115.
53 Pejanovic, 2002: 24.
54 Interview Rajko Kasagic, Banja Luka, 11 November 2003.
55 Prstojevic, 1990: 115. Vucelic, Milorag, 1990. “ Srbi se najsporije bude”. Borba, 23 July, p. 5.
56 Pejanovic, 2002: 36.
57 Gagnon, 2004:49. PejanoviC, 2002: 37, 39.
58 Banjac, D., 1990. “Stranka koja ukida straha”. Borba, 16 July, p. 3. NinCic, Roksanda, 1990. 
’’Udruzeni poraz komunista i reformista”. Danas, 26 November, p. 12-14.
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An important difference compared with the SDS in Croatia should, however, be 
noted: the SDS in Bosnia earlier on adopted an uncompromising position. The Serb 
National Council (SNV) was already formed before the elections and the SDS made 
clear that they would not accept any decisions going against their declared goal of 
preserving the Yugoslav federation. There was no talk of autonomy; no solution 
short of a federal Yugoslavia was acceptable, but to achieve this goal the SDS 
initially emphasised the need for partnership. The vagueness was, therefore, 
primarily related to the means used to achieving this goal, but the goal itself was also 
ambiguous: was it the preservation of Yugoslavia or a Greater Serbia?
After the elections this rather ambivalent position was replaced by an increasingly 
radical one. In May 1991, Balaban, a Minister in the Bosnian Government, warned: 
“I f  Bosnia becomes an independent and sovereign state... the associated [Serb] 
communes will break away and create their own autonomous province, with all the 
functions o f a state. Within 24 hours at least one military unit will be set up in each 
Serb commune. The Serbs will not allow themselves to be surprised as they were in 
1941”.59 And when the Bosnian Parliament in October 1991 passed the Declaration 
o f Sovereignty, the SDS shed any semblance of moderation and Karadzid declared: 
“The road you have chosen is the same road that took Croatia into Hell, except that 
the war in Bosnia will take you into a worse Hell, and the Muslim nation may 
disappear altogether”.60 The SDS then continued to realise its fallback option: the 
joining of large parts of Bosnia to Serbia; and in this they followed a strategy very 
similar to the one used by the SDS in Croatia. Between September and November 
1991, six Serb Autonomous Regions (Srpska autonomna oblast, SAO) were 
proclaimed. In the SAOs, the SDS monopolised the top posts: the economic, political 
and, above all, military posts; and the new authorities initiated a policy of 
discrimination and terror against non-Serbs.61 In late October 1991, the Serb 
Assembly was created and on 9-10 November 1991, a referendum among Serb voters, 
unsurprisingly, showed an overwhelming majority for staying in Yugoslavia. On 21 
November, the Serb Assembly proclaimed as part of Yugoslavia all municipalities,
59 Quoted in Bougarel, Xavier, 1996. “Bosnia and Hercegovina: State and Communitarianism”. In 
David Dyker & Ivan Vejvoda (eds.) Yugoslavia and After. London and New York, NY: Longman, p. 
100.
60 Ibid. 100.
61 Ibid. 100.
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local communities and populated places in which over 50 per cent of the Serbs had 
voted for this option. Shortly afterwards the formation of separate Serb institutions 
moved from being voluntary to being mandatory for SDS local boards; they had to 
set up so-called Crisis Headquarters (Krizni stab) that would take power in the 
municipality when given the order by Karadzic. In early January 1992, the Serb 
Assembly approved a declaration on proclamation of the Serb Republic of Bosnia- 
Herzegovina (Srpska republika Bosna i Hercegovina), which would cover “all the 
territories o f the autonomous [regions] and all other regions where the Serbian 
people represent a minority due to the Second World War genocide”. The republic 
was proclaimed in Pale on 7 April 1992, and on this occasion, the SDS recalled its 
two representatives from the Bosnian Presidency and appealed to Serb Ministers, 
civil servants and policemen to break with the Bosnian state.64
The avoidance of successful outbidding in the Bosnian SDS owed something to this 
persistent radicalisation of the party, as well as the stronger party structure and the 
relative weakness of the Bosnian Krajina faction compared with the Knin faction in 
the Croatian case. One of the causes of the relative weakness of the challengers was 
their lack of kin-state support. As in the Croatian case, Belgrade helped strengthen 
radical forces but its role was not contested and it did not become involved in intra­
party strife.
4.2 Kin-state: “We authorise Milosevic to act on our behalf’
In pre-war Bosnia, Belgrade’s influence was largely covert and Milosevic may even 
initially have been hoping for an ally other than the SDS. Late 1989 and early 1990 
saw the League of Communists of Bosnia becoming increasingly divided into pro- 
and anti-Milosevic camps65 and such divisions could have given Milosevic reason to 
believe that the Bosnian Communists would, in the end, come out in support of his 
stance. Some commentators argue that this can explain the late establishment of a 
Serb party in Bosnia: Milosevic was waiting for a possible change within the local
62 Document from 19 December 1991, presented at the ICTY. ICTY, 2002b: 1127-9. See also Gow, 
2003: 129-30.
63 Isakovic, Zehrudin, 1992. “Another Serbian State”. Vreme News Digest, no. 16, 13 January. My 
emphasis.
64 Bougarel, 1996: 103.
65 Andjelic, 2003: 117. Gagnon, 2004: 75, 84.
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communist ranks.66 Reliance on the SK-SDP instead of on an explicitly Serb party 
made sense given the meagre election results achieved by the SDS in Croatia. A 
problem with this explanation is, however, the already considerable ethnification of 
politics in Bosnia. Milo§evic was not just hoping for support from the Serbs in the 
SK-SDP and support from a united party was increasingly unlikely. The timing of 
the SDS’s establishment in Bosnia can, furthermore, be explained by the increasing 
success for its sister party in Croatia, which may have spurred faith in the electoral 
fortunes of an explicitly Serb party. Belgrade’s influence in Bosnia did not produce 
the required support for the Serbian Government’s policies and the need therefore 
materialised for an explicitly Serb party that could represent Belgrade’s position in 
Bosnia. But how great was Belgrade’s influence over the SDS in pre-war Bosnia?
Milosevic and the SDS
The SDS’s public relationship with Milosevic varied considerably between the pre­
election and the post-election period. Shortly after the formation of the SDS, 
Karadzic, when asked about his co-operation with political parties in Belgrade, said 
that he did not want an alliance with Milosevic’s SPS, which he considered the 
bastion of the communist movement.67 The public profile of the SDS was that of an 
anti-communist, national party, which was willing and able to co-operate across the 
ethnic divide. Public association with the Serbian President, therefore, was not in the 
party’s interest. Moreover, since the Serbian secret police had a weaker network in 
Bosnia than in Croatia, more of the organisation of the SDS was left to the locals and 
Belgrade arguably had less influence over the party. Former members of the SDS, 
nevertheless, assert that Belgrade was very much present behind the scenes. Thus, 
Srebrov argues that Milosevic was the initiator of his removal from the SDS 
leadership.69
The paramount role of Milosevic, at least on a symbolic level, was recognised by 
Karadzic after the elections when, in February 1991, he made statements such as: “I f  
Yugoslavia is to be dissolved, we authorise Slobodan Milosevic to act on our behalf ’, 
and “We are amateurs ... Only Slobodan Milosevic is a real statesman who could
66 Andjelic, 2003: 151.
67 Pejanovic, 2002: 23.
68 Judah, 2000: 192.
69 Kulenovic, Adil, 1995. “Memorandum sanum”. Vreme, 30 October, p. 14-17.
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70lead the country”. To further demonstrate his loyalty, Karadzic publicly supported 
Milosevic during the 9 March 1991 demonstrations in Belgrade.71 Even though 
Karadzic initially downplayed his links with Belgrade, Milosevic’s legitimacy to 
represent the Serbs outside Serbia was, thus, not denied by the SDS leaders. In the 
main part of the pre-war period, Karadzic, unlike RaSkovic, did not challenge 
MiloSevic in statements or in actions. This display of loyalty was, however, not 
always reciprocated by MiloSevic, who sought to camouflage his links with the SDS
77leaders. By late February 1992, the Serbian President had abandoned his hope for 
an agreement with Izetbegovic and adopted a more radical position: he argued that 
the Serbs could “neither be threatened nor separated against their w iir but, 
nevertheless, maintained that he did not know Karadzic well and that “Serbia has 
nothing to do with Bosnia. It's not our problem”. Following the international 
recognition of Slovenia and Croatia and mounting US pressure for Bosnia’s 
recognition, MiloSevic appears to have become more committed to a “new less 
extensive Yugoslavia”.1* In this altered strategy, the Serbs in the neighbouring 
republics would be not be incorporated into the state but would obtain de facto 
independent status within Croatia and Bosnia. For this strategy to succeed, MiloSevic 
needed the co-operation of the international community75 as well as less obvious 
links with the local Serb leaders.
Thus, while the link with Belgrade was initially downplayed by the SDS, soon after 
the elections, they made clear their view of MiloSevic as their legitimate leader. 
However, the Belgrade Government officially distanced itself from the Bosnian Serb 
leadership following a change in the position of the international community. 
Factions within the SDS, furthermore, could not look to Belgrade for support since 
MiloSevic seemed satisfied with Karadzic’s leadership and with the party’s course. 
There was, therefore, no reason to take advantage of possible internal divisions. The 
most radical wing in Banja Luka was, furthermore, close to Babic and following 
Milosevic’s fall-out with the Knin leader in early 1992, he was unlikely to support 
Bosnian Krajina’s challenge to Karadzic. There was, therefore, no support
70 Andjelic, 2003: 207. Sell, 2002: 129.
71 Gordy, 1999: 34.
72 Sell, 2002:160.
73 Ibid. 162.
74 Burg, Shoup, 1999: 103
15 Ibid
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forthcoming for intra-party challengers and the kin-state was, therefore, of less 
significance for the outcome of intra-Serb competition in Bosnia than it had been in 
Croatia. This does not, however, mean that Belgrade did not influence the 
radicalisation of the SDS: Belgrade provided the party with the resources needed to 
pursue the war-option.76
In terms of the general population, there were also significant differences between 
the two cases. Whereas the Serb voters in Croatia had given their electoral support to 
the reformed communists and the SDS consequently had to rely on other resources to 
become dominant, the situation was markedly different in Bosnia where the Serb 
voters closed ranks behind the SDS.
4.3 General population:
Unclear mandate for popular nationalists
The massive support for the nationalist parties in the Bosnian elections came as a 
great surprise, since none of the pre-election polls had pointed to such a landslide and 
had actually indicated victory for the SK-SDP. Thus, even in a poll in early 
November, only days before the elections, the SDS looked set to win just 14 per cent 
of the vote and a majority of the Serbs would vote for either the SK-SDP or for the 
Reformists.77 It therefore appeared to be a repeat of the Serb voting patterns in the 
Croatian elections.
There are some problems surrounding the surveys,78 but one thing they do point to is 
a rapid development in attitudes and a clear upward trend in the support for the 
nationalist parties. Less than a year before the elections, the nationalist leaders were 
not a significant political force and popular support for them was not registered. Thus, 
in December 1989, a poll on the most popular individuals was conducted in urban 
areas and nationalist leaders failed to be mentioned by anyone surveyed.79 The lack 
of popular support for nationalist parties is even better illustrated in a well-known 
poll from April-May 1990 in which a great majority supported a ban on ethnic
76 Pejanovic, 2002: 55.
77 Overview of polls in Amautovic, Suad, 1996. Izbori u Bosni i Hercegovini '90: Analiza izbomog 
procesa. Sarajevo: Promocult. p. 57-8.
8 Andjelic, 2003: 181. Amautovic, 1996: 52-3.
79 Andjelic, 2003: 129.
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O A
political parties. This poll was limited to urban areas but the lack of support for 
nationalist parties is still striking considering that the situation in Yugoslavia had 
already become tense at this point. As regards the Serb voters, the surveys point to 
growing support for the SDS: the party increased its share of the vote from 4.5 per 
cent in late August to 10.2 per cent in early November.81 For the Serb respondents, 
what was most important for their view of a political party was its programme: 
whether it had a Yugoslav orientation or not. Interestingly, the Serb respondents 
reported having very little knowledge of the SDS’s programme. The resulting 
confusion over the SDS’s programme must have been augmented by events pointing 
to possibly greater radicalism: the creation of the Serb National Council in October 
1990 and the expressed militancy of at least parts of the party. This uncertainty is 
reflected in the large proportion of Serb respondents who, in October 1990, said that
OA
they were still undecided as to their electoral choice. Crucially for the electoral 
results, these many undecided voters chose to cast their vote to Serb nationalism. 
Since the SDS and the non-ethnic alternatives did not differ on their declared 
programmatic goal, this suggests that ethnification among the population had indeed 
taken place before the elections.
One of the reasons for this greater ethnification found in Bosnia than in Croatia is 
obviously the timing of the elections: the Bosnian elections were held six months 
later than the Croatian ones and the situation in Yugoslavia was becoming 
progressively more tense. Ethnification was, moreover, strengthened by the 
weakness of the non-ethnic parties, by the SDS’s own strength and by the co­
operation between the nationalist parties. In the media there was, furthermore, a 
tendency to replace communist patrons with nationalist ones, which resulted in 
unbalanced coverage of the campaign.83 Consequently, at the time of the 1990 
elections, the reformed communists had lost their popular base: the SK-SDP had 
been replaced by the nationalist parties as the party of the masses.84 This was the 
outcome of political competition and was influenced by the distribution of resources
80 Ibid. 141.
81 Amautovic, 1996: 57-8. The 10.2 per cent translates into 14.3 per cent if only decided voters are 
included.
82 Ibid 54-6.
83 Andjelid, 2003: 125. This is contested by Kurspahic, who argues that the Bosnian media backed the 
non-ethnic forces, but that Croatian and Serbian media, which were also part of the Bosnian media 
market, supported the nationalist forces. Kurspahic, 2003: 94-97.
84 Andjelic, 2003: 160.
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between the SDS and the non-ethnic parties; it was not about the overwhelming 
power of ethnicity and the SDS resorted to adopting a vague position, since playing 
the ethnic card would not have been successful. Even though more radical sentiments 
were sometimes expressed by SDS officials, the profile of the party was moderate, if 
rather vague.
Post-electoral radicalisation
The ethnification of politics and the popular support for the nationalist parties does 
not automatically entail that the voters endorsed the subsequent radicalisation and it 
certainly does not mean that the radicalisation was driven by voter attitudes.
In a survey conducted to mark the first anniversary of the new authorities, great 
reservations were expressed by the respondents: 77 per cent were in favour of new 
elections and 43 per cent said that the new government’s performance was below 
their expectations, while only 8 per cent thought it exceeded their expectations. 
These sentiments were also expressed by members and supporters of the nationalist
Of
parties. The population was disappointed with the chaotic rule of the nationalist 
parties and with the declining living standards, and popular protests became more
Of
and more widespread. Shortly before the war, protests also emerged over the 
nationalist policies of the parties: In the cities, peace movements were organised and 
mass peace rallies took place in early 1992. The mass protests failed to alter the 
position of the nationalist parties, but along with the above-mentioned survey they do 
indicate that the radicalisation did not enjoy popular support, or was at least not led 
by popular demands.
The Serb leaders in Bosnia had, however, taken note of the successful holding of 
Serb referenda in Croatia. This was an effective way of bolstering their position by 
demonstrating popular support for their radicalisation, and the result of the 
referendum was unsurprisingly overwhelming support for staying in Yugoslavia. The 
preference of the majority of the Serbs for staying in Yugoslavia had already been 
made clear in surveys and the outcome was, therefore, to be expected. But the
85 Survey by Oslobodenje and the Department of Journalism. Krsmanovic, Vlatka, 1992. “Memories 
of a common past”. Vreme News Digest, no. 42,13 July.
86 Andjelic, 2003: 203.
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expressed support for joining parts of Bosnia with what remained of Yugoslavia 
could be argued to signify a radicalisation and the SDS could use this to argue that 
their position was indeed the majority position in the Serb community.
Nevertheless, there were significant irregularities in the referendum and one cannot 
conclude from the result that the war-option, which the SDS increasingly 
championed, also enjoyed majority support in the Serb community. The Bosnian 
President, Alija Izetbegovic, strongly questioned the referendum result when he 
stated “O f course, the result was a triumph -  the response was over one hundred
on m
percent - 1 can’t help thinking it was Bolshevik-style voting’. The SDS might have 
been able to take the voters along to a more uncompromising position but they did 
not have an opportunity to express alternative views. The SDS’s ability to control the 
Serb population, as well as the existence of popular support for the party, was aptly 
demonstrated by the almost complete boycott of the Bosnian independence 
referendum in February 1992. The SDS could manipulate the expression of popular 
attitudes and surveys demonstrate the existence of dissatisfaction with nationalist 
rule. Even so, Karadzic used the alleged extremism of the Serb population to justify a 
radicalisation of the SDS’s position. Just before the outbreak of war, he stated that 
the SDS would have to take a tougher stand because the nation wanted extreme 
leaders and if the SDS did not radicalise they would be outflanked by rivalling 
parties and leaders.88 Whether Karadzid actually believed this to be the case or not is 
an open question, but legitimation of ones position in terms of popular attitudes was 
clearly widespread. Despite this rhetorical regard for popular opinion there is no 
evidence that it played a decisive role in the radicalisation of the SDS’s position; this 
change in policies was not led by popular demand.
When the SDS was still competing with non-ethnic parties, and espoused a relatively 
moderate or vague position, the party did, however, have great success in attracting 
popular support. One of the important factors influencing this ability was the inter­
ethnic interplay, which strengthened the ethnification of politics and thereby helped 
marginalise the already weakened non-ethnic parties.
87 Silber; Little, 1996: 216.
88 Butorovic, N., 1992. “Vise nema jedinstvene BiH”. Borba, 6 March, p. 3.
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4.4 Inter-ethnic interplay: Tripartite structure
In terms of the inter-ethnic interplay in Bosnia and Croatia there are two important 
differences: the Bosnian tripartite structure introduces the importance of shifting 
alliances and the relative demographic strength of the Serb community is, 
furthermore, decidedly different in the two cases. Beyond these differences many 
similarities are, nevertheless, found in the two cases and the interplay was, as in 
Croatia, decisive for the ethnification of politics.
Ethnification and radicalisation
Realising that none of the ethnic parties would be in a position to rule on their own 
and, furthermore, aware of the need to undermine the support of the non-ethnic 
parties, the three main ethnic parties in Bosnia chose to co-operate. Although they 
frequently used inflammatory rhetoric to increase tensions, they simultaneously 
emphasised that their opponents were not the other ethnic parties but rather the 
representatives of the old system.89 At the founding assembly of the SDS, the leader 
of the Bosniak SDA, Alija Izetbegovic, received standing ovations and he welcomed 
the new Serb party with the words: “we have been waiting for you for some time -  
for this Bosnia needs you”.90 Karadzic reciprocated this praise, expressed “great 
liking” for Izetbegovic and stated: “Owr Muslims are much closer to us... than many 
Christian people in Europe”.91 The alliance between the SDS, the SDA and the HDZ 
was never made formal but the parties openly encouraged their supporters to give 
lower preference votes to the other ethnic parties.92
The co-operation between the ethnic parties aided the ethnification of politics; it 
strengthened the parties’ attempt to define political competition in ethnic terms. This 
may seem counter-intuitive since the co-operation could be taken to indicate that 
anti-communism was more important than ethnicity. However, the cleavage between 
the reformed communists and the anti-communist ethnic parties was merely used to 
justify their co-operation and the need for ethnic representation was stressed. Thus,
89 Banjac, B., 1990. “Stranka koja ukida strah”. Borba, 16 July, p. 3.
90 Bougarel, 1996: 98.
91 Stefanovic, Nenad, Lj, 1994. “Dr Radovan Karadzic, President of the Sab Republic in BiH”. Vreme 
News Digest, no. 142,13 June. In its election programme, the SDS professed its support for equal 
treatment of the different nations living in Bosnia. Election programme in Prstojevic, 1990: 113-5.
92 Zulfikarpa§ic, Adil, 1998. The Bosniak. London: Hurst, p. 155.
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the SDS warned of the consequences of a non-ethnic vote and the HDZ, in their 
electoral programme, assured the Croat voters that if their neighbours, friends and 
colleagues were ready to accept them as Croats, then they would also be ready to 
accept that they had their own party. Since they did not agree on the issue of the 
future status of Yugoslavia, with the HDZ supporting a confederation, their co­
operation, furthermore, prevented this issue from being the most salient issue in the 
campaign. As in Croatia, the initially relative moderate position of the ethnic parties, 
paradoxically, facilitated ethnification: they recognised each other as legitimate 
representatives and reinforced each other’s message of an ethnic definition of politics.
The ethnic definition, at first, did not preclude co-operation and the interplay with the 
HDZ and the SDA in the pre-election period scarcely gave the SDS reasons or 
ammunition for radicalisation. The SDS and the SDA, especially, were adamant that 
they were not opponents and both parties supported the continued existence of the 
Yugoslav federation. Nevertheless, the SDS did radicalise during the election 
campaign, most visibly with the establishment of the SNV, which indicated that the 
SDS would not necessarily respect the Bosnian institutions. The SDS argued, 
however, that this should not be interpreted as a radicalisation, that it was a defensive 
measure in case the rights of the Serbs were not protected.94 Although this 
radicalisation did not directly mirror the interplay with the HDZ and the SDA, it did 
reflect an underlying fear among the Serbs that the Bosniaks and Croats would form 
an alliance and thereby be able to outvote the Serbs. The interplay, therefore, had 
some influence but it is nevertheless interesting that the SDS in Bosnia radicalised at 
an earlier stage than the SDS in Croatia, despite the existence of the nationalist 
partnership.
Problematic co-operation despite restraint
After the landslide victory, Karadzic continuously emphasised the need for 
partnership95 and the three parties proceeded to divide the positions of power 
between them. Although they were to find that co-operation was problematic once 
substantial questions had to be addressed, it took almost a year before open battles
93 Vucelic, Milorag, 1990. “Srbi se najsporije bude”. Borba, 23 July, p. 5. HDZ BiH programme in 
Prstojevic, 1990: 44-5.
94 ‘Tako srpski narod kaze”. Danas, 13 November 1990, p. 11.
95 Nincic, Roksanda, 1990. “Udruzeni poras komunista i reformista”. Danas, 26 November, p. 12-14.
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were fought between the parties.96 Conscious of the increasingly tense situation, 
especially after war broke out in Croatia, the SDA and the HDZ avoided taking 
extreme positions on the federation-confederation debate.97 But also the SDS showed 
restraint: despite the continued radicalisation of its statements, the SDS leadership 
still came out supportive when a chance for the preservation of Yugoslavia was on 
the horizon. Thus, when the partnership with the HDZ and SDA was re-established 
after a row in early 1991, Karadzic stated that the SDS as a democratic party had 
long ago abandoned extreme Serb positions: forces for a unitary Yugoslavia or 
Greater Serbia.98 Similarly, when Adil Zulfikarpasic from the Muslim Bosniak 
Organisation (Muslimansko-boSnjadka organizacija, MBO) proposed a plan for 
Bosnia in Yugoslavia, the SDS was willing to back this so-called ‘Belgrade 
Initiative’.99 The possibility of changing alliances resulted in a vague position still 
being of use to the SDS, despite its near monolithic status within the Serb community.
But, ultimately, the SDS chose to adopt a position of staunch intransigence and 
argued that co-operation was impossible. The blame for this, they argued, was 
entirely the SDA’s and the HDZ’s since they refused to accept the SDS’s position.100 
The alliance between the Croats and the Bosniaks was something the SDS had 
warned against from the outset, as Kraji§nik stated in early 1991: “The Serb nation 
does not want to live in an independent state where they will be afraid o f being
outvoted\ 101 The SDS could argue that the HDZ and the SDA were violating the
100national parity principle and they used this to justify choosing the war-option. The 
hardening of the Serb position was further reinforced by movements on the 
international scene; especially by the US push for Bosnia’s recognition which started 
in February 1992. 103 While this was the reason used to justify the SDS’s 
radicalisation, the position of the party should not be seen as merely reactive: other 
forces gave the leadership strong incentives to radicalise and the party most often
96 Pejanovic, 2002: 40-1.
97 Cohen, 1995: 209.
98 Habal, E., 1991. “Bosna je suverene u okviru Jugoslavije”. Oslobodenje, 20 February, p. 3.
99 The SDA, however, rejected the plan. Zulfikarpasic, 1998: 169-188.
100 Pejanovic, 2002: 63,65.
101 StaniSic, D. 1991. “Ustavno ili neustavno, pitanje je sad”. Oslobodenje, 4 February, p. 4.
102 Glenny, 1996: 141. Karadzic argued that the SDA and the HDZ were no longer partners, that they 
were now “classical opponents”. Butorovic, N., 1992. “Vise nema jedinstvene BiH”. Borba, 6 March, 
p. 3.
103 Burg; Shoup, 1999: 100
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took the lead in radicalisation. However, the tripartite constellation was of 
importance: for the initial co-operation, but also for the radicalisation of the SDS’s 
position. In terms of the latter aspect, the SDS had markedly different relations with 
the HDZ and the SDA and this was to influence subsequent developments.
Scepticism o f Croats and wooing o f Bosniaks
The SDS was, from the beginning, much more sceptical of the Croat HDZ than the 
Bosniak SDA. This was partly based on the HDZ’s preference for a confederal 
solution but should also be seen in the light of the mounting tensions in Croatia. 
However, there were Croat forces in Bosnia that the SDS could possibly ally itself 
with. The HDZ was itself divided: between factions supporting an independent 
Bosnia and factions dreaming of a Greater Croatia. Greater Croatia was anathema for 
the Serbs in Croatia but it opened up for potential alliances with the Serbs in Bosnia: 
it could be possible to reach an agreement on dividing Bosnia. At the time of the 
elections the pro-Bosnia faction was still in the stronger position, under the 
leadership of Stjepan Kljuic, but with support from Zagreb, the Herzegovin lobby 
gradually took over.104 This change made new alliances possible, especially 
following the Karadjordjevo talks between Tudman and MiloSevic.
However, in the pre-war period the SDS primarily put its faith in the Bosniaks and it 
was this interplay that had the greatest impact on the SDS’s position. Izetbegovic and 
Karadzic had, from the founding of their parties, publicly emphasised the necessity 
and value of their co-operation. The Serbs in Bosnia and Belgrade actively tried to 
woo the Bosniaks, hoping that they could thereby prevent the disintegration of 
Yugoslavia. The SDS could seek co-operation with not only one but two Bosniak 
parties: with the SDA and with the MBO. The latter party had been formed as a more 
moderate alternative after a pre-election split in the SDA leadership105 and it proved 
more open to supporting the SDS’s position.
The first sign of a definitive break between the SDA and the SDS came in February 
1991 when the SDA adopted a new position and began advocating a confederal
104 Judah, 2000: 165.
105 Demirovic, E., 1990. “Razvjencanje na cednom mjestu”. Borba, 20 September, p. 5. LuSic, M.,
1990. “Ozbiljno skretanje udesno”. Borba, 20 September, p. 5.
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solution.106 But although this clearly contradicted the SDS’s goal and raised the 
prospect of a Croat-Bosniak alliance, the partnership did not collapse. A final attempt 
at reviving the co-operation was initiated by the MBO with the so-called Belgrade 
Initiative in the summer of 1991; an agreement which would guarantee Yugoslavia’s 
continuation.107 At this point, the Serb leaders felt increasingly isolated and the 
MBO’s leader, Zulfikarpasic, argues that they were pleasantly surprised by the 
proposal.108 The agreement, however, failed when Izetbegovic refused to sign. The 
Serbs attempted to secure agreement for a while longer but after this last attempt it 
was not long before the HDZ and the SDA declared a sovereign Bosnia and the SDS 
left Parliament and began preparing for the war-option.109 Already at the time of the 
negotiations over the Belgrade Initiative it was clear that relations between the SDA 
and the SDS were frosty at best. Thus, Koljevic, in Izetbegovic’s presence, allegedly 
exclaimed: “He is lying to ws!”110
Part of the explanation for this lack of trust is to be found in the internal divisions in 
the SDA, which radicalised Izetbegovic’s position and contributed to Serb mistrust. 
Hardline forces within the SDA effected a gradual radicalisation of the party and, in 
negotiations with the Serbs, Izetbegovic found himself constrained and he retracted 
from statements on possible settlements following negative reactions within his own 
ranks.111 When Zulfikarpasic defended the Belgrade Initiative on Bosnian television, 
a fax was received from the SDA executive committee stating: “We are against the 
very idea o f negotiating with the Serbs”. Izetbegovic said he had no idea who sent 
it,112 which attests to the factional disputes in the party or at least to Izetbegovic’s 
ambivalent position.
The divisions in the Bosniak community permitted the SDS to maintain their hope 
for Bosniak support but it also contributed to Izetbegovic’s increasingly 
uncompromising position and the SDS leadership’s lack of trust in him. Both the
106 Andjelic, 2003: 207.
107 A Yugoslav Federation dominated by Serbia was by no means an ideal solution for the Bosniaks 
but it was a last ditch attempt to avoid war.
108 Zulfikarpasic, 1998: 152.
109 Ibid 178,180,181.
110 Ibid 172.
111 Ibid 172.
112 Ibid. 183.
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SDS and the HDZ had tried to win the Bosniaks over and the failure of the SDS to 
secure their support resulted in a great sense of betrayal.113
The tripartite coalition in some ways dampened radicalisation since it was not clear 
from the outset who would end up in the minority position. It encouraged moderation 
as a means to ensuring co-operation. However, radicalisation eventually ensued and 
it is an interesting point that increased radicalisation co-existed with continued 
partnership and attempts at reaching agreements. This radicalisation was 
significantly influenced by the context of increasing tensions and the outbreak of 
violence in Slovenia and Croatia. While the interplay and overall context, therefore, 
affected the position of the Serb leadership, it would be mistaken to regard the 
radicalisation of the SDS as merely mirroring this interplay: the radicalisation was 
strongly pushed by intra-party divisions and by the kin-state, and the SDS often took 
the first step in radicalising its position.
4.5 Dynamics of competition and division
At the time of elections, the ethnification of politics in Bosnia was considerable and 
with this issue being dominant, the non-ethnic parties found it very hard to compete 
with the SDS. The inter-ethnic co-operation was a conscious strategy to define 
politics in ethnic terms and the initially relative moderate position of the nationalist 
parties, paradoxically, aided ethnification and, hence, ultimately the radicalisation of 
politics. The ability of the SDS to attract Serb voters was, furthermore, augmented by 
the weakness of the non-ethnic parties and their internal squabbles. Moreover, the 
SDS managed in the short time from its foundation to the elections to establish a 
well-functioning party structure. The only nationalist party that competed with the 
SDS was the SPO but it never became a serious challenge. When the SPO became 
significantly more moderate and hence very distinguishable from the SDS, the 
party’s only deputy chose to abandon the SPO and join the SDS. The existence of 
non-ethnic rivals meant that a vague position was instrumental for the SDS in its 
attempt to capture the middle ground. Playing the extreme ethnic card was not
113 Stefanovic, Nenad, 1994. “Dr. Radovan Karadzic, president of the Serb Republic in BH”. Vreme 
News Digest, no. 142, 13 June. Serb politicians from that time frequently argue that the position of the 
Serbs was reactive and that it was in particular a reaction to the SDA’s and the HDZ’s co-operation. 
E.g. Interview Dragutin Ilic, Banja Luka, 23 October 2003. Interview Predrag Lazarevic, Banja Luka, 
12 November 2003. Interview Vladimir Lukic, Banja Luka, 2 December 2003.
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successful, but due to the earlier ethnification of politics a vague position soon lost 
its use: the SDS was almost monolithic within the Serb community, non-ethnic 
alternatives were marginalised and a significant, more moderate Serb party seemed 
unlikely to emerge. Rivals to the SDS and its leadership, therefore, had to come from 
within.
Radovan Karadzic was initially not a strong charismatic leader around whom the 
party was created: the SDS built him up, not the other way round. Power was, at least 
before the elections, exerted from behind the scenes rather than in the official party 
leadership. Despite having such relatively weak leadership from the outset, the party 
was fairly cohesive and not plagued by fractionalisation. The only serious problem of 
intra-party challenges in the pre-war period was caused by the increasingly 
autonomous Krajina leadership. Like other threatening intra-party divisions this was, 
however, solved resolutely through a compromise involving concessions to the 
hardline elements. It therefore followed the trend of continuous radicalisation of the 
party. This radicalisation, as well as Karadzic’s strong backing from behind the 
scenes, seems to have preserved an undivided party. Finally, Belgrade’s support for 
the leadership and lack of involvement in intra-party struggles helped Karadzic fend 
off challengers; they did not posses the resources needed to win in the intra-Serb 
competition.
Despite popular endorsement of the SDS at the time of elections, the party could not 
necessarily count on popular support for its continued radicalisation. Dissatisfaction 
with the nationalist parties was mounting but the party made clever use of a 
referendum to point to the support enjoyed by its more radical position. While the 
party in its radicalised form was certainly not without popular backing, there is no 
evidence that supports a voter-led radicalisation: the Serb voters had no chance to 
support any alternatives to the SDS and with its control of resources in Serb- 
dominated areas, the party had the power to heavily influence popular opinion and its 
expression.
Finally, the inter-ethnic interplay proved to be of great significance in the 
ethnification of politics and the resulting marginalisation of non-ethnic parties. The 
tripartite structure, moreover, influenced the SDS’s strategies and for a while
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dampened the drive towards radicalisation. But radicalisation was fuelled by the 
context of increasing tensions and ensued following the marginalisation of 
alternatives, pressure from Belgrade and in an attempt to appease intra-party 
challengers.
4.6 Pre-war intra-ethnic competition
The analysis of intra-Serb competition in pre-war Croatia and Bosnia highlighted 
some interesting dynamics. In particular, popular attitudes were found to be of 
limited significance in the process of radicalisation and the ethnification of politics 
was part of the political struggle; it was not based on the overwhelming power of 
ethnicity.114 The analysis found that the intra-Serb competition was primarily 
dominated by non-democratic resources, which were, to a large extent, supplied by 
Belgrade, and the dominance of hardliners was consequently based on their control 
of resources outside democratic competition. What was important for the rivalling 
elites was to have a geographical basis of support, a core area where an alternative 
power base could be built. Furthermore, the use of distinctly non-democratic tactics 
to get rid of more moderate rivals greatly aided the victory of the radical faction. The 
availability and effectiveness of coercive resources strengthened the hardliners and 
made possible the dominance of centrifugal dynamics. Contrary to what is argued in 
theories of outbidding, popular attitudes were not the driving force in the intra-party 
struggles; they were not based on popular demands for a harder line. One decisive 
factor in the victory of the hardliners in the Croatian case was Belgrade’s 
involvement: the Serbian regime provided the resources needed in the competition. 
The importance of Belgrade’s involvement consequently increased with the 
increasing importance of non-democratic resources.
Competition with non-ethnic parties and the process of ethnification progressed 
differently in the two cases, and this illustrates some of the interplay between 
ethnification and political competition. In the competition with non-ethnic parties the 
SDS in Bosnia proved much stronger than the SDS in Croatia: the authority of the 
League of Communists was eroded to a greater extent, the non-ethnic parties 
weakened each other by competing internally, the SDS in Bosnia was stronger and
114 As Gagnon puts it: “It is the very inability o f elites ‘to play the ethnic card’ as a means o f  
mobilising the population that leads them to use other options”. Gagnon, 2004: xvi.
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better organised than the SDS in Croatia, and the ethnic issue finally had greater 
political salience in Bosnia than in Croatia, where the main electoral issue was the 
future status of Yugoslavia. Ethnification of politics was part of the political struggle 
and should be analysed as political competition: in terms of the dynamics of 
competition, distribution of resources and the inter-ethnic interplay, which lends it a 
quality different from more conventional political competition. The ethnification of 
politics was not an automatic process once an ethnic party was created: the 
competition between the ethnic parties and the non-ethnic parties was influenced by 
the process of ethnification but the competition also had an impact on this process. 
The ethnification of politics and the marginalisation of non-ethnic rivals was in both 
cases complete in late 1990, i.e. before the outbreak of widespread violence and was 
consequently not merely a consequence of violence, as it is sometimes argued.115 But 
the support for the nationalist parties and their subsequent radicalisation was not 
based on elites successfully playing the ethnic card and mobilising people from a 
radical position.
When ethnification was still incomplete and non-ethnic rivals still posed a treat to the 
ethnic party, a vague position was, therefore, instrumental: a position from which the 
party could simultaneously promote tensions and compete with non-ethnic forces. 
The vague position, furthermore, meant that ethnic alternatives to the SDS were 
unlikely to emerge. The parties presented themselves as ‘catch-all’ Serb parties, 
which dissuaded more moderate rivals, and when the non-ethnic rivals were 
marginalised, the SDS was consequently near-monolithic in the Serb community. 
Once ethnification was complete and alternatives were marginalised, the incentive 
for a vague position disappeared and a more radical position became strategic, 
especially since radical factions were found within the party. This tendency was 
augmented by the lack of possibility for moderate SDS factions to forge alliances 
with non-ethnic forces. In this sense, ethnification fostered radicalisation whereas 
incomplete ethnification was more compatible with moderate dynamics. However, a 
drawn-out process of ethnification can result in a weak ethnic leadership, due to the 
need for a vague position. Therefore, gradual ethnification, which may be caused by 
relatively moderate divisions, can actually increase the risk of radicalisation. The
115 See e.g. Gagnon, 2004. Mueller, John, 2000. “The Banality o f ‘Ethnic’ War”. International 
Security 25 (1): 42-70.
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effect of ethnification on political competition is, consequently, less than 
straightforward.
In both pre-war Croatia and Bosnia, the dominant dynamic of Serb elite competition 
was centrifugal: despite different degrees of divisions, radicalisation was the 
outcome. The SDS in Croatia provided a clear example of intra-party outflanking 
when more radical factions continuously pressured Raskovic to take a more extreme 
position and ultimately replaced him as party leader. In Bosnia, the SDS leadership 
was in greater control of the party but this greater cohesion and ability to deal with 
divisions and factions was accompanied by a constant radicalisation of the party. The 
rivalry was fuelled by differing views of solutions to the inter-ethnic conflict, by 
ideological and regional cleavages and by personal power ambitions. These issues 
came together in the SDS’s strong regional factions in Knin and Banja Luka. 
However, the Knin faction reached into the leadership of the SDS, whereas the Banja 
Luka faction was in conflict with the leadership of the SDS. The primary issue of 
contention differed: Banja Luka wanted greater autonomy while Knin wanted the 
party to take a more radical course, i.e. in Croatia, the internal competition was 
primarily over the national or ethnic issue, whereas in Bosnia the divisions were also 
based on other issue. Furthermore, the Banja Luka faction was internally divided and, 
therefore, weakened vis-a-vis the central leadership. The Banja Luka faction was, 
consequently, much easier to manage than the Knin faction and the leadership only 
had to make minor concessions. In terms of the resulting dynamics of competition, 
these differences, therefore, point to the importance of the structure of the party, the 
nature of divisions and the cohesiveness of the oppositional factions. Both 
leaderships may deliberately have created or encouraged radical factions in order to 
be able to stir up tensions while at the same presenting themselves as the more 
moderate forces who needed concessions in order to fend off the hawks. This is, 
however, a dangerous strategy and for Raskovic, if such a strategy was ever 
deliberate, it backfired.
As regards the leaders of the two parties, one might have expected that Karadzic 
would have faced more factions than Ra§kovic, who had his popular support and 
charisma to lean on. But Karadzic had strong people behind him who were not 
harbouring leadership ambitions. Raskovic’s charismatic authority was of limited
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value in securing cohesion in the party: it was far from sufficient when factions were, 
at the same time, allowed to flourish and when Raskovic failed to build a cohesive 
leadership. Personal leadership was, therefore, not as important as one would have 
expected in a transitional situation, which is generally characterised by weak parties. 
The organisation of the party matters and the weak structures, which were especially 
characteristic of the Croatian SDS, caused the central party structures to be of limited 
importance for the internal struggles. Instead, regional and local party structures as 
well as other resources became decisive especially when the conflict intensified, 
military considerations began to play a role and a general situation of lawlessness 
spread.
The inter-ethnic interplay proved very important for the ethnification of politics but 
had a less significant impact on the process of radicalisation: radicalisation of the 
‘other side’ provided ammunition for hardliners, but it was not the decisive factor in 
the outcome of intra-ethnic competition and changes in intra-ethnic elite competition 
need not be a response to changed rhetoric or actions of opposing ethnic leaders. The 
inter-ethnic interplay primarily matters when popular attitudes are of great 
significance and its importance was consequently reduced by the decreasing 
significance of this audience. However, the number of ethnic groups did impact on 
the strategies adopted by the two SDSs. Finally, the extent of unity or disunity 
among the Serbs appears to have been influenced by the inter-ethnic interplay. 
During the process of ethnification, when the marginalisation of non-ethnic parties 
was still an open question, divisions were limited to intra-party competition and were 
then of a fairly muted nature. Only once the rivals were removed did intra-party 
strives really come to the fore. This would suggest that the nature of the conflict and 
the success of the ethnic parties influence the degree of unity. The inter-ethnic 
interplay seems to have had a more direct impact in Bosnia where the Bosniak-Croat 
alliance, to some extent, can be seen as a turning point that temporarily led to greater 
Serb unity. This was further strengthened by the outbreak of war. However, while the 
inter-ethnic interplay had some impact on this closing of ranks, one should not 
overlook the significance of enforced unity: non-ethnic deputies were subject to very 
significant pressures to join the SDS’s ranks and moderates were often removed from 
their posts. This had more to do with the dynamics of intra-ethnic competition than
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with inter-ethnic relations. Intra-ethnic competition should consequently not be 
regarded as just an epiphenomenon of inter-ethnic relations; it is not merely reactive.
Despite the different dynamics of competition, the outcome was, nevertheless, the 
same in Croatia and Bosnia: increasing radicalisation of the dominant Serb position. 
But the different paths to this radicalisation meant that the two SDS leaders, Babic 
and Karadzic, entered the war with significantly different degrees of political support, 
fractionalisation and threats to their leadership.
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Chapter 5
Intra-Serb Competition in Wartime Croatia- 
Disunity did not save the Serbs
With the outbreak of war, we find ourselves in a very different context for political 
competition: not only has the transition to democracy failed and complete 
ethnification has become a reality but it is also a situation of war in which other 
resources, especially military resources, are available and effective in the intra-Serb 
rivalry. Given the importance of coercive resources, links with military and 
paramilitary forces becomes of crucial significance for the outcome of the intra-Serb 
competition; they consequently have an important influence on the dominant Serb 
position that can be exercised either through support for competing political leaders 
or through direct challenges to these leaders. These are the background conditions for 
the intra-ethnic competition, which is, consequently, far removed from political 
competition in a peaceful, consolidated democracy. However, the wartime period 
also brings with it the emergence of competition between ethnic parties, often also 
focused on issues other than the conflict itself. Divisions are still fuelled by 
disagreements over the inter-ethnic conflict, by ideological cleavages and by 
personal power ambitions, but it now also becomes focused on criticism of war 
profiteering and differing views of relations with Belgrade. This runs contrary to 
theoretical expectations that unity will increase in a time of crisis and that the 
outbreak of violence will prevent other issues from becoming salient. Intra-party 
competition, therefore, ceases to be the only form of intra-Serb competition and other 
issues of contention and competition surfaces. But while party competition increases 
in importance, the party structures themselves are even weaker than in the pre-war 
period: other resources are important and the need for democratic legitimacy has 
been reduced by the outbreak of war.
In the period immediately before the outbreak of war, the dynamics of intra-Serb 
competition had differed significantly in the two cases, although continuous 
radicalisation was a common feature. But after war broke out, in the summer of 1991 
in Croatia and in April 1992 in Bosnia, the dynamics of intra-Serb competition 
gradually changed and in some ways became more alike. The intensity of the 
competition increased in Bosnia and, in both cases, competition from other parties
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now also became of importance. However, the Serb elites in Croatia remained far 
more divided than in Bosnia and this affected the positions taken by the leaders and 
the ultimate defeat of the radicals when Croatian forces retook Krajina in August 
1995. Initially, however, the Serb leaders in both cases had great success in 
achieving their military objectives: by late 1991 Serb forces controlled one third of 
Croatian territory and by September 1992 Serb forces in Bosnia controlled as much 
as 70 per cent of the country.
Milosevic’s pre-eminent role had, in the pre-war period, been nearly uncontested 
among the victorious local leaders but this changed significantly during the war: the 
radical leaders that had been successful in the ‘local’ intra-ethnic competition almost 
invariably fell out with their protector in Belgrade. Rivalry therefore began over who 
was the true interpreter of Serb interests and goals, and in this competition 
disgruntled leaders in the two Serb statelets sought alternative alliance partners in 
Serbia while Milosevic found other players more willing to follow his tune. The 
Serbian President thereby sought to utilise the existence of divisions among the local 
Serbs and, therefore, continued to have a significant impact on the dynamics of intra- 
Serb competition. However, the local Serb leaders were able to gamer alternative 
support in Serbia: from the democratic opposition, intellectuals, the Serbian 
Orthodox Church and, in particular, the Serb Radicals. The existence of resources 
emanating from within the statelets as well as the support from these alternative 
audiences in the kin-state resulted in a greater level of autonomy from Milosevic, 
who consequently was not always able to dictate developments in the two statelets.
The importance of popular attitudes decreased considerably with the outbreak of war 
and it was not a significant constraint on the rivalling leaders, even though elections 
and referenda were held. In David Owen’s words, these leaders “displayed a 
callousness o f mind in which the people’s view never seemed to come anywhere near 
the conference table”.1 Similarly, the position of ‘opposing’ ethnic leaders did not 
significantly impact on the direction of competition; on changes in a more radical or 
more moderate direction. The form of inter-ethnic interplay that really mattered was 
the military balance but even when this became detrimental to the Serb leaders, it
1 Owen, David, 1995. Balkan Odyssey. San Diego, CA: Harcourt. p. 3.
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took changes in the intra-Serb competition and kin-state pressure to force a 
significant change in the dominant elite position.
Radicalisation continued to be the dominant response to intra-party challengers but it 
was not the chosen response to competition from other parties or independent leaders. 
Such challengers would most often be sought repressed and, hence, caused no 
change in the dominant position, but it also at times led to a relative moderation of 
the dominant position. Radicalisation is, therefore, not the only possible outcome of 
intra-ethnic competition, not even in a violent, highly polarised situation. This 
contradicts existing theorising in the field.
5.1 Infighting in the Serb statelet
Following the outbreak of war in Croatia, there was initially a closing of ranks 
behind Milan Babic, who had emerged victorious from the pre-war intra-Serb 
competition. Formally, however, Babic was only president of the SAO Krajina as 
well as president of the Serb National Council. In the two other SAOs in Croatia; 
SAO Western Slavonia and SAO Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem, Veljko 
Dzakula and Goran Hadzic were in the leadership. The initiative was, nevertheless, 
with Babic and on 19 December 1991, the parliament of SAO Krajina proclaimed the 
Republic of Serb Krajina (Republika Srpska Krajina, RSK), with Babic as its 
president. The RSK was, in early 1992, joined by the two other autonomous regions. 
Once the RSK was established, however, infighting quickly re-emerged and the 
intra-Serb competition was characterised by an array of political parties, factions and 
independent candidates. The rivalling elites were divided over their different 
positions on the war, over relations with Belgrade and over criticism of war 
profiteering. The competition was, furthermore, fuelled by regional cleavages and by 
personal power ambitions. While the RSK was caught in perpetual infighting, which 
eventually proved to be its downfall, the leaders of the Serbs outside of the RSK 
were in a very different position. Of the two main leaders, Milorad Pupovac and 
Milan Dukic, the former in some ways acted as a link between Zagreb and Knin, 
while the latter largely functioned as the Croatian Government’s ioyal Serb’.
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SDS factions, independents and multipartism
The onset of war had brought with it the reunification of the SDS under its radical 
leadership but without this ensuring more than temporary unity. As a consequence of 
continued fractionalisation and leadership disputes, Babic lost power in early 1992 
and subsequently chose to re-activate his SDS of Krajina and constitute it as an 
actual party. Competition between parties was thereby introduced in the RSK. Due to 
limited institutionalisation, the divisions between parties were at times unclear but 
the main challenges to the leaders now came from outside their own party or 
movement: from other parties or from independent candidates. Intra-party divisions 
persisted but they primarily concerned the ability to take hardliners along to new 
political positions rather than explicit challenges. The event that set these changing 
dynamics in motion was a leadership struggle over the Vance Plan in early 1992.
Babic faces defeat and party competition emerges
The Vance Plan set up four United Nations Protected Areas that coincided roughly 
with the Serb-held areas that had had a Serb majority or substantial minority before 
the war. In return for the deployment of UN forces, the JNA would withdraw from 
Croatia and the paramilitaries would be disarmed. Babic was, however, vehemently 
opposed to the plan: he refused to accept the disarmament and the withdrawal of the 
JNA fearing that the mandate of the UN forces would not be extended after six 
months.2
In his opposition, Babic had counted on the support of his loyal followers in Knin but 
with the joining of the two other autonomous regions to the RSK, the balance of 
power had changed and support from SAO Krajina was no longer sufficient for 
Babic to remain in power. The RSK political system was in essence a parliamentary 
system and the president could consequently be removed by parliament. It was, 
therefore, crucial that the speaker of the RSK parliament, Mile Paspalj, agreed to 
endorse the plan and called a parliamentary session in Glina, away from Babid’s 
stronghold in Knin. Members of parliament from outside the Knin area proved more 
willing to play Belgrade’s game: they endorsed the plan, dismissed Babic as 
president and requested the resignation of the government. Goran Hadzic, who was
2 ICTY, 2002a: 13625.
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president of SAO Slavonia, argues that this was merely the result of the joining of 
the two other SAOs: Babic was only president of the ‘small Krajina’ and a new 
parliament had to be constituted and a new president elected.3 It was, however, not a 
clear divide between Krajina and the rest of the RSK: the conflict between Babic and 
Belgrade also brought out divisions between Knin and the regions of Lika, Kordun 
and Banija, and many deputies from the latter regions chose to go against the RSK 
president. Divisions were, thus, fuelled by different views of the war, by regional 
cleavages as well as by personal ambitions. Babic had, however, not given up his 
fight and convened his loyalists to a parliament session in Knin. They decided to call 
a referendum on the Vance Plan and voted against the dismissal of Babic, whereby 
double rule was effectively established in the RSK. On 26 February 1992, Hadzic 
was elected new president of the RSK and after a period of competing centres of 
power the authority of his government was established.4
Although Babic was formally ousted by the parliament, coercive resources and 
support from military forces were decisive for this outcome. Babic lacked support in 
the ‘enlarged’ RSK and he crucially lacked the support of the military. He did not 
trust the JNA5 but had counted on support from the local paramilitaries. This was, 
however, conditional on support from Milan Martic, who controlled the paramilitary 
police. Babic and Martid had previously clashed due to Babic’s desire to control the 
armed forces, and an additional reason for Babic’s rejection of the Vance Plan may 
have been that the entailed demilitarisation would have left Martic’s police as the 
only military force in the RSK.6 Martic, perhaps realising this opportunity for 
increased power, chose not to forgive and forget and sided with Hadzic. As a 
response to this situation and in protest over the Vance Plan, Babic in April 1992 
formed the paramilitary ‘Petar Mrkonjic’ brigade.7 He, furthermore, decided to re­
activate his SDS of Krajina and constitute it as a separate party with himself as
3 Interview Goran Hadzic, Belgrade 30 October 2003.
4 Dakic 1994: 59. Curuvija, Mirko, 1992. “Kordun i Banija napuStaju Babicu”. Vjesnik, 12 February, 
p . l .
Cerovic, Stojan, 1992. ‘Troubles with a bit player”. Vreme News Digest, no. 16,13 January.
6 Milosevic, Milan, 1992. “Babic Caput”. Vreme News Digest, no. 16, 13 January. Cerovid, Stojan,
1991. “Balvan Suva Jugoslaviju”. Vreme, 17 June, p. 16-17. Rajic, Vlado, 1992. “Knin -  drugi put”. 
Vjesnik, 7 January p. 5.
7 Dakic, Mile, 2001. Krajina kroz Vijekove. Belgrade: Vedes. Hronika p. 15.
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president.8 Babic’s SDS and his paramilitaries were later to become of importance 
but for now he lacked support for his position and in late March he allegedly 
narrowly escaped an assassination attempt.9 Eventually, therefore, he returned to 
parliament, waiting for time to be ripe for his comeback.
The conflict over the Vance Plan gave Raskovic a chance to make a comeback. He 
was reinstated as leader of the SDS and announced that the party was “back in 
Croatian politics” and that the Serb representatives would return to the Croatian 
Parliament.10 Despite this formal position of power, Raskovic never regained 
influence and he was in a marginal position until his death in the summer of 1992. 
The moderation entailed by the Vance Plan was, therefore, of a very limited nature 
but it did, for a while, put an end to centrifugal dynamics.
Even though the new RSK government appeared to be more moderate, it soon 
became clear that the Vance Plan was only intended to freeze the situation and the 
other provisions of the plan were never implemented. Frustrated with the lack of 
progress, two members of the RSK government, Veljko Dzakula and Dusan 
Ecimovic, initiated negotiations with the Croatian authorities over the return of 
refugees to Western Slavonia and, together with other SDS leaders from Western 
Slavonia, they signed the so-called Daruvar Agreement in February 1993. The 
Government in Zagreb quickly distanced itself from the agreement11 but in Knin the 
reaction was more severe since it was thought to create an unwanted precedent: if in 
Western Slavonia why not in Knin? Dzakula and Ecimovic were relieved of their 
posts and in September 1993 they were arrested alongside one of the other 
negotiators, Mladen Kulid, and charged with high treason.12 The RSK leadership 
controlled the resources necessary to suppress such challengers and the charges sent 
a clear signal to others who might be contemplating moderation. By arresting these 
popular figures, the RSK leadership also made sure that they would not be able to
8 Kovadevid, 2003: 68-9. Interview Dragan Kovadevic, RSK information minister, 1995. Belgrade, 17 
September 2004.
9 “Pokusan atentat na Babica”. Borba, 25 March 1992, p. 4.
10 “Vracemo se politici s gandijevskim elementima”. Hina, Belgrade, Vjesnik, 5 February 1992, p. 12.
11 Komlenovic, Uros, 1995. “Mavericks on the Road”. Vreme News Digest, no. 183, 3 April.
12 Interview Veljko Dzakula, Zagreb, 12 August 2003. Komlenovic, Uros, 1995. “All Dzakula’s 
arrests”. Vreme News Digest, no. 189,15 May. Svarm, Filip, 1994. “Darkness at Noon”. AIM Press, 
20 February.
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run in the 1993 elections in the Serb-held territories.13 The Western Slavonian 
leaders had taken a step too far and misjudged when moderation was tolerated and 
when it would bring them in danger: acceptance of the Vance Plan was necessary in 
order to obtain power, implementation of the plan was not.14 Divisions based on 
different views of the war, thus, remained significant and continued to have a 
decisive impact on Serb politics.
Outbidding and conflict between civilian and military leader
The new president of the RSK had considerable problems with more radical forces 
and, with the added help of hindsight, Hadzic now argues that he could not have 
supported the Daruvar Agreement since he would have risked being killed.15 The 
central force behind the rejection of the agreement and the arrest of the negotiators 
was Hadzic’s main rival, Milan Martic, the minister of the interior and the strongman 
in Knin.16 Outflanking had again become dominant and military forces played a 
significant role in the intra-Serb rivalry.
As part of his strategy for returning to power, Babic also pursued a strategy of 
outbidding. Thus, following talks at the UN, the SDS of Krajina’s executive 
committee issued a declaration in which it accused the RSK delegation of leaving for 
New York without the parliament’s permission and o f “too easily getting into talks...
17about giving up part o f the Serbian territory — handing it over to our enemies”. Due 
to Martid’s control of significant coercive resources, his persistent challenges were, 
however, of greater immediate concern to Hadzic. Even though he was president of 
the whole of the RSK, Hadzic never managed to establish control in the Knin region: 
in this area, Martic with his paramilitary police ruled supreme. Martic had been 
considerably strengthened after the withdrawal of the JNA, which left his police as 
the only ‘official’ force in the RSK, and Hadzic eventually had to withdraw to
13 Interview DuSan Ecimovic, Belgrade, 29 August 2003.
14 In February 1994, Dzakula was kidnapped in broad daylight in Belgrade following a television 
interview in which he criticised the RSK leaders. The RSK ministry of the interior took responsibility 
for the kidnapping stating that Dzakula was taken into custody by the municipal court in Glina, where 
proceedings for “territorial threat to the RSK and espionage” had been initiated against him. Svarm, 
Filip, 1994. “Darkness at Noon”. AIM Press, 16 February 1994.
15 Interview Goran Hadzic, Belgrade, 30 October 2003.
16 Jure§ko, Goranka, 1993. “Srpski pregovaraci imaju jedno lice za javnost, druge za pregovore”. 
Vjesnik, 19 December, p. 8-9.
1 Svarm, Filip, 1993. “Patriots and Godfathers”. Vreme News Digest, no. 75. 1 March.
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Slavonia and could only come to Knin under strong escort.18 In Eastern Slavonia, 
other paramilitary formations had considerable influence, especially the Serbian 
Volunteer Guard, or the Tigers’, led by Zeljko Raznjatovic, better known as ‘Arkan’. 
The Tigers were effectively the paramilitary wing of the so-called Generals’ Party, 
the League of Communists -  Movement for Yugoslavia (Savez komunista -  Pokret 
za Jugoslaviju, SK-PZJ).19 The SK-PZJ was founded by retired JNA Generals but it 
was linked to Milosevic’s wife, Mira Markovic, and was clearly loyal to the Belgrade 
regime. The presence of the Tigers in the RSK undermined Martic’s monolithic 
control of the armed forces, but their influence was largely contained to Slavonia and 
Hadzic’s power was similarly constrained.
Hadzic’s problems in ruling the RSK were, furthermore, augmented by an economic
collapse: there was a shortage of food, electricity and fuel, which spurred the
undeniable need for economic negotiations with the Croatian authorities.20 At the
same time, fear of Croatian military attacks became widespread after Croatian forces
successfully retook control of the important Maslenica bridge in early January 1993.
Finding themselves in an increasingly untenable position, the RSK government
actually began negotiating with Zagreb.21 Thus, despite continued politics of
outbidding, the RSK leaders, lacking any other alternatives, chose a more moderate
position. The prime minister of the RSK, Dorde Bjegovic, even stated: “<z loose
00  •confederation with Croatia could be en\isioned\ Hadzic’s government was not 
strong enough to repress its opponents and this was, therefore, not a viable strategy 
in the competition. The challenges that they were facing were, moreover, not limited 
to outbidding on the issue of the war: they were also accused of war profiteering and 
incompetence. Further radicalisation of their position on the war would, therefore, 
not make the challenge disappear and it was, furthermore, difficult to imagine a 
position more radical than the one espoused by Babic and Martic.
In order to gain time, the government had postponed elections scheduled for March 
1993, but the situation in the RSK was becoming increasingly chaotic: Hadzic was
18 Svarm, Filip, 1995. “Orders from Belgrade”. Vreme News Digest, no. 180,13 March.
19 Gow, 2003: 83
20 Svarm, Filip, 1993. “Patriots and Godfathers”. Vreme News Digest, no. 75. 1 March. Vasic, Milo§,
1992. “Neither Unity nor Law”. Vreme News Digest, no. 45,3 August.
21 Svarm, Filip, 1993. “Patriots and Godfathers”. Vreme News Digest, no. 75. 1 March.
22 Svarm, Filip, 1993. “A Fragile Pontoon Link”. Vreme News Digest, no. 96. 26 July.
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not in control and the conflict between him and Martid eventually reached breaking- 
point. In October 1993, Hadzic decided that Mart id’s paramilitary police should be 
subjected to the RSK army; an army which had been created following the Maslenica 
offensive and which was formally under the president’s authority. To achieve this, 
Hadzic ousted Martic in a parliamentary session, but Martic fought back by accusing 
Hadzic of controlling the oil resources in the RSK23 and, furthermore, criticising 
Hadzic’s absence from the RSK: Hadzic mostly stayed in Novi Sad where he was 
enrolled in the Faculty of Economics and he spent his holidays in glamorous Sveti 
Stefan in Montenegro. Martic argued that the parliament had not been quorate when 
it dismissed him and he called another parliament session in P lit vice in Krajina. 
When this session revoked the decision to dismiss Martic, elections were 
inevitable.24 As in the case of the Babic-Hadzic conflict, parliamentary sessions 
called in different parts of the RSK could, due to limited mobility, be used to support 
contested positions. The SDS was divided and its influence as a party organisation 
was limited. Furthermore, non-party actors such as Martic had considerable influence. 
Issues of war and peace were still significant in the elite rivalry, but other issues had 
also become salient and this influenced the dynamics of competition; in particular the 
strategies available to Hadzic. Moreover, the importance of coercive resources was 
clearly reflected in the competition; the control of military forces was crucial.
The holding of elections did, however, not only promise to solve the strife between 
Hadzic and Martic, it also gave Babic a chance to make a comeback. The elections 
cemented Hadzic’s weakness and his SDS of Serb Lands lost decisively to Babic’s 
SDS of Krajina. In the presidential elections the main competitors were Babic and 
Martic. Martic ran on a populist platform promising the voters a fight against war 
profiteers, aid to war invalids and families of killed soldiers, as well as economic 
revival.26 Babic’s platform was similar and none of the campaigns envisaged a 
change in course from the intransigent one followed so far.27 This campaign reflects
23 “Chronology 1993, October through December”. Croatian International Relations Review 2000, 
6(18/19) p. 54.
24 Mataija, Z., 1993. “PluSte uzajamne optuzbe”. Vjesnik 13 October, p. 4. Svarm, Filip, 1995. 
“Political clashes in the Krajina”. Vreme News Digest, no. 118,13 March. Svarm, Filip, 1993.
“Patriots and Godfathers”. Vreme News Digest, no. 75,1 March.
25 Svarm, Filip, 1993. “Milosevic loses Krajina”. Vreme News Digest, no. 117, 20 December.
26 Svarm, Filip, 1993. “Milan Martic’s Flying Circus”. Vreme News Digest, no. 116,13 December.
27 Marijacic, Ivica, 1993. “Balvanska konstanta”. Vjesnik, 16 December, p. 4. Svarm, Filip, 1994.
“The Return of the District Strongman”. Vreme News Digest, no. 123, 31 January.
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a change in the form of competition: the primary source of division was no longer the 
inter-ethnic conflict. Babic seems to have already won in the first round, but the 
election commission called a second round, which Martic narrowly won after 
having received substantial support from Belgrade and its media. Before this final 
round, Martic had indirectly threatened to use his military might to take over power 
and he, furthermore, argued that Belgrade would be likely to abandon the RSK 
should Babic return to power.30 By winning, Martic demonstrated that control of the 
paramilitary/police in Krajina and links with Belgrade were more important than the 
SDS name and organisation when it came to securing the RSK leadership.
Post-electoral dynamics: Multipartism and deadlock
The result of the elections was a president, Milan Martic, who had no political party 
to back him up and who was faced with a parliamentary majority consisting of 
Babic’s SDS and the Serb Radical Party (Srpska radikalna stranka, SRS). Like its 
mother-party in Serbia, the Serb Radicals in the RSK espoused extreme Serb 
nationalism and served as an even more radical rival or alliance partner to the SDS. 
The SRS was founded in the RSK in July 199231 and began co-operating with Babic 
once it became clear that his political death had been prematurely declared.32 Under 
the leadership of Rade Leskovac, the SRS became a highly organised party and it 
made significant inroads into Hadzid’s support. Together with the SDS of Krajina’s 
30 deputies and one of eight independent deputies, the Radicals’ 16 deputies held a 
majority in parliament and could, therefore, topple any prime minister proposed by 
Martic.
In addition to the Serb Radicals and the competing versions of the SDS, the elections 
had given political representation to two more parties.33 The first of these was the 
Serb Party of Socialists (Srpska partija socijalista, SPS), which was created shortly
28 Interview Mile Dakic, Belgrade, 29 August 2003.
29 Svarm, Filip, 1994. “No roads for reality in Krajina”. AIM Press, 20 March.
30 Svarm, Filip, 1994. “The Return of the District Strongman”. Vreme News Digest no. 123, 31 
January.
31 Interview Rade Leskovac, president of the Radicals in the RSK 1992-5. Vukovar, 26 September 
2003.
32 Svarm, Filip, 1993. “Love that’ll never die”. Vreme News Digest, no. 113, 22 November. Svarm, 
Filip, 1993. “Who is Who?”. Vreme News Digest, no. 109, 25 October.
33 Dakic, 1994: 60. In addition to Babic’s SDS of Krajina and Hadzic’s SDS of Serb Lands there was 
also a party named just SDS which espoused a royalist position and only won four mandates in the 
elections. Interview Dragan Kovacevic, Belgrade 17 September 2004.
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before the elections under the leadership of RSK prime minister Dorde Bjegovic and 
was designed as Belgrade’s voice in the Serb statelet. However, its success was 
limited: the SPS won six out of 84 mandates in the parliamentary elections and in the 
presidential race it implicitly supported Martic and did not put forward its own 
candidate.34 Likewise, the Social Democratic Party of Krajina proved to have 
marginal electoral success and secured only four mandates. It should, however, be 
noted that this was the only party contesting the elections that did not have ‘Serb’ in 
its title, although this was no guarantee for a more moderate stance.35 Nevertheless, 
its more ambiguous position made the Social Democratic Party a prime target for 
attacks and its then leader, Ranko Bakic, even speaks of murders of some of the 
party’s members.36 Finally, the ‘Generals’ party’, the SK-PZJ, played some political 
role, although it did not run in the elections. It represented Belgrade’s voice and 
through its paramilitary wing, Arkan’s Tigers, it had significant influence in Eastern 
Slavonia.37 This was the party of Martid’s prime minister candidate, Borislav Mikelic. 
The competition between these parties was primarily based on regional and 
ideological differences and on differing links with Belgrade, and only secondarily on 
the issue of the war or on valence issues, such as war profiteering.
No one leader was in clear control following the elections, and intense competition 
and deadlock ensued. While Martic could rely on his presidential powers, control of 
the police and support from Belgrade, Bab id was also in a strong position: he had the 
backing of parliament and, since his ousting in 1992, had managed to build up his 
own paramilitary structure, which, through selected assassinations, had helped him 
retrieve power.38 Babic, therefore, could not be ignored by Martid and this caused 
great difficulty in forming a government. At first, Babic with the backing of the Serb 
Radicals insisted that he should be the new prime minister and when Martid rejected 
this, the SDS and the SRS deputies started vetoing presidential decrees and passed a 
vote of no-confidence in the sitting government.39 Babic and the Radicals opposed 
Martid’s choice Borislav Mikelic, who was very much regarded as Milosevic’s
34 Svarm, Filip, 1993. “Campaign and uniforms”. Vreme News Digest, no. 115, 6 December.
35 Svarm, Filip, 1995. “Springtime Change”. Vreme News Digest, no. 179, 6 March.
36 Interview Ranko Bakic, Banja Luka, 23 October 2003.
37 Gow, 2003: 83-4
38 Interview Filip Svarm, Belgrade, 13 September 2004. Woodward, 1995: 221
39 Svarm, Filip, 1994. “The start of the trade-off’. Vreme News Digest, no. 131, 28 March.
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man.40 But the constitution permitted Martic to start an initiative for a change of 
government in case parliament dismissed his choice for prime minister and by citing 
a state of war he could, furthermore, dissolve parliament41 Babic finally conceded: 
he accepted Mikelic and his own appointment as foreign minister, even though it cost 
him the support of the Radicals.
Despite the existence of a more radical opposition and the intense competition, 
negotiations with the Croatian Government continued and an agreement on economic 
co-operation was even reached in December 1994. Outflanking was not decisive and 
in October 1994, the Radical speaker of parliament, Branko Vojnica, was removed in 
a parliamentary vote, due to his resistance to continued negotiations 42 However, it 
would not be long before intransigence again became dominant.
Clashes over the Z-4 Plan
In early 1995, the so-called Z-4 Plan was drawn up by the ‘Mini-Contact Group’: the 
US, Russia, EU and UN representatives from the Peace Conference on the former 
Yugoslavia. The plan promised far-reaching autonomy in Serb-majority areas, 
including separate currency, parliament, police force, fiscal policy and links with 
Serbia. The agreement thereby came close to creating a state within the state and 
hence to accommodating Serb demands for self-determination. This was the most 
generous offer so far and in the above-mentioned spirit of greater willingness to 
negotiate one could have expected some readiness on part of the RSK leadership to 
at least consider it. However, Martic chose to reject the plan outright. He did so for a 
number of reasons: the official reason was lack of trust in the Croatian authorities, 
but to this must be added growing desire to assert his independence from Belgrade as 
well as lack of support from the paramilitary. Babic was also faced with resistance 
from the hardliners, the police and the army and, therefore, was not able to support 
the agreement,43 whether he wanted to or not. Through the SDS of Krajina, Babic 
consequently demanded a ‘ freeze on talks with Croatia until it changes its attitude
40 Mikelic was a member of the League of Communists -  Movement for Yugoslavia (SK-PZJ), which 
was very close to Milosevic’s wife, Mira Markovic.
41 Svarm, Filip, 1994. “The Return of the District Strongman”. Vreme News Digest, no. 123,31 
January.
42 Interview Rajko Lezajic, speaker of the RSK parliament 1994-5. Belgrade, 17 September 2004. 
Dakic, 2001: Hronika, p. 27.
43 Interview Rajko Lezajic, Belgrade, 17 September 2004.
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towards the RSK”.44 The two leaders were, despite their strength, not monolithic and 
they were concerned that they would not be able to bring their ‘hawks’ along. Their 
own ranks remained internally divided over the issue of war and peace. Furthermore, 
Martic may have calculated that by distancing himself from Belgrade and by winning 
the support of the Serb Radicals, he could bolster his position against the ever- 
stronger Babic. In this atmosphere, only the RSK prime minister, Borislav Mikelic, 
came out openly in support of the agreement and with that move he lost the support 
of Martid who decided to get rid of the prime minister. For a long time Babic chose 
to sit on the fence and largely kept quiet, but when Martic, on 1 March 1995, asked 
the RSK parliament to dismiss Mikelic, he failed to get the support of Babic’s 
deputies and Mikelic remained in his post.
While Krajina was caught in infighting, the situation in the region was changing and 
their position was weakening. In May 1995, the miscalculation became obvious: in 
Operation Flash, Croatian forces retook Western Slavonia. The fall of Western 
Slavonia was accompanied by accusations of complicity by Belgrade and Martic 
argued that the loss of Western Slavonia vindicated his uncompromising position, 
that it would “open the eyes o f those Serbs who thought we could do a deal with the 
Croats. Now it’s clear that our only option is to have our own state”.45 Blame, 
however, had to be apportioned and turmoil in the Krajina leadership ensued: 
Mikelic blamed Martic and the military leadership but Martic managed to retain his 
post with the help of Babic,46 who had once again changed sides and now turned 
against Mikelic. Mikelic argued that Babic even though he was politically at odds 
with Martid, feared his hawks and therefore chose to make a deal.47
Further geographical divisions in the leadership
One of the issues that divided Mikelic from the remaining RSK leadership was a 
proposed union with Republika Srpska in Bosnia. The unification of the two statelets 
had been declared many times over the years but never realised. In the spring of 1995, 
Martic and Babic, however, set their mind to realising the union. But one important 
person in addition to Mikelic was against such a union: Goran Hadzic, who had
44 Svarm, Filip, 1995. “Checkmate on Z-4”. Vreme News Digest, no. 175, 6 February.
45 Svarm, Filip, 1995. “The Dawn of Power Holders”. Vreme News Digest, no. 190,22 May.
46 Owen, 1995: 344.
47 Svarm, Filip, 1995. “Wrong Choice”. Vreme News Digest, no. 192, 5 June.
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returned from political obscurity in mid-1994 and begun charging a more 
autonomous course for Eastern Slavonia.48 As part of this strategy, Hadzic formed 
the co-ordinating committee for Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem, which was 
akin to an autonomous region.49 And when the RSK parliament, in June 1995, 
unanimously adopted the decision on unification with Republika Srpska, the 
committee issued a letter stating: “Representatives o f Eastern Slavonia will not 
participate in any way in further implementing this decision...Dismissal procedures 
are underway for all deputies who are participating or acting counter to those 
interests”.50 The regional divisions had, therefore, once again come to the fore. When 
Mikelic finally resigned in late July 1995, he warned the Slavonian deputies that 
Babic would form a new government that only represented Knin.51 This claim found 
resonance with the Eastern Slavonian authorities, who consequently prevented Knin 
deputies from taking part in a parliamentary session which was to appoint a new 
government.52 Similar techniques were, however, used by the Knin leaders and in 
Krajina, on 27 July 1995, a new government was appointed with Babic as the prime 
minister. Only in the 11th hour did the RSK leadership become willing to negotiate 
and by then it was too late. On 2 August 1995, Babic accepted the Z-4 plan as a basis 
for negotiations, stating that “a modified version o f the Z-4 plan which would treat 
the eastern and the western part o f Krajina equally would provide a good basis for  
political negotiations”. The Croatian representatives, however, demanded that the 
Serbs accepted Croatian rule immediately, well knowing that their offensive 
‘Operation Storm’ would be launched the following day. The RSK army quickly 
collapsed and no assistance was forthcoming from either Pale or Belgrade.
In 1995, infighting once again furthered the intransigence of the Knin leadership and 
moderation was impossible to sustain. The wartime intra-Serb competition in Croatia 
saw the increased importance of regional cleavages and valence issues, but strategies 
and goals in the war also remained a salient issue. The resources used in this 
competition were primarily coercive, and links with military forces were therefore 
crucial. The more moderate voices that did exist within the RSK were marginalised
48 Woodward, 1995: 345.
49 Janjic, Dragan, 1995. “Union never brought to a close”. AIM Press, 6 June.
50 Svarm, Filip, 1995. “Hadzic Re-activated”. Vreme News Digest, no. 192, 5 June.
51 Perunicic, Vesna Fabris, 1995. “Babic -  najveca nepoznanica”. Vjesnik, 27 July, p. 7.
52 Svarm, Filip, 1995. “A Stop for Westerners”. Vreme News Digest, no. 198,17 July.
53 Svarm, Filip, 1995. “The View from the Fort”. Vreme News Digest, no. 201, 7 August.
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with sometimes brutal means: they were harassed, threatened and even killed.54 The 
centripetal forces that emerged due to the increasingly desperate position of the 
Hadzic government persisted for a while under the new government and were even 
strengthened when an agreement on economic co-operation was reached with Zagreb. 
Competition from other parties or independents was not met with a radicalisation of 
the dominant position, but centrifugal dynamics once again became dominant when 
the status of the RSK came on the table and the leaders feared not being able to bring 
their own hawks along. Competition from within the party or movement, therefore, 
again resulted in radicalisation or reinforced existing intransigence.
The only area remaining under Serb control after August 1995 was Eastern Slavonia, 
and the leadership here needed less encouragement to negotiate. They concluded that 
unless an agreement was reached, they would face the same destiny as the Serbs in 
Krajina.55
Zagreb Serbs; go-betweens or puppets
The divisions among the Serbs become even more striking if one also looks at the 
representatives of the so-called ‘urban Serbs’, i.e. the Serb leaders outside the RSK, 
who were not only in conflict with the RSK leaders but also competed with each 
other, primarily over the appropriate political position to adopt.56
The Croatian Constitution provided for Serb parliamentary representation in 
proportion to their share of the population, which translated into 13 seats. The 
problem was, however, that no Serbs were directly elected in the 1992 elections and 
mechanisms for ensuring proportionality were not provided by the electoral law. The 
electoral commission decided that the 13 seats should be distributed among parties 
that had gained parliamentary representation and had fielded Serb candidates. This 
would give eight mandates to the SDP57 and two mandates to the Croatian People’s
54 Gagnon, 2004: 5.
55 Interview Vojislav Stanimirovic, the president of Eastern Slavonia’s executive council. Vukovar, 25 
September 2003.
56 Away from both Zagreb and the RSK in the remote area of Gorski Kotar still other dynamics were 
found. Here a moderate faction of the SDS managed to stay in power and reached an agreement with 
Zagreb whereby peace was upheld in this region. See e.g. Tatalovic, Sinisa, 1996. “Peaceful solution 
of conflicts in Croatia: Case study of Gorski Kotar”. Peace and the Sciences XXVII (June): 38-46.
57 In November 1990, the party had changed its name from SKH-SDP to just SDP.
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Party (HNS) as the only parliamentary parties that had Serb candidates on their lists. 
The SDP had had a catastrophic election, winning only three seats in Parliament, but 
the party was, nevertheless, far from happy with this unexpected gift which would in 
effect turn it into a Serb party.58 The SDP leadership therefore demanded that its Serb 
deputies either turned down the seats or left the party.59 Following internal 
discussions in the party, the outcome was that three of the SDP’s Serb deputies 
stayed in the party and agreed to being SDP representatives and not Serb 
representatives, while the remaining five deputies left the party.60 The crisis 
involving the election of the Serb deputies made the legitimacy of all Serb deputies 
questionable.61 Furthermore, the SDP had made clear that it would not perform the 
function as the representative of the Serbs, as Ivica Racan, the party’s leader put it: 
“the SDP has not in the past nor now had any pretensions to represent all Serbs in 
Croatia, nor their majority. The SDP is not a Serb party and has no mandate from 
the Serbs'9.62
This function, therefore, would have to be filled by another party. The Constitutional 
Court had, in a controversial decision, decided to award the remaining three Serb 
seats to the Serb National Party (Srpska narodna stranka, SNS), which had failed to 
pass the electoral threshold. The SNS was led by Milan Dukic, who was elected 
Deputy Speaker of the Croatian Parliament in September 1992. Dukic and his party 
were the creation of the Croatian Government: the SNS was formed after contacts 
were broken off with Knin and the more moderate forces gave up and withdrew.63 
The party was intended to perform the function as the ‘loyal Serbs’, to demonstrate 
to the world that the RSK leaders did not represent the majority of Croatia’s Serbs. 
Needless to say that Dukic’s influence with the RSK leadership was as good a non­
existent.64 Dukic’s resonance in the Serb community was limited and another figure 
emerged as the leader of the urban Serbs: Milorad Pupovac, then president of the 
Serb Democratic Forum. Pupovac was not accepted by the radical elements of the 
RSK but he had contacts with more moderate forces in the statelet, some of whom
58 Interview Du§an PlecaS, SDP. Zagreb 26 March 2004.
59 SDP, 1992a. “Stavovi predsjedniStva SDPH o srpskim zastupnicima u Saboru Republike Hrvatske”. 
Author’s copy.
60 Interview DuSan PlecaS, Zagreb 26 March 2004.
61 Kasapovie, 1997: 50-79.
62 SDP, 1992b. “Izjava Ivice RaCane na konferenciji za novinare 4.9.1992. godine.” Author’s copy.
63 Culic, Marinko, 1995. “Gentle Hatred”. Vreme News Digest, no. 175, 6 February.
64 Interview Milan Dukic, Zagreb, 30 July 2003.
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also acted as negotiators with the Croatian Government.65 Among the people 
Pupovac established contacts with was Radovan Jovic, who was one of the RSK 
representatives in negotiations in 1993. This link, however, proved costly for Jovic 
who was dismissed as a judge in Glina, had his house was blown up, had several 
clashes with Martic and was mobilised by the RSK army in 1995. When he refused, 
he was sent to prison.66 Taking a more moderate stance and having contacts with the 
‘urban Serbs’ was a very dangerous strategy in the RSK, which the murder of Dmitar
Obradovic, mayor of Vrginmost, in 1992 attests to. This murder was presumably
(\*1ordered by Martic due to Obradovic’s defiance of the radical course. The danger 
involved in contacts with the ‘urban Serb’ leaders significantly reduced the influence 
they could have on dynamics in the RSK Pupovac had some success with the 
contacts that, for example, led to the signing of the Daruvar Agreement, but it did not 
permanently change the position of the dominant forces in the RSK
Between Pupovac and Dukic not many warm words were exchanged: Dukic accused 
Pupovac of being an exponent of Knin and Belgrade, while Pupovac criticised Dukic 
for keeping quiet about events such as the Gospic massacre and for in general being a 
mouthpiece for the Croatian Government.68 In January 1995, Pupovac founded 
another Serb party, the Independent Serb Party (Samostalna srpska stranka, SSS), 
which was to compete with Dukic’s SNS. Even among the urban Serbs, great 
divisions were therefore found: both supported compromise, but Pupovac also 
strongly criticised the Croatian Government and had to maintain credibility with his 
contacts in the RSK. To some extent there was a process of outbidding between 
Pupovac and Dukic and, over the course of the war, Dukic moved closer to 
Pupovac’s position. Their competition then became largely focused on valance issue, 
especially on who was the legitimate representative of the Serbs.69
Wartime intra-ethnic rivalry was in the RSK marked by increasing competition and 
by the dominance of coercive resources. It was fuelled by divisions over issues of
65 Interview Milorad Pupovac, Zagreb, 11 August 2003.
66 Vasic, MiloS; Svarm, Filip; Tagirov, Tatjana; Ra§eta, Boris, 1995. “Arrest in Tucepi”. Vreme News 
Digest, no. 213. 30 October 1995.
67 Interview Milorad Pupovac, Zagreb, 11 August 2003.
68 “Pupovac dobio zadacu”. Vjesnik 10 December 1993, p. 3. Interview Milan Dukic, Zagreb, 30 July 
2003. Interview Milorad Pupovac, Zagreb, 11 August 2003.
69 Raseta, Boris, 1994. “Srbi su spremni na pregovore”. Pecat, 11 October, p. 14.
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war and peace, charges of war profiteering, regional and ideological cleavages, 
differing view of relations with Belgrade and finally by personal ambitions. Due to 
the importance of coercive resources in the competition, links with military and 
paramilitary forces were crucial. These links constrained the civilian leaders, even 
though the distinction between civilian and military leaders was often blurred due to 
the fragmentation of the military forces. But even in this violent and polarised 
environment, radicalisation was not the only possible outcome of intra-ethnic 
competition and temporary, relative moderation even ensued. The position that 
eventually won out was, however, one of persistent radicalisation, which ultimately 
led to the fall of Krajina in August 1995. This happened despite pressure from 
Belgrade for a change in course. The Krajina leaders displayed a growing appetite 
for independence, but Milosevic was by no means deprived of influence: he if 
anyone knew how to take advantage of changing alliances and could still supply 
resources needed in the local elite competition. But Belgrade’s support was no longer 
the sine qua non of political power in the RSK: alternative resources were available 
and it was possible to redefine the borders of legitimate political influence.
5.2 Kin-state: Serbia is defended in Knin -  for a while
Military failures, international pressure and German push for Croatia’s recognition 
gradually led to a change in Belgrade’s strategy and goal. The Serbian Government 
now appeared willing to accept the notion of ‘special status’ for the Croatian Serbs, 
even if it also insisted on the Serb right to self-determination. The message to the 
Krajina Serbs contained in this policy was: “You are on your own ”10 and it was to 
significantly influence relations with the kin-state. Possible difference of opinion was 
already indicated during the negotiations over the Carrington Plan in the autumn of 
1991. Both Belgrade and Knin eventually rejected the plan, but Milosevic had been 
willing to accept earlier versions, whereas the Krajina leadership refused it all 
along.71 These were, however, minor skirmishes compared with the rift created by 
the Vance Plan a few months later.
70 Burg; Shoup, 1999: 89
71 Silber, Laura, 1991. “Divisions emerge among Serb leaders over EC proposals”. Financial Times, 1 
November. ICTY 2002a: 14074.
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Babic’s rejection of the Vance Plan brought out the wrath of the Serbian President 
who, in an unusual move, issued a public letter to the RSK president in which he 
rejected his right to make decisions that would harm the Serb people: ‘Tow have 
turned a deaf ear to the explicit attitudes . . .o f  the Serbian leadership more than once, 
giving yourself the right to make decisions the price o f which, unfortunately, has to 
be paid in blood by the entire Serbian nation”.72 The main board of the SDS did not, 
however, take this lying down; they issued a response letter in which they described 
Milosevic’s move as “o call for overthrowing the legally elected president’ and “o
T \dangerous attempt at causing the division among the Serbian people”. The SDS 
thereby reaffirmed Babic’s legitimacy and, furthermore, used the need for unity as a 
way of further discrediting Milosevic’s move. Since Babic was clearly not poised to 
abandon his intransigent position, Belgrade instead chose to make use of the 
divisions in the RSK and installed a new loyal leadership and for a while Belgrade’s 
control in the statelet seemed unproblematic.
The puppeteer gradually loses control over his puppets 
But the RSK elections in late 1993 were a shock to Milosevic. Belgrade had decided 
to place its bet on Martic but what Belgrade had not planned for was that Babic’s 
SDS of Krajina would make a decisive comeback, followed in the second place by 
the local Serb Radicals. This was after Milosevic’s break with SeSelj and the results 
indicated that the Serbian President was losing control in the RSK This impression 
was reinforced by the first round of the presidential elections in which Babic was 
declared to have won just below 50 per cent of the votes. In the crucial second round, 
no effort was spared to secure Martic’s victory and the continuation of Belgrade’s 
influence. Martic made his loyalty to Milosevic painstakingly clear when he stated 
that he would like to be president of Krajina for five days only, after which he would 
step down in favour of “all-Serb President Milosevic”.74 When Martid won the 
second round, Belgrade thereby secured the continuation of a loyal leadership and, 
furthermore, demonstrated its crucial role in the RSK elite competition. But Martic, 
like other leaders before him, eventually also fell out with the Serbian President.
72 Milosevic, Milan, 1992. “Babic caput”. Vreme News Digest, no 16,13 January.
73 Milosevic, Milan, 1992. “Babic caput”. Vreme News Digest, no 16,13 January. My emphasis.
74 Svarm, Filip, 1994. “The Return of the District Strongman”. Vreme News Digest, no 123, 31 
January.
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The first step in the cooling of relations between Milosevic and Martic was taken by 
Belgrade when the Yugoslav Government in January 1994 signed a joint statement 
on normalisation of Croatian-Yugoslav relations.75 However, relations became even 
frostier after Milosevic chose to punish the leaders in the RS following their rejection 
of the Contact Group Plan. The introduction of sanctions also hurt the RSK, which
7now found itself geographically isolated and fearing abandonment. Martic avoided 
taking Milosevic’s side and he even went to the RS to vote, in the name of the RSK, 
against the Contact Group Plan. Moreover, in the spring of 1995 Martic sought to 
free himself of Belgrade’s influence by ousting Milosevic’s man, Borislav Mikelic. It 
is significant that Mikelic’s more moderate position did not win despite Belgrade’s 
support. Milosevic may actually not have been too unhappy about this, since it made 
it easier to abandon the RSK leadership and Martic argues that he actually followed 
orders from Belgrade when he rejected the Z4-plan.77 But Mikelic’s demise does 
attest to Belgrade’s markedly reduced influence in Knin and Martic had many other 
reasons to reject the Z4-plan, including lack of cohesion within his own ranks.
After Martic’s public defiance of Milosevic the Serbian President had no great 
qualms abandoning his former protdgds and leaving them to their fate. When 
Western Slavonia was retaken in Operation Flash, Serbian television and Politika 
limited their coverage to the protests lodged by FRY’s Foreign Minister and to the 
flood of refugees.78 Milosevic did not react publicly and it is indeed remarkable that 
the only official reaction came from the Foreign Ministry and not from the ‘President 
of all Serbs’. Similarly, when the Croatian Army launched Operation Storm and 
Knin fell within 24 hours, Milosevic’s reaction was reportedly to exclaim: “Imagine, 
those fools withdrew?'. The SPS attributed the defeat to the failures of Martic and 
Karadzic and the Serbian media was ordered to follow this line in their reporting.79 It 
was as if Milosevic had never supported the unruly leaders in Knin.
In Eastern Slavonia, which was the only area remaining under Serb control after 
August 1995, the situation was, however, different. Relations with Serbia overlapped
75 Svarm, Filip, 1994. “The start of the trade-off’. Vreme News Digest, no 131,28 March.
76 Komlenovic, Uros, 1994. “The Fate of the Krajina”. Vreme News Digest, no 160, 17 October. 
Svarm, Filip, 1994. “Knin: sam na svijetu”. Pecat, 11 October, p. 15.
77 Kova5evi6, 2003: 81-4.
78 Gordy, 1999: 73.
79 Sell, 2002: 250.
Nina Caspersen: Intra-ethnic competition and inter-ethnic conflict 147
Chapter 5 -  Intra-Serb Competition in Wartime Croatia- Disunity did not save the Serbs
with regional divisions in the RSK and the then President of SAO Slavonia, Goran 
Hadzic, had, throughout the war, been closely in tune with Belgrade. One of the 
reasons for this closeness, in addition to the geographical proximity, was the greater 
presence in Eastern Slavonia of paramilitaries from Serbia, in particular Arkan’s 
Tigers. This reduced the autonomy of the local leaders, but they were able to use the 
paramilitaries as a resource in their competition with Knin. Thus, in July 1995, Knin 
only had support in one municipality in Eastern Slavonia, the rest were with Hadzic 
and Milo§evic. After the fall of Knin and in the face of an impending military attack 
by the Croatian Army, Belgrade had little difficulty exerting its influence on the 
eastern part of the RSK. Even though negotiations were taking place between the 
local leaders and the Croatian Government, the Erdut Agreement was actually the 
result of negotiations in Dayton between Milosevic and Tudman. Richard Holbrooke 
argues that although the agreement was a Dayton product, MiloSevid insisted that it 
be signed by a local Serb leader since he “did not want his fingerprints visible in the 
region”.80
During the war, all the leaders of the RSK either fell out with Belgrade when they 
sought greater autonomy or, as in the case of Hadzic, were abandoned when their 
failure to retain control in the statelet became obvious. Hadzic argues that Milosevic 
was deliberately looking to support leaders who were likely to defect and that he lost
ftlBelgrade’s support because he continued being unquestionably loyal. This being 
the case or not, the cooling of relations and the stubborn intransigence of the Knin 
leaders certainly made it easier for Milosevic to abandon them to their own fate 
without this resulting in a backlash in Serbia. However, Belgrade did not only seek to 
increase the distance between itself and the maverick RSK leaders, the Serbian 
authorities also actively sought to influence the internal competition in the RSK in 
order to secure influence in the statelet.
Disunity as a means o f influence
Belgrade quickly realised that taking advantage of the rampant elite competition 
could be an effective strategy against the growing self-assertiveness among the 
leaders of the RSK. Milosevic could utilise cleavages found in the statelet and play
80 Holbrooke, Richard, 1999. To End a War. New York, NY: Modern Library, p. 267.
81 Interview Goran Hadzic, Belgrade, 30 October 2003.
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on the personal power ambitions of some leaders, and through the supply of 
resources Belgrade was an important audience to the internal competition. This 
strategy was successfully utilised when Milosevic fell out with Babid over the Vance 
Plan. The local leaders, however, also actively sought to gamer Belgrade’s support as 
an important resource in their internal competition. Over time, however, the 
importance of Belgrade as an audience decreased; this was in particular due to the 
availability of alternative resources.
When the competing RSK elites felt that Belgrade’s support might make the 
difference between ascent to the top and political oblivion, letters professing loyalty 
to the Serbian President was one favoured form of action. In the conflict between 
Milo§evic and Babic, Hadzic and Paspalj, who now saw their chance to seize power, 
sent a letter to Milosevic in which they described Babic as an autocrat, adventurer 
and Bolshevik who was spearheading the Serbs to ruin. When the 1993 elections in 
the RSK were approaching, the competing leaders were once again vying for 
Belgrade’s support, which would provide much needed resources for their campaign. 
Thus, several RSK leaders, including Hadzic and Martic, sent a letter to Milosevic in 
which they slated Seselj, whom Milosevic had recently fallen out with. SeSelj was 
derided as a man who “has discarded all interests o f the Serbian people” and his 
behaviour was described as “dishonourable” and resembling “that o f a bandif\ 
Martic had not long before been closely aligned with SeSelj’s Radicals in his attack 
on Hadzic and, therefore, he needed to make his continued allegiance to Milosevic 
clear.
As expected by the RSK leaders, Belgrade did indeed take a very active role in the 
1993 elections. From the outset of campaigning it was clear that Martic was 
Milosevic’s new man in Knin and, according to some reports, Martic received as 
much as 200,000 Deutschmarks from the SPS for financing his campaign. While 
valuable to Belgrade, Martic was an independent candidate and Belgrade also needed 
to ensure the loyalty of a large number of deputies and hence needed a loyal political 
party. Consequently, the SPS had helped found the Serb Party of Socialists, which
82 Svarm, Filip, 1993. “Love that’ll never die”. Vreme News Digest, no. 113, 22 November.
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shared both acronym and policies with Milosevic’s party and which was intended to 
be Belgrade’s new parliamentary mouthpiece.
But Babic’s strong showing in both the parliamentary and the presidential elections 
did not correspond to Belgrade’s wishes. The presidential election was the easier for 
Belgrade to rectify since a second round would be called if no candidate secured 50 
per cent of the votes in the first round. The electoral commission, which was under 
Belgrade’s strong influence, quickly declared that there had been irregularities in the 
election and subsequently annulled the results in several of Babi6's strongholds. This 
did the trick and it was finally announced that Babic had received 49.89 per cent of 
the votes in the presidential race.84 A second round was thereby secured, but 
Belgrade needed time to devise a new strategy that would guarantee Martic’s victory. 
Election day was consequently postponed for ten days and no expenses were spared
O f
in Martic’s campaign. This time the strategy worked and Martic won the second 
round. Nevertheless, the elections had shaken Belgrade and its ability to affect the 
outcome of internal conflicts was now increasingly open to questioning.
Commentators speculated that Babic had been able to build a parallel military 
infrastructure and since power in Krajina depended on control of military resources, 
he was, therefore, able to successfully confront Belgrade’s candidate.86 This may 
have aided Babic in the first round but Belgrade in the second round created a clear 
perception that it would abandon the RSK if it were not satisfied with the elected 
candidate.87 Belgrade’s promised support rather than actual involvement seemed 
crucial but Belgrade’s influence thereby came to depend on the credibility of its 
continued involvement. Even though he emerged as the winner, Martic may, 
moreover, have concluded that Belgrade’s influence was reduced and that the need 
for co-operation with Babic had increased accordingly. Into Martic’s place as 
Belgrade’s trusted man in the RSK stepped the prime minister Borislav Mikelic. 
Martic had given up on Belgrade’s support and was now instead relying on the
83 Svarm, Filip, 1993. “Milan Martic’s Flying Circus”. Vreme News Digest, no. 116,13 December.
84 Svarm, Filip, 1993. ‘Touching the Untouchables”. Vreme News Digest, no. 118, 27 December.
85 Svarm, Filip, 1994. “The Return of the District Strongman”. Vreme News Digest, no. 123, 31 
January.
86 Svarm, Filip, 1993. ‘Touching the Untouchables”. Vreme News Digest, no. 118, 27 December.
87 Svarm, Filip, 1994. “The Return of the District Strongman”. Vreme News Digest, no. 123, 31 
January.
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military and the police, on Karadzic’s SDS, on the Radicals and on his growing
OQ
popularity resulting from increasing popular anger with Milosevic.
Belgrade’s willingness to support the RSK was increasingly questioned and 
Milosevic’s popularity was decreasing. Combined with the apparent existence of 
power resources in the RSK that were outside Belgrade’s control, MiloSevid’s ability 
to influence internal politics was reduced. This became clear when Mikelic was 
ousted by Martic and Babic, despite being Belgrade’s preferred man on the post.
Countering Belgrade’s moves
Even though Belgrade’s influence in the RSK waned, the local leaders knew that 
greater independence would come at a price and that it would be dangerous to 
distance themselves too far from the kin-state. One aspect of this dependence was the 
economy: the RSK economy was a shambles and the only thing keeping it from 
complete collapse was the help coming from Serbia.89 The RSK elites were aware of 
their dependence on such support and, therefore, were limited in their ability to react 
against unwanted changes in Belgrade’s policy. In their attempt to counter 
Belgrade’s moves they, in addition to using resources found within the RSK, relied 
on making new alliances or strengthening existing ones: with Pale and with the 
Serbian opposition.
Co-operation between the RSK and the RS
The possibility of creating a common front with the RS was continuously used as an 
implicit bargaining strategy by the RSK leaders and hence as a way of increasing 
their autonomy from Belgrade. In 1993, a referendum was held in the RSK on 
unification with the RS. This referendum was a show of force on part of the RSK 
leaders who knew that the referendum, which resulted in a clear endorsement of 
unification, was powerful political capital which could be utilised at a strategic point. 
Babic optimistically stated: “The referendum is probably making Milosevic’s hair 
stand on end... In the end they’ll swallow what we cook up here”.90
88 Komlenovic, Uros, 1994. “The Fate of the Krajina”. Vreme News Digest, no. 160,17 October.
89 Milosevic, Milan, 1992. “Babic caput”. Vreme News Digest, no. 16,13 January.
90 Stefanovid, Nenad Lj., 1993. “A Referendum by Candlelight”. Vreme News Digest, no. 92, 28 June.
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Unification was kept in store as a possibility in case relations deteriorated rapidly and 
as a blackmailing devise in the meantime. At some point Martic, however, became 
afraid that too close co-operation with Pale would risk enraging Belgrade to such an 
extent that sanctions would also be imposed on the RSK. Consequently, in the 
summer of 1994, he called off the planned unification of the two statelets.91 However, 
a year later relations had become so frosty that unification was once again on the 
table and the RSK parliament unanimously adopted the decision on unification, in 
clear defiance of Belgrade.
The leaders in Pale were, however, reluctant alliance partners. The RS was in a much 
stronger position than the RSK and less dependent on Belgrade’s support. Any co­
operation, therefore, would be on terms decided by the leaders in Pale. As a 
replacement for co-operation with Pale, or as a supplement, the RSK leaders sought 
to ally themselves with the Serbian opposition.
The RSK and the Serbian opposition
The Serbian opposition party that was most clearly present in the RSK was the Serb 
Radicals: the SRS had created a strong branch party that had close political and 
institutional links with the SRS in Serbia.92 When the local leader of the SRS tried to 
assert his independence and broke with Seselj, he was promptly ousted from the 
leadership and the Serbian SRS thereby retained its influence in the statelet.93 For the 
remaining opposition parties, alliances with parties and leaders in the RSK was the 
only way of influencing RSK politics since they had not managed to gain a foothold 
in the Serb statelet. Notwithstanding the ideological affinity between the SDS and 
some of the Serbian opposition parties, the effect of these links, however, appears to 
have been negligible.
In the first conflict between Milosevic and the RSK leaders, Babic had 
unsuccessfully tried to muster the support of the Serbian opposition, but he largely 
failed in his endeavour, even though he did win the support of the Serbian Orthodox
91 Svarm, Filip, 1994. “Knin Between Two Kingdoms”. Vreme News Digest, no. 151,15 August.
92 The leader of the local party was also vice-president of the party in Serbia. Interview Nikola 
Popla§en, founder of the SRS in Bosnia. Banja Luka, 3 December 2003.
93 Interview Rade Leskovac, Vukovar, 26 September 2003.
Nina Caspersen: Intra-ethnic competition and inter-ethnic conflict 152
Chapter 5 -  Intra-Serb Competition in Wartime Croatia'- Disunity did not save the Serbs
Church.94 No support was forthcoming from the SPO, whereas the DS was more 
wavering on the issue. In Parliament, Zoran Bindic spoke of the need to “determine 
the western borders o f Serbdom” and stated: “We do not intend to turn our backs on 
the Serbs outside Serbia”.95 Nevertheless, the party accepted the Vance Plan and 
little support materialised.96 Support from ultra-nationalist circles would have been 
more likely but Seselj was still in tow with Milosevic and the Radicals, therefore, 
remained quiet.
After SeSelj fell out with Milosevic, he tried to make use of his strength in the RSK 
to improve his position in Serbia proper. He, therefore, embarked to topple 
Milosevic’s man Hadzic, pressed for elections and presented himself to the RSK 
leaders as the only politician who would not shun total war. He, furthermore, told the 
local leaders that he was their only chance of remaining in power.97 Thereby, SeSelj’s 
support became important for the local leaders in their conflict with Milo§evi6: it 
became another resource in the ongoing competition between pro- and anti- 
MiloSevic forces. Belgrade launched a counter-attack by instructing Hadzic to settle 
accounts with “paramilitary groups and Chetniks”, a shorthand for SeSelj’s Radicals 
in the RSK. Local Radicals, as well as people thought to be close to Se§elj, were 
arrested and, although they were quickly released, it was a clear signal from Belgrade 
that co-operation with SeSelj would come at a price. This round of rivalling was, 
however, lost by Belgrade, since the Radicals along with Babic launched an even
go
fiercer attack on Hadzic and elections were ultimately called.
Shortly after the presidential election in the RSK, Seselj further stepped on 
Milosevic’s toes by forming a coalition with Babic.99 But Seselj and Babic did not 
remain friends and the Radical leader instead turned to Martic after he had also fallen 
out with the Serbian President. In May 1995, SeSelj visited Krajina in order to 
demonstrate the SRS’s influence in RSK politics and to help and encourage Martic in 
his intransigent position. Moreover, SeSelj aimed to solidify the offensive by the 
Serbian nationalist opposition and the RS leaders against Milosevic, but Babic was
94 Milosevic, Milan, 1992. “Serbia in a broken mirror”. Vreme News Digest no. 18, 27 January.
95 Thomas, 1999: 110.
96 Svarm, Filip, 1994. “Kidnappers and hostages”. Vreme News Digest, no. 142,13 June.
97 Svarm, Filip, 1993. “Love that’ll never die”. Vreme News Digest, no. 113, 22 November.
9*Ibid
99 Svarm, Filip, 1995. “Of love and hate”. Vreme News Digest, no. 182, 27 March.
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wavering and without his participation the front was weakened.100 The co-operation 
between the RSK leaders and the SRS, therefore, never decisively weakened 
Milosevic but the existence of another Serbian leader whom the local leaders hoped 
could substitute for Milosevic undoubtedly strengthened their intransigence and 
radicalism. The Radicals, therefore, directly affected the internal competition in the 
RSK, including through its local branch party that proved an alliance partner for 
whoever leader was willing to adopt a staunchly uncompromising position.
The rest of the Serbian opposition had a more limited impact, even after they also 
decided to seek to utilise internal divisions in an attempt to weaken Milosevic. Thus, 
in the elections in 1993, the opposition leaders sent premature expressions of 
congratulations to Babic whom they had shunned nearly two years earlier.101 This 
support for any leader in the RSK who expressed resistance to Milosevic continued, 
but with little impact: the democratic opposition in Serbia was too weak to be of 
great significance.
Serbia and RSK internal competition during the war 
There is little doubt that the Belgrade Government had an important influence on 
competition in the RSK but its influence decreased during the four years of war; 
from being mere puppets of the Belgrade regime, the Krajina leadership came out in 
defiance of Milosevic and his change to a more accommodative position. As 
relations between Belgrade and Knin became increasingly frosty, a common 
rhetorical ploy by both sides was to deny the other’s legitimacy. Thus, even though 
the need for unity persisted as a readily available dictum, the borders of the intra- 
Serb competition changed. The fractionalisation of the RSK elite, nevertheless, made 
considerable Belgrade influence possible even when parts of the top echelons 
distanced themselves from Milosevic. Support from Belgrade was a valuable 
resource in the fierce competition and Milosevic generally had no problems finding 
new loyalists. However, Belgrade’s resources gradually became of less importance: 
two of the main contenders for the top of the hierarchy, Martic and Babic, had, to 
varying degrees, access to their own paramilitary resources and in the 1993 elections,
100 Svarm, Filip, 1995. “Seselj goes to Krajina”. Vreme News Digest, no. 182,27 March.
101 Svarm, Filip, 1994. “The Return of the District Strongman”. Vreme News Digest, no 123,31 
January.
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the importance of Belgrade’s support was dependent on the credibility of its 
continued involvement in the RSK. Hence, when fear of abandonment grew, 
Belgrade’s influence on the internal rivalry was reduced. This change fostered 
centrifugal dynamics anew. The counter-moves available to the RSK leaders 
remained limited but the existence of other potentially relevant audiences, especially 
the Radicals, encouraged intransigence. Autonomy from Belgrade was, moreover, a 
potential basis for popular support and it was the only significant issue separating the 
candidates in the RSK elections: Babic argued that his more autonomous course had 
been vindicated, while Martic emphasised his unquestionable loyalty to Belgrade.102
5.3 General population:
Referendum and elections but doubtful voter influence
Despite the possible benefits of popular support, the attitudes of the general 
population became even less significant for the intra-Serb rivalry than it had been in 
the pre-war period. When the RSK was constituted, only few of the deputies making 
up the new parliament actually had popular mandates from the 1990 elections. The 
remaining deputies were appointed by the SDS and they were often people with 
connections to the Serbian secret police.103 In a wartime situation, one would expect 
the ability of ordinary people to make their opinions heard to be very limited, but the 
extreme divisions within the leadership actually provided opportunity for voter 
influence when the holding of elections became the only way out of the political 
stalemate.
Elections 1993/94
The holding of elections in 1993/94 added a new dimension to elite competition in 
the RSK. However, the fact that winning the elections was necessary for the leaders 
to obtain or retain power does not necessarily mean that popular attitudes were 
decisive for the competition and hence the position of the leaders. A number of 
factors prevented a direct link between the elites and the mass population from 
materialising.
102 Interview Filip Svarm, Belgrade, 13 September 2004.
103 Svarm, Filip, 1993. “Campaign and Uniforms”. Vreme News Digest, no. 115, 6 December. Svarm, 
Filip, 1995. “Orders from Belgrade”. Vreme News Digest, no. 180,13 March.
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The first problem was the lack of clear political differences. The electoral 
competition between the parties and candidates was primarily about allegations of 
corruption and war profiteering and not very much about the war itself; on this issue 
the parties were united in their radicalism. The only war-related issue that separated 
the parties was their views on links with Belgrade. Thus, on this issue the voters had 
a chance to make their opinions heard. Another problem was, however, the existence 
of factions and frequent splits which made the effect of a party vote highly 
unpredictable. The value of a party vote was, moreover, reduced by the limited role 
of parties and their low level of cohesion which left deputies largely unconstrained. 
To these problems, which are not uncommon in transitional elections, should be 
added the dubious democratic credentials of the elections. Before the elections the 
arrest of popular leaders from Western Slavonia ensured that the RSK leadership 
would not be faced with these more moderate voices.104 This of course limited the 
choice available to the voters. The elections themselves were, moreover, far from 
free and fair: physical attacks on political rivals were reported, the parties did not 
have equal access to the media and, most importantly, the election commission was 
under heavy influence from Belgrade and annulled the results in selected electoral 
districts.105
Despite these limitations, the election results did indicate support for Babic’s 
uncompromising stand and his autonomous course: he managed to make a comeback 
notwithstanding Belgrade’s supply of resources to his rivals. This was one possible 
reason for asserting independence from Belgrade: it could win popular backing. 
However, following the election results, Filip Svarm commented in Vreme that as 
long as Babic’s victory was based exclusively on the will of the voters, then this need 
not worry Belgrade too much. What should worry the Serbian regime was the 
possibility that the election victory was based on control of paramilitary resources.106 
This argument brings out the limited value of popular support in the RSK: other 
resources could be used to undermine rivals and an unwelcome result was unlikely to 
be respected by a candidate in control of more important resources, such as the 
military. Only if these resources are more evenly spread or have decreased in
104 Interview Du§an Ecimovid, Belgrade, 29 August 2003.
105 MarijaSic, Ivica, 1993. “Balvanska konstanta”. Vjesnik, 16 December p. 4.
106 Svarm, Filip, 1993. ‘Touching the Untouchables”. Vreme News Digest, no. 188,27 December. 
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importance does electoral support become more decisive for the elite competition. At 
the time of the elections, this was not the case. Even so, ‘the will of the people’ was 
persistently used to legitimise political positions, especially positions in conflict with 
Belgrade. When Martic fell out with Belgrade, he was hoping to win the support of 
other audiences and alliance partners, in particular Babic, Karadzic, the SRS and his 
own hardliners. But he publicly pointed to the general population and stated: “The 
people will decide the fate o f the Krajina and I  certainly won’t accept a solution 
against the will o f the people”} 01 The supposed ‘will of the people’ was thereby 
invoked as an alternative resource in the elite competition, but this was also done 
more formally through referenda.
Use o f  referenda
Calling a referendum had, before the war, been one of the SDS’s preferred strategies 
when needing to bolster its position. Following the fall-out over the Vance Plan, 
Babic again sought to emulate his strategy by calling a referendum on the plan. This 
demand was, however, in vain; a referendum was never held and this illustrates the 
difficulty of playing the ‘referendum-card’ from a weak position. It is a powerful 
instrument for the already powerful and thereby does not change the dynamics of 
competition significantly. The only referendum that was held during the war was on 
the unification with Republika Srpska. The official result was 99 per cent in favour
1 HRwith a 97 per cent turnout. At this point, Babic had recovered from his defeat over 
the Vance Plan and the referendum was seen as important political capital in dealings 
with Belgrade.109 However, the unification was never realised; it was only a useful 
threat when the leaders needed greater space for manoeuvre and the actual impact of 
the expressed voter attitudes was consequently limited.
In the case of the ‘urban Serbs’ popular attitudes are also difficult to gauge but their 
effect likewise appears to have been negligible even though the urban Serbs were 
outside the areas directly affected by war.
107 Komlenovic, Uros, 1994. “The Fate of the Krajina”. Vreme News Digest, no. 160,17 October.
108 “Chronology 1993: April through June”. Croatian International Relations Review, 1999 V(15/16). 
p. 131.
09 Stefanovid, Nenad Lj., 1993. “A Referendum by Candlelight”. Vreme News Digest, no. 92, 28 
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Urban Serbs: handpicked representatives
Following the departure of the SDS from the political scene and the loss of faith in 
the SDP, the Serb vote appears to have been scattered among a number of parties. 
Milan Bukid was recognised as the official representatives of the ‘urban Serbs’ but 
his party, the SNS, had actually failed to pass the threshold in the 1992 elections and 
had even had difficulty collecting the signatures necessary to run for the elections in 
the first place.110 The SNS was only given three of the reserved Serb seats when it 
became clear that the elected parties did not have enough Serbs on their slates. The 
SNS’s popular mandate was, therefore, limited at best. The other main representative 
of the urban Serbs, Milorad Pupovac, seems to have enjoyed greater support in the 
Serb community but he lacked a popular mandate.
Survey data for the ‘urban Serbs’ during the war is very limited, and possibly not 
very reliable, but it does indicate fairly moderate attitudes. Thus in 1992, 49 per cent 
supported cultural autonomy for the Serbs and 28 per cent were satisfied with 
individual human and political rights, while only 20 per cent supported territorial- 
political autonomy in Serb majority areas.111 If these figures are to be trusted, then at 
least one of the Serb representatives, Milorad Pupovac, made demands that were 
more far-reaching than what the urban Serbs desired. Pupovac’s strategy was, 
however, not merely to mirror the attitudes of the urban Serbs; he also attempted to 
find a solution that could prove acceptable to the RSK leaders. But the two rivals 
would both have to consider their chances in coming elections, and Bukic during the 
war moved closer to Pupovac’s position and began demanding more extensive 
autonomy for the Serbs.112 This emerging consensus led Pupovac to remark that it 
seemed no longer to be a question of what the Serbs wanted, but who would be the 
legitimate representative of their national interests.113 This became the central issue 
of contention: who represented the urban Serbs?
110 Promitzer, 1992: 44.
111 Pre-election survey: “Anketa: Izbori 1992”. Fakultet politidkih znanosti, SveuciliSta u Zagrebu. 
There were only 113 Serb respondents in this survey but the results are nevertheless statistically 
significant.
11 Latinovid, Andrea, 1993. “Traze razmjemu zastupljenost Srb”. Vjesnik, 22 December, p. 2.
113 RaSeta, Boris, 1994. “Srbi su spremni na pregovore”. Pecat, 11 October, p. 14.
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Thus, despite the holding of elections and a referendum in the RSK and the fact that 
a sizeable proportion of Croatia’s Serb lived outside the war-affected areas, the 
impact of popular attitudes on the position of the Serb leaders was very limited. 
Changes in the dominant position were not driven by popular demands, although 
popular support was not completely without importance as an additional resource.
5.4 Inter-ethnic interplay: Winner takes it all
Following the outbreak of war, direct contacts between Knin and Zagreb ceased and 
given that the RSK leaders’ determination for ‘their’ territory to remain separate 
from the Croatian state, the interplay that mattered was primarily of a military nature: 
what was the relative strength of the two sides? The lack of willingness to negotiate 
was reinforced by a false sense of security among the Serb leaders provided by the 
presence of UN forces as well as lack of interest in negotiations on part of the 
Croatian Government following its international recognition.114 However, Belgrade 
and Zagreb were still negotiating and this led to fears among the RSK leadership that 
they would be sold in an agreement between the two states. Such fears were 
heightened by the so-called Graz agreement concluded in May 1992 between 
Karadzid and Mate Boban, HDZ BiH’s leader, in which they agreed to divide Bosnia 
between them. The interplay between the Serb leaders and Zagreb was, therefore, 
affected by the changing relations with the kin-state.
Meanwhile, the outbreak of war did not bring lasting unity in Tudman’s ranks. Just 
before the outbreak of war, Tudman was forced to form a Government of National 
Unity to avoid the rebellion of HDZ hardliners. With this move unity was 
temporarily established: the usual disputes between political parties ceased and 
hardliners were isolated.115 But the Government of National Unity was a Croat 
Government, it did not seek to include Serb representatives,116 and although the 
marginalisation of hardliners indicated moderation, it did not change the interplay 
with the Serb leaders. Despite the establishment of political unity, the war and the 
loss of Croatian territory led to a marked drop in Tudman’s ratings, the HDZ was
114 Burg; Shoup, 1999: 92
115 Goldstein, 1999: 228. Silber; Little, 1996: 170.
116 Interview Nenad Zakosek, Professor in political science. Zagreb, 18 and 19 March 2004.
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facing collapse and Tudman, furthermore, found himself challenged by the extreme 
Croatian Party o f Rights (Hrvatska stranka prava, HSP).117 The Croatian President 
was desperate for the fighting to stop so that the army could be strengthened and the 
acceptance of the Vance Plan in early 1992 was consequently an easy choice. Prior to 
the signing of the Vance Plan, the Croatian Parliament had conceded to international 
demands for recognition and had passed the Constitutional Law on Human Rights 
and Freedoms.118 Following recommendations from the Badinter Commission, this 
law was amended in May 1992 and autonomous status was granted to the regions of 
Knin and Glina.119 This was more than the Croatian Government had previously been 
willing to offer the Serbs but the RSK leaders were bent on their intransigent position 
and it did not make them more willing to consider a future inside a Croatian state. 
Despite this apparent stalemate and unwillingness to compromise, negotiations 
between Zagreb and Knin gradually began in 1993. However, both sides were 
adamant not to make significant concessions and divisions within the HDZ both 
affected the Croatian position as well as Serb perceptions of their ‘opponent*. While 
the Serb leaders did not express any special alarm over the challenge from the 
HSP,120 the hardliners within the HDZ were a greater cause for concern.
Negotiations despite Croatian offensives
Paradoxically, the resumption of negotiations happened after an intensification of the 
conflict: after the Croatian army launched an offensive against the RSK in January 
1993 and retook the strategic Maslenica bridge. The president of the RSK, Goran 
Hadzic, was in a weak position and in order to save his political life, he needed a 
success; he needed to change the rules of the game. The RSK leader was constrained 
and insisted on a withdrawal to the January frontline,121 but in a climate of Croatian 
offences and continued violations of ceasefires it is still significant that there was 
willingness to negotiate. The conflict situation mattered insofar as Hadzic would be 
significantly weakened if the Croatian forces made additional gains; internal
117 Lovric, Jelena, 1991. “Opposition in Croatia". Vreme News Digest, no. 9, 25 November.
118 GrdeSic, Ivan, 1997. “Building the State: Actors and Agendas”. In Ivan Siber (ed.) The 1990 and 
1992/3 Sabor Elections in Croatia. Berlin: Sigma, p. 120.
119 Vukas, Budislav, 1999. “The Legal Status of Minorities in Croatia”. In Snezana Trifunovska (ed.) 
Minorities in Europe: Croatia, Estonia and Slovakia. The Hague: TMC Asser Press, p. 44. 
Trifunovska, Snezana, 1999a. “Political and Security Aspects of Minorities in Croatia”. In her (ed.) 
Minorities in Europe: Croatia, Estonia and Slovakia. The Hague: TMC Asser Press, p. 28.
120 Hislope, 1997: 487.
121 Svarm, Filip, 1993. “Clashes, elections, negotiations”. Vreme News Digest, no. 74,22 February.
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competition and increased isolation from Belgrade provided further incentives for 
negotiations. The changing relations with Belgrade could be said to have changed the 
structure of the interplay: an alliance between Belgrade and Zagreb became a 
possibility and, therefore, it dampened the effect of the bipartisan structure. The fear 
of being marginalised gave the RSK leadership incentives for moderation.
The renewed Croatian offences indirectly affected the outcome of the RSK elections 
since they reinforced Babic’s argument that agreeing to the Vance Plan had been a 
fatal mistake.122 While this argument was primarily targeted against Belgrade, it 
meant that the radical posturing of the Croatian side did influence the outcome of the 
intra-Serb competition, even if it did not affect the position of the leadership; after 
the change in the RSK leadership, more substantial results were actually reached in 
the negotiations even though the new leadership appeared more hardline. The 
Croatian Government maintained that it would not go beyond what had already been 
offered in the Constitution and the Constitutional Law,123 but agreements on other 
areas were nevertheless reached. The RSK leaders still rejected ever becoming part 
of a Croatian state and, therefore, one could argue that the position of the Croatian 
Government mattered little for the positions they adopted. But the military position 
of the Serbs was weakening and while the RSK leadership proved very capable of 
ignoring this fact, a conciliatory position from the Croatian Government might have 
made it easier for them to realise the need for compromise.
Following the thaw in Zagreb-Knin relations that culminated with the reopening of 
the Zagreb-Belgrade highway, intransigent positions again came to the fore. In 
January 1995, Tudman, partly due to pressure from HDZ hardliners, announced that 
the mandate of the UN forces in Croatia would not be extended.124 This was a clear 
provocation and resulted in predictable hardline reactions in Knin where Martic 
stated that he was unwilling to negotiate as long as the Croatian Government 
intended to terminate the mandate. Negotiations nevertheless continued and were
122 Interview Filip Svarm, Belgrade, 13 September 2004.
123 Markovic, Brana. 2002. “Yugoslav Crisis and the World, 1994”. Balkan Repository Project. 
>http.7/www.balkan-archive.org.yu/politics/chronology/chron94.html<
124 Svarm, Filip; Hedl, Drago, 1995. “Bye, bye boys in blue”. Vreme News Digest, no. 173, 23 
January.
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apparently going well,125 but when the Z4-plan was tabled, Martic refused to even 
look at it. Lack of trust in the intentions of the Croatian Government may, therefore, 
have been a factor adding to the failure of the plan. The Croatian Government must 
have been aware that this move would weaken the more moderate elements of the 
RSK leadership and the Croatian envoy, Hrvoje Sarinic, was even told so directly by 
Milosevic.126 One of the chief Croatian negotiators, Slavko Degoricija, had, during 
previous negotiations, argued that more moderate forces did exist in the RSK but that 
they needed to be given guarantees before they could accept re-integration with 
Croatia.127 However, in early 1995, the Croatian Government sensed that a 
negotiated solution was no longer necessary and the strengthening of extremists was, 
therefore, not unhelpful. The extent to which the Croatian Government’s move added 
to the strength of the extremists should, however, not be exaggerated: Martic was 
already far stronger than Mikelic and had access to military resources which Mikelic 
lacked.
When a new arrangement for UN forces, UNCRO, was accepted in April 1995, the 
Z4-plan was already dead and the RSK leaders perceived that the intention of the
10finew arrangement was to treat Krajina as part of Croatia. Timing is crucial and, by
April 1995, the positions on the Serb side were hardened. Whether the Croatian 
Government was actually willing to compromise is, furthermore, questionable and 
the RSK leaders certainly did not believe it. There was, therefore, an added risk 
associated with negotiations, in addition to internal backlash: the risk of being 
cheated. When the RSK leaders in the 11th hour finally agreed to compromise, the 
Croatian Government was clearly not interested and demanded what amounted to an
1 9 0unconditional surrender. Due to the intransigent positions on both sides, Owen 
describes it as a “winner takes all stand-off \  which Tudman won.130 It was a stand­
off in the sense that no side was willing or able to veer significantly from their 
intransigent positions and a compromise was, therefore, unfeasible. However, in late 
1994 this did not seem as impossible: dynamics within the RSK were gradually
125 Svarm, Filip, 1995. “We are not backing out”. Vreme News Digest, no. 175, 6 February.
126 “Chronology 1994/5: November 1994 through April 1995”. Croatian International Relations 
Review VIII: 26/27,2002. p. 80.
127 “Pozeljue Mimare”. Feral Tribune, 14 December 1993, p. 8.
128 Svarm, Filip, 1995. “UNCRO”. Vreme News Digest, no. 184, 10 April.
129 Svarm, Filip, 1995. “The view from the fort”. Vreme News Digest, no. 201, 7 August.
130 Owen, 1995: 327.
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changing, agreements were actually reached and trust was increasing among the 
negotiators. In this sense, the decision to cancel the UN mandate was crucial; the 
moderates in the RSK were not powerful enough to force a compromise through but 
Martic and Babic might have been able to persuade their followers and especially 
military forces of the need for compromise. Therefore, while intra-ethnic competition, 
kin-state relations and international pressure was crucial for willingness to negotiate, 
simultaneous moderation was necessary for an agreement. Such a situation did not, 
however, materialise and part of the reason is to be found in the internal divisions in 
the HDZ and the Croatian Government, which fuelled Croatian intransigence and 
Serb mistrust.
Effect o f divisions on the Croatian side
Throughout the war, Tudman found himself pressured by the right-wing of the ruling 
party, which urged him to take a much more radical course and specifically to refrain 
from any compromises with the Serbs. Internal politics played a crucial part in the 
President’s decision and Woodward argues that military adventures were used as a 
means for winning support: in January 1993 the military offensive took place three 
days before local elections and elections to the Upper House of Parliament. Similarly, 
in September of the same year, the Croatian Army invaded the Medak area
i - j i
immediately prior to the HDZ congress. In these instances, Tudman was inclined 
to the right wing of his party.132 After the signing of the Croat-Bosniak Washington 
Agreement for Bosnia, there was a greater level of optimism surrounding talks 
between Zagreb and Knin. Although both sides were still making uncompromising 
statements, it was felt that this was mostly meant for internal audiences.133 Shortly 
afterwards, however, a serious rift emerged in the HDZ over the party’s policy in 
Bosnia and several high-profile members chose to leave the party. Following this 
split, the hardline faction of the HDZ became dominant and the disarray led to a 
postponement of negotiations on an economic agreement with the RSK and 
ultimately reactivated hostilities between Zagreb and Knin.134
131 Woodward, 1995: 354.
132 Svarm, Filip, 1993. “A fragile pontoon link’. Vreme News Digest, no. 96, 26 July.
133 Svarm, Filip, 1994. “The start of the trade-off’. Vreme News Digest, no. 131, 28 March.
134 Gagnon, 2004: 159. Pupovac, Milorad, 1994. “Moving Towards Peace in Krajina?”. War Report, 
May 1994, p. 8-9. Woodward, 1995: 356.
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Although the radicalisation of Zagreb’s position in 1993 paradoxically led to 
renewed negotiations and later offences only caused temporary halts in talks, the rifts 
within the HDZ did cause scepticism among the RSK leaders as to the 
implementation of the reached agreements.135 The lack of cohesion of the Croatian 
side, therefore, increased the already rampant mistrust. Moreover, rightist pressure 
was one of the reasons for the cancellation of the UN Mandate in early 1995 and this 
added to a new round of intransigence in the RSK
‘Loyal Serbs ’ become less loyal
The positions of the ‘urban Serb’ leaders were, in many ways, more significantly 
affected by the interplay with the Croatian authorities: these representatives 
supported co-existence in a Croatian state and a very extreme stand on part of the 
Croatian authorities would made their position untenable. Initially, Dukic’s SNS 
performed the role as the ‘loyal Serbs’ and reiterated the Government’s position. But 
the party gradually began demanding more extensive autonomy and thereby came 
closer to Pupovac’s position. This move followed increasing attacks on the party: 
first from the right-wing HSP, which demanded a ban on all the SNS’s activities, but 
later also from within the ruling party and the Government.136 This dynamic thereby 
followed the pattern of radicalisation of one side being reciprocated by the other side, 
although the position of Pupovac remained unaffected. The ‘urban Serb’ leaders 
simultaneously had to concern themselves with the policies of Zagreb, Belgrade and 
Knin, and Pupovac described them as being “wedged between the anti-Serb policies
117 _o f Zagreb and the anti-Croat policies o f Belgrade”. The SNS’s change in position,
furthermore, also reflected the on-going competition with Pupovac.
In general, however, the intra-Serb competition was, during the war, less directly 
influenced by the actions and rhetoric of the Croatian leaders. The RSK’s temporary 
willingness to negotiate was primarily caused by internal competition and pressure 
from Belgrade rather than a reaction to the Croatian negotiating position. What 
mattered in terms of inter-ethnic interplay was rather the relative military strength of 
the RSK, as well as the changing structure of relations; from bipartite to tripartite.
135 Jelovac, Milan, 1993. “Brutal history”. Vreme News Digest, no. 102, 6 September.
136 Culic, Marinko, 1995. “Gentle hatred”. Vreme News Digest, no. 175, 6 February.
137 Tanner, Marcus, 1997. Croatia: A Nation Forged in War. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
p. 282.
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While willingness to negotiate did not, therefore, merely mirror the inter-ethnic 
interplay, reaching a settlement requires simultaneous moderation and timing is 
essential as both sides are affected by internal competition. Another important factor 
in reaching agreement is trust, which was in short supply in RSK-Croatian relations 
and was further undermined when the Croatian Government cancelled 
UNPROFOR’s mandate. This move consolidated the zero-sum nature of the conflict.
5.5 Fractionalisation and infighting in wartime Croatia
The imperative of unity following the outbreak of war did not ensure cohesion for 
long and divisions soon re-emerged. However, the emerging competition from other 
parties and independents was accompanied by different dynamics than the intra-party 
competition that had characterised the pre-war period. Importantly, radicalisation 
was not the preferred strategy in the face of outside competition, although the 
changing alliances provided by multipartism offered support to the more radical 
versions of the SDS and thereby fuelled radicalisation. Outflanking was attempted by 
rivalling parties and independents but incumbent leaders did not respond with 
radicalisation of their position: firstly, they frequently had other resources at their 
disposal to marginalise the opposition and secondly, since the opposition also 
criticised them on other issues, political positioning on the issue of the war was not 
necessarily a winning strategy. The issue of the war was still salient, but competition 
was also based on regional and ideological cleavages and fuelled by charges of war 
profiteering and incompetence.
Thus, when Hadzic’s government found itself in an increasingly untenable position, 
losing control and pressured from all sides, they chose to negotiate in an attempt to 
change the situation. Hadzic lost the battle, but the more moderate course, i.e. the 
willingness to negotiate, persisted under the new leadership that had previously 
criticised Hadzic for this same ‘offence’ and was itself faced with hardline 
challengers. However, the importance of coercive resources did constrain the leaders 
and they refrained from accepting compromises on the future status of the RSK since 
they feared that this would cost them the support from hardliners: people in control 
of various military and paramilitary forces. The leadership relied on these forces for 
their continued hold on power and could not simply suppress them: links with
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(para)military forces were of crucial importance. Furthermore, since these forces 
most often challenged the leadership due to its position on the war issue, adopting an 
extreme position could make the problem disappear. Competition from within the 
party or movement thereby resulted in radicalisation of the dominant position and the 
internal divisions, therefore, ultimately fuelled the intransigence of the Krajina 
leaders.
Parties as such were of limited importance, other sources of support were more 
important, as the ascent of Martic demonstrated. More important were links with the 
paramilitary, economic and military support from Belgrade and the possibility of 
establishing alliances with other parties or actors. The RSK parliament was, however, 
of some significance since support from parliament was used as a way of 
strengthening contested positions, and one of the strategies used by the leaders was 
to call sessions in their geographical strongholds. Negotiators always insisted on the 
need for acceptance by parliament, fearing that they would otherwise risk outbidding 
when returning to the RSK.138 The existence of more moderate Serb voices outside 
of the RSK served to undermine the claim to homogeneity made by the radical RSK 
leaders but aside from occasionally assisting short-lived centripetal dynamics, their 
impact on dominant forces in the RSK was limited.
The wartime period saw an important change in relations with the kin-state and 
towards the end of the war the Serbs in the RSK were all but ignored by the Serbian 
regime. A clear distinction was then made between the Serbs in Serbia and the Serbs 
outside Serbia and, hence, between local and kin-state leaders. Such a distinction was 
made by Belgrade as well as by local leaders asserting their independence. At this 
point, Belgrade’s support was no longer decisive for whether a local leader could 
maintain his position of power, whereas it had earlier been the sine qua non of 
political success in the RSK. The local elites had other resources at their disposal, 
could appeal to other audiences and Belgrade had lost its credibility. This changed 
the dynamics and the borders of intra-ethnic competition and reinforced radicalism.
138 Interview Slavko Degoricija, Zagreb, 10 December 2003.
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Political competition in this context of failed transition, ethnification and war took on 
a distinct character. Non-political resources, especially military resources, were of 
great importance; new politically salient issues, primarily valence issues, emerged; 
party competition increased but party structures as such were not important. 
Compared with the pre-war period, the importance of popular attitudes and the 
position of the ‘other side’ was also reduced. The Serb leaders nevertheless 
continued to argue that they were acting according to the will of the people and it is 
interesting to note that Babic, in defence of his radicalism, now says that he thought 
he was representing the views held by the majority of Serbs: “/  think that I  was not 
an extremist but was simply performing my public duties, which implied reflecting 
public opinion and expressing that public opinion on which my political office 
depended\ 139 However, most of the leaders actually lacked a popular mandate until 
the holding of elections in late 1993. In these elections, the constraint posed by 
popular attitudes was also limited since the control of other resources could be used 
to manipulate their expression and the choice for the voters was, furthermore, highly 
restricted. The only issue on which the candidates really differed was the issue of 
relations with Belgrade. This could, therefore, provide a possible basis for power, but 
even on this issue, the general population was not the most important audience: the 
rivalling elites were primarily vying for the support of paramilitary forces, political 
alliance partners in the RSK, the Serb Radicals and the leaders in Pale. Similarly, 
while referenda were used as a reserve resource in the elite competition, it was only 
available to the ones who were already in a powerful position.
Finally, the importance of the inter-ethnic interplay was reduced compared to the 
pre-war period. Radicalisation was generally not reciprocated; other factors were 
more important for the direction of competition. The military balance of power was 
the most important aspect of the interplay and the conflict situation rather than the 
position of the Croatian leadership, therefore, proved a decisive influence.
139 ICTY, 2002a: 13628.
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Chapter 6
Intra-Serb Competition in Wartime Bosnia- 
Divided we stand
In the previous chapter we saw how wartime intra-Serb competition in the RSK was 
characterised by greater independence from Belgrade, by the emergence of 
competition from other ethnic parties and by the dominance of coercive resources 
and the consequent great impact of (para)military forces. Intra-Serb competition had 
in pre-war Bosnia been less intense than in Croatia but this gradually changed during 
the war, although the SDS retained its dominance throughout the period and the 
leadership remained intact.
When war broke out in Bosnia, the SDS leadership had already established the Serb 
Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina (later renamed Republika Srpska, RS). The 
establishment of the statelet, therefore, did not provide for leadership challenges, as it 
had in Croatia, and the leadership had a much more unified party behind it than the 
Serbs on the other side of the border. There had been murmurings of regional 
divisions but not to the extent that it threatened the leadership of the SDS. One could 
expect that this stronger, more unified party would be better able than its Croatian 
counterpart to avoid debilitating fractionalisation during the war. But even at their 
strongest, the SDS and the RS leadership were not monolithic. Like in Croatia, Serb 
representatives were also found outside the RS. These had greater influence than the 
‘urban Serb* leaders in Croatia, due to the persistence of a non-ethnic option, but in 
the RS their influence was limited at best.
Internal divisions in the SDS were on the increase throughout the period and they 
gradually became important for the position of the RS leaders. Even more significant 
were, however, the increasingly strenuous relations between the civilian and the 
military leaders; the RS leaders were heavily dependent on the military, both to 
pursue their war aims and to hold on to power. As a further challenge to the power of 
the previously near-monolithic leaders, opposition parties also began to emerge. 
Finally, kin-state relations became progressively less cordial and following the RS 
rejection of the Contact Group Plan, they descended into open conflict. Belgrade had 
played a less direct role in pre-war Bosnia than in pre-war Croatia, at least
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rhetorically, but this did not make it easier for Milosevic to abandon the Serbs in 
Bosnia. The Serbian President instead chose to pressure the leadership and tried to 
sow divisions, and Belgrade thereby became a very significant audience to the intra- 
Serb competition. These oppositional forces were not unrelated and the political 
dynamics in the RS underwent a change when they began to coalesce. They 
overlapped on a number of cleavages and issues which facilitated their co-operation: 
they shared similar positions on the issue of war, they overlapped on a regional and 
ideological cleavage, and all criticised the rampant war profiteering associated with 
the leadership. Their co-operation was, moreover, given further impetus by personal 
power ambitions, especially those of the RS army commander, Ratko Mladic. This 
challenge occurred at a time when the military balance was also changing which 
provided a further incentive for the leadership to adopt a different position.
As in the Croatian case, this chapter will show that radicalisation is not the only 
possible outcome of intra-ethnic competition -  even in a situation of war and 
polarisation -  and also that the competition was not decided by elites successfully 
playing the ‘ethnic card’.
6.1 Increasing fractionalisation and rift with the army
Shortly after the war broke out, the RS government issued a decree which froze the 
work of political parties “in times o f imminent threat o f war and in a state o f war".1 
This decree meant that while the top of the party was still in function, other parts of 
the party ceased to have influence and it was, in effect, imposing a more 
authoritarian structure. It, moreover, served to dissuade competition from other 
political parties. The official reason for the decree was the need for unity in time of 
war3 but it also increased the control of the party top and one of the reasons for the 
decision was presumably a fear that the army would otherwise have too great an 
influence.4 The civilian leadership crucially depended on the army and its supply of
1 See e.g. ICTY, 2003a. “Judgement: Prosecutor vs. Blagoje Simic, Miroslav Tadic, Simo Zaric (IT- 
95-9-T)”. 17 October 2003. para 467.
2 Interview Dorde Mikic, member of the SDS’s political council in 1990. Banja Luka, 7 November 
2003.
3 Interview Slobodan Nagradic, Sarajevo, 19 November 2003.
4 Interview Dorde Mikic, Banja Luka, 7 November 2003.
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coercive resources, but it did not trust the army completely and therefore sought to 
limit its influence.
However, in the spring of 1993 the SDS leadership reversed its position and decided 
to reactivate the work of the party. According to Vladimir Lukic, who was RS prime 
minister at the time, this was decided following pressure from SDS officials who felt 
their influence slipping.5 But although the reactivation of the party certainly satisfied 
some party officials, it also resulted in increasing divisions within the party and it 
opened up for the organisation of competing parties. Initially, the internal divisions 
were, however, not significant in the RS political top, which was under the firm 
control of Radovan Karadzic. The RS constitution gave the president significant 
powers and the government had little independent authority on issues of importance; 
crucially, all military issues were solely under the president’s authority.6 The SDS as 
such did not play a significant role in the RS government: not all government 
ministers were SDS members and the control of the government was in the hands of 
Karadzic rather than the party.7 Rajko Kasagic, who became prime minister in 1995, 
argues that “the prime minister de facto was Karadzic”.8 He therefore contends that, 
before him, none of the governments had functioned according to the semi- 
presidential RS constitution.9 During the war there were frequent prime ministerial 
changes: five prime ministers in a period of less than four years. These changes were 
formally decided by parliament but it served as a way for Karadzic to avoid criticism; 
the prime ministers proved to be useful scapegoats.10
Compared with the government, the parliament was less under Karadzic’s control. 
Karadzic was elected by parliament and dependent on its continued support. The RS 
parliament was, however, very much dominated by the SDS: apart from seven 
independent deputies, all members of parliament were also SDS members and a 
parliamentary opposition, therefore, did not exist. This did, however, not mean that 
parliament was completely devoid of importance. As in the RSK, the RS parliament
5 Interview Vladimir Lukic, Banja Luka, 2 December 2003.
6 RS constitution, art. 80ff. in Kuzmanovic, 1994.
7 Interview Vladimir Lukic, Banja Luka, 2 December 2003.
8 Interview Rajko Kasagic, Banja Luka, 11 November 2003.
9 “Cooperation -  My Deadly Sin!” Evropski Novosti, Belgrade 18 May 1996. 
>http://www.cdsp.neu.edu/info/students/marko/evnovosti/evnovosti5.html<
10 Interview Rajko Kasagic, Banja Luka, 11 November 2003.
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was used to strengthen contested positions, especially if there was considerable
pressure from Belgrade and/or international forces. Peace plans were, therefore,
subject to parliamentary approval. The insistence on parliamentary approval proved
particularly important in the rejection of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan in May 1993.
Karadzic had, after intense pressure from Milosevic and international mediators,
finally agreed to the plan, under the provision that the RS parliament approved it.
However, this acceptance did not have the support of the rest of the RS leadership
and especially Momdilo Krajisnik, the speaker of parliament and second in command
of the SDS, was against. Karadzic publicly stated that he hoped the deputies would
accept the plan11 but given the divisions within the leadership it is unsurprising that
his support for the plan was half-hearted at best. The parliamentary rejection of the
plan was, therefore, predictable, although Karadzic and Kraji§nik both argued that
the parliament did not technically reject the plan and that there was no reason for
Karadzic to resign.12 Owen argues that following this rejection, Krajisnik became
very influential and Karadzic and Krajisnik would thereafter have to be considered as 
13one.
When it came to the party leadership, the government and the parliament, Karadzic 
was, therefore, faced with few direct challenges to his leadership, but he was aware 
of the existing divisions and the dangers to his position if he alienated the rest of the 
SDS leadership. These divisions were primarily based on the issue of the war and 
therefore constrained the positions that Karadzic was able to adopt, the compromises 
that he was able to accept. Owen contends that Karadzic “never allowed any 
difference to emerge between himself and Krajisnik, and often asked for solutions to 
be imposed on him, frequently claiming that he would be killed by his own people if  
he agreed to some difficult compromise”.14 Despite the lack of outright challenges to 
Karadzic, he was still facing constraints and this caused a radicalisation of his 
position or at least reinforced his intransigence. Outside of the leadership, divisions 
also existed but they were fairly muted. Kasagic recalls: “z/ was possible to see that
11 “Karadzic: Vecina ce glasati za moj potpis”. Politika, 4 May 1993, p. 1.
12 Owen, 1995: 164. When Karadzic agreed to die Geneva Principles, upon which the VOPP was 
based, he said that he was ready to resign if parliament did not agree with him. Cerovic, Stojan, 1993. 
“Geneva Ghosts”. Vreme News Digest, no. 69,18 January.
13 ICTY, 2003b. ‘Transcripts: Prosecutor vs. Slobodan Milosevic (IT-02-54)”. Transcripts from David 
Owen’s testimony, 3-4 November 2003. p. 2856.
14 Owen, 1995: 53.
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there was a lot o f mistrust or dissatisfaction“. And Lukic likewise asserts: “...the SDS 
was not a monolithic party during the war”. 15 Ensuring cohesion of the SDS, 
especially the leadership, was a priority for Karadzic and he was in large parts 
successful. The lack of cohesion in the SDS, therefore, only becomes striking when 
one looks at the regional factions of the party. When these factions began to 
converge with the army, with opposition parties and with Belgrade, they became a 
very serious threat to the RS leadership.
Regional factions grow in importance
The most important of the regional factions, the Bosnian Krajina faction, had already 
shown its desire for autonomy before the war, but during the war it became stronger 
and it also began asserting its influence over the RS leadership. In addition to this 
faction, there was an East-Herzegovin lobby led by Bozidar Vudurevic, and the RS 
leaders during the war lacked control of the town of Bijeljina, where Ljubisa 
‘Mauzer’ Savic and his elite unit of the RS army, the Panthers, were in command.16 
Mauzer was generally on good terms with the political leadership of the RS, although 
his main loyalties were in Belgrade.17 The regional conflicts that were underlying the 
divisions were exacerbated by a breakdown in communications and by the resulting 
differences in the situation in the local regimes. Divisions were, furthermore,
1 ftaugmented by the different impact of the war on various parts of the RS.
Banja Luka vs the *village with a TV-station9
During the war, Serbs from Banja Luka became increasingly dissatisfied with their 
fate being decided by a “village with a TV-station”, as they called Pale.19 Banja 
Luka’s looming dissatisfaction first came to a head in September 1993 when 
members of the 16th Banja Luka Brigade and some members of the 1st Krajina Corps 
rebelled. The rebellion was accompanied by demonstrations of discontent in a 
number of other units of the army and among the civilian population directed against
15 Interview Rajko Kasagic, Banja Luka, 11 November 2003. Interview Vladimir Lukic, Banja Luka,
2 December 2003.
16 Bougarel, 1996: 105. Svarm, Filip, 1994. “Knin Between Two Kingdoms”. Vreme News Digest, no. 
151,15 August.
17 Vaskovic, Slobodan; Djogic, Goran, 2000. “Violent end of controversy”. Reporter, 14 June. 
>http://free.freespeech.org/ex-Yupress/reporter/reporter41.html< Svarm, Filip, 1994. “Knin Between 
Two Kingdoms”. Vreme News Digest, no. 151,15 August.
18 Bougarel, 1996: 105,107.
19 Anastasijevic, Dejan, 1994. “The Left Bank”. Vreme News Digest, no. 153,29 August.
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‘war profiteers’ and the leaders of the SDS.20 Many of the rebels’ demands centred 
on the conditions for the army but significant political demands were also uttered: the 
government’s resignation, holding of elections, forming of a new government with
all regions proportionally represented and solving of the question of where the
01government’s seat would be. The conflict was eventually solved through 
negotiations and the rebels gave up their political demands. However, the rebellion 
caused a rift in the SDS leadership since Biljana Plavsic, RS vice-president, openly 
supported the rebels,22 and Predrag Radic, the wartime mayor of Banja Luka, argues 
that the rebellion marked the “beginning o f the end o f SDS”.23 It was at least the 
beginning of the end of monolithic SDS-rule. The SDS in Banja Luka had been 
among the targets of the rebellion and it was, therefore, not a symptom of an internal 
SDS conflict, but it demonstrated the existence of a pool of dissatisfaction that the 
Krajina faction could feed into as well as the possibility of forging an alliance with 
the military.
Krajina proved a challenge to the RS leaders because, due to its geographical 
position, it could create a state of its own by joining the RSK in Croatia. When the 
Contact Group Plan was discussed in the summer of 1994, some political circles in 
Banja Luka began protesting and insisted on knowing the verdict of the RS 
parliament, since the plan would cede large parts of Bosnian Krajina.24 Karadzic 
consequently decided to enrage Belgrade with yet another rejection rather than face 
potential rivals from within the RS.25 In late 1994 some SDS deputies from Banja 
Luka, however, took a decisive step in a more moderate direction when they met 
Milosevic along with several RS opposition forces. The Krajina leaders had not 
previously constituted more moderate rivals to the Pale leadership and Krajina 
deputies had been among the most vociferous opponents of the Vance-Owen Peace
ty/T
Plan. However, towards the end of the war, military losses posed an increasing
20 Bougarel, 1996:107.
21 Komlenovic, Uros, 1993. “Every Day is Tuesday”. Vreme News Digest, no. 104, 20 September.
22 Anastasijevic, Dejan, 1994. “Biljana Plavsic, Vice-President Bosnian Serb Republic”. Vreme News 
Digest, no. 151,15 August.
23 Gagula, Biljana, 1999. ”Ask Novic About Red Van”. Nezavisne Novine, 15 September. 
>http://www.cpj.org/awardsOO/kopanja_articles.html<
24 “Three Sets of Threats”. Vreme News Digest, no. 148, 25 July 1994. Milosevic, Milan et al, 1994. 
’Total Recall”. Vreme News Digest, no. 150, 8 August.
25 “Three sets of threats”. Vreme News Digest, no. 148,25 July 1994.
26 “Do resenja mirom, ane ratom”. Politika, 6 May 1991, p. 1.
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threat for Krajina. In addition to divisions over a settlement, there was criticism in 
Banja Luka of the sums of money spent by the negotiations teams and scandals over 
financial abuse, embezzlement, war profiteering and corruption further augmented 
the divisions.27
Karadzi6 reacted to the challenge by imposing strict censorship and for a while, the 
conflict was fairly muted 28 But the conflict was left brewing and fear and mistrust 
became widespread following the fall of Croatian Krajina and the loss of Western 
Bosnia; the Bosnian Krajina leaders feared that large parts of the Banja Luka region 
would be sacrificed by Pale. They argued that the insistence on Sarajevo had resulted 
in loss of territory in Bosnian Krajina and they demanded a reversal of this strategy. 
Consequently, in October 1995, various political parties and individuals, including 
high-ranking SDS members, formed the Krajina Patriotic Front (Krajina otadzbinski 
front). The Patriotic Front, which was supported by the RS army, finally challenged 
Pale directly and demanded Karadzic’s resignation. Unable to counter this challenge, 
Karadzic withdrew to the Sarajevo region where he managed to regain control of the 
army, but with Krajina slipping away from him and Eastern Herzegovina also 
proclaiming its autonomy.30 In the RS parliament, 20 SDS deputies from Krajina 
signed an initiative to overthrow the government and form a government of national 
salvation under the leadership of Andelko Grahovac from Banja Luka, who had been 
expelled from the SDS for “pro-Serbia deviations”.31 Following a meeting in the 
SDS deputies’ club, however, they agreed to abandon this demand and Karadzic 
conceded by sacrificing four generals and one lieutenant colonel, as well as the prime 
minister, arguing that they were responsible for the territorial loses suffered. The 
demand for a Krajina prime minister was accommodated by appointing Rajko 
Kasagic who was president of SAO Krajina.32 This was a compromise since Kasagic 
was, at the time, known as a ‘hawk’, close to Karadzic, although Kasagic himself 
argues that Karadzic “knew that I  wouldn’t obey him”.33
27 Komlenovic, Uros, 1995. “All Karadzic’s Opponents”. Vreme News Digest, no. 184,10 April.
28 Svarm, Filip, 1995. “Karadzic vs. Everyone Else”. Vreme News Digest, no. 193,13 June.
29 VuCinic, Perica, 1995. “Capital’s Watchtower”. Vreme News Digest, no. 209,2 October.
30 Bougarel, 1996: 112.
31 Vu£inic, Perica et al, 1995. “The Final Round”. Vreme News Digest, no. 212, 23 October. Vufiinic, 
Perica, 1995. “Milosevic’s New Karadzic”. Vreme News Digest, no. 221,25 December.
32 Interview Rajko Kasagic, Banja Luka, 11 November 2003.
33 Ibid.
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When the Krajina leaders became afraid that their region would be sacrificed, they 
finally decided to challenge Karadzic’s leadership; they realised that without the 
leadership’s willingness to cede territory outside Krajina, Banja Luka could be 
sacrificed. Earlier in the war, disagreements with Pale were mostly over the lack of 
autonomy for the region, criticism of some of the more blatant cases of war 
profiteering as well as Banja Luka’s insistence on an intransigent position. But as the 
military fortunes of the RS began to change, disagreements were increasingly over 
the consequences for Krajina of settlement rejections and also the region’s position 
in possible settlements. Underlying these divisions were, however, also the different 
traditions of the regions: Banja Luka had a strong Partisan tradition and hence felt 
closer to the army than the strongly anti-communist Pale. Thereby, the conflict 
between Banja Luka and Pale overlapped with the growing conflict between the 
political and military leaders.
Military vs civilian leaders
The political leadership in the highly militarised statelet increasingly feared the 
influence of the army and the civilian-military conflict came to be the most 
significant challenge to the RS leadership. The army was a double-edged sword for 
the civilian leaders: they needed its support, since their power depended on their 
control of coercive resources, but they also feared the army’s potential influence and 
what they regarded as its communist tendencies. The RS army was the product of the 
communist system and it expected in wartime to enjoy significant autonomy from 
civilian authorities.34 The SDS leaders, therefore, encouraged a belief that the army 
could not be trusted.35 The second cause of the conflict was the corruption, theft and 
war profiteering associated with the RS political leadership, which the high officers 
of the army found damaging to the conduct of war.36 Finally, the personal rivalry 
between Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic over absolute power in the statelet also 
helped fuel the conflict.
34 Interview Slobodan Nagradic, Sarajevo, 19 November 2003. Vasic, MiloS, 1995. “The President 
and His Generals”. Vreme News Digest, no. 202,14 August.
35 Interview Rajko Kasagic, Banja Luka, 11 November 2003.
36 Ibid. Interview Slobodan Nagradic, Sarajevo, 19 November 2003.
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The ambitions of Mladid to provide more than military leadership first became clear 
during the debates over the Vance-Owen Peace Plan in the spring of 1993. Mladic’s 
vehement opposition and 35-minute-long impassioned speech against acceptance 
was one of the decisive factors in the parliament’s rejection of the plan and, hence, 
the radicalisation of the dominant position.37 Owen argues that, after this session, 
Mladic began to have a political constituency.38 Divisions persisted despite the 
rejection of the plan and in his usual hyperbolic fashion, Mladic threatened to 
“bombard London” in case of a military intervention in Bosnia. Karadzic responded 
that this was an “idiotic and irresponsible blunder■” and that such statements could 
furthermore only be made by civilian authorities, i.e. by Karadzic himself.39
The looming conflict was next manifested in September the same year in the above- 
mentioned army rebellion in Banja Luka. The brigades orchestrating the rebellion 
issued a communique in which they argued: “while we were fighting... skilful 
manipulators, with the blessing o f the existing authorities, increased their private 
empires and carried out their depraved political dreams in the safeness o f the rear 
And they proceeded to arrest people they alleged to be war profiteers.40 During the 
conflict between Pale and Belgrade over the Contact Group Plan, Mladic long 
resisted openly saying if he would side with Pale and this only served to heighten 
doubts about the army’s loyalty.41 Some army officers, moreover, insisted that the 
RS leaders should decide what territories it intended to cede so “people don 7 have to 
die for nothing'\ 42 The conflict further intensified following military defeats when 
Karadzid insisted on his role as supreme commander and began wearing a uniform 
and, moreover, chose to strengthen the police corps and reorganise it as a military 
organisation;43 Karadzic needed military forces that he could fully control. In April 
1995 Mladic once again addressed the RS parliament but this time with bleak news. 
He criticised the civilian authorities for interfering in the line of command, 
demanded control of all economic facilities and told parliament: “z/ a political 
solution isn 7 found through negotiations, the war will be long and exhausting fo r the
37 Stefanovic, Nenad Lj., 1993. “The Pugnacious Commander”. Vreme News Digest, no. 87,24 May.
38 ICTY, 2003b: 28562.
39 Vasic, Milos; Svarm, Filip, 1993. “All Serbian Threats”. Vreme News Digest, no. 87, 24 May.
40 Vasic, Milo§, 1993. “A State Without Bread”. Vreme News Digest, no. 104,20 September.
41 Svarm, Filip, 1994. “The Silence of the General”. Vreme News Digest, no. 152, 22 August.
42 “Three Sets of Threats”. Vreme News Digest, no. 148,25 July 1994.
43 Svarm, Filip, 1995. “Civilian-Military Games”. Vreme News Digest, no. 186, 24 April.
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R S ” and that the proclamation of a state of war would, therefore, be required. But the 
deputies did not accept his warning. On the contrary, Mladic’s report was rejected as 
a political pamphlet and there were calls for his resignation.44
Owen argues that Karadzic during the war became ever more extreme in his 
championing of Serb nationalism, while Mladic was slowly beginning to reassess the 
costs of war 45 International mediators tried to take advantage of the growing conflict 
between Mladic and Karadzic and Carl Bildt recalls how they used Mladic to 
undermine Karadzic and chose to negotiate directly with the military commander 
behind Karadzic’s back.46 Finally, in August 1995, Mladic’s autonomous role 
became too much for Karadzic and, behind closed doors, the RS parliament decided 
to remove him from his post under emergency war conditions declared a week earlier. 
Politika speculated that Karadzic wanted to remove Mladic to prevent a military 
coup by the generals.47 If such an initiative had been under way it was averted, but 
Karadzic had not yet won the battle, since the next day Mladic’s entire command 
signed a letter to the RS parliament rejecting Karadzic’s announcement and declaring 
Mladic commander of the RS army.48 Karadzic finally backed down and on 11 
August 1995, he declared that the decision to remove Mladic had been annulled. 
Shortly thereafter he also backed down on the issue of negotiations and agreed to 
give Milosevic the deciding vote in a joint Serb delegation. At this point, Karadzic 
controlled Pale and the majority of eastern RS and enjoyed the support of the RS 
special police, extreme nationalists in the RS and in Serbia, as well as SDS officials 
who feared Mladic’s attack on war profiteers. But, by August 1995, this did not 
match Mladic’s support and resources: the RS commander enjoyed the support of all 
generals in the RS army, the Krajina faction of the SDS, the more moderate 
opposition parties and, finally, the Serbian regime which provided him with political, 
military and logistical support49
44 Filip Svarm, “Civilian-Military Games”. Vreme News Digest, no. 186,24 April 1995. Bougarel, 
1996: 111-2.
45 Owen, 1995: 324.
46 Bildt, Carl, 1998. Peace Journey: the struggle for peace in Bosnia. London: Weidenfeld. p. 64.
47 “Chronology 1995: August 1 through August 31”. Croatian International Relations Review, 2002, 
XI (30/31). p. 54.
48 “Generalni ne prihvataju Karadzica za vrhovnog komandanta”. Politika, 7 August 1995, p. 1.
49 Vasic, Milo§, 1995. “Predsednik ili general”. Vreme, 14 August 1995, p. 14-15.
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The convergence between Mladic and the Krajina faction of the SDS was not only 
based on the issue of a settlement but also reflected a regional division of the RS and 
an accompanying ideological divide: both the RS army and the Krajina faction were 
closer to the Partisan tradition than to the Pale leadership’s more Cetnik-inspired 
ideology. Finally, they were both attacking the rampant war profiteering and 
corruption associated with the SDS leadership.50 When the army and the Krajina 
faction began coalescing, they could effect a change away from the centrifugal 
dynamics: Karadzic feared being removed by forces urging negotiations not by more 
radical forces.
Non-parliamentary multipartism
The most severe competition to the RS political leaders, therefore, came from within 
the party and from the army. Competition from other parties was, on the other hand, 
scarce but it was not non-existent, and the RS leadership even proudly described the 
statelet as a “multi-party democracy”.51 In the beginning of the war, competition to 
the SDS was, however, even more limited than in the pre-war period since Serb 
representatives closed ranks behind the party. Almost all Serb representatives from 
non-ethnic parties joined the SDS after the outbreak of war: there were only seven 
exceptions in the RS parliament. Thus, deputies who had been elected for the SDP, 
the Reformists or the DSS on a non-ethnic platform, now chose to join the explicitly 
Serb party. The non-ethnic parties ceased to operate in the territory under RS control 
and the only alternative to joining the SDS in this part of Bosnia, therefore, was to 
become an independent. One of the prime examples of this conversion was Dragan 
Kalinic, a former Communist leader elected for the Reformists, who became 
powerful in the SDS. And if anyone in the party doubted Kalinic’s nationalist 
credentials, his speech in the RS Parliament in May 1992 proved them wrong: 
“Among all the issues this assembly should decide on, the most important one is this: 
Have we chosen the option o f war or the option o f negotiations?... I  do not hesitate 
in selecting the first option, the option o f war”.
50 Ibid
51 Kuzmanovic, 1994: 60.
52 ICTY, 2002b: 1171.
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Despite this homogenisation of Serb political representation, divisions soon began to 
emerge and alternative political initiatives came under way, especially after the ban 
on political parties was lifted in March 1993. The first party to be formed after the 
war began was the Liberal Party (Liberalna stranka, LS), which was founded in April
1992 before the work of parties was frozen. This party consisted of Banja Luka 
intellectuals, it was not a nationalist party and it supported negotiations and an end to 
the war.53 The party illustrated the continued existence of non-ethnic, moderate 
voices in the RS but its influence was marginal. A party of much greater concern to 
the SDS was the Serb Radical Party (Srpska radikalna stranka, SRS), which, just 
before the war and during the war, increased its popularity significantly and provided 
an even more extreme opposition to the SDS. Apparently, some members of the SDS 
were simultaneously members of the SRS, thereby giving the leadership reasons to 
fear splits in the party: in 1992, Radoslav Brdanin, who was then president of the 
SAO Krajina crisis headquarters,54 reportedly said on a radio show that he had an 
SRS membership card signed by Seselj personally.55
The SRS started working in 1992 and was formally founded in Bosnia in March
1993 by university professor Nikola Poplasen. Popla§en lists two reasons for 
founding the party: firstly, in order to pursue the goal of uniting all Serbs in one state 
since the SRS felt that this goal was not sufficiently pursued by the SDS, and they 
argued that the party lacked autonomy in relation to Milosevic who was seen as an 
obstacle; secondly, to break the SDS monopoly and fight against the crime and 
authoritarianism associated with the party.56 Finally, there was the Socialist Party of 
Republika Srpska (Socijalisticka partija Republike Srpske, SPRS), which was 
founded in Banja Luka in June 1993 by Dragutin Ilic. Contrary to the SRS, the 
Socialist Party charged a more moderate course than the SDS and supported the 
different peace plans rejected by the RS leaders. It was consequently derided as a 
party of traitors in the RS media. The party established municipal organisations in 
most of the territory of the RS57 but its most important organisational link was with
53 Interview Miodrag Zivanovic, Banja Luka, 22 October 2003.
54 In effect, president of the regional government.
55 ICTY, 1996. ‘Transcripts: Prosecutor vs Du§ko Tadic (IT-94-I-T)”. Transcript from testimony of 
anonymous witness, 30 May - 4 June 1996. p. 1807-8.
56 Interview Nikola Poplasen, Banja Luka, 3 December 2003.
57 Interview Dragutin Ilic, Banja Luka, 23 October 2003.
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Belgrade and by the other opposition parties it was seen as little more than 
Milosevic’s mouthpiece.58
Consequently, by the second year of war, the SDS was faced with competition from
both more extreme and more moderate parties, and it was also challenged on issues
other than the issue of war: in particular, the issue of war profiteering and the
regional divide were of importance. The challenge to the SDS’s power was,
nevertheless, of a limited nature since none of the parties were represented in
parliament. The political channels open to the opposition were limited and opposition
activities, therefore, mostly consisted of public announcements while the parties
were institutionalised.59 But the RS leaders still feared the possible impact of
increased competition and, therefore, chose to harshly repress the opposition. Ognjen
Tadic, from the SRS, argues that the treatment of the opposition included “arrests,
political liquidations, physical liquidations”.60 The opposition of the Liberal Party
was similarly reduced by sending most of its members to the first line of the front.61
The leader of the party, Miodrag Zivanovid, recalls that it had to function semi-
legally: “7 was on the front, and I  came to Banja Luka to make press conferences,
62and then I  went back to the front, to save my life. Because it was safer there”.
In parliament the only opposition to the SDS was made up by seven independent 
deputies. Following the rejection of the Contact Group Plan and the resulting clash 
between Belgrade and Pale, they constituted themselves as a group, the ‘Club of 
Independent Deputies’ under the leadership of Milorad Dodik, and began to act as an 
opposition to the SDS and Karadzic.63 They issued a demand for a parliamentary 
session to achieve final peace and they blamed Karadzic and Krajisnik for the 
casualties in the period following the rejection of the Contact Group Plan and added 
that parliament had to define new stands for the talks and priorities in regard to the
58 Interview Miodrag Zivanovic, Banja Luka, 22 October 2003. Interview Ognjen Tadic, Banja Luka, 
7 November 2003.
59 Interview Nikola Poplasen, Banja Luka, 3 December 2003. Interview Ognjen Tadic, Banja Luka, 7 
November 2003.
60 Interview Ognjen Tadic, Banja Luka, 7 November 2003.
61 Interview Miodrag Zivanovic, Banja Luka, 22 October 2003.
62 Ibid
63 Interview Igor Radojicic, SNSD spokesman. Banja Luka, 1 December 2003. Milorad Dodik had 
been elected for the Reformists in 1990.
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territorial division.64 Dodik coalesced with other opposition forces from Krajina and 
argued that the RS leadership’s insistence on its right to Sarajevo “has resulted in the 
loss o f a large part o f Bosnian Krajina”.65 The Club was taken very seriously by the 
SDS leadership and KrajiSnik stated: “someone wants to break up the RS 
Parliament’,66 and announced greater discipline in the SDS.67 Dodik argued that 
certain SDS deputies also supported them but that “rigid party and every other 
discipline” discouraged them.68 The Club of Independents had no party apparatus 
behind them, nor formal structure, but they nevertheless began co-ordinating their 
stands and, for instance, voted against the dismissal of Mladic in August 1995, which 
the parliament, at least according to the SDS leaders, otherwise supported 
unanimously.69
Given the SDS’s strong hold on power, the opposition from other parties did not 
significantly shake the leadership. But the fear of outflanking by the Serb Radicals 
was one of the reasons for the reactivation of the work of the SDS in 199370 and it 
thereby indirectly affected the increasing lack of cohesion in the party. Moreover, the 
break of the SDS’s monolithic status seems to have fostered or inspired divisions 
within the SDS itself, especially towards the end of the war when the Banja Luka 
faction co-operated with opposition parties in a bid to defeat the Pale leadership. The 
opposition had deputies in the Banja Luka city council and could use this as a 
platform for influencing the SDS in this region. The opposition, if not a significant 
threat on its own, affected the internal dynamics in the SDS as well as the relations 
with the army and thereby eventually gave rise to more centripetal dynamics. The 
SDS leadership was aware of the potential dangers posed by competing parties, but 
the presence of rivalling parties did not lead the SDS to take a more extreme position. 
Obviously, the SDS had already adopted an extreme position but it is also of 
importance that the opposition did not just challenge the SDS on the issue of the war,
64 Vucinic, Perica; Rovac, Pajo, 1995. “Playing on the Reformists Ticket”. Vreme News Digest, no.
175, 6 February.
65 VuCinic, Perica, 1995. “Capital’s Watchtower”. Vreme News Digest, no. 209, 2 October.
66 Vucinic, Perica; Rovac, Pajo, 1995. “Playing on the Reformists Ticket”. Vreme News Digest, no.
175, 6 February.
67 Svarm, Filip; Dimovic, Dragan, 1995. “Our Man in Pale”. Vreme News Digest, no. 172,16 
January.
68 Peranic, Drazena, 1995. “Sejfiidin Tokic and Milorad Dodik”. AIM Press, 5 June.
69 “Chronology 1995: August 1 through August 31”. Croatian International Relations Review, 2002,
XI (30/31). p. 49. The vote was behind closed doors.
70 Interview Slobodan Nagradic, Sarajevo, 19 November 2003.
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and a more extreme position on this issue was, therefore, not necessarily the answer. 
Furthermore, the distribution of resources meant that the SDS could prevent the 
opposition from becoming a serious threat; the opposition was repressed with harsh 
means and it was, therefore, not able to effectively appeal to the audiences of 
importance for the SDS’s hold on power. The leadership, consequently, did not have 
to compete through political positioning. However, when the opposition parties 
fostered an alliance with other oppositional forces, the RS leadership was eventually 
forced to change its position or face defeat; the direction of competition had changed.
Serbs outside o f the RS
Despite the strategy of national homogenisation undertaken by the SDS, Serb 
representatives were still found outside the RS. These were more moderate forces 
who were not in direct competition with the RS leaders but still challenged their 
claim to represent all Serbs in Bosnia.
In order to maintain the multi-ethnic nature of the Bosnian Presidency, replacements 
had to be found for Plavsic and Koljevic after the SDS deputies left the Bosnian 
institutions in April 1992. And following from the constitution and the electoral law, 
the posts were offered to the two runner-ups from the 1990 presidency election: 
Mirko Pejanovic and Nenad Kecmanovid, who were, respectively, leaders of the 
DSS and the Reformists. Their acceptance caused fury in Pale where Karadzic 
exclaimed that Pejanovic and Kecmanovic were “the private Serbs o f Alija
71Izetbegovic”. Kecmanovic quickly bowed under the pressure exerted on him by the 
RS and Belgrade and left Sarajevo in June 1992. He was replaced by Tatjana Ljuic- 
Mijatovic from the SDP and Mirko Lazovic, also from the SDP, was appointed 
Speaker of Parliament.72 The Serb members of the Bosnian Presidency took a 
radically different approach than the RS leaders: they stayed in Sarajevo and they 
spoke out against war and separation. In that way they can be seen as playing a 
similar role to Milan Bukic in Croatia: they were the ‘loyal Serbs’. But there are also 
differences: Pejanovic, Ljuic-Mijatovic and Lazovic represented non-ethnic parties; 
they held their positions as ethnic Serbs but not as representatives of an ethnic party. 
A non-ethnic option still existed and the Serb representatives also today insist that
71 NinCic, Roksanda, 1992. “A New Breed of Serbs”. Vreme News Digest, no. 37, 8 June.
72 Pejanovic, 2002: 103,109.
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they had actual influence on some important issues, while acknowledging that their 
most important role was perhaps to help keep alive this non-ethnic conception of 
Bosnia.73
The non-ethnic option was, however, weakened during the war and the non-Bosniak 
presence in the governing bodies was reduced. When the Washington Agreement on 
the Bosniak-Croat Federation was negotiated, Lazovic was present but, despite his 
insistence, Serbs were not included in the Federation Constitution, which established 
it as an entity with two constituent peoples: Bosniaks and Croats. The Serb proposals 
were rejected with the explanation that the Serbs could not be a constituent people in 
both the Federation and the RS. This indicated that the Pale leaders were given the 
authority to also decide for the Serbs outside the RS.74 Ethnification was further 
strengthened when the Serb Civic Council (Srpsko gradansko vijece, SGV) was 
established with the support of the Bosnian authorities. The name itself illustrates the 
schism: the SGV was to represent the Serbs who rejected the policies of the RS but 
the term ‘civic’ sits uneasily with ethnic representation. However, the SGV provided 
a basis for contesting the representativeness of the RS; a basis for challenging the 
conflation of Serb politics and RS politics.75 Within the SGV there were forces that 
urged the creation of an actual Serb party, which would be a counterpart to Karadzic 
and would undermine his claim to represent all Serbs. This was, however, never 
realised: most of the members of the SGV were from non-ethnic parties and those 
who supported the creation of an ethnic party were a small minority.77
The influence of the ‘Sarajevo Serbs’ in the RS was, nevertheless, very limited. They 
had some links with more moderate opposition parties78 but remained marginal. The 
Liberal Party also attempted to develop contacts with non-ethnic parties in Sarajevo: 
with the SDP, the Union of Social Democrats and with some smaller Croat parties.79 
Dodik’s Club of Independents similarly had secret contacts with the Bosnian
73 Interview Miro Lazovic, Sarajevo, 29 June 2004. Interview Tatjana Ljujic-Mijatovic, Sarajevo, 2 
July 2004. Interview Mirko Pejanovic, Sarajevo, 6 July 2004.
74 Udojovic, Radenko, 1994. “The Serbs on ‘this’ side”. AIM  Press, 26 November.
75Bougarel, 1996: 111.
76 Udojovid, Radenko, 1994. “The Serbs on ‘this’ side”. AIM  Press, 26 November.
77 Interview Mirko Pejanovic, Sarajevo, 6 July 2004.
78 MiloSevid, Milan et al, 1994. ‘Total Recall”. Vreme News Digest, no. 150, 8 August. Interview 
Mirko Pejanovic, Sarajevo, 6 July 2004.
79 Interview Miodrag Zivanovic, Banja Luka, 22 October 2003.
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opposition and, in May 1995, these contacts were made public when Dodik in the 
Italian city of Perugia met Sejfiidin Tokic, leader of the Union of Social Democrats, 
and they declared their support for the Contact Group Plan.80 In September the same 
year, opposition parties from all of Bosnia again met in Perugia, formed the 
Democratic Alternative Forum and issued a declaration in which they demanded an 
immediate stop to the war.81 These meetings are significant: firstly, because engaging 
in co-operation across the ethnic divide was sure to give the RS opposition deputies 
the label ‘traitors’; it was a very significant signal of moderation and attested to the 
emergence of new dynamics. Secondly, the presence of Serb opposition 
representatives from the RS as well as from Sarajevo strengthened the attempt to 
break the SDS’s monopoly on representation of the Serbs in Bosnia. Even so, the 
contribution of the ‘Sarajevo Serbs’ to the changing dynamics in the RS was limited 
at best.
One decisive change in the wartime period was, as already mentioned, the relations 
with the kin-state. But what influenced Belgrade’s altered role in the RS and what 
effect did this change have?
6.2 Kin-state involvement:
Increasingly divided RS argues over Belgrade’s influence
Even though Milosevic was initially uncontested in the RS, the Pale leaders soon 
followed the pattern established on the Croatian side of the border: relations became 
increasingly strenuous as Milosevic distanced himself from the war and his former 
proteges began to assert their independence. Again mirroring events in the RSK, 
Belgrade utilised internal divisions to try to maintain control while the local leaders 
sought co-operation with the Serbian opposition and with the RSK in an attempt to 
bolster their autonomy. The specific dynamics, however, differed from those in the 
RSK: Belgrade initially had greater difficulty influencing the internal competition 
and the fall-out with the local leaders was much more severe.
80 Svarm, Filip, 1995. “Karadzic Vs. Everyone Else”. Vreme News Digest, no 193, 13 June.
81 Peranic, Drazena, 1995. “Gathering of Democratic Alternative Forum from the whole of B&H”. 
AIM Press, 2 October.
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Increasing divisions between Pale and Belgrade
Shortly after Milosevic fell out with Babic in the RSK, there were speculations that 
he might also be looking for a replacement for Karadzic: for a leader more inclined 
to compromise and less inclined to power ambitions. Such speculations were fed by 
actions of both the Serbian and the RS president. Thus, in April 1992 during the 
peace talks in Lisbon, MiloSevid had talks with Kecmanovic which fostered rumours 
that the leader of the Reformists was more willing than Karadzic to follow 
Milosevic’s lead in the negotiations.83 Karadzic did not seek to counter such rumours 
and he had, for a while, been increasingly asserting his independence and making 
statements to the effect that he, and not Milosevic, was the leader of the Serbs in 
Bosnia.84 Milosevic, therefore, had reason to fear that Karadzic might follow Babic’s 
course and an attempt to engineer a leadership change became progressively more 
likely. This, however, never materialised and once it became clear that the ousting in 
Knin would not be followed by a similar one in Pale, Karadzic felt safe in his 
leadership position. Commentators argued that the war in Bosnia played an important 
part in Milosevic’s election victory in late 1992 and the Serbian President could not, 
therefore, afford to suddenly reverse his position.85
This seeming co-existence and co-dependence was, however, shattered when the 
Vance-Owen Peace Plan was tabled in the spring of 1993. Although relations 
between Belgrade and the RS leaders had been fairly unproblematic during the first 
year of war, Milosevic was not completely trusted in Pale. In the RS parliament there 
was widespread belief that Karadzic had been forced to sign the agreement and this 
caused great resistance among the deputies.86 Milo§evic was, furthermore, not aided 
by the vehement opposition of some SDS leaders to the plan, Mladic’s impassioned 
speech against it and Karadzic’s half-hearted support. Thus, even though Milosevic 
appealed to Serb unity, he only managed to win two votes.87 The humiliation greatly 
angered Milosevic who made no effort to hide his resentment. He described the 
behaviour of the RS leaders as that of “drunk poker players” and forbade Biljana
82 Camo, Mensur, 1992. “Pucanje srpskog monolita”. Slobodna Bosna, no. 12,16 January, p. 5.
83 Isakovic, Zehrudin, 1992. “Is a replacement being sought for Karadzic”. Vreme News Digest, no.
30,20 April.
84 Camo, Mensur, 1992. “Pucanje srpskog monolita”. Slobodna Bosna, no. 12,16 January, p. 5.
85 Cerovic, Stojan, 1993. “Geneva Ghosts”. Vreme News Digest no. 69,18 January.
86 Interview Vladimir Lukic, Banja Luka, 2 December 2003.
87 Cerovic, Stojan, 1993. “Political Debauchery”. Vreme News Digest, no. 85,10 May.
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Plavsic to cross the Drina, saying that her place was in a lunatic asylum.88 On a more 
formal level, Milosevic, along with the Yugoslav and the Montenegrin Presidents, 
issued a public letter to the RS parliament in which they stated: “You have no right to 
endanger 10 million citizens o f Yugoslavia”. But the parliament rejected the implied 
assertion that Milosevic enjoyed a special position by responding: “We allow 
ourselves the same right that you have to make decisions that are o f importance to 
the Serbian people” 89 Belgrade also resorted to more tangible measures than mere 
insults in an effort to discipline the ‘drunk poker players’. The Serbian Government 
imposed a temporary blockade on the Drina, cutting off all supplies except food and 
medical supplies, and flavoured it with an attack on the “luxurious lifestyle” the Pale 
leaders were enjoying in Belgrade “while the people suffer*’.90
After a temporary backtrack, Belgrade finally broke with the RS leadership in 
August 1994 following their rejection of the Contact Group Plan. Before the vote in 
the RS parliament, the Serbian President issued a letter in which he reminded the 
deputies: “the Serbian people have only one president, chosen directly by the people 
and with a fully legitimate mandate”?1 Once again the special position of Milosevic 
was used to try to pressure the local Serb leaders. Some of the deputies 
acknowledged Milosevic’s special position but still insisted that the parliament had 
other considerations as well. Thus, Milano vie stated: “We (..) have never either with 
words or acts showed that we dismissed the fact that there is only one elected head o f 
state o f the Serbian people (..) We have wanted him to be our president as well. [But] 
We are answerable to this people [the people o f the RS]”. However, some deputies 
spoke out in clear defiance of Belgrade. Radoslav Brdanin, from the powerful 
Krajina faction, stated: “Those playing the roles o f puppets at crucial moments must 
be immediately recognised and removed, or the darkness will engulf us”. 92 
Ultimately, Belgrade’s persuasion and threats were to no avail and when the 
parliament decided to hold a referendum on the plan, thereby in effect rejecting it, 
Belgrade announced that they were breaking off all economic and political relations 
with the Pale leadership and banning all transport to the RS except food, clothes and
88 Svarm, Filip, 1994. “Kidnappers and hostages”. Vreme News Digest, no. 142,13 June.
89 Ibid.
90 Vasic, Milo§, 1993. “Out of the Frying Pan into the Fire”. Vreme News Digest, no. 85,10 May.
91 Svarm Filip, 1994. “The President’s Three Letters”. Vreme News Digest, no 151, 15 August.
92 “A Message from Pale”. Vreme News Digest, no. 150, 8 August 1994.
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medicine. Milosevic reiterated that the RS leadership did not have the right to reject 
the plan and he accused them of wishing to achieve their bmtal political ambitions 
with the lives of other people’s sons.93
Despite this break in relations, the RS leaders remained calm, convinced that 
Milosevic would again be forced to change his position.94 What they had not 
considered, however, was that divisions in the RS leadership were growing and this 
would increase Belgrade’s influence in the RS. Furthermore, the Banja Luka faction 
of the SDS and the opposition parties based in the same city were growing in 
strength.
Belgrade and RS elite competition
Prior to the definitive break between Pale and Belgrade, the Serbian Government did 
not make much use of internal divisions in the RS: the leadership was cohesive and 
the opposition was weak. Consequently, Belgrade did not try to remove Karadzic 
when the Vance-Owen Peace Plan was rejected. With the formation of the Radicals 
in Bosnia in early 1993, relations with Belgrade, however, became a factor in the RS 
elite competition95 and the challenge from the SRS seems to have contributed to the 
SDS’s distancing from Milosevic: the Pale leaders were vulnerable to rivals who 
accused them of being too close to Milosevic and thereby of being too moderate. 
This kind of criticism also came from within the SDS’s own ranks.
The distancing from Belgrade, therefore, ensured cohesion on the RS radical wing 
but the introduction of the economic embargo after the rejection of the Contact 
Group Plan destroyed the overall cohesion. In the RS parliament, Milorad Dodik 
formed his Club of Independent Deputies, while the opposition parties stepped up 
their campaigns.96 The clash between Belgrade and Pale started a process of rot 
among the Bosnian Serbs and that was precisely Milosevic’s goal. In order to further 
the surfacing of divisions in the RS, Milosevic publicly blamed Karadzic for the 
military defeats suffered in western Bosnia.97 Aside from the public slandering of the
93 Milosevic, Milan et al, 1994. ‘Total Recall”. Vreme News Digest, no. 150, 8 August.
94 Ibid.
95 Interview Nikola Popla§en, Banja Luka, 3 December 2003.
96 Bougarel, 1996: 111.
97 Vasic, MiloS; Svarm, Filip, 1994. “Storm over Bosnia”. Vreme News Digest, no. 163, 7 November.
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Pale leaders, Milosevic also actively sought to increase his support in the RS 
parliament through contacts with disgruntled deputies and in late 1994 SDS deputies 
from Banja Luka met the Serbian President in Belgrade. Following this meeting 
Karadzic for the first time admitted that divisions in parliament were growing, saying 
that 15 out of 82 MPs were members of the ‘Left’ and close to the ‘Left in Serbia’.98 
According to rumours at the time, Milosevic was, however, more sure of his support 
in the RS parliament and said that he already had 25 out of the 42 deputies necessary 
for a majority.99 In addition to fostering divisions in the RS parliament, Belgrade also 
coalesced with the opposition parties. Milosevic had a special relation with the SPRS, 
which was formed shortly after the rejection of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan. The 
founder of the party, Dragutin Ilic, acknowledges that he received three kinds of 
assistance from the Serbian Government: access to the media, material aid and 
physical protection. After the rejection of the Contact Group Plan, Milo§evic 
reportedly asked Ilic to bring 70 RS businessmen to Belgrade to explain to them the 
huge costs of war and urge for negotiations.100
In addition to fostering political divisions, the Serbian authorities also sought to 
augment the already-existing conflict between the political and the military 
leadership in the RS. Milosevic recognised the importance of the military for the 
civilian leadership and saw a deepening conflict as the best way to effect a change in 
their position. For this purpose, Milosevic could utilise the close relationship 
between Mladic and the military leadership in Belgrade;101 even when the embargo 
against the RS was imposed, Belgrade continued having RS army officers on its 
payroll. Milosevic did not want to engineer an RS military defeat; what he wanted 
was a change in the political position. The close link between Mladic and Belgrade 
persisted throughout the war and although the RS commander, after some initial 
hesitation, rejected the Contact Group Plan, he continued having secret contacts with 
Milosevic.102 But Mladic and Milosevic almost fell into disagreement when Belgrade 
in September 1995, sent Arkan and his paramilitary Tigers to the RS. Mladic flew 
into a rage, whereas the political leadership supported the presence of the Tigers,
98 Stefanovic, Nenad Lj., 1994. “Buying Time.” Vreme News Digest, no. 168,12 December.
99 Vasic, Milo§; Svarm, Filip, 1994. “Storm over Bosnia”. Vreme News Digest, no. 163, 7 November.
100 Interview, Dragutin Ilic, Banja Luka, 23 October 2003.
101 Gow, 2003: 180
102 Thomas, 1999: 204.
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thereby once again underlining the fluidity of alliances.103 Generally, however, 
Belgrade’s strategy proved successful and Mladic chose to follow Milosevic’s lead, 
even though he reportedly rejected launching a coup against the political 
leadership.104
Belgrade’s strategy was highly effective in augmenting divisions in the RS and 
thereby served to weaken Karadzic. However, Karadzic’s initial reaction to 
Belgrade’s attempts to undermine him was to seek to strengthen his power base 
within the RS, consequently adopting an even more intransigent position. While the 
strategy was eventually successful, it therefore took a long time for it to have the 
desired effect. Only in August 1995 were the RS leaders so weak that they gave in: 
they agreed to a joint Serb delegation in Dayton in which Milosevic would have the 
deciding vote. During the Dayton negotiations, Milosevic dismissed any objections 
from the RS delegates and boasted: ‘77/ make sure they accept the final 
agreement’. 105 And so they did, after Milosevic had reportedly threatened that 
Karadzic and the rest of the leadership would otherwise be arrested.106
Attempting to counter Belgrade
As was the case in the RSK, the Pale leadership did not just stand idly by when 
Milo§eviC tried to undermine their power base. Instead, they sought alternative 
alliance partners, mainly in the Serbian opposition. Many of the Serbian opposition 
leaders, such as Seselj, Draskovic and DindiC, had roots in Bosnia and they, 
moreover, estimated that support for the Serbs in Bosnia could provide fertile ground 
for weakening Milosevic. Thus, after the break with Belgrade over the Contact
1 07Group Plan, several Serbian opposition politicians paid visits to Pale.
The RS leaders found one of their strongest supporters in the leader of the Serb 
Radicals. SeSelj was strongly opposed to the Vance-Owen Peace Plan and, following 
the RS rejection, he offered his support and attempted to create havoc in Belgrade. 
When MiloSeviC introduced sanctions against the RS following the rejection of
103 Ibid 243-4.
104 Ibid 240. Sell, 2002: 233.
105 Holbrooke, 1999: 243.
106 Sell, 2002: 254.
107 Svarm, Filip; Dimovic, Dragan, 1995. “Our Man in Pale”. Vreme News Digest, no. 172, 6 January.
Nina Caspersen: Intra-ethnic competition and inter-ethnic conflict 189
Chapter 6 -  Intra-Serb Competition in Wartime Bosnia: Divided we stand
Contact Group Plan, SeSelj described it as a definite proof that Milosevic had 
betrayed the interests of the Serb people.108 But even though Karadzic needed the 
support in Belgrade, he was still cautious not to let the Radicals become too strong in 
the RS. The Bosnian version of the SRS was closely linked with the party in Serbia 
and in order to avoid increased competition from the party, Karadzic chose to curtail 
its activities.109 Internal competition in the RS thereby weakened the Pale leaders in 
their conflict with Milosevic since they could not fully embrace co-operation with 
the Radicals.
In addition to the obvious support from the Radicals, the SDS was also wooing other 
forces in Belgrade. It had most success with Vojislav Kostunica’s Democratic Party 
of Serbia (Demokratska stranka Srbije, DSS), with which the SDS had strong 
ideological affinity, including close links with the Serbian Orthodox Church. 
Throughout the conflict with Milosevic, the DSS was to remain a staunch supporter 
of Pale and KoStunica dismissed any political attempts to divide the Serbs.110 The 
position of the DS was more wavering. Ideologically it had less in common with the 
SDS and the party had also accepted the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, despite 
reservations. However, following the change in leadership and the coming to power 
of Zoran Dindie, the party increasingly sought to make political capital of the 
Belgrade-Pale rift. The DS consequently came out against the Contact Group Plan, 
although it attacked it less fiercely than the DSS and emphasised the need for 
compromise.111 The SPO, on the other hand, was unwilling to support Pale’s 
intransigence, even though Draskovic’s decision to back the Vance-Owen Peace Plan 
caused a rift within the party.112 Nevertheless, the RS leaders enjoyed the support of 
an almost united opposition following the Belgrade-Pale fall-out over the Contact 
Group Plan: they were backed by the SRS, the DSS, the DS, by the Serbian 
Orthodox Church and by a group of “national intellectuals”.113
108 Milosevic, Milan et al, 1994. ‘Total Recall”. Vreme News Digest, no. 150, 8 August.
109 Svarm, Filip; Dimovid, Dragan, 1995. “Our Man in Pale”. Vreme News Digest, no. 172, 6 January
110 Thomas, 1999: 222.
111 Ibid 220.
112 Ibid 151.
113 Milosevic, Milan, 1994. “Public Vices, Secret Diplomacy”. Vreme News Digest no 160,17 
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However, this support was of limited use to Karadzic; the Serbian opposition was too 
weak and disunited for Milosevic to be seriously concerned.114 Even the Serbian 
Orthodox Church was plagued by internal divisions: at the time of the Contact Group 
Plan hardliners dominated,115 but the more moderately inclined Patriarch Pavle 
regained control and supported the peace talks in 1995. Karadzic had counted on 
Milosevic not being able to abandon the RS because of the Serbian opposition but he 
had overestimated its strength.116 In 1993, when Milosevic first decided to punish the 
Pale leaders, the situation had been somewhat different: the Radicals had created a 
huge spectacle in Serbia and the RS elite was still united. Eventually, Milosevic 
backtracked. This furthered the intransigence of the RS leaders and, in 1994, they 
were convinced that Milosevic would again reverse his position. But by then the 
situation was different: divisions, which Milosevic could make use of, were 
appearing in the RS elite and the SRS was in a far weaker position. Milosevic had 
concentrated his coercive force on the Radicals and SeSelj was, in September 1994, 
given a prison sentence for two violent attacks in the Federal Parliament. Thus 
amputated, the Radicals were unable to repeat the spectacles of 1993 and capitalise 
on their support for Pale.117
Strenuous relations but very significant kin-state involvement 
As relations between Belgrade and Pale became increasingly frosty, Milosevic was 
no longer seen as the legitimate leader to whom the RS leaders owed their allegiance. 
This change in the borders of the intra-ethnic space was, as in the RSK, based on 
Milosevic’s political position rather than on an explicitly changed view of Serb 
identity. Again, the analysis pointed to the degree of internal divisions and the access 
to alternative resources as decisive for the influence that the kin-state leader could 
exert. Towards the end of the war, Belgrade seemed to be more effective in 
influencing the internal rivalry in the RS than in the RSK, even though a change in 
leadership never materialised. This difference can partly be explained by the 
difference in the configuration of the competition and availability of alternative 
resources but also owes something to the harsher measures used against the RS.
114 Svarm, Filip; Dimovic, Dragan, 1995. “Our Man in Pale”. Vreme News Digest, no. 172, 6 January.
115 MiloSevid, Milan; Brajovic, Velizar, 1994. “A magnificent landscape, poisonous atmosphere, 
pigheaded people”. Vreme News Digest no. 151, 15 August.
1 Milosevic, Milan et al, 1994. ‘Total Recall”. Vreme News Digest, no. 150, 8 August.
117 Svarm, Filip; Dimovic, Dragan, 1995. “Our Man in Pale”. Vreme News Digest, no. 172, 6 January.
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Milosevid may, finally, have been less interested in effecting moderation in the RSK 
since this would have made it harder to abandon the Knin leaders. The more covert 
involvement in the RS before the war did not make it easier for Milosevic to distance 
himself from the Pale leaders: the issue of Bosnia was salient in Serbian politics and 
the involvement of the Serbian opposition furthered the intransigence of the RS 
leaders.
6.3 General population:
Referenda and civil protests, but limited influence
In the pre-war period, the impact of popular attitudes was reduced once the non­
ethnic parties became marginalised. Party competition re-emerged during the war but 
the general population remained of limited importance, despite the leadership’s 
rhetorical regard for popular attitudes.
The RS parliament was constituted by Serb deputies elected for the Bosnian 
Parliament in the 1990 elections. But although they were popularly elected, their 
mandates were problematic on two accounts: firstly, they had been elected to a 
different parliament and usually on a more moderate basis; and secondly, a number 
of them were elected for non-ethnic parties but chose to join the SDS. Even so, in the 
political competition, this popular mandate would often be pointed to and PlavSic, for 
example, in an argument with Karadzic, emphasised that contrary to him she had
I  1 o
been elected by the Serb people. During the war, the RS population was, however, 
not given a chance to renew this mandate. No elections were held, despite the 
opposition’s insistence and despite the fact that the mandates from 1990 expired in 
1994. Surveys were not conducted either and it is, therefore, very difficult to assess 
popular opinion, but few channels were anyway open for popular influence.
Aside from the referenda held on peace agreements, the only way for the general 
population to register support or disagreement was through civil protests. However, 
the Serb Radicals argue that a local election was actually held in Jajce in 1993 but 
that the results were cancelled by the RS authorities when the SRS emerged as the
118 Anastasijevic, Dejan, 1994. “Biljana Plavsic, Vice-President Bosnian Serb Republic”. Vreme News 
Digest, no. 151, 15 August.
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winner.119 It has not been possible to confirm this event but it fits well with the 
SDS’s pattern of repressing the opposition. Referenda were, on the other hand, a 
popular instrument which was used when the RS leaders wanted to strengthen their 
defiant position. Consequently, referenda were held on the Vance-Owen Peace Plan 
and on the Contact Group Plan since the RS leaders could thereby argue that they 
were only following the will of the people. The official results in both referenda 
pointed to a massive turnout and overwhelming rejection of the proposed plans. Thus, 
in the referendum on the Vance-Owen Peace Plan in August 1993, turnout was 
reported to be around 90 per cent with well over 90 per cent rejecting the 
agreement.120 In the Contact Group Plan referendum turnout was reported to be 91 
per cent with 95 per cent rejecting the plan, despite a fierce campaign in its favour
191waged by the Belgrade media machine. In a state of war, such high turnouts seem 
highly unlikely and the overwhelming rejection of the plan should be taken with a 
pinch of salt: these are official results from authorities not averse to bending the rules 
of democratic competition.
Regardless of the extent to which the referenda reflected actual popular opinion, they 
did not have a significant impact. Everyone knew in advance what the results would 
be, otherwise the RS leaders would never have called a referendum, and the political 
agenda had already moved on by the time they were held. In late 1995, RS 
authorities organised a referendum on the Dayton Agreement in the Serb-controlled 
part of Sarajevo. The referendum was a desperate attempt to alter the agreement that 
had awarded all of Sarajevo to the Federation and therefore made the RS cease 
control of the suburbs. But despite an overwhelming rejection of the plan -  98.7 per 
cent of the approximately 80,000 people who voted were said to have voted 
against122 -  the referendum failed to achieve any changes in the Dayton Agreement 
or in the political position of the Serb leadership. The RS leaders knew that popular 
support was not enough for them to retain power and they were too weak to make 
use of the result. Popular opinion, therefore, cannot be said to have been an important 
constraint on the position of the leaders.
119 Interview Ognjen Tadic, Banja Luka, 7 November 2003.
120 Lalovic, S., 1993. “Nezvanidni podaci: ‘Ne’ Vens-Ovenov Planu”. Politika 18 May, p. 1.
121 Silber; Little, 1996: 343. “Chronology 1994: May through August”. Croatian International 
Relations Review, 2001, VII (22/23) 2001 p. 48.
122 Lekid, Bojana, 1995. “Night Moves”. Vreme News Digest, no. 220,18 December.
Nina Caspersen: Intra-ethnic competition and inter-ethnic conflict 193
Chapter 6 -  Intra-Serb Competition in Wartime Bosnia: Divided we stand
Resistance to the policies of the RS leadership was expressed on at least two 
occasions. When the RS parliament accepted the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan, this caused 
strong reactions in the territories that were to be ceased.123 Of greater concern to the 
RS leadership was, however, the September 1993 rebellion in Banja Luka which was 
accompanied by civilian demonstrations of discontent.124 When the SDS feared 
competition from other parties, its primary concern was, nevertheless, not focused on 
popular support. The SDS leadership feared growing divisions within its own ranks 
as well as an intensification of the conflict with the army; it feared co-operation 
between its rivals and a possible coup. The SDS’s rivals could conceivably have 
made use of popular discontent and thereby weakened the leadership but as long as 
the war was ongoing, the possibilities for doing so were limited and other resources 
were of greater importance. Judah argues that by 1995 it was common for Serbs in 
Bosnia to privately whisper that Karadzic and the other leaders were “all crooks”} 25 
But even if this were true for the majority of the population, there were no channels 
through which it could affect the leadership and the opposition was unable to utilise 
such attitudes.
Support fo r urban Serb leaders?
The Serbs remaining outside the RS were also represented by deputies elected in the 
1990 elections. The Sarajevan deputies claimed to represent all Serbs who had stayed 
in the areas controlled by the Bosnian Government126 and argued that these Serbs 
rejected Karadzic’s policies and supported their moderate position.127 Unfortunately, 
it has not been possible to obtain surveys that backup or reject this assertion. But the 
few available surveys point to limited support among the Sarajevan Serbs for the 
people who claimed to represent them. In the summer of 1993, Dani asked the 
Sarajevans which politicians they trusted the most. And somewhat surprisingly, the 
most trusted politicians among the Serb respondents were not Serbs: on the top place 
was the Bosniak Fikret Abdic, while the highest placed Serb, Mirko Pejanovic, was
123 Bougarel, 1996: 105.
124 Ibid 107.
125 Judah, 2000: 296. See also Glenny, 1996: 263.
126 When the Serb Civic Council was established in 1994, it claimed to represent around 200,000 
Serbs. Pejanovic, Mirko, 1994. “Srpsko gradansko vijece i buducnost RBiH”. Vijece kongresa 
bosankomuslimanskih intelektualaca, Tribina br. XV. p. 4
127 “Deklaracija Skupstine gradana srpske nacionalnosti,” In SGV, 2004. lOgodina Srpskog 
gradanskog vijeca -  Pokret za ravnopravnost u Bosni i Hercegovini. Sarajevo: SGV. p. 31-33.
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trailing behind at number four. The Serb Speaker of Parliament, Miro Lazovic, was 
only regarded as the most trusted politician by 1 per cent of the Serb respondents, 
while the other Serb member of the Presidency, Tatjana Ljujic-Mijatovic, did not get 
a single vote from the Serb respondents.128
Abdic was the leader of the self-declared Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia; 
he was in opposition to the Bosnian Government and had signed an agreement with 
the RS. The Serb support for him, therefore, could conceivably be an expression of 
support for the RS, or at least against the Bosnian Government. Thus, while the 
support for non-Serb candidates could indicate a more moderate stand, it could also 
reflect lack of backing for the position of the Sarajevan Serb representatives. 83 per 
cent of the Serbs questioned, furthermore, said that they supported direct negotiations 
between Izetbegovic and Karadzic, which the Serb representatives in the Bosnian 
institutions were against.129 Either way, the Serb population outside the RS did not 
have a chance to make their opinions heard. Their representatives were elected based 
on popular support before the war, which was not limited to support from Serb voters, 
and based on the fact that they were deputies of Serb nationality who had chosen to 
stay in Sarajevo. Therefore, wartime popular opinion among the ‘urban Serbs’ was 
not decisive for their position.
As in the case of Croatia, the impact of popular attitudes during the war was 
consequently limited at best. Other resources were more effective in the elite 
competition and they were widely available. Finally, the importance of the inter­
ethnic interplay was, as in Croatia, largely based on the military balance.
6.4 Inter-ethnic interplay: Mutually hurting stalemate decisive
Direct interaction between the leaders of the ethnic parties was reduced considerably 
once war broke out.130 Moreover, due to the RS leaders’ uncompromising insistence 
on a separate Serb territory, the positions of SDA and HDZ leaders were of limited 
importance: they were not interested in any proposals for co-existence. The 
possibility for alliances spurred by the tripartite structure, nevertheless, meant that
128 “Sarajlije se izjasnile”.Z)tf«z', 3 June 1993, p. 9-14.
129 Ibid
130 It was limited to negotiations, usually under international auspices, where the opposing leaders 
might not even meet face to face.
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the interplay was still of some importance. In negotiations, the position of the other 
leaders, furthermore, made a difference for the extent to which the RS leadership 
would be pressured by the international community. The interplay between the ethnic 
leaders finally mattered in a military sense: was there a military stalemate? Had this 
become a mutually hurting stalemate? Ultimately, the latter led to a change in the 
Serb position, in combination with the changed dynamics of intra-ethnic competition 
and kin-state pressure.
Changing alliances
After war broke out, the Pale leaders put some effort into breaking up the Bosniak- 
Croat alliance, realising that this would significantly strengthen their military 
position. Unlike in the pre-war period, the wooing was mostly reserved for the Croats, 
and the SDS’s strategy was to get the Herzegovin faction of the HDZ to agree to a 
division of Bosnia. HDZ and SDS leaders met frequently, and in Graz in May 1992, 
Karadzic and Boban agreed on dividing Bosnia between them. The Pale leaders were, 
however, competing with the Bosnian Government over the Croats’ favour. Croatia 
continued to pursue two separate and contradictory policies: their secret collusion 
with the Serbs and their formal alliance with the SDA and the Bosnian 
Government.131 But the latter alliance broke down in the spring of 1993 when war 
broke out between the Croatian Defence Council (Hrvatsko vijece odbrane, HVO) 
and the Bosnian Army. This greatly strengthened the Serb military position and the 
RS leadership sought to build on the broken alliance by co-operating with the 
Bosniak Fikret Abdic, who had declared an autonomous province in northwest 
Bosnia and was now at war with the Sarajevo Government.132 With this move, the 
RS leaders hoped to strengthen their position in Krajina and weaken the Bosnian 
Government. By 1994 Pale’s luck in terms of shifting alliances was, however, 
changing: the Bosnian and the Croatian Government signed the Washington 
Agreement on a Bosniak-Croat Federation in March and Abdic was defeated in 
August. Consequently, the RS was facing a much more united front and the stalemate 
began to hurt.
131 Silber; Little, 1996: 306-8.
132 Ibid. 306.
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The rapprochement between the Croats and Bosniaks demonstrated a change in the 
Croat strategy, which was mostly caused by a rethinking of Zagreb’s course. Among 
the Bosniaks, divisions were, however, still plentiful and were, furthermore, 
complicated by the non-ethnic option which still survived in Sarajevo.
Divisions in Sarajevo
Owen argues that Izetbegovic had two loyalties: to multi-ethnic Bosnia and to his 
party, the SDA.133 But the SDA was itself marked by deep divisions and Izetbegovic 
consequently had to concern himself with ensuring cohesion in the party while 
simultaneously keeping up the image of a multi-ethnic state. The lack of cohesion 
within the SDA, again according to Owen, resulted in Izetbegovic frequently 
wavering when it came to peace negotiations: he had to make sure that he could take 
the party with him and he often failed to do so.134 In the course of 1993-4, 
Izetbegovic seemed to be increasingly leaning on the hardliners in the SDA and 
consequently emphasised the Muslim nature of the SDA-dominated Government. 
This move caused a rift with the Bosnian Prime Minister, Haris Silajdzic, which 
again led to immobility on the Bosnian side and, furthermore, put the non-ethnic 
forces in the Bosnian Presidency in an even less influential position.
In the Presidency, Izetbegovic played a much more dominant role than his 
constitutional status as ‘first among equals’ allowed for, and by the autumn of 1993, 
the collective Presidency mostly existed on paper.136 The non-ethnic forces in the 
Bosnian authorities were particularly alarmed by the increasing ethnification of the 
Bosnian army; the increasing insistence that this was a Bosniak army.137 And, in 
early 1995, the opposition centred on the Bosnian Presidency started a battle with the 
SDA. They distanced themselves from the introduction of religious ideology in parts 
of the army and generally spoke out against the increasing ethnification of the war.138 
Although the increasing ethnification of the Bosnian authorities weakened the
]33 Owen, 1995: 40.
134 Ibid 236, 248.
135 Peranic, Drazena, 1994. “Where are the politicians heading?”. AIM Press, 7 April.
136 Bougarel, 1996: 109.
137 Interview Jovan Divjak, Sarajevo, 7 July 2004. Interview Miro Lazovic, Sarajevo, 29 June 2004. 
Interview Tatjana Ljujic-Mijatovic, Sarajevo, 2 July 2004.
138 Peranic, Drazena, 1995. “Divisions in the Bosnian Presidency”. Vreme News Digest, no. 176,13 
February.
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position of the non-ethnic representatives, the impact on the RS was negligible. The 
leaders in Pale were actually happy with an ethnically defined Government since this 
helped justify their position: their ethnic definition of politics and the argument that 
co-existence was impossible. This position was maintained during years of unfruitful 
negotiations.
Negotiations and stalemate
The frequency of negotiations was much higher in Bosnia than in Croatia where the 
RSK leaders refused to negotiate for prolonged periods of time. International 
mediators kept the negotiation process going but one crucial element was lacking: 
simultaneity; when one side was prepared to accept an agreement, the other side 
rejected it. The strategies chosen by the leaders were based on the proposals 
themselves, on the internal competition that they were faced with, as well as on an 
assessment of the other side’s position. If the others would anyway reject the 
proposal, then acceptance was a strategy for winning international favour. The 
strategic adoption of positions was explicitly acknowledged by Izetbegovic when the 
Bosnian Government only accepted the Contact Group Plan because they were 
certain that the Serbs would reject it.139 It was, thus, a complex game: a nested game 
with many actors and several dynamics of intra-ethnic elite competition.
The inter-ethnic interplay that ultimately mattered for the position of the RS 
leadership was of a military nature. A military stalemate had already emerged in the 
beginning of 1994140but without this resulting in willingness to compromise. The 
leaders were still constrained by internal forces, they did not want to show weakness 
and, furthermore, hoped for a future improvement in their situation. For the Serbs, 
however, things began to change with the fall of Kupres in the autumn of 1994 which 
was dubbed a betrayal by the HVO.141 It was, thus, the first tangible effect of the re­
launched Bosniak-Croat alliance. This event was followed by additional changes on 
the battlefield and a new form of stalemate arose: a mutually hurting stalemate in 
which “<z// involved were constrained by the prospective cost o f a return to armed
]39 Silber; Little, 1996: 340.
140 Gow, James, 1997. Triumph o f the lack o f will London: Hurst, p. 261.
141 Vasic, Milo§, 1994. “War without declaration”. Vreme News Digest no. 164,14 November.
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hostilities” 142 The stalemate was made to hurt even more following NATO 
bombings of Serb positions in August 1995; it was made clear that continued Serb 
radicalism would come at a price. The change in relative military strength deepened 
existing divisions in the RS and the combined dynamics of hurting stalemate, 
significant pressure from the kin-state and changed internal dynamics finally resulted 
in acceptance of a settlement.
In conclusion, while the relative military strength of the Serbs had a significant effect 
on elite positions, the positions of the other ethnic leaders only had a limited effect. 
Due to the extremism of the RS leadership and their denial of future co-existence, the 
position of the Bosnian Government and the HDZ primarily mattered as an 
indication of potential weakness and in terms of possible risk-free acceptance of a 
settlement. One final form of inter-ethnic interplay was the possibility o f shifting 
alliances, which caused the Croats to be wooed by both the Serbs and the Bosniaks. 
However, this had only limited effect on leadership positions. The main effect of 
shifting alliances was the resulting changes in military balance; this change 
significantly influenced the dynamics of intra-Serb competition and finally led to 
greater willingness to compromise.
6.5 Fractionalisation and infighting in wartime Bosnia
From being a very unified party at the beginning of the war, the SDS in Bosnia 
became increasingly plagued by fractionalisation and the RS leaders, furthermore, 
had to deal with a growing rift with the military. Karadzic constantly feared being 
undermined from within, and after his near defeat over the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, 
he took no steps without ensuring the backing of the rest of the leadership and a more 
radical position resulted.
Competition from other parties grew in significance during the war and was affected 
by, and in turn affected, intra-party divisions: when the SDS was reactivated, it 
feared competition from the Radicals, but this move opened up for increasing 
competition from other parties and also helped foster divisions within the formerly so 
cohesive SDS. Towards the end of the war, moderating dynamics finally emerged,
142 Gow, 1997: 281.
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whereas earlier the most serious challenges to the RS leaders had come from more 
extreme challengers. This was to a considerable extent the result of overlapping 
cleavages and issues: the oppositional forces found common ground on regional and 
ideological cleavages, on the issue of a settlement, on links with Belgrade and on the 
issue of war profiteering. The more extreme challengers had enjoyed the support of 
paramilitary forces, while the more moderate forces lacked this kind of resources 
until the army sided with the opposition and the Banja Luka faction of the SDS. This 
new alliance provided the opposition and the Banja Luka faction with needed 
military resources and it gave Mladic his first political base within the RS.143
The Bosnian case, therefore, again demonstrates the predominance of non-political 
resources in the wartime competition. Party structures as such lacked importance but 
the support of the RS parliament was highly valued by a constrained leadership. The 
need for such support, as well as the need for coercive and economic resources often 
emanating from within the movement itself, meant that internal challenges often 
resulted in radicalisation. Moreover, when internal challenges towards the end of the 
war came from a more moderate direction, radicalisation could not solve the problem. 
Challenges from other parties would, on the other hand, most often be repressed and 
did generally not cause radicalisation. Another reason for this is the emergence of 
new issues of contention and competition: the opposition became increasingly 
focused on war profiteering and corruption. Responses to intra-ethnic challengers are, 
thus, affected by both the form of this competition, the resources available and the 
issues on which it is centred.
Within the RS, the main audiences to the competition were intra-party forces and, 
even more decisively, paramilitary forces and various other military constellations. 
The general population was, on the other hand, not a significant audience during the 
war: there were no channels for influence, no elections were held and the opposition 
could not make use of its potential popular support. The only way to express support 
or resistance was through referenda or civil protests. However, referenda did not 
affect the position of the RS leaders and popular expressions of dissent, while of
143 Anastasijevic, Dejan, 1995. “Crucial Defence of Power”. Vreme News Digest, no. 212,23 October.
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concern to the RS leadership, were not significant as long as the leaders controlled 
the non-political resources that were dominant in the elite competition.
Although relations with the kin-state were increasingly strenuous, Belgrade had an 
important impact on RS competition. Contrary to what was the case in Croatia, 
Belgrade, however, only became a significant influence on the internal competition 
in 1994. The high degree of cohesion made it more difficult for Belgrade to affect 
elite positions by playing on internal divisions and Milosevic had no reason to desire 
a leadership change until the rejection of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan in 1993. 
Growing divisions in the statelet increased the potential for kin-state influence but 
the intransigence of the RS leadership was remarkably resilient. The Pale leaders had 
access to alternative resources and alliance partners and, furthermore, found 
themselves challenged on the issue of relations with Belgrade: by forces within their 
own party and by the Serb Radicals.
The intransigent position of the RS leaders, finally, meant that Croat and Bosniak 
elite positions were of limited influence; what mattered was the relative military 
strength but this only led to a change in position when combined with changed 
dynamics of intra-ethnic competition and kin-state pressure.
6.6 Wartime intra-ethnic competition
Intra-Serb competition in wartime Bosnia and Croatia was far removed from 
‘conventional’ political competition: it was simultaneously characterised by 
ethnification, failed transition and a situation of war, and each of these factors had an 
impact on the dynamics of competition.
Following the outbreak of war, ethnification was no longer an issue; even the ‘urban 
Serb’ leaders defined themselves, and were, especially, defined by others, as Serb 
representatives. The situation in Sarajevo, however, constitutes a partial exception 
since the Serb representatives persistently defended a non-ethnic option and rejected 
forming an ethnic party. In the initial period after the outbreak of war, there was a 
closing of ranks behind the dominant Serb party, but this only provided a brief 
respite from disunity which, in a context of ethnification, returned even more
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forcefully. The transitional situation, or rather the aborted transition to democracy, 
also had an important impact on competition. Democracy was still used as a 
legitimising concept and political competition formally took the form of competition 
between political parties in a parliamentary system. However, the parties were 
dominated by their leaders and party structures were strikingly weak, and one could 
observe high-ranking officials who were simultaneously members of more than one 
party. Competition between parties, therefore, did not take the form of competition 
between two party organisations but was rather a competition between leaders who 
had different levels of political and especially non-political resources at their disposal. 
It was about individual leaders and their ability to foster alliances with political and 
military forces. Due to the weak party structures and the limited programmatic 
differences, the transitional situation, therefore, augmented the importance of the 
non-political resources in the political competition, although this was more 
importantly the result of the war.
Throughout the war, military and paramilitary forces played a crucial role; in alliance 
or in competition with civilian leaders. The civilian leaders lacked full control over 
the military forces, but they depended on their resources. This left the civilian leaders 
constrained and civilian-military links were decisive for the outcome of the intra- 
Serb competition. Thus, the resources of importance in the political competition were 
often far from ‘conventional’ democratic resources: links with Belgrade, support 
from (para)military forces as well as the bending of political rules to take advantage 
of regional differences in parliamentary support. Popular attitudes were of limited 
importance; changes in the dynamics of competition were not led by popular 
demands and even when elections or referenda were held, these reflected the balance 
of power in terms of the resources that really mattered: economic resources and, 
above all, military resources. The elections in the RSK and the salience of the 
‘Belgrade issue’ are, therefore, only a partial exception to the lack of significance of 
popular attitudes. The persistent Serb intransigence greatly reduced the impact of 
actions and rhetoric of the other ethnic leaders; what mattered in both cases was the 
military balance. Military strength and the risk of defeat directly affect the future 
prospects for the elites, not only for the general population. The persistent Serb 
intransigence greatly reduced the impact of actions and rhetoric of the other ethnic 
leaders; what mattered in both cases was the military balance. Military strength and
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the risk of defeat directly affect the future prospects for the elites, not only for the 
general population.
Despite the dominant use of non-political resources in the competition, the rivalling 
elites often sought to bolster their position by referring to their alleged legitimacy. 
This form of rhetoric was especially used when it came to the representatives of the 
‘urban Serbs’ who were both in the RS and the RSK derided as traitors and as 
illegitimate representatives of the Serb people. Legitimacy in this case referred to 
their political position. These representatives found themselves in an uneasy position 
between trying to mediate in the conflict and being used to serve legitimation 
purposes by the HDZ and the SDA. In Bosnia there was, furthermore, a schism 
between providing a Serb alternative and still holding on to a non-ethnic option. 
Their direct impact on the dynamics of intra-Serb competition was limited, partly due 
to the repressive measures used against anyone with whom they had links in the 
statelets. However, by questioning the position of the RS and RSK leadership, they 
did serve to undermine their claim to representing all Serbs.
Radicalisation was still the dominant dynamic when leaders were met with 
challenges from within their own party or from related paramilitary forces. If they 
had been contemplating moderation under such circumstances, they were forced to 
reverse their position or face defeat. However, radicalisation was not the chosen 
response to competition if it came from the outside, regardless of whether the 
challengers were more moderate or more extreme. In the RSK, leaders chose to 
negotiate with the Croatian Government despite severe challenges from other parties 
and independents. In the RS, such moderating dynamics were not significant for the 
main part of the war, but the leadership, nevertheless, did not radicalise when 
challenged with competition from other parties; instead, it tried to suppress the 
opposition with the coercive resources that the war and the SDS-dominated regime 
made so readily available and effective for the incumbent leadership. However, 
towards the end of the war, when the opposition parties, the SDS Krajina faction and 
the army coalesced, the RS leadership lacked the strength to continue its intransigent 
position and it was forced to reverse it: radicalisation would not save the leadership 
and its relative strength was not sufficient to marginalise the rivals. This also 
illustrates the effect of more moderate challenges from within: in such a situation,
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radicalisation will not provide a solution and the choice is consequently to either 
repress the challengers or accommodate them by adopting a more moderate position. 
Towards the end of the war, Karadzic had to choose the latter option.
There therefore seems to be an interesting difference in the dynamics of intra-pariy 
and inter-party competition. The leaders relied on resources emanating from within 
the party or movement and they were, therefore, less likely to be able to merely 
suppress the challenges. This would, of course, have been an option had the leaders 
been completely monolithic within their own party, but in both cases even the 
strongest leaders were constrained by other leaders in the party and by paramilitary 
forces. Another difference between the two kinds of competition was that challenges 
from within the party were often focused on the issue of the war and radicalisation, 
therefore, provided a sufficient response. In the opposition from other parties, other 
issues were often also prominent, thereby preventing radicalisation from pre-empting 
the attacks. And it is indeed interesting, and somewhat surprising, that other 
politically salient issues could emerge despite the situation of war. Before the war, 
competition had been mainly based on the issue of the inter-ethnic conflict, even 
though regional and ideological cleavages had also played a role. During the war, 
these cleavages increased in importance, but the real change was the importance of 
valence issues, especially the issue of war profiteering. These cleavages and issues 
fostered the creation of new alliances and altered the strategies open to beleaguered 
leaders. The issues on which the intra-ethnic competition is based have an important 
impact on the resulting dynamics.
These divisions also influenced relations with the kin-state and one general trend 
clearly emerged from both cases: during the war, Belgrade fell out with almost all 
leaders of the local Serbs; with Babic, Martic and Karadzic. Milosevic changed his 
strategy and goal following military failures and international pressure, but he had 
difficulties taking his former proteges along: the Serbian President was no longer 
always able to dictate developments in the two statelets. These changed relations 
brought about a considerable change in rhetoric. In the pre-war phase, the unity of 
the Serbs and the special position of Milosevic as ‘the President of all Serbs’ was 
emphasised by most actors, but as the conflict deepened, the distinct nature of the 
Serbs in Serbia and the Serbs outside of Serbia was increasingly stressed by both
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sides. When his position became questioned, Milosevic sought to influence elite 
competition in the two statelets in order to retain control. Belgrade thereby became a 
very strong, but largely external, influence on the competition. There was, thus, a 
change in the form of influence: from being at least partly based on shared ethnicity 
to being almost exclusively based on the need for Belgrade’s resources.
Milosevic’s attempt to engineer more moderate dynamics was, however, not always 
successful. In the RSK it worked in the conflict with Babic but failed when Babic 
and Mart id, towards the end of the war, decided to go against Milosevic’s man, 
Mikelic. In the RS, the strategy was slow-working and only in 1995 did more 
centripetal dynamics emerge. One of the factors limiting Belgrade’s success in 
engineering moderating dynamics was that the link with Belgrade increasingly 
became an issue of contestation among the local elites: while the elites did not 
change their position on the issue of the war, they could score political points by 
vowing to assert their independence and not take orders from Belgrade. The ability to 
take a more independent position was affected by the involvement of the opposition 
parties from Serbia, which functioned as an alternative audience that gave the leaders 
hope of being able to continue their intransigent positioning. Moreover, the leaders 
had access to alternative paramilitary resources that could be used in the internal 
competition. Consequently, Belgrade’s influence became increasingly dependent on 
the credibility of its willingness to protect the statelet and, as this was being 
questioned, Milo§evi6’s influence was reduced. The detachment of the Serbian 
regime was relative, and it retained strong links with the military, but its ability to 
influence developments was nevertheless reduced.
When Pale and Belgrade fell out, the resulting conflict was much more intense than 
the one between Belgrade and various Knin-leaders: in the RSK, Milosevic never 
used the military and economic levers he possessed and, furthermore, he did not 
actively push for an agreement with Croatia.144 Milosevic had generally been able to 
influence the RSK leadership without resorting to sanctions but, by 1995, this ability 
to control elite competition in the RSK had diminished whereas it was on the rise in 
the RS, possibly due to the sanctions imposed. In the RSK, kin-state influence was
144 Sell, 2002: 239.
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reduced towards the end of the war by the high degree of fractionalisation, the 
frequently changing alliances and the access to paramilitary resources. An additional 
reason for Milosevic’s more forceful reaction may have been the greater sway of the 
Pale leaders in Serbia. Milosevic would have been more concerned about a 
prolonged conflict with Pale, since the RS leaders had a greater chance of 
undermining his position. Milosevic himself professed that the reason was that he 
could not afford another intra-Serb conflict.145 Finally, from a strategic perspective, 
Milo§evic knew, in 1995, that Tudman would not accept an agreement and the only 
thing Belgrade could hope for was for the situation to remain frozen.
Compared with the pre-war period, the competition during the war showed some 
specific characteristics: non-political and especially military resources became even 
more effective and more available, links with military and paramilitary forces were 
of crucial importance, competition with non-ethnic parties practically ceased, 
competition with other Serb parties was on the increase and issues other than the 
national issue became of importance. In the next chapter, I will analyse the 
competition in the different phases more fully and also look at the intra-Serb 
competition in the post-war period: what were the changes and what were the 
continuities?
145 Cohen, 1995: 243.
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Chapter 7
Post-War Intra-Serb Competition in Croatia and Bosnia*
Change and continuity
Even though intra-ethnic elite competition does not merely mirror developments in 
the conflict, the end of violence is, nevertheless, expected to affect the dynamics of 
competition; especially the availability and effectiveness of different resources. 
Moreover, the absence of violence is often argued to make it more likely for issues 
other than the national or ethnic one to become politically salient.1 The end of 
violence does not, however, result in a return to the pre-war situation, as far as intra­
ethnic competition is concerned: following a war, one would expect the ethnification 
of politics to remain for a significant period of time and also that the leaders are 
constrained by their wartime positions. An important change in the post-war phase 
was the introduction of an important international dimension: in Bosnia and in 
Eastern Slavonia, international administrators became an important audience to the 
intra-Serb competition. The international community had also earlier influenced the 
dynamics of Serbs politics, but in the post-war period the influence of international 
authorities was much more direct: they influenced the distribution of resources 
between moderates and extremists and reduced the availability and effectiveness of 
coercive resources.
The end of the war left the Serbs in significantly different positions in the two cases. 
Whereas the Serbs in Croatia were, in Owen’s words, “the biggest losers”, the Serb 
leaders in Bosnia had been more successful in pursuing their nationalist goals. In 
Croatia, almost no Serbs were left in Krajina and the leaders in Eastern Slavonia had 
to settle for the Erdut Agreement, which was all but silent on the political 
arrangement following the reintegration of the region. In Republika Srpska, the 
leaders could look to the continued existence of their statelet, albeit within a Bosnian 
state and with the added risk of indictment by the Hague Tribunal. The Serbs in 
Bosnia were, therefore, in a much stronger position than the Serbs in Croatia and this 
affected the position adopted by the leaders as well as the challenges facing them. 
The fleeing of the radicals from Krajina altered the dynamics of competition in
1 See e.g. Gagnon, 1995: 89.
2 Owen, 1995: 387.
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Croatia, while elections were finally held in Bosnia thereby allowing the opposition 
to gain an institutional foothold. The relative importance of resources underwent a 
change in the post-war period: the significance of coercive resources was reduced 
while political resources, including popular support, increased in importance. Despite 
the changes brought about by the end of the war, the immediate post-war dynamics 
were, to a considerable extent, built on wartime divisions.
7.1 Croatia: 
Centripetal dynamics gradually become dominant
The Croatian offensive in Krajina brought with it a significant change in the Serb 
leadership. Hitherto dominating actors such as Babi6 and Martic fled Krajina and 
found themselves in Belgrade without any influence on the continued unfolding of 
events. The remaining Serb political elites were, therefore, the Eastern Slavonian 
leaders and the leaders of the ‘urban Serbs’.
Eastern Slavonia: Competition for positions in the remnants o f  the SDS 
According to the Erdut Agreement, Eastern Slavonia was to be under UN 
administration for a transitional period of one year, with the possibility of a one-year 
extension should either side request it. The powers of the local leaders were, 
therefore, confined and the international authorities also had influence on the balance 
of power between the rivalling leaders. Before his arrival, the UN’s administrator, 
Jacques Klein, chose to circumvent the president of SAO Slavonia, Goran Hadzic, 
and instead work with the more moderate Vojislav Stanimirovic, who was president 
of the Eastern Slavonia executive council. Stanimirovic was given the task of 
forming a transitional authority, while Hadzic was largely marginalised.3 But he was 
still waiting in the wings and it generally remained unclear how hardliners would 
react to the re-establishment of Croatian authority.4
The terms of reintegration were set out in January 1997 when the Croatian 
Government submitted a Letter of Intent to the UN that, together with the Erdut 
Agreement, was to form its legal basis. According to this document, Eastern Slavonia
3 Interview Vojislav Stanimirovic, Vukovar, 25 September 2003.
4 Hadzic’s resistance to reintegration was re-enforced by the decision of the Croatian authorities to 
explicitly exclude him from the proposed amnesty law.
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would be divided between two counties, Osijek-Baranja and Vukovar-Srijem. This 
was not what the Serb leaders had hoped for and Stanimirovic argued that this 
division would make the Serbs a minority and that a single unit would offer more 
protection. He, nevertheless, maintained that they were not demanding political 
autonomy, “that is in the past, a finished matter*'.5 But hopes for a better deal were 
quashed when Jacques Klein received the document enthusiastically: “I  think the 
Serbs in the Podunavlje [Eastern Slavonia] will be very satisfied, as they are being 
offered more than they could ever have imagined\ 6 Subsequently, Stanimirovic 
acknowledged that they lacked support for a referendum on the ‘political integrity’ of 
Eastern Slavonia.7 Hadzic’s more radical stream had, however, not giving up on its 
demands and insisted on holding a referendum.8 The outcome of the leadership 
struggle in the remnants of the SDS, therefore, was crucial for the dominant Serb 
position and for the peaceful reintegration of the region. Contrary to the wartime 
dynamics, the more moderate position this time prevailed, but it was a narrow victory. 
Although Hadzic lacked political influence in the transitional authorities, his 
authority in the SDS was still considerable and Stanimirovic had to resort to arguing 
that Croatian citizenship, which Hadzic had not acquired, was a precondition for a 
party leader in a reintegrated Eastern Slavonia. This earned him only a slender 
victory in the main board (19 v. 14 votes) and Hadzic’s supporters allegedly 
commented that it “could be settled in the streets too”.9 However, coercive resources 
no longer decided political outcomes: the international presence was a significant 
influence, which supported the moderate option, but the victorious leader still had to 
resort to less than democratic methods. The victory of Stanimirovic and his moderate 
position, nevertheless, illustrate that outbidding had ceased to be the order of the day 
in Eastern Slavonia and the reintegration of the region proceeded.
'Urban Serbs V New Serb party enters the stage
Changing dynamics also affected the urban Serb representatives but the main fault 
line between Milorad Pupovac and Milan Dukic persisted. Pupovac, in 1995, went
5 Hedl, Drago, 1997. “Svi smo mi izaSli iz rovova”. Feral Tribune, 3 March, p. 18-9.
6 Hedl, Drago, 1997. ”A Pleasant Surprise”. War Report, Issue 48, January/February 1997.
7 Kolovrat, Igor, 1997. “Vecina Srba jo§ nema povjerenja u Hrvatsku drzavu” Globus, 4 April p. 10- 
11.
8 Hedl, Drago, 1997. “Elections as the only choice”. AIM Press, 12 March.
9 Ibid.
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back on his earlier disinclination to form an ethnic party and formed the Independent 
Serb Party (Samostalna srpska stranka, SSS). With the already-existing Serb 
National Party (SNS), the post-war period therefore brought increased intra-Serb 
party competition but the dynamics were initially similar to the wartime dynamics: 
centred on the rivalry between Pupovac and Bukic. During the war, Bukid was 
accused of being a puppet for the Croatian Government but he now gradually began 
inhabiting the more extreme position. With the formation of the SSS, Bukic found 
himself in a situation where he had to compete directly with Pupovac, whereas 
during the war, he was given parliamentary representation in return for being the 
‘loyal Serb’. In this situation Bukic seems to have concluded that moderation was no 
longer opportune. The radicalisation was, however, only relative since any extremity 
of demands was curtailed by the weakness of the Serb position. Pupovac, on the 
other hand, argues that he had all along wanted to politically tie the ‘urban Serbs’ 
and the Krajina Serbs together10 and in early 1997 this became possible.
Centripetal dynamics after merger
In March 1997, the SSS merged with the remnants of the SDS under the name the 
Independent Democratic Serb Party (Samostalna demokratska srpska stranka, SDSS). 
Eastern Slavonia was decisive for the future of the Serbs in Croatia: it was the area 
where the Serbs were most numerous and the only area where the war had not 
resulted in a total victory for the Croatian forces. The leverage of the Serb 
representatives was therefore greater in this area and Pupovac through the merger 
also secured his political future.11 Bukic’s SNS had been offered to join the new 
party, but the talks failed when Bukic refused to accept Stanimirovic as party 
president and the setting up of headquarters in Vukovar.12 The competition was 
therefore fuelled by different views of inter-ethnic relations, by a regional cleavage 
and by personal power ambitions. With the creation of the SDSS, the main Serb 
political forces in Croatia had chosen a conciliatory course and the party showed 
itself more willing than the SNS to co-operate with the Croatian Government.13 The 
SDSS, thus, chose to support amendments to the Constitution in December 1997,
10 Interview Milorad Pupovac, Zagreb, 11 August 2003.
11 Raseta, Boris, 1997. “Serbs at elections”. AIM Press, 20 March 1997.
12 Interview Milorad Pupovac, Zagreb, 11 August 2003. Interview Milan Dukic, Zagreb, 30 July 2003.
13 RaSeta, Boris, 1997. “Interview Milorad Pupovac: Serbs in the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) 
Government”. Vreme News Digest, no. 292,10 May.
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which the SNS vehemently opposed. Dukic strongly opposed that the Serbs in the 
preamble would be described as a ‘national minority’ rather than as a ‘nation’ and he 
also argued that naming the Croatian Parliament ‘Sabor’ brought back memories of 
the pro-Nazi Independent State of Croatia.14 The SDSS’s support for the Constitution 
consequently led Dukic to accuse Pupovac of being a traitor.15 Outbidding, therefore, 
was still taking place and the polarisation between the two Serb parties persisted, but 
it was accompanied by gradual marginalisation of the SNS. In July 1997, the Serb 
National Council (Srpsko narodno vijece, SNV) was founded as an umbrella 
association of Serb associations and political representatives, but without the 
participation of the SNS, which rejected the initiative. The SNS’s strategy was still 
successful in the 2000 elections for the lower house of Parliament when the party 
won the only Serb mandate but gradually the SNS’s backing decreased and in the 
2003 elections it failed to win parliamentary representation.
Kin-state involvement: What Serb minority?
Contrary to the first two phases, Belgrade now played a very limited role and the 
Serb minority in Croatia was largely ignored, not only by MiloSevid, but also by the 
opposition. The Serb Radical Party had, during the war, been an important factor in 
Eastern Slavonia, but following the signing of the Erdut Agreement, the local party 
chose to dissolve itself. SeSelj was against the agreement but realising that plans for a 
Greater Serbia were now beyond the realm of the possible, the Radicals chose to 
withdraw.16 Consequently, when Eastern Slavonia was reintegrated into Croatia, the 
only thing remarkable about the reaction in Belgrade was the complete lack of 
reaction. No statements were made by Milosevic’s SPS nor by more extreme 
circles.17 The most important effect of this silence was the lack of support enjoyed by 
the more radical forces that remained in Eastern Slavonia. Thus, when the Croatian 
Government issued its Letter of Intent, Belgrade reportedly made clear to Hadzic that
1 ftit supported the arrangement and he therefore had no one else to turn to.
14 Bukic, Milan, 1997. “Letter of Warning”. Letter to the Secretary General of the United Nation, Kofi 
Annan, December 1997. In News Bulletin, Serbian Unity Congress, issue 140,1 January 1998.
15 Interview Milan Dukic, Zagreb, 30 July 2003.
16 Interview Filip Svarm, Belgrade, 13 September 2004.
17 Svarm, Filip, 1998. “Vukovar, What Vukovar?”. AIM Press, 31 January
18 Culic, Marinko, 1997. “Pakleno Podunavlje”. Feral Tribune, 10 February, p.7-8.
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Belgrade had chosen to support the more moderate line represented by Stanimirovic 
but Milosevic’s influence over the new leaders was limited. These leaders felt 
betrayed by Belgrade and, consequently, did not have warm feelings for the Serbian 
President.19 Regardless of the position of the new leaders, Belgrade had no intention 
of becoming involved and Milosevic was not pressured by the opposition to alter his 
position. The kin-state was, therefore, of limited importance in the post-war period, 
although in the immediate aftermath of war, it mattered for Hadzic’s inability to 
support a radical stance.
General population : Increasing importance o f popular attitudes 
With the end of the war, democratic institutions and, thereby, popular attitudes had 
become an important resource for the elites. But the impact of the general population 
was still limited by the continued use of non-democratic resources, by self-imposed 
restraint and intimidation of Serb candidates, and by the absence of elections in 
Eastern Slavonia prior to the reintegration. As a result, intra-ethnic competition was 
not merely driven by popular demands.
In the 1995 elections, held immediately after the end of the war, competition was 
largely subdued and the choice for the Serb voters was limited. Following Operation 
Storm and the recapturing of Krajina, Serb representatives in Zagreb kept a low 
profile and the new Serb party, the SSS, did not get registration in time for the 
elections. Surveys from 1995 unfortunately have so few Serb respondents that it is 
difficult to say anything about their attitudes. What does stand out among the very 
few Serbs in the pre-election survey, however, is the large proportion who are still 
undecided as to their vote.20 In the elections, the SNS won two of the three reserved 
Serb seats, while Pupovac was elected for the Action of Social Democrats and 
transferred his mandate to the SSS when the party got registered.
Elections were not held in Eastern Slavonia in 1995 but arguments over popular 
attitudes still played a role in the political competition. The competing leaders were 
eager to point to their alleged popular support and Hadzic demanded a referendum on
19 Interview Vojislav Stanimirovic, Vukovar, 25 September 2003.
20 Pre-election survey. “Anketa: Izbori 1995”. Fakultet politiCkih znanosti, Sveucilista u Zagrebu. The 
sample only includes 25 respondents, out of 1144, who reported themselves as being of Serb 
nationality.
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the ‘integrity’ of the region in order to test whether his more uncompromising 
position represented a wish of only a “handful o f extremists” or of “the majority o f 
the local Serbian population”. In support of his stand, Hadzic could point to the 
several thousand people who took part in daily protests in Vukovar echoing his 
demand.21 In April 1997 a referendum was organised and the result pointed to 
overwhelming popular support for preserving the ‘integrity’ of the region and hence 
for Hadzic’s stand.22 But it was all to no avail: Hadzic lost the battle over the party 
leadership and the region was reintegrated as planned. Public opinion was not put to 
the test and hence not allowed a possible impact on the outcome of elite competition 
in the region.
When the first all-Croatian elections since 1990 were held in April 1997, there no 
longer existed a radical Serb alternative. What remained were the newly formed 
SDSS and Dukic’s SNS. In the local elections, the SDSS established a stronghold in 
Eastern Slavonia where it won majorities in 11 out of 28 municipalities and won six 
out of 42 seats in the Osijek-Baranja county and 10 out of 42 seats in the Vukovar- 
Srijem county.23 In the election for the Croatian Upper House, the Serb parties were 
less fortunate: none of them succeeded in getting a candidate elected and the SDSS 
only gained two seats through President Tudman’s personal appointments.
The elections in Eastern Slavonia had been marked by significant problems and 
widespread chaos24 but this seemed to have affected all parties equally and they 
consequently accepted the results. Prior to the elections, the Serb leaders in Eastern 
Slavonia had, however, managed to weaken their own position considerably: they 
hesitated until 48 hours before the elections to recommend the population to go to the 
polls and similar hesitation over the issue of Croatian identity papers left many 
prospective Serb voters without adequate documents on election day.25 On the 
remaining territory of what had been the RSK, only few Serbs were left and potential 
Serb candidates were reluctant to run for office due to the considerable risks
21 Hedl, Drago, 1997. “Elections as the only choice”. AIM, Zagreb, 12 March.
22 Svarm, Filip, 1997. “Following Orders From Belgrade”. Vreme News Digest, no. 228, 12 April.
23 ZakoSek, Nenad, 1997b. “Pregled rezultata izbora za domove Sabora Republike Hravtske i za 
zupanijske skup§tine”. Politicka Misao XXXIV(2): 129-143.
24 OSCE/ODIHR, 1997a. “Election of Representatives to the Chamber of Counties of the Parliament 
and of Representatives of Local Government and Self-Government Bodies of the Republic of Croatia, 
13 April 1997”.
25 Hedl, Drago, 1997. ‘Two bridges and three Serb auto-goals”. AIM Press, 20 April.
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involved. Although these elections were relatively free and fair, and undemocratic 
resources played a far less important role, voter attitudes were still not clearly 
reflected in the outcome: the Serb leaders had through their hesitation limited the 
participation of Serb voters, intimidation was a concern and Serb representation in 
the Upper House of Parliament was based on the will of the Croatian authorities 
rather than the preference of the Serb voters. In the continued competition between 
the two Serb parties, the SNS’s strategy of outbidding was initially successful. But 
over the years, the SDSS gradually took over the SNS’s dominant position and the 
SDSS in the 2003 elections won all three Serb seats in Parliament. While this would 
seem to reflect more moderate popular attitudes, it undoubtedly also reflects the far 
better party organisation built up by the SDSS.
Immediately after the war, popular attitudes were, therefore, of limited importance in 
the moderation of political positions. In the years to come, attitudes among Serb 
voters did, however, become of great importance in the competition between the 
SNS and the SDSS, and other resources were now of negligible importance. Tudman
onexhibited an increasing trend towards authoritarianism but this was largely reserved 
for his rivals in the non-Serb parties and does not appear to have significantly 
affected the impact of popular attitudes on Serb politics. The position of the Croatian 
Government did, however, have some effect on the intra-Serb competition but this 
was mediated by international involvement and its impact was, furthermore, reduced 
by the weakness of the Serb position.
Inter-ethnic interplay: International involvement crucial fo r compromise 
The immediate post-war period was marked by the euphoria of the Croatian 
Government, which at times bordered on gloating, such as when Tudman, a few 
weeks after Operation Storm, said about the Serbs: “They disappeared ignominiously, 
as i f  they had never populated this land.” “We urged them to stay, but they did not 
listen to us. Well then, bon voyage” The hardening of the Croatian position did not, 
however, lead to a radicalisation of the Serb position: the dominant forces realised 
that from their position of weakness, radical posturing would not bring many
26 Anic, Alen, 1997. “Elections in Western Slavonia”. AIM Press, 25 March.
27 Tanner, 1997: 302.
28 Ibid. 299.
Nina Caspersen: Intra-ethnic competition and inter-ethnic conflict 214
Chapter 7 -  Post-W ar Intra-Serb Competition in Croatia and Bosnia: Change and continuity
concessions. Following international criticism, the Croatian Government, however, 
gradually began to moderate its position and this change helped the moderate forces 
come out victorious in Eastern Slavonia, although it was by no means the only factor 
in this rivalry.
Government rejects demands o f defeated *enemy*
In the aftermath of the military triumph, the Croatian authorities decided that it was 
no longer necessary to offer the Serbs anything that could be portrayed as a generous 
deal, and the constitutional provisions for special status districts and proportional 
representation were suspended until the next census.29 Tudman’s grip on power was 
also strengthened; there was a marked trend toward authoritarianism and the 
President even raised the prospects of reburying the UstaSa leader, Ante Pavelic, in 
the homeland. In terms of Eastern Slavonia, the Croatian authorities made thinly 
veiled threats of military action and demands were raised for the Serbs to leave en 
masse.31 For the leaders of the ‘urban Serbs’ it was clear that the environment was 
not ripe for extensive demands and they generally kept a low profile. However, the 
uncompromising stand served to strengthen the hardliners in Eastern Slavonia. One 
must, nevertheless, not forget that these hardliners were competing from an 
increasingly weak position: they had lost Belgrade’s support, the international 
administration sought to undermine them and non-political resources were now less 
available and less effective. The Croatian Government’s position was, however, met 
with international criticism and, in July 1997, the World Bank decided to postpone 
indefinitely a $30 million loan. The International Monetary Fund also postponed 
discussions on the release of part of a $486 million credit.
Croatian moderation helps Serb moderate position
As a response to this critique, the Croatian Government submitted a Letter of Intent 
to the UN that was assessed to be surprisingly generous and predictably led to 
critique from the HDZ ranks.34 Tudman managed to weather the storm and although
29 Trifunovska, Snezana, 1999b. “Minority Rights in Croatia”. International Journal o f Minority and 
Group Rights 6(4): 463-482. p. 474-5.
30 Tanner 1997: 302.
31 Flander, Goran, 1996. “Rejecting the UN Mandate, again”. War Report, Issue 44, 2 August.
32 Ibid.
33 Trifunovska 1999b: 479.
34 Hedl, Drago, 1997. “A Pleasant Surprise”. War Report, issue 48, January/February 1997.
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the Eastern Slavonian Serbs were less than enthusiastic about the terms, it, 
nevertheless, helped the more moderate elements in the internal rivalry. Acceptance 
was given further impetus by statements from the Croatian side that after the 1997 
elections a firmer union of Serb municipalities could be created.35 Even though the 
actions of the Croatian Government, therefore, contributed to the marginalisation of 
the hardliners, it was not the decisive factor since the hardline faction was already 
significantly weakened. Moreover, the interplay failed to significantly affect the 
position of the urban Serbs, although it may have contributed to the gradual 
radicalisation of Dukic’s SNS.
Post-war intra-ethnic competition in Croatia
Following the Croatian recapture of Krajina and the exodus of Serbs from the region, 
the Serbs in Croatia were but a small minority. One of the consequences of this 
position was that the ethnic cleavage quickly ceased to be the defining character of 
political competition in Croatia at large. However, among the Serbs it still was and 
even intellectuals, such as Pupovac, who had previously championed a non-ethnic 
definition of political competition continued being explicitly Serb representatives, 
concerned with the position of the Serb minority. Ethnification dominated and other 
issues or cleavages did not surpass the ethnic cleavage in strength. The competition 
among the Serb elites in Croatia was, after the end of the war, marked by the weak 
position of the Serbs as well as the by the departure of the Knin hardliners. This 
significantly changed both the dynamics of competition as well as the demands made 
by the dominant actors. In Eastern Slavonia, the hardliners were marginalised due to 
pressure and actions taking by the international authorities as well as due to ‘political 
trickery’ used by intra-party rivals. The support of the international authorities was 
an important resource in the elite competition in Eastern Slavonia and the presence of 
international forces also meant that the threat of Hadzic’s supporter to take the intra­
party struggle to ‘the streets’ did not prove decisive. But despite this change in the 
resources of importance, strategies not clearly democratic in nature were still used to 
settle leadership struggles. Among the leaders of the ‘urban Serbs’ there was greater 
continuity but the introduction of electoral competition meant that political 
positioning became a strategy in the competition. This led the SNS to adopt a more
35 Culic, Marinko, 1997. ‘Takleno Podunavlje” Feral Tribune, 10 February, p.7-8.
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extreme position. However, after the merger of the SSS with the remnants of the 
SDS, the SNS was gradually weakened and dynamics of outbidding did not become 
dominant. The SDSS had a much stronger geographical basis than the SNS and made 
good use of this, and the party was, furthermore, far better organised. Thus, in this 
second transitional situation, ethnification was still characteristic of Serb politics but 
there was a marked shift in the availability and effectiveness of resources used in the 
competition.
Notwithstanding the end of violence, popular attitudes do not, however, appear to 
have been decisive for the initial centripetal dynamics in the post-war period. This 
was due to the involvement of international authorities, the continued use of non- 
democratic means and the nomination of Serb representatives by the Croatian 
President. But despite the temporary support for a more radical SNS, popular 
attitudes mattered for the persistence of the centripetal dynamics since elections were 
held and other resources had become of less importance. With the increased 
significance of the general population for the intra-Serb rivalry, the inter-ethnic 
interplay also increased in importance. It was, however, still limited by the 
pronounced weakness of the Serbs in Croatia, which reduced their ability to 
reciprocate radicalisation of the other side. The moderation of the Croatian position, 
following international pressure, helped the moderates come out victorious in Eastern 
Slavonia, without it being the decisive influence. The role of the kin-state was 
reduced significantly in this phase and the Serbs in Croatia were all but ignored by 
Belgrade. The importance of political resources located within Croatia increased and 
kin-state influence was reduced accordingly.
7.2 Bosnia: Hardliner moderates and the SDS splits
In Bosnia the situation for the Serbs was markedly different and the end of the war 
did not initially bring about any changes in the RS leadership, although the 
indictment for war crimes eventually forced Karadzic to exert his power from behind 
the scenes. However, the end of the war and the holding of elections lent greater 
strength to the divisions that had emerged during the war. Ethnification was still 
dominant: political competition was confined to intra-Qthnic competition and even
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within this separate party system socio-economic cleavages were insignificant.36 But 
this did not prevent the intra-Serb competition from becoming even more fragmented 
and the dynamics of competition were now very significantly influenced by the 
international presence.
SDS factions leave the party
The SDS, and especially Karadzic, had been significantly weakened by the signing 
of the Dayton Agreement, which constituted a humiliating defeat for the war-bent 
leaders who were left completely without influence during the negotiations. 
Karadzic, at first rejected the settlement but, following this automatic demonstration 
of continued radicalism, he quickly backed down and for the next couple of months 
kept a low profile.
Due to this weakening of the party, factions in the SDS saw both the need and the 
opportunity for changing the party from within. These forces were gathered around 
the RS vice-President, Nikola Koljevic; the Mayor of Banja Luka, Predrag Radic, 
who was one of the most outspoken leaders of the Krajina faction; the RS Prime 
Minister Rajko Kasagic; and military authorities such as the commander of the 
‘Panthers’, Ljubisa Savic ‘Mauzer’. These were powerful individuals who now saw 
their chance to transform the party, repair its tarnished reputation and win the 
elections.37 However, when Karadzic re-emerged on the political scene, his position 
was a policy of strict non-co-operation and, in the spring of 1996, he stated: “the 
international community is wasting its time looking for Serbs with moderate 
stands”.38 Within the SDS, Karadzic made sure that this statement would hold true 
and he ousted the RS Prime Minister, Kasagic, for being too moderate, for being too 
willing to co-operate with the international authorities.39 Kasagic had managed to 
become very unpopular with the RS President for a number of reasons: he announced 
his intention to replace part of the hardline RS leadership; he reported to the RS 
Assembly that Karadzic had stolen money from the RS central bank; and he, finally,
36 Bose, 2002: 210.
37 Todorovic, Dragan, 1996. “Radic in Center”. Vreme News Digest, no. 246,25 June.
38 Svarm, Filip, 1996. “Kasagic fired”. Vreme News Digest, no. 234,2 April.
39 “Cooperation -  My Deadly Sin!”. Evropsld Novosti, Belgrade 18 May 1996. >http://www.ex- 
yupress.com/evnovosti/evnovosti5.html <
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wanted to move the RS capital to Banja Luka.40 Karadzic, therefore, called a 
parliamentary session without Kasagic’s presence41 and he managed to rid himself of 
his Prime Minister with the help of deputies from Krajina, who were allegedly 
promised that Banja Luka would become the capital of RS if they helped topple 
Kasagic.42 At the time, Kasagic acknowledged the legality of the decision43 but he 
now argues that Karadzic actually lacked the needed support in the Assembly and 
that only two out of the 20 required deputies supported his dismissal.44 Karadzic also 
tried to oust Radic but the popular Banja Luka Mayor dodged this first attempt to 
remove him from his post. Competition in the RS, thus, continued to be based on the 
issue of inter-ethnic relations, on valence issues such as corruption and war 
profiteering, and on regional and ideological cleavages.
Since they had failed to transform the party from within, the holding of elections in 
September 1996 gave a stimulus for SDS factions to establish themselves as parties 
and try to wrest power from the SDS. This resulted in the creation of a number of 
smaller parties that joined forces under Radic’s leadership in the Democratic 
Patriotic Bloc (Demokratski patriotski blok, DPB). The DPB included both SDS and 
SRS splinter parties: the Democratic Party, the Party of the Democratic Centre, the 
People’s Radical Party and others. Radic’s creation of an opposition bloc finally 
proved too much for the SDS in Banja Luka and the local party committee expelled 
him. It attests to the weakness, or insignificance, of party structures that Radic 
formed an oppositional party without immediately losing his SDS membership. 
While the parties in the DPB were against the SDS, they did not necessarily take a 
more moderate position. They criticised individuals in the party and the 
concentration of power in Pale but they did not argue for greater moderation on the 
issue of inter-ethnic relations. Radic argued that the main difference between the 
SDS and the DPB were the people in the coalition rather than its programme: “our 
common goal is to preserve what was won and defended with blood”.45
40 Interview Rajko Kasagid, Banja Luka, 11 November 2003.
41 Ibid
42 “Cooperation -  My Deadly Sin!”. Evropski Novosti, Belgrade, 18 May 1996. 
>http://www.cdsp.neu.edu/info/students/marko/evnovosti/evnovosti5.html<
43 Vu&nic, Perica; Svarm, Filip, 1996. “Dama iz starog §pila”. Vreme, 25 May p. 12-16.
44 Interview Rajko Kasagic, Banja Luka, 11 November 2003.
45 Todorovic, Dragan, 1996. “I won’t keep quiet”. Vreme News Digest, no. 246,29 June.
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The elections, however, also gave the wartime opposition parties a chance to test 
their strength against the SDS. The left-opposition was united in the People’s Union 
for Peace -  Union for Peace and Progress (Narodni savez za Slobodan mir -  Savez za 
mir i progres). This coalition was made up of the Socialist Party, the Liberal Party, 
the Yugoslav United Left (JUL) and the newly formed Serb Independent Social 
Democrats (Srpski nezavisni socijaldemokrati, SNSD), which was created on the 
basis of Dodik’s Club of Independent Deputies. Karadzic feared this coalition and 
already in February 1996 he had stated: “The new enemies are people with left-wing 
ideas that are alien to the Serbian people”.46 The two opposition coalitions had tried 
to unite to present a stronger front against the SDS but they failed due to political and 
personal differences.47 In addition to these two coalitions, a number of smaller 
parties formed by individuals formerly associated with the SDS or the SRS also 
contested the elections. Finally, the SDS was faced with the Serb Radicals who ran 
with a programme almost indistinguishable from the SDS’s.48 Thus, the SDS was 
met with opposition from both sides, although the moderation of the more moderate 
forces should not be exaggerated: apart from the only ‘civic’ party, the Liberal Party, 
most parties maintained that unification with Serbia was a priority, although the 
imagined time frame for this unification differed significantly between the parties.49 
The most well-organised of the opposition parties were the Radicals and the 
Socialists, which were the only parties apart from the SDS that had organised 
municipal committees in all RS municipalities.50 The remaining parties mainly had to 
rely on their coalition partners or on well-known individuals for their electoral 
success.
The SDS could, on the other hand, make full use of the resources it controlled as the 
incumbent party and it, for example, made sure that the opposition would lack media 
access.51 In addition to this control of important resources, the SDS was also 
inadvertently aided by the international community: the removal of Karadzic and the 
arrest of a Serb general and a colonel strengthened Karadzic and the SDS and helped
46 Pomfret, John, 1996. “Bosnia’s Serb’s Leader Stages Show of Defiance”. Washington Post, 10 
February, p. 1.
47 Interview Igor Radojidid, Banja Luka, 1 December 2003.
48 Vudinid, Perica, 1996. “Conflicting forces”. Vreme News Digest, no. 254, 17 August.
49 Stavljanin, Dragan, 1996. “Belgrade or Pale”. Vreme News Digest, no. 227,12 February.
50 Stefanovic, Nemanja, 1996. “What do Serb parties have to offer?”. AIM Press, 6 July.
51 Vucinic, Perica, 1996. “Conflicting forces”. Vreme News Digest, no. 254, 17 August.
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make the national issue the dominant electoral issue.52 While the opposition made 
significant inroads into the SDS’s support, they therefore failed to wrest power from 
the party that had dominated Republika Srpska since its creation: with 52 per cent of 
the votes, the SDS secured 45 seats and an absolute majority in the RS Assembly, the 
Union for Peace and Progress got 10 seats, the SRS got six seats, the Democratic 
Patriotic Bloc got two seats, while other Serb parties got two seats in total. In 
addition, however, non-Serb parties got 18 seats and the Bosniak SDA became the 
second-largest party with 14 seats. The uneven distribution of resources between 
the competing parties played an important role in the SDS’s continued hold on power 
and the party did not change its position when faced with competition from other 
parties. One of the reasons why the SDS could avoid this was that it had already 
established its nationalist credentials in the eyes of the public. When the challenges 
came from within the party, as was the case immediately after the end of the war, 
radicalisation was, however, pursued and party structures were (mis)used to cut deals 
and expel dissenters. Thus, despite this significant strengthening of the opposition, 
the result meant that it would take a split in the SDS or new elections for the 
opposition to gain power. Within little over a year, both were to occur.
Emergence o f new dynamics
Immediately after the elections, the SDS leadership appeared to be united with 
Karadzic ruling from behind the scenes. Karadzic had chosen Biljana PlavSic as his 
replacement and with this choice of a hardline loyalist his continued control seemed 
ensured.54 This was, however, only until Plav§ic started asserting herself and from 
being a Karadzic loyalist became an increasing liability for the SDS leadership. 
Strongly pressured by international authorities, PlavSic came to the conclusion that 
greater pragmatism was the best way to preserve the RS but this view was not shared 
by Karadzic and co. and the conflict rapidly intensified. In order to strengthen her 
position, Plavsic went public with documentation of corruption and other crimes 
committed by the authorities. The existence of such activities was surely not news to 
Plav§ic, who had been highly placed from the beginning, but it proved useful in 
discrediting Pale and competition thereby moved away from the national or ethnic
52 Bildt, 1998: 189, 229.
53 Tomic, Zoran; Herceg, Nevenko, 1998. Izbori u Bosni i Hercegovini. SveucSiliste u Mostaru, Centar 
za studije novinarstva.
54 Vucinid, Perica, 1996. “The man in the high castle”. Vreme News Digest, no. 242,28 May.
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issue. Increasingly pressured by the Pale-dominated Government, PlavSic tried to 
turn the anti-terrorist battalion of the Banja Luka police into her loyal intelligence 
and security service55 but this move pushed the conflict over the top and SFOR- 
forces had to protect the RS President. The SDS leadership accused PlavSic of being 
influenced by sedatives and ‘foreign forces’ and she was derided as a traitor.56 
However, as a legacy from the wartime system, Plav§ic was anything but powerless 
and she used her constitutional powers to dissolve the Assembly and call new 
elections. This decision was, unsurprisingly, not accepted by Pale and the conflict 
left the RS sharply divided: each side had part of the media, police and even army 
loyal to them.57
The competing centres of power became formalised when Plavsic was expelled from 
the SDS and subsequently formed the Serb National Alliance (Srpski narodni savez, 
SNS). As with the other SDS splinter-parties, the differences between the SDS and 
the SNS were limited: their political programmes were very similar and the vice- 
president of the SNS, Ostoja Knezevic, stated that they had left the SDS “because the
58program o f the SDS was not implemented in practice although it is good\ The 
ability of Plav§ic to retain her post as President despite having fallen out with the 
SDS leadership depended crucially on the presence of international forces: Pale’s 
inability to solve the conflict, i.e. get rid of Plav§ic, through coercive means owed 
more to the presence of SFOR than to the end of the war. The local military was now 
an ineffective source of power since it was faced with the much stronger SFOR. 
Moreover, PlavSic’s institutional powers, inherited from Karadzic, also gave her 
access to significant resources. Finally, the opposition given its new parliamentary 
basis was able to exert significant influence on the competition within the SDS.
Initially, the opposition parties were, however, indecisive as to what role to play and 
in the summer of 1997, when the conflict between Plavsic and Pale was at its most 
intense, the RS opposition organised a big rally in support of Plav§ic’s ideas but not 
in support of her personally.59 The parties had been created in opposition to the SDS
55 Vasic, Milo§; Svarm, Filip, 1997. ‘Tobacco Road”. Vreme News Digest, no. 301,12 July.
56 Topic, Tanja, 1997. “Grim business”. Vreme News Digest, no. 300, 5 July.
57 Topic, Tanja, 1997. ‘Twilight Zone in Republika Srpska”. Vreme News Digest, no. 307, 23 August.
58 Novakovic, Dejan, 1997. “Party against ‘position’ and ‘opposition’. AIM Press, 30 October.
59 Topic, Tanja, 1997. “The generals’ flour”. Vreme News Digest, no. 301,12 July.
Nina Caspersen: Intra-ethnic competition and inter-ethnic conflict 222
Chapter 7 -  Post-W ar In tra-Serb Competition in Croatia and Bosnia: Change and continuity
and Plavsic was still too closely associated with the party’s history. But, except for 
the Serb Radicals and the Liberal Party, the opposition parties eventually chose to 
support Plavsic as RS President. When Plavsic formed her own party, the support of 
the opposition parties once again wavered since she was now a rival to them in the 
upcoming extraordinary elections; it was no longer merely about defeating the 
SDS.60 In the campaign for the 1997 extraordinary elections to the RS Assembly, 
Plavsic received substantial support from the international authorities and the SDS, 
while still the largest party, came out significantly weakened with only 24 mandates 
and did not even have a majority with the Serb Radicals.
Table 7.1 Elections to the RS National Assembly, 1996 and 1997
1996 elections
SDS SRS DPB Union for Peace and Progress SDA
52 pet (45) 7 pet (6) 3 pet (2) 12 pet (10) 16 pet (14)
1997 elections
SDS SRS SNS SPRS SNSD KCD (SDA)01
26 pet (24) 16 pet (15) 16 pet (15) 10 pet (9) 3 pet (2) 17 pet (16)
Vote percentage and number of mandates won. Data from Tomic; Herceg, 1998.
The SDS and the Radicals, therefore, tried to woo the Socialist Party and this almost 
led to a split in the party when the party’s founder, Dragutin Ilic, and the party’s 
leader, Zivko Radicic, took opposite sides. One party official expressed what was to 
prove the dominant view in the party: i f  we go along with them, in the next
election not even members o f  our families would vote fo r  us”.62 Plavsic’s supporters, 
however, did not have a majority either and a new prime minister would have to rely 
on support from Bosniak and Croat deputies. This also proved difficult to swallow 
for the Socialists as well as for leaders from other parties.63 Plavsic, therefore, faced 
a narrow choice o f options and in the end pointed to Dodik, leader o f the SNSD, who 
accepted the nomination. Dodik’s Government was finally elected at a dramatic 
assembly session after SDS and SRS deputies had adjourned for the night.64 The
60 Novakovic, Dejan, 1997. “Party against ‘position’ and opposition”. AIM Press, 30 October.
61 The SDA contested this election in a coalition with the SBiH, the GDSBiH and the Liberals o f BiH.
62 Djordjevic, Ivan, 1997. “The lact big job”. AIM Press, 4 December.
63 Interview Igor Radojicic, Banja Luka, 1 December 2003.
64 Chandler, David, 2000. Faking Democracy after Dayton. London: Pluto, p. 127.
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intra-ethnic competition, therefore, eventually resulted in a moderation of the 
dominant position. Given the pressure from the international authorities, moderation 
was one way of gaining an advantage in the competition: the international authorities 
had been very eager for a split in the SDS to emerge and were highly instrumental in 
the events.
The moderation entailed by the SDS losing power should not, however, be 
exaggerated. Plavsic’s coalition also included parties that were anything but 
moderate, including the Serb Party of Krajina, which was banned in 1999 for 
violating the Dayton Agreement. Some opposition politicians, therefore, question the 
significance of the split and the changes in PlavSic’s position. Zivanovic argues: “7/ 
was a constructed conflict ... [the SNS] was a clone o f the SDS*'.65 The SDS was, in 
any case, far from defeated and made a strong comeback in the 2000 elections but 
the growth of party pluralism had by then forced the party to moderate its position.66
Kin-state involvement: To support or not to support the SDS?
Despite the increasing conflict between Milosevic and the local leaders, Belgrade’s 
influence over Serb politics in Bosnia had still been significant during the war. But 
Belgrade’s impact was markedly reduced in the post-war period, although not to the 
same extent as in Croatia.
Milosevic would most likely have preferred to leave the RS to itself but international 
sanctions were in place until after the first Bosnian elections and Milosevic was, 
therefore, still held responsible for developments. Furthermore, the political scene in 
Belgrade did not ignore Bosnia as it did Croatia. Even though relations between the 
RS and Belgrade gradually decreased in significance, it was, therefore, still a factor 
of some importance in the immediate post-war period.
In order to maintain influence over developments in the RS, Belgrade continued its 
strategy of attempting to affect dynamics in the SDS. However, it was not completely 
clear what Milosevic’s strategy was: he was pressured by the international authorities
65 Interview Miodrag Zivanovic, Banja Luka, 22 October 2003.
66 Bose, 2002: 211.
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to help oust Karadzid but seemed unable or unwilling to do so.67 Also, when 
Karadzic decided to rid himself of the more moderate prime minister, Kasagic, there 
were speculations that Milosevic had silently approved and Kasagic himself is 
convinced that this was the case.68
Belgrade and the opposition
Compared with Milosevic’s relationship with the SDS, his links with the opposition 
were much more public. Close links with the Socialist Party of the RS had already 
been established during the war and Milosevic, after the war, made sure that they 
would continue. The SPRS was so closely linked with Milosevic’s SPS that any 
rupture between them or bad electoral results for the SPRS would be potentially 
damaging to the Serbian President. Milosevic therefore made sure to exert his 
influence and according to the then leader of the SPRS, he pressured the party into 
joining the Union for Peace and Progress which included Mira Marko vic’s party, the 
JUL. During the war, Milosevic had also had close contacts with one of the other 
leaders in the coalition, Milorad Dodik, and the close contacts between Belgrade and 
the coalition earned it the nickname ‘Union for Slobodan [Milosevic] and Mira 
[Markovic]’ (Savez za Slobodna i Miru). Ilic argues that he had been against this 
coalition with the JUL, which he felt would damage both the SPS and the SPRS, and 
he was consequently punished at the SPRS’s first congress where he tried to assert 
the party’s independence. At the congress, Ilic advocated changing the party’s 
symbol and changing its name to Democratic Socialist Party but instead of these 
changes a message from Milosevic was adopted and Ilic was ousted as leader.69
Milosevic, therefore, had considerable sway over the opposition, but while the 1996 
elections were, by some commentators, seen as a choice between Belgrade and Pale, 
Milosevic was still close to the SDS leadership, especially after the signing of the 
Agreement on Special Relations between Serbia and the RS.
67 Smajlovid, Ljiljana, 1996. “Svi MiloSevicevi ljudi”. Vreme, 25 May, p. 14-15.
68 Interview Rajko Kasagid, Banja Luka, 11 November 2003.
69 Interview Dragutin Ilic, Banja Luka, 23 October 2003.
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Choosing between the SDS and the opposition
Biljana PlavSic had, contrary to the other SDS leaders, not supported the agreement 
which she denounced as unconstitutional.70 This rejection only added to the long-felt 
mutual antipathy between Milo§evic and PlavSic and the Serbian President was more 
than hesitant to take Plavsic’s side in her conflict with the rest of the SDS. Instead of 
openly supporting the SDS, Milosevic used Seselj to launch a series of attacks on the 
RS President and when PlavSic arrived in Belgrade airport at the height of the 
conflict, she was detained by the Serbian police. This was seen as a clear attempt at 
intimidation, and illustrated that, covertly, Milosevic was supporting and directing 
efforts to overthrow Plavsic.71 The Belgrade Government was, nevertheless, 
wavering in its support since Plavsic was increasing her strength with the help of the 
opposition in both the RS and Serbia.72 Consequently, Milosevic chose to sit on the 
fence and publicly maintained that the power struggle was an internal matter for the 
RS.73 Belgrade’s wavering was also reflected in the SPRS’s position and its rejection 
of the offered premiership following the extraordinary elections in 1997.74 Only 
when it became clear that Plavsic would be victorious did Milosevic come out in her 
favour. Belgrade was no longer a crucial audience and the reduced importance of 
Milo§evi6’s support is well illustrated by the SPRS’s poor performance in the 1997 
elections when it had received significant rhetorical and financial support from the 
Serbian regime. Belgrade’s position had become reactive, other resources were 
available and it no longer had a significant impact on the internal competition in the 
RS.
General population: Hopes o f moderate groundswell disappointed 
Popular attitudes finally had a chance to become known after the end of the war, and 
the competing elites were forced to take these attitudes seriously. This was especially 
so since other resources that had previously been crucial in the elite competition were 
of less value or had been rendered more difficult to use. But popular attitudes were, 
nevertheless, not decisive for the changing dynamics of competition.
70 Thomas, 1999: 331.
71 Ibid. 332-3, 363.
72 Ibid 332, 335.
73 Ibid 363.
74 Interview Igor Radojicic, Banja Luka, 1 December 2003.
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1996 elections
The distribution of resources was, in the 1996 elections, greatly skewed in the SDS’s 
favour and the party benefited in particular from its control of the media.75 
Opposition politicians had long suffered from lack of media access and consequently 
lacked a public profile. This was, however, not so much the case in Banja Luka: 
some of the opposition parties had been represented in the Banja Luka municipal 
council and a number of the new parties were, furthermore, formed by former SDS 
officials who had been prominent members of the Krajina faction. Unsurprisingly, 
the opposition did significantly better in the Banja Luka region than in the eastern 
part of the RS. This was likely caused by a regional division in attitudes combined 
with the better level of organisation that the opposition had established in the western 
RS.
Overall, the election results showed a considerable decrease in the support for the 
SDS compared with the 1990 elections; although the loss of support was clearly not 
as substantial as the international authorities had hoped. With 52 per cent of the votes, 
the SDS, while weakened compared with its wartime position, still had an absolute 
majority in the RS Assembly. Karadzic had, before the elections, gradually been 
losing support, even though 31 per cent of the RS respondents in an opinion poll in 
the spring of 1996 still had a very favourable view of him.76 The SDS leaders were 
tainted by wartime scandals and by having had to backtrack on their intransigent 
position. But following some run-ins with the international authorities and the 
forcing of Karadzic from the political scene, the SDS regained much of its strength.77 
Even if earlier elections would have meant a weaker SDS, it would, however, also 
have given the opposition less time to organise itself and the result would most likely 
not have been markedly different.
What does the election result tell us about popular opinion? The voters did face an 
actual choice with a range of different parties to choose between. However, none of 
the parties were linked to any specific societal stratum; socio-economic issues were
75 OSCE, 1996. “The elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Preliminary statement of the co-ordinator 
for international monitoring”. Vidovic, Milan, 1996. “Controlled by Pale and Belgrade”. AIM Press, 5 
August.
76 Smajlovic, Ljiljana, 1996. “Svi Milosevicevi ljudi” Vreme, 25 May, p. 14-15.
77 Bildt, 1998: 189,229.
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not emphasised and the political competition really boiled down to pro- v. contra- 
SDS. Although the SDS had many advantages as the incumbent party and there were 
many reports of irregularities,78 there is nothing that indicates a landslide of moderate 
opinion. In a poll from 1997, 91 per cent of the Serb respondents were opposed to a 
unified Bosnian state79 and the attitudes of the population and their elected leaders do 
not, therefore, seem far removed. Moreover, an analysis of the local elections in 1997 
shows that the SDS and the SRS especially enjoyed significant support in areas with 
a more ethnically mixed voter composition. Ethnification was still characterising 
political competition and in more heterogeneous areas, the ‘threat’ of non-Serb 
parties seems to have encouraged support for the most extreme forces: the Serb 
voters closed ranks behind the dominant party or its ally.80 Despite virtually identical 
post-war problems facing all of Bosnia’s citizens, politically salient cross-ethnic
O  1
cleavages did not emerge. The only significant non-ethnic party in the competition, 
the Liberal Party, chose to run in a coalition for the 1996 elections and popular 
support for its moderate, non-nationalist position is, therefore, somewhat difficult to 
assess. However, judging from the party’s poor performance in later elections, it 
would not have done well on its own. Popular attitudes, therefore, failed to 
significantly change the dynamics of elite competition but this does not mean that 
they had no impact. The holding of elections, moreover, gave the opposition a 
parliamentary foothold that was to prove decisive in the 1997 SDS split.
1997 local elections and extraordinary elections
The first elections held after the conflict between PlavSic and the Pale leadership 
boiled over were the September 1997 local elections. As expected, the SDS was 
further weakened but, contrary to expectations, the result was a great triumph for the 
Serb Radicals that won over 20 per cent of the votes with almost no election 
campaigning. Most commentators had expected the Socialist Party to strengthen its 
position significantly: the party had a well-developed party organisation, experienced 
leaders, financial support from Belgrade and a well organised election campaign. But
78 The International Crisis Group argued that the voter participation amounted to a 103 pet. turnout! 
Shoup, Paul, 1997. “The Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The end of an illusion”. Problems o f  
Post-Communism 44(1): 3-15. p. 10.
79 Bose, 2002: 2.
80 Caspersen, Nina, 2004. “Good fences make good neighbours? A comparison of conflict regulation 
strategies in post-war Bosnia”. Journal o f Peace Research 2004,41(5): 569-588. p. 577-8.
81 Bose, 2002: 212.
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despite these factors of strength, the voters still chose the ultra-nationalist option. 
Although the disinclination to support the more moderate option was partly caused 
by conflicting signals from the Socialists in Banja Luka and in Belgrade, the results 
still made clear that a new era of moderation was not sweeping over the RS.82
The results of the extraordinary elections for the RS Assembly further eroded the 
SDS’s support but, again, it did not give a landslide victory to the more moderate 
parties: the SDS’s support fell to 26 per cent of the votes but a considerable part of 
the loss was picked up by the Radicals with 16 per cent of the votes. The rest of the 
SDS’s former votes went to Plavsic’s SNS, also 16 per cent, while the remaining 
opposition did not make any inroads. In this election, the SDS could not to the same 
extent as previously make use of state resources to strengthen its position and the 
media was now actually biased in Plavsic’s favour, following the SFOR’s seizure of 
the Pale TV transmitters.83 There is, therefore, no basis for arguing that the results 
significantly overestimated the support enjoyed by the nationalist parties. In terms of 
electoral competition, the opposition parties may have had good reason to be 
cautious of appearing ‘too moderate’ and were, therefore, for example, reluctant to 
accept the premiership which depended on support from Bosniak and Croat deputies. 
Consequently, it is difficult to argue that the 1997 split in the SDS and the 
subsequent change in dynamics of competition were voter driven. But popular 
attitudes were not without importance for post-war intra-Serb competition and their 
increased importance also increased the significance of the position of the ‘other 
side’.
Inter-ethnic interplay: Re-enforcing radicalism
Although a settlement was reached in Dayton, this did not translate into consensus on 
Bosnia’s future, and the leaders of the SDS, the HDZ and the SDA had radically 
different interpretations of the agreement. However, their interests converged on one 
point: radicalism on one side would justify radicalism on the other side and aid their 
continued hold on power. As the RS Prime Minister Dodik said in 1998: “The ruling 
structures on all sides support and maintain each other. And until the first o f them
82 Peric, Branko, 1997. “Rise of the Radicals, decline of the Socialists”. AIM Press, 16 September.
83 OSCE/ODIHR, 1997b. “Republika Srpska National Assembly Elections, 22-23 November 1997”.
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falls, it is impossible to expect that a more lasting solution will be found”*4 Bildt 
argues that the immediate post-war climate was marked by increased radicalisation 
of both the SDA and the HDZ85 and this radicalisation arguably helped the SDS 
regain some of its lost ground: it could argue that despite problems of corruption and 
war profiteering and the set-back in Dayton, there was still a need for the SDS’s 
policies and its established nationalist credentials. Further ammunition for the SDS’s 
position was provided by the exodus of Serbs from Sarajevo, which strengthened the 
argument for ethnic separation.86 Just as in the pre-war period, the inter-ethnic 
interplay therefore ensured the dominance of the ethnic cleavage, while other issues 
were kept in the background.
Judging from the SDS’s recovery in the polls, it therefore seems that the interplay 
proved important for its ability to stay in power. Popular support had become much 
more significant in the intra-ethnic elite competition and the general population 
seemed susceptible to arguments of continued threat and need for protection. 
Propaganda based on the alleged radicalism of the ‘other side’ is significantly more 
important when attitudes in the general population are important. The interplay 
thereby helped the SDS stay in power; it affected the outcome of the RS competition 
but it did not alter the SDS’s position which remained largely unchanged. The 
positions of Bosniak and Croat leaders did, however, also in one instance have a 
more direct impact on RS competition: when Bosniak and Croat deputies, following 
pressure from the international authorities, agreed to support a non-SDS government 
in the RS. Compared with the case of Croatia, an important difference is the relative 
strength of the Serbs vis-a-vis the other group(s). The Serbs in Bosnia were in a 
much stronger position and could therefore afford to reciprocate radicalism, or even 
be more radical than the other side, whereas in Croatia such a strategy would likely 
have left the Serbs in an even weaker position. The effect of the position of the ‘other 
side’ on Serb positioning was thereby greater in Bosnia than in Croatia, although this 
was itself a product of the conflict situation and hence of inter-ethnic relations.
84 Peranic, Drazena, 1998. “Milorad Dodik, Prime Minister of RS, or the shadow cabinet coming out 
of the shadow”. AIM Press, 19 January.
85 Bildt, 1998: 189.
*6Ibid. 198.
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Post-war intra-ethnic competition in Bosnia
Unlike the Serb leaders in Croatia, the RS leaders were not forced to admit defeat: 
despite the humiliation in Dayton they could claim to have successfully defended 
their statelet. The main part of the leadership was still in place, ethnification was still 
characteristic of politics and continuation of wartime dynamics of divisions and 
competition was the dominant trend. However, not everything was continuous and 
the analysis demonstrated the importance of a new audience in the intra-ethnic elite 
competition: the international authorities which now played a decisive role in the 
intra-Serb competition. Previously, more moderate challengers emerging from within 
the SDS would have been defeated but now moderating dynamics prevailed -  at least 
for a while. The possibility for alliances was decisive in producing these dynamics: 
the break in the dominant party was necessary for the opposition to gain power and 
the break in the SDS would not have been of the same significance if the opposition 
had not been willing to act as alliance partners. But without the reduced availability 
and effectiveness of coercive resources, the SDS’s challengers would probably still 
have faced defeat. The absence of violence, the international presence and the 
renewed process of transition all influenced this change in the resources of 
importance in the competition.
Even though the emerging more centripetal dynamics do not appear to have been 
voter led, the holding of elections meant that the RS population could no longer be 
ignored and the foothold gained by the opposition as a consequence was of great 
importance for the changing dynamics of competition. Popular support mattered, 
even though the emergence of centripetal dynamics did not reflect a change in 
popular attitudes. As a consequence, the positions of the other ethnic leaders 
mattered more and radical posturing prevented other issues from becoming salient 
and helped the SDS retain its dominance in the first election.
Belgrade’s influence, however, waned considerably, even though Milosevic could 
not afford to ignore the Serbs in Bosnia to the same extent as the Serbs in Croatia. 
The issue of Serbs in the neighbouring republics was no longer highly salient in 
Serbia, which reduced the involvement of the opposition as well the political capital 
Milosevic could gain from supporting the local leaders. Furthermore, other resources,
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especially international support and democratic resources, were now of importance 
for the political competition in the RS: the competition, therefore, was more difficult 
to influence through the supply of coercive and economic resources
7.3 Conclusion:
Intra-ethnic competition in three conflict phases
Notwithstanding the imperative of unity in the face of severe conflict, as famously 
called for in ‘only unity saves the Serbs’, disunity prevailed in all three phases. 
Rivalry was unrelenting and even the ‘President of all Serbs’, Slobodan Milosevic, 
was unable to always dictate developments in Serb politics in Croatia and Bosnia. 
The need for guarding the position of the nation was evidently not enough to prevent 
divisions. Horowitz’s thesis that intra-ethnic competition will be limited by a concern 
for weakening the position of the group was not, therefore, supported by the two 
cases. On the contrary, when military fortunes were reversing, disunity became even 
more pronounced. There are, however, some factors that seemed to cause greater 
unity and, therefore, serve as exceptions to the overall tendency of increased disunity 
in times of crisis. Firstly, when ethnification was still part of the political struggle 
and non-ethnic rivals were yet to be marginalised, the intra-ethnic competition was 
limited to fairly low-intensity competition within ethnic parties. Secondly, the risk of 
being outvoted and, more importantly, the outbreak of war caused a temporary 
homogenisation of the Serb community. It is, however, important to realise that this 
unity was in large parts enforced. Finally, the weakness of the Serbs in post-war 
Croatia was so pronounced that it actually fostered greater unity. But the overall 
picture was one of disunity and the deliberate creation of more extreme rivals even 
seems to have been a strategy utilised in the pre-war phase to improve bargaining 
positions and contribute to growing nationalist tensions while still retaining a broad 
appeal.
A number of interesting findings have emerged from the previous chapters; findings 
that contradict or add to existing theorising. Radicalisation was, contrary to what is 
argued in most theoretical literature, not the only possible outcome of intra-ethnic 
competition, and when radicalisation did result, this was most often not based on 
appeals to popular attitudes. Other resources were more available and effective in the
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competition, which was consequently not driven by popular demand. The lack of 
success in playing the ethnic card also meant that the ethnification of politics was 
part of the political struggle; it was not an automatic process based on the 
overwhelming power of ethnicity. In terms of the interplay with ‘opposing’ ethnic 
leaders this was found to be of great importance for the ethnification of politics, but 
radicalisation or moderation was not necessarily reciprocated; other factors were 
often more significant for the direction of competition. Finally, kin-state involvement 
took two forms: symbolic influence largely based on shared ethnicity and more 
tangible influence based on supply of resources. The control that the kin-state leader 
was able to exercise over local leaders varied considerably in the different conflict 
phases and the form and degree of kin-state influence was found to be strongly 
influenced by the phase of the conflict, the degree of local divisions and access to 
alternative resources. In general, the relative importance of audiences was found to 
be highly variable and influenced in particular by the phase of the conflict and by the 
institutional framework.
Dynamics o f competition
One of the most important findings was that intra-ethnic competition did not 
necessarily result in radicalisation, even in a situation of war and polarisation. Intra­
ethnic challengers were often suppressed by the incumbent leaders and no change in 
position therefore resulted; this was most notably the case for most of the wartime 
period in both the RSK and the RS, when the leadership met challenges from other 
parties with repression rather than political manoeuvring. But the analysis also found 
instances of intra-ethnic competition leading to relative moderation. Examples of this 
include the competition over the Vance Plan in the RSK, when support for the plan 
provided a quick route to power. Also during the war, Hadzic began to negotiate 
despite being fiercely attacked by hardliners and these same hardliners continued on 
this course when they won power, despite also being attacked from the flanks. But 
the most durable example during the war was the change in dynamics in the RS 
towards the end of the war, when opposition parties, the army and SDS factions 
coalesced. Centripetal dynamics were, finally, dominant in the post-war period in 
both cases, despite the persistence of intense intra-ethnic competition.
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An important difference was found between challenges from within the party or 
movement and challenges from other parties, with the former most often causing 
radicalisation and the latter resulting in either no change in position or even a relative 
moderation of the dominant position. Especially during the war, positions of power 
relied on resources emanating from within the party and the movement at large; 
paramilitary support in particular. This made it more difficult to merely suppress 
challengers. Furthermore, these internal divisions were mostly over the issue of the 
war and, by radicalising, the leader could ensure continued control of the necessary 
resources. In case of competition from other parties, the leader could often choose to 
suppress the opposition rather than change position; as long as the challenge was not 
accompanied by intra-party strife. Moreover, the opposition parties would frequently 
also challenge the incumbent leader on other issues than the war issue, and 
radicalisation on this issue, therefore, would not pre-empt them. Hence when Hadzic 
was not only facing outbidding on the issue of negotiations but was also being 
accused of war profiteering and incompetence, he did not have many options since 
he did not have the necessary resources to suppress his rivals. Instead he sought a 
more drastic change by initiating negotiations with the Croatian Government. Finally, 
more moderate opposition forces were in some instances able to force a change in the 
dominant position but alliances were needed in order for this to succeed. This was 
what happened when more moderate factions of the SDS had the opportunity to 
coalesce with opposition parties, with the army, with Belgrade and/or with 
international authorities. The incumbent leaders could then choose between changing 
their position or face defeat.
The issues underlying the intra-ethic elite divisions, therefore, appear to be important 
for the effect of competition, but the question is to what extent other issues can 
become salient in a situation of violence. Gagnon argues that violence has the effect 
of rendering all other issues politically insignificant.87 But if all significant actors 
take the same position on the national issue, then political competition will likely be 
focused on other issues, including ‘valence issues’ such as war profiteering and 
corruption. In both cases, such issues were salient despite the situation of war and 
polarisation. In addition, ideological and regional cleavages mattered for the
87 Gagnon, 1995: 89.
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dynamics of competition and the forging of alliances. If the incumbent leaders take 
very extreme positions on the issue of the conflict, the opposition is actually given 
strong incentives to take a more moderate position and/or focus on other issues. An 
exception to this seems to be a situation of very fragmented competition, in which 
alliances are constantly changing and parties are breaking apart, as was the case in 
wartime RSK. In such a situation, the most promising political strategy is very hard 
to gauge and attempting moderation would be highly risky. Disinclination to 
moderate is, of course, augmented by fears relating to personal safety in case a more 
moderate position is adopted. Both the issues salient in the competition, as well as 
the configuration of competition, should, therefore, be included in an analysis of 
intra-ethnic competition.
Regional divisions were of great significance in the intra-Serb competition in both 
cases. This rivalry was based on regional cleavages but fuelled by different views of 
the inter-ethnic conflict, ideological cleavages, valence issues and personal ambitions. 
Regional divisions are important because they are likely to be linked to a regional 
distribution of resources that are of significance in the competition, e.g. due to local 
paramilitary constellations, patron-client relations and the possibility of 
monopolising local resources, the regional leaders are often far from powerless. 
Regional divisions were of great importance in both cases and led to radicalisation 
but they were only able to significantly alter the course of the party if they penetrated 
the leadership or coalesced with military forces. Again, the distribution of resources 
and the resources effective in the competition proved crucial.
The dynamics of competition were significantly affected by the transitional context 
in which the competition was played out. Even when transition had failed and war 
had broken out, the transitional experience still affected the legitimising principles of 
the statelets: no matter how repressed the opposition was, the leadership would still 
insist that it was a democratic, multi-party system. The transitional context had an 
important impact on the parties involved in the competition: they were, in general, 
leader dominated, their organisation was weak and they resembled political 
movements rather than structured political parties. As a consequence, cohesion was 
often limited, central party structures were of negligible importance and other 
resources became important in intra-party struggles. This resulted in more intense
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intra-party competition and greater risk of radicalisation. In the competition between 
parties, there was a great degree of fluctuation in political positions, parties were not 
organised around a consolidated programme and today’s moderate could be 
tomorrow’s hardliner. The effect of transition on party structures is, however, not 
uniform, as illustrated by the more structured SDS in pre-war Bosnia. In the post-war 
period, i.e. in the second round of transition, the dynamics of competition gradually 
changed: party structures and other democratic institutions became of greater 
importance, both for intra-party rivalry and in competition with other parties.
The transitional situation served to reduce the impact of popular attitudes on the 
intra-ethnic competition. This tendency of elite dominance was augmented by the 
communist legacy: the population was used to one-man, one-party rule and 
unfamiliar with democratic competition. Finally, the outbreak of war greatly 
strengthened this already-existing elite predominance and popular attitudes became 
of limited importance.
Elite competition and popular attitudes
In the theoretical literature on intra-ethnic elite competition, outbidding is held to be 
about mass responsiveness to playing the ethnic card, the idea being that elites will 
refrain from moderating since they fear that more extreme rivals can successfully 
outflank them by appealing to mass sentiments. But the two cases showed that 
popular support can, in some circumstances, be of far less importance than other 
resources used in the intra-ethnic elite competition: radicalisation was not driven by 
popular demand; it was not about elites successfully playing the ethnic card. This 
does not mean that popular attitudes had no importance at all. They mattered for the 
ethnification of politics in the pre-war period and became of increasing importance in 
the post-war period when outbidding was at times even an effective strategy. 
However, the intra-Serb competition was not driven by popular attitudes; the general 
population lacked alternatives and could be taken along, but popular attitudes were 
not the driving force behind radicalisation; or moderation for that matter. Other 
resources were more important, especially during the war when coercive resources 
were crucial for the direction and outcome of the intra-Serb rivalry.
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Political and non-political resources can be used to manipulate the expression of 
popular opinion or make sure that it does not fundamentally alter the balance of 
power. In that way, popular support can be an important resource in elite competition 
without this meaning that popular attitudes are driving elite competition. Finally, 
various factors can distort the link between the general population and the elites, 
even if institutions are in place to allow for the expression of popular support. In the 
analysis, some of these problems, such as weak party organisations, great degree of 
ffactionalisation and minor political differences between parties, are associated with 
a situation of transition. This transitional situation also influenced the limited 
importance of socio-economic cleavages and the dominance of the ethnic cleavage. 
Other problems, especially lack of alternative information, were linked with the 
prevailing situation of war or with remaining authoritarian tendencies. The ability for 
popular attitudes to significantly affect elite positions is arguably greater in later 
phases of transition and especially in a peaceful environment where other resources 
are less accessible or rendered more difficult to use.
One could argue that the limited impact of popular attitudes in a situation of post­
communist transition and increasingly tense conflict is hardly a surprising conclusion. 
However, it does depart from existing theorising on intra-ethnic elite competition. 
Moreover, the holding of elections and referenda as well as elites claiming to 
represent the ‘will of the people’ would lead one to expect greater popular influence 
on the position of the leaders. Even in non-violent phases of the conflict, the impact 
of popular attitudes was often limited and violence, therefore, is not the only variable 
of importance. Likewise, ethnification of popular attitudes occurred before the war 
and cannot be explained simply by the outbreak of violence.
Ethnification o f politics
In order for the SDS to become dominant in the Serb community in Croatia and 
Bosnia, the ethnification of politics and the subsequent marginalisation of non-ethnic 
rivals was necessary. But ethnification was part of the political struggle and should 
be analysed in terms of political competition: while being aided by outside events, 
the ability to make an ethnic cleavage dominant also depends on the distribution of 
resources between the ethnic and non-ethnic parities. Rhetorically, the ethnic parties
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sought to impose the ethnic cleavage by accusing the non-ethnic parties of either 
being ethnic parties in disguise, of representing the other side, or of being poor 
representatives of their own community.
In Bosnia, the SDS benefited from the weak leadership of the SK-SDP, the problems 
the Reformists had organising themselves, the internal competition between the non­
ethnic parties and the stronger organisation that the party had established compared 
with its counterpart in Croatia. The Serb voters consequently closed ranks behind the 
party. The SDS in Croatia also achieved dominance despite its poor showing in the 
elections. This process of ethnification was strengthened by the Croatian 
Government recognising the party as the legitimate Serb representative, increasing 
divisions within the SKH-SDP, improved organisation of the party and the use of 
non-democratic methods to force out non-SDS officials. The speed of ethnification 
was influenced by the distribution of resources and the dynamics of competition; an 
ethnic party system did not automatically emerge due to some overwhelming power 
of ethnicity.
In a context of gradual ethnification, with the continued existence of non-ethnic 
rivals, adopting a vague position was instrumental for the Serb parties: the 
competition was not only about mobilising the faithful since the faithful might be the 
minority and potential supporters could be discouraged by extreme rhetoric. It was, 
thus, a symptom of the lack of success in playing the ethnic card: the power of 
ethnicity was not enough in itself to ensure the ethnic parties’ dominance. They had 
to make the ethnic cleavage the dominant cleavage and acquire resources in addition 
to popular support. From a vague position the Serb parties could, moreover, engage 
in negotiations or even co-operation with Croat and Bosniak parties, which served to 
strengthen the ethnification of politics. This vague position, however, had, as one of 
its consequences, that the leadership became vulnerable to outbidding. While 
ethnification, when complete, will generally lead to radicalisation, since incentives 
for vagueness disappears, a more gradual process of ethnification can, therefore, 
paradoxically also foster radicalisation.
One of the important factors in the process of ethnification was the interplay with the 
leaders of the other ethnic groups. However, the impact of the inter-ethnic interplay
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varied considerably and it did not always have a significant influence on the direction 
and outcome of the intra-Serb competition.
Effect o f  inter-ethnic interplay
As a corrective to the idea that radical nationalism feeds on other radical nationalism, 
the analysis found that radicalism was not necessarily reciprocated and that the 
process of radicalisation, although aided by Croat or Bosniak radicalisation, was 
frequently more the result of other factors; especially intra-party competition and 
kin-state involvement. Changes in intra-ethnic elite competition, radicalisation or 
moderation, need not be a response to changed rhetoric or actions of the ‘other side’. 
Consequently, one can question the benefit o f analysing conflicts predominantly in 
terms of reactive frameworks.
This clearly does not mean that the interplay was not at times of great significance 
for the intra-Serb elite competition: in Croatia, in the pre-war period, it delivered 
ammunition to the extremists; during the war the cancellation of the UN mandate 
heightened mistrust and strengthened the hardliners; while in the post-war period, the 
altered position of the Croatian authorities on Eastern Slavonia helped finally 
marginalise the remaining hardliners. In Bosnia, in the pre-war period, the possibility 
for shifting alliances put a dampener on radicalisation and the change in alliance 
patterns significantly affected Serb positioning; during the war the mutually hurting 
stalemate emerging in 1995 combined with internal Serb dynamics to finally cause 
willingness to compromise; and in the post-war period, the radicalism of the HDZ 
and the SDA helped the SDS reclaim some of its lost ground. One important 
dynamic pointed to in the analysis was the effect of fractionalisation of the ‘other 
side’; this provided hardliners with ammunition and it is, therefore, another way in 
which lack of cohesion makes radicalisation more likely. However, in neither of the 
above instances did the inter-ethnic interplay alone account for the dynamics of intra- 
Serb competition.
A structural aspect of the interplay was found to influence the significance of the 
position of the ‘other side’: the number of groups involved and their relative 
demographic strength. In addition, the audiences that mattered in the competition 
influenced the significance of the position of other ethnic leaders: the more the
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general population was decisive for the elite competition, the greater the impact of 
the position of the ‘other side*. Intra-party forces and kin-state leaders were 
frequently appealed to using different techniques and the leaders were less dependent 
on having to justify their position by pointing to the radical stance of the other side. 
Finally, the position adopted by the Serb leaders mattered for the effect of the inter­
ethnic interplay: when co-existence was rejected outright, the negotiating position of 
the other side had only limited impact.
The interplay impacted to a different extent in the three phases and the effect was 
greatest when ethnification was still an issue, when the other ethnic leaders could 
help impose the ethnic cleavage as the dominant cleavage and hence help 
marginalise non-ethnic rivals. In this phase, the same paradox was found in both 
cases: the initially relative moderate position of the ethnic parties and the resulting 
willingness to have contacts actually helped reinforce ethnification. During the war, 
the intransigence related to the choice of the war-option greatly reduced the impact 
of actions and rhetoric of the other ethnic leaders; what mattered was the relative 
military strength. Finally, in the post-war phase, the general population became of 
greater importance, as did the inter-ethnic interplay. It was, however, still limited by 
continued intransigence of the Serbs in Bosnia and the pronounced weakness of the 
Serbs in Croatia.
What results from this is a complex picture of related fields of intra-ethnic elite 
competition which, while affecting each other, may also function largely 
independently. The resulting imperfect simultaneity in both radicalisation and 
moderation causes problems for reaching settlements. Both the intra-ethnic elite 
competition and the inter-ethnic interplay, including the military balance, have to be 
right and the question of timing is therefore crucial. A stalemate or a suitable 
configuration of intra-ethnic elite competition may persist for a long time without 
producing negotiation results.
Kin-state involvement in intra-ethnic elite competition 
The potential influence of a kin-state on intra-ethnic elite competition can be derived 
from two sources. Firstly, from it being a kin-state that, due to the ethnification of 
politics, is given authority to become involved in the local political competition.
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Secondly, the influence can be primarily due to it being a state, and the kin-state 
leader thereby has access to resources that the local leaders lack.
As Milo§evic fell out with the local leaders, the demarcation of intra-ethnic dynamics 
changed. To begin with, Milosevic was part of the intra-ethnic dynamics, although 
not part of the intra-ethnic competition, but when Milosevic’s position became 
increasingly questioned, he sought to influence elite competition in the two statelets 
in order to retain control. Kin-state dynamics and ‘local’ intra-ethnic dynamics are 
not necessarily distinct: the definition of ethnic identity is flexible and the local elites 
can seek to exclude or include the kin-state, thereby rejecting or accepting the 
authority of the kin-state leader. Brubaker’s ‘relational fields’ may therefore also 
overlap, which adds further fluidity to a theory that already insists on the instability 
of the triadic relationship. It is, moreover, useful to make a distinction between 
different forms of kin-state influence, since acceptance of the special role of the kin- 
state leader is likely to vary in different phases. In the two cases, it was greatest in 
the pre-war phase, when ethnification was yet incomplete and it was important to 
demonstrate the unity of all Serbs. In the wartime phase and in the post-war phase, 
ethnification was a reality and the authority of the kin-state leader was increasingly 
down-played: although political competition was ethnicised, the local leaders defined 
the space of legitimate leadership as being limited by the border, not by ethnicity.
The effect of kin-state involvement was initially to strengthen radicalisation through 
support for the most uncompromising factions. Later on, following intense 
international pressure and military failures in Croatia, Milosevic attempted to 
engineer more moderate dynamics but this strategy was not always successful since 
the local leaders enjoyed support from the Serbian opposition and controlled their 
own paramilitary forces. After the war ended, Belgrade did not have significant 
influence on the gradual emergence of centripetal dynamics. Belgrade’s success in 
engineering moderating dynamics during the war was limited due to the availability 
of alternative resources and because it had become a salient issue in the local 
competition: even though the elites did not change their position on the issue of the 
war, they could score political points by vowing to assert their independence and not 
take orders from Belgrade. The degree of internal competition, moreover, affected 
the extent to which the kin-state could exert its influence. If divisions already exist
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then this facilitates kin-state control, while a very high degree of ffactionalisation 
seems to impede such influence. A high degree of divisions and frequently changing 
alliances will make the political scene more fluid and less controllable and the 
divisions may, furthermore, be accompanied by divided control over military 
resources.
Overall, the preceding analysis has highlighted the importance of intra-ethnic 
competition in ethnic conflicts and the importance of intra-Serb rivalry in the 
Yugoslav conflict. Intra-ethnic competition, therefore ought to constitute an integral 
part of conflict analysis. It is, however, important to move beyond conventional 
theoretical expectations: radicalisation is not the only possible outcome of intra­
ethnic competition and popular attitudes can be of limited importance. Intra-ethnic 
competition should not, therefore, be reduced to outflanking elites successfully 
playing the ethnic card. Intra-ethnic competition is the norm in ethnic conflicts, and 
elite rhetoric alleging unity, the protection of national interests and representation of 
the population should not be accepted at face value. In the concluding chapter, these 
findings will be used to suggest a preliminary theory of the impact of intra-ethnic 
competition in inter-ethnic conflict.
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Part III: Conclusion
Chapter 8 
Intra-Ethnic Competition in Inter-Ethnic Conflict
Despite posturing to the contrary, unity was far from characteristic of the Serb 
leaders in Croatia and Bosnia between 1990 and 1995. Serb politics was marked by 
great divisions: initially by divisions over the ethnic definition of politics and later by 
divisions between leaders who all gladly accepted the label ‘Serb leader’ and 
professed to be protecting the interests of the Serb nation. Such claims to a 
homogeneous national interest were clearly an illusion and divisions and rivalry 
persisted throughout the pre-war and wartime periods and continued into the post­
war period. This rivalry was fuelled by differing views of the inter-ethnic conflict, 
ideological and regional cleavages, valence issues and personal power ambitions.
Intra-Serb elite competition constitutes an under-developed aspect of the Yugoslav 
disintegration and war; an aspect which significantly impacted on the dominant Serb 
position in Croatia and Bosnia and which is, therefore, important to understanding 
the intensification of the conflict, the outbreak of war and the persistent difficulty in 
reaching a peace settlement. Through an in-depth analysis, involving dozens of 
interviews with actors directly involved in the intra-Serb competition, this thesis has 
sought to throw some light on these dynamics of competition and on the variables 
affecting its impact. Theoretically, intra-ethnic elite competition is also under­
analysed and almost limited to a theory of outbidding based on elite appeals to mass 
extremism. This thesis has sought to fill some of this gap in the literature and some 
interesting findings have emerged from the empirical analysis. These findings will be 
used to suggest a preliminary theory of intra-ethnic elite competition in inter-ethnic 
conflicts; a theory which emphasises that intra-ethnic competition should be analysed 
in terms of political competition with a focus on politically relevant audiences and 
resources, and which urges analysts to move beyond the assumption of ethnic 
outbidding. More research is still needed but, nevertheless, it holds some important 
lessons for conflict analysis and for the impact of intra-ethnic competition.
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The radicalisation of the Serb position in Croatia and Bosnia owed much to the intra- 
Serb rivalry but the outcome was by no means inevitable and radicalisation was, 
moreover, not the only effect of intra-Serb competition. Ethnification was part of the 
political struggle and radicalisation was not driven by popular demands but 
contingent on especially coercive resources and support from Belgrade, although the 
importance of the kin-state was reduced during the war. Contrary to what is often 
argued in existing literature on the Yugoslav disintegration and war, the dominance 
of the Serb hardliners was not based on elites successfully playing the ethnic card 
and mobilising the population.1 Moreover, it was concluded that Milosevic was not 
always able to dictate the internal politics of the two Serb statelets; the local Serb 
leaders enjoyed a certain level of autonomy and this influenced the political position 
they adopted and hence the development of the war. This constitutes an important 
addition to existing literature on Serb politics in the 1990s.
8.1 Serb disunity in Croatia and Bosnia
The dominance of the ethnic cleavage was not an automatic result of the formation of 
ethnic parties in Croatia and Bosnia. The ability of the ethnic or nationalist parties to 
ensure the dominance of this cleavage and hence the marginalisation of non-ethnic 
rivals depended heavily on their control of political and non-political resources as 
well as on the interplay and even co-operation between the ethnic parties. This 
ethnification of politics was, furthermore, aided by the transitional situation and by 
the associated weakly developed socio-economic linkages between political parties 
and the general population. In addition, the transitional situation also strengthened 
the hardliners in the internal competition and reduced the impact of popular attitudes 
on elite positions.
The position of the Serb leaders was significantly influenced by intra-Serb 
competition and the lack of unity, therefore, had a decisive impact on the 
development of the conflict and the war. Intra-Serb competition greatly affected the 
decision by leaders to radicalise or moderate, and to reject or accept proposed 
settlements. This competition was characterised by a great flux in positions: today’s 
hardliners could be tomorrow’s moderates, and vice versa. Radicalisation was most
1 For a more detailed argument on the lack of success in popular mobilisation, see Gagnon, 2004.
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often the chosen response in case of intra-party challenges but the emergence of an 
external opposition did not have the same effect. Moreover, when other issues were 
salient and/or the opposition could coalesce with (para)military forces or 
international authorities, moderating dynamics also ensued. But, overall, intra-Serb 
competition was characterised by the dominance of hardliners. How were the 
hardliners able to win in the intra-Serb competition? How did they marginalise the 
moderates? Popular attitudes as well as the position of other ethnic leaders often had 
remarkably little influence on the dynamics of competition and its outcome; 
outbidding was not about mass responsiveness to extreme rhetoric nor was it 
determined by ‘lost generosity moments’. Generally, access to economic and 
coercive resources, in large part supplied by Belgrade, was much more decisive and 
the dominance of the hardliners was contingent on these factors. The increased 
importance of non-political resources in the pre-war period greatly aided the 
extremists and made possible the marginalisation of moderates. Timing was crucial 
and the outcome was by no means predetermined.
Belgrade’s involvement and support for the hardliners played a crucial role but the 
Serb leaders in Croatia and Bosnia, nevertheless, should not be regarded as mere 
puppets of the Serbian President. The leaders in the RSK and the RS played an 
increasingly independent role vis-a-vis Belgrade and the cooling of relations between 
Belgrade, Knin and Pale significantly affected the dynamics of elite competition in 
the two statelets. Finally, international involvement added a new audience of 
importance in the post-war period. This altered the incentives facing the elites and 
radicalisation became a problematic strategy in the intra-ethnic competition: the 
international authorities influenced the distribution of resources which benefited less 
extreme forces.
When analysing the Yugoslav conflict, therefore, it would be a serious simplification 
to regard the Serbs as monolithic. The dominance of hardline Serb leaders in Croatia 
and Bosnia in the pre-war period was an important factor in the Yugoslav 
disintegration. It strengthened Belgrade’s position and made a peaceful solution 
increasingly unlikely. To fully understand the Yugoslav disintegration, it is therefore 
important to know how this dominance came about; on what it was based. During the 
war, the intra-Serb rivalry increased in intensity and, at first, this served to entrench
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the radicalism of the leaders and made significant concessions and compromises 
impossible. Milosevic’s grip on Serb politics in the statelets gradually decreased but 
hardline dominance persisted. However, the dynamics of competition could also give 
rise to centripetal dynamics, and a complete analysis of the end of the war must 
include an analysis of intra-Serb rivalry: to fully explain the increased willingness to 
negotiate in Bosnia and to explain the lack of such willingness in Croatia and 
Krajina’s eventual downfall. Finally, in the post-war period, the gradual moderation 
and increased stabilisation cannot be understood without analysing the dynamics of 
intra-Serb competition. This is, however, not to say that intra-Serb competition 
provides a complete explanation for the Yugoslav disintegration and war. The 
framework of analysis is relational: it has included both inter-ethnic interplay and 
international involvement which had a decisive impact on Serb politics. The point is 
that an analysis of the intra-Serb competition is also needed when explaining the 
Yugoslav disintegration and war; it is not sufficient as an analysis but it is necessary. 
The intra-Serb competition in Croatia and Bosnia was strongly influenced by the 
inter-ethnic conflict, by international involvement and by kin-state involvement, but 
it was not merely an epiphenomenon of these factors. It is an independent dynamics 
which is particularly crucial when analysing the timing of political change; of 
radicalisation or moderation.
Steven Burg and Paul Shoup in their book The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina argue 
that Western policymakers failed to respond to changes in the Serbian position. If 
the dynamics of intra-Serb competition had been better understood, it would 
arguably have aided international attempts to engineer a peaceful solution. In the pre­
war period, Serb claims of unity were largely accepted at face value and attempts 
were not made to support more moderate voices, for example, through the supply of 
resources or at least through recognition of their legitimacy. During the war, an 
understanding of the importance of Serb internal politics gradually developed, at 
least in the Bosnian case, and mediators tried to foster further divisions between 
Belgrade and Pale and between civilian and military leaders. International sanctions 
were instrumental in creating the rift between Belgrade and the local Serb leaders, 
but the resulting divisions were only utilised to a limited extent by mediators. A
2 Burg, Shoup, 1999: 90
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quicker result, an earlier emergence of centripetal dynamics, could conceivably have 
resulted from a clearer targeting of the resources on which the extremists relied or 
from a deliberate fostering of more moderate alliances.
In conclusion, this thesis has in two important ways contributed to the existing 
literature on the Yugoslav disintegration and war. Firstly, it provides a full analysis 
of Serb politics in Croatia and Bosnia, which has so far been lacking; an analysis 
which emphasises the high degree of disunity and highlights the changing relations 
between Belgrade and the local Serb leaders. These dynamics of competition and 
their effect on the dominant Serb position in Croatia and Bosnia should be included 
in any analysis which aims to fully understand the Yugoslav disintegration and 
subsequent war. Contrary to widespread assumptions, the thesis showed that 
Milosevic was not always able to dictate developments in the statelets. Secondly, the 
thesis adds to the emerging evidence of the lack of importance of popular attitudes, 
as convincingly argued by Gagnon in his recent book.3 However, compared to 
existing literature it provides a fuller picture of the links that mattered in the intra- 
Serb competition and consequently argue that although popular attitudes were not the 
primary driving force, we cannot conclude that popular attitudes had no significant 
impact at all: its impact varied in different phases of the conflict, depending on the 
availability and effectiveness of other resources, in particular coercive resources.
8.2 Impact of intra-ethnic competition
The empirical findings are at odds with the dominant theoretical assumption in the 
field: the theory of outbidding which holds that intra-ethnic competition will lead to 
radicalisation based on elites playing on extreme mass sentiments. Contrary to this 
argument, intra-ethnic competition and the position of the Serb leaders were only to a 
limited extent influenced by popular attitudes and radicalisation was not the only 
response to challengers. The elites were generally not constrained by the general 
population; they had a high level of autonomy and victory in the intra-Serb 
competition depended on resources other than popular support. Popular attitudes 
played a limited role, even though elections and referenda were held and the rhetoric 
of popular legitimacy and authenticity was given priority by the competing elites.
3 Gagnon, 2004
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Crucial periods of radicalisation can fall between elections and even when elections 
and referenda are held, popular attitudes need not be the primary factor driving elite 
competition. The lack of importance of popular attitudes was especially pronounced 
during the war but popular sentiments were even in the pre-war period and in the 
immediate post-war period not determining changes in the position of the leaders: 
neither radicalisation nor moderation appear to have been driven by popular demands.
The theory of outbidding also holds that radicalisation will be the preferred response 
to intra-ethnic challenges. However, the analysis found that radicalisation or defeat 
were not the only options available to leaders faced with competitors and centrifugal 
dynamics, therefore, were not an automatic consequence in case of intra-ethnic 
competition. The analysis pointed to an interesting difference between competition 
within and between parties: while intra-party competition was generally met with 
radicalisation, competition from other parties or independents was not. The Serb 
leaders depended on the party/movement for resources and were, therefore, less 
likely to use repressive measures against internal challengers, whereas the same 
concerns did not exist with external challengers. Moreover, challenges from other 
parties often involved issues other than the national and ethnic one. Finally, since 
popular attitudes were found to be of limited significance, radicalisation in case of 
challenges from other parties lacked an obvious audience. Competition between 
parties in some instances even caused relative moderation of the dominant position. 
In existing theories, such moderation is argued to be based on the possibility or 
necessity of cross-ethnic alliances and in the case of Horowitz’s Alternative Vote 
system it is ultimately voter-led.4 But the moderating dynamics that were uncovered 
in the analysis were not based on cross-ethnic cleavages and it was elite-led; it was a 
moderation that took place in spite of elite dominance and ethnicised political 
competition.
The lack of importance of popular attitudes in a transitional context, and especially in 
a violent conflict, could be seen as an unsurprising conclusion. However, it runs 
counter to existing theorising, elections and referenda were held throughout the 
conflict and the Serb leaders persistently claimed to be representing the general
4 Sisk, 1996: 16. Horowitz, 1985: 359-60. Horowitz, 1991: 196.
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population. Moreover, radicalisation as the outcome of intra-ethnic competition 
would be expected to be even more likely in a situation of extreme polarisation and 
warfare but the analysis found that radicalisation was not the only response and that 
relative moderation could even ensue. These findings were backed up by the 
theoretical discussion and I would venture to say that they do not only reflect 
idiosyncratic dynamics but illustrate that popular attitudes are not necessarily driving 
intra-ethnic competition and that this competition need not lead to radicalisation. I 
would, therefore, suggest an alternative approach to analysing the impact of intra­
ethnic competition; an approach which holds that the key to this impact is the 
different audiences to which the rivalling elites appeal.
The existence of more than one politically relevant audience means that intra-ethnic 
elite competition can be seen as a form of ‘nested games’ in which the elites must 
consider the effect of their positions in more than one arena. In most conflicts, the 
elites will need to seek support from the general population and from their own 
party/movement, including the military. But other audiences can be added to this list. 
In the case of Croatia and Bosnia, the kin-state was a very significant audience and 
international actors became an important audience in the post-war period. The 
audiences are important to the elites because they provide them with the resources 
needed if they are to be victorious in the intra-ethnic rivalry. The attitudes found 
among the audiences of significance will, therefore, decisively influence the impact 
of intra-ethnic competition on the dominant position: what will be the best strategy to 
ensure the support of the audience that provides the most effective resources? One 
way for rivalling elites to improve their relative position is through alliances, such as 
when the more moderate opposition in the RS aligned itself with the army. Resources 
from one arena can, to some extent, substitute for resources from another but the 
relative importance of the audiences is not static: the effectiveness and availability of 
resources emanating from the different audiences will change in the course of a 
conflict and this will affect the strategies chosen by the rivalling elites and the 
outcome of the competition. For example, coercive resources were, during the war, 
more important than democratic resources, such as popular support, and the latter 
could not substitute for the former; having links with military forces was more 
important than reflecting popular attitudes. Finally, the institutional framework, e.g.
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the regime type, will serve as an additional influence on the relative importance of 
the different resources as well as on their distribution.
In addition to the distribution of resources, one of the factors influencing the chosen 
response to intra-ethnic challenges is the issues on which this challenge is based. If 
issues other than the conflict are included then radicalisation is a less effective pre­
emptive strategy. Other strategies, therefore, are likely attempted and relative 
moderation on the conflict issue can even be a way of trying to change the rules of 
the game for a cornered leader. The emergence of other salient issues is argued to be 
unlikely in a situation of violence5 but the case studies clearly showed that even 
though the ethnic cleavage is predominant, this does not prevent the emergence of 
politically very salient valance issues. And it was actually not until the outbreak of 
war, when ethnification was complete, that such issues became salient. A final 
variable of importance was shown to be the configuration o f competition, especially 
the fragmentation of the opposition: is it strong enough to constitute a challenge?
What, then, will be the outcome of intra-ethnic competition in a specific situation? 
This is illustrated in figure 8.1, which is focused on the decisions made by an 
incumbent leader or party faced with challenges from either a more moderate or a 
more extreme direction. There are three possible outcomes, corresponding to the 
outcomes found in the two cases: 1) the challengers are suppressed and no change in 
position ensues; 2) no action is necessary; 3) the incumbent leader must adopt the 
opposition’s position or face defeat. Only the latter option corresponds with the 
theory of outbidding, but note that this need not be based on popular attitudes nor 
does the change in position necessarily take a radical direction.
5 Gagnon, 1995: 89.
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Figure 8.1 The impact of intra-ethnic competition
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This model is based on kin-state involvement being o f significance but this audience 
could be substituted for other audiences, e.g. international actors, without the basic 
idea changing. The model is, o f course, a simplification and, for example, it leaves 
out the issues that are salient in the competition. In case issues other than the national 
one are salient an incumbent leader faced with a strong opposition will not 
necessarily have the option of retaining power by adopting the opposition’s position. 
Instead, the leader may attempt to compete on the other salient issues, but this is a 
difficult strategy if the other issues are valence issues, and the only options will then 
be to seek to change the rules o f the game or face defeat. Otherwise, the model points 
to the following instances which will lead to the opposition’s position becoming the 
dominant position, either through opposition victory or through pre-empting 
positioning by the incumbent leader or party: a) the opposition has disproportionate
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control of party/military resources; b) the cohesive opposition enjoys kin-state 
support and popular support; c) the cohesive opposition enjoys kin-state support and 
the context (institutional framework and conflict phase) favours non-political 
resources; d) the cohesive opposition enjoys popular support and the context does not 
favour non-political resources.
Additional theoretical implications
Other empirical findings, which are partly derived from the limited or variable 
importance of popular attitudes, also run counter to existing theorising in the field of 
conflict studies. Firstly, the dominant elite position was not merely reactive: 
radicalisation also occurred independently of the ‘other side’ and radicalisation or 
moderation was not always reciprocated. Actions and rhetoric of the other ethnic 
leaders would be much more important if protection of the nation had been the 
primary goal, but other interests and constraints were more significant when the 
leaders chose their position. Contrary to what is often argued, radicalisation does, 
therefore, not necessarily breed radicalisation -  nor does moderation. One could, 
consequently, question how useful concepts such as ‘national interests’ are when 
analysing elite behaviour in ethnic conflicts. An exception to this general pattern was 
the relative military strength which was found to be of significant importance, as 
argued in the ‘mutually hurting stalemate’ theory. But a military stalemate, 
nevertheless, did not have an immediate effect on elite positions and had to be 
supplemented by changed dynamics of intra-ethnic competition if moderation was to 
follow. Moreover, the need for unity in the face of outside threats did not generally 
reduce the intra-ethnic competition; it was, on the contrary, more intense in times of 
crisis. All this, nevertheless, does not mean that the inter-ethnic interplay was of no 
significance for intra-ethnic elite competition: the conflict situation mattered greatly, 
as did the relative military and demographic strength, and the position of opposing 
leaders could be used as ammunition by rivalling elites.
Secondly, ethnification of politics was found to be very much part of the political 
struggle and far from an automatic outcome following the emergence of ethnically 
defined parties. Furthermore, it need not reflect a voter-driven process. In the two 
cases, the ethnification of politics depended in particular on the distribution of
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resources between ethnic and non-ethnic parties, as well as on the interplay and even 
co-operation between the ethnic parties. Solely playing on extremism risked 
alienating the middle ground and a vague, ambivalent position was, therefore, 
strategic for the ethnic parties. The incentives for such a position disappeared with 
the ethnification of political competition, when the ethnic cleavage became dominant 
and non-ethnic rivals consequently were marginalised. Radicalisation therefore 
ensued; not because of appeals to mass sentiments but because the most significant 
rivals for the ethnic leaders changed and so did the strategies used.
Suggestedframework for analysing intra-ethnic competition 
Intra-ethnic competition has, in this thesis, been analysed based on politically 
relevant audiences and the resources they supply. This formed the basis of the 
preceding model of the impact of intra-ethnic competition. While this is far from a 
parsimonious theory, I would still suggest that this framework avoids the pitfall of 
over-simplification while pointing to factors decisive for the direction and outcome 
of intra-ethnic competition. In addition to party/movement forces and the general 
population, other audiences can, as already mentioned, also play a significant role 
and in both cases, the kin-state leader was of great importance, although the degree 
and form of Belgrade’s influence varied considerably. Brubaker’s concept of 
relational fields provides a valuable framework for analysing such influence but it is 
useful to distinguish between two forms of kin-state influence: one based on the 
leader being of the same ethnicity as the local leaders and the other based on the 
supply of resources. Only the former form of influence is clearly distinct from the 
influence exerted by other audiences. In the Croatian and Bosnian cases, kin-state 
influence decreased when the local leaders had other alliance partners, possessed 
their own resources or when competition was primarily conducted in the political 
sphere and through legal institutions. International actors can finally act as an 
important audience. Depending on the degree of international involvement, 
international administrators or negotiators can provide resources to the elites that will 
make the support from other audiences less important. Strong involvement can, 
under some circumstances, change the outcome of intra-ethnic rivalry, as it did in the 
post-war period in both Croatia and Bosnia.
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The relative importance of the different audiences was found to be significantly 
affected by the context in which the competition is played out and the analysis in 
particular highlighted the importance of two variables: ethnification and violence. 
When ethnification was still contested, i.e. in the pre-war phase, the kin-state leader 
was afforded significant authority by the local leaders, who sought to impose an 
ethnic definition of politics and display unity. In this context, the position of 
‘opposing’ ethnic leaders was, moreover, very significant since the inter-ethnic 
interplay was important for the attempt to impose the ethnic cleavage and 
radicalisation of the other side, furthermore, provided hardliners with ammunition 
against more moderate forces who were still advocating co-existence. The relative 
importance of the different audiences was even more clearly affected by the change 
from a non-violent to a violent conflict and the most significant effect of this change 
was the increased importance of coercive resources, especially control of 
(para)military forces. Finally, the conflict situation must be expected to influence the 
attitudes of the different audiences, with attitudes generally being hardened by 
violence and ethnification.
Figure 8.2 illustrates the different audiences to which the elites address their appeal 
as well as the interplay with the positions of ‘opposing’ ethnic leaders. This 
framework emphasises the importance of identifying the politically relevant 
audiences, which is done by analysing the context in which the competition is played 
out: the phase of the conflict and the regime type. The next step is then to uncover 
the attitudes in the politically relevant audiences and the resulting distribution of 
resources. This latter factor will also be influenced by the institutional framework, 
e.g. the electoral system. Finally, the issues of salience in the competition and the 
fragmentation of the opposition should be considered since these factors will also 
influence the direction and outcome of the intra-ethnic competition.
Nina Caspersen: Intra-ethnic competition and inter-ethnic conflict 254
Chapter 8 - Intra-Ethnic Competition in Inter-Ethnic Conflict
Figure 8.2 Intra-ethnic competition and different audiences
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Such an approach, I will argue, forms a more useful basis for analysing intra-ethnic 
competition in inter-ethnic conflict than automatic assumptions of successful 
outbidding based on elite appeals to mass extremism.
Generalisability to other conflicts?
This thesis has been based on an analysis o f two case studies that followed the ‘most 
similar cases’ design, rather than the ‘most different cases’ design. This is generally 
regarded as suitable for initial theory development.6 But although the cases differed 
on a number o f important variables, whose effect could therefore be analysed, the
Karl; Schmitter, 1995: 971.
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empirical foundation of the suggested theory of intra-ethnic competition is clearly 
limited. To further develop it, more empirical analysis is needed; especially analysis 
which also includes less similar cases. One of the limitations of the empirical study is 
that it only covers transitional cases. While ethnic conflicts frequently occur in 
transitional settings, conflicts in other political contexts are also found: conflicts in 
clearly authoritarian settings, such as Sudan, or in more democratic settings, such as 
the conflict in the Basque Country.
The transition from a communist system significantly affected the dynamics of 
competition and hence the impact of intra-ethnic competition on the dominant elite 
position. A transitional situation in particular affects the structures of emerging 
parties and makes fractionalisation more likely: the first democratic election is 
generally associated with parties with weak organisations and undeveloped 
programmes, which disadvantages attempts to create cohesive political parties. 
Additionally, these characteristics of political competition make it difficult for 
popular attitudes to be reflected by the elected representatives and the impact of 
popular sentiments on elite positioning is therefore reduced. This tendency is re­
enforced by a tradition of elite dominance. The weakness of party structures, the 
relative unimportance of popular attitudes and the undeveloped party programmes, 
furthermore, means that non-democratic resources increase in importance. Finally, 
well-established elite-mass linkages will be scarce and this facilitates the 
ethnification of political competition: other cleavage structures are under-developed 
and ethnic identity offers an easy answer to political parties in search of a political 
platform. The transitional setting therefore makes radicalisation and ethnification 
more likely and this would, therefore, be expected to be less pronounced in more 
consolidated political environments. Moreover, the elite dominance characterising 
the two cases would be expected to be reduced in consolidated democracies. In 
addition to the transitional setting, conflicts outside of the former Yugoslavia are 
likely to differ on a number of other factors not included in this analysis and some of 
these will affect the dynamics of intra-ethnic elite competition. This includes factors 
such as natural resources available to the elites as well as factors such as the degree 
of international involvement. Finally, the transitional situation can itself vary 
significantly and the Yugoslav republics were, for example, characterised by a
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weakly developed democratic opposition compared with other Eastern European 
countries.7
Despite these caveats and the need for more empirical research, the analysis, 
nevertheless, demonstrated the need for analysis of intra-ethnic elite competition and 
the need for regarding it as more than an epiphenomenon of popular attitudes or of 
the position of opposing ethnic leaders. It demonstrated that popular attitudes can be 
of limited importance for the position of leaders and a claim to national self- 
determination can, paradoxically, be an authoritarian claim. Radicalisation was, 
furthermore, not the only outcome of intra-ethnic competition even in a case of 
polarisation and war. The process of ethnification should, finally, be seen as a 
political struggle and, when analysing this as well as the effect of intra-ethnic elite 
competition, attention should be paid to the audiences to which the elites must 
appeal; attitudes found among these audiences; the institutional framework and the 
resulting distribution of resources; the issues that are salient in the competition; and 
the cohesion of the opposition. By adopting such a framework, it will be easier to 
predict if intra-ethnic elite competition will cause a radicalisation of the position of 
the leaders, if it will have no significant effect or if it will, on the contrary, lead to a 
relative moderation of the dominant position. Intra-ethnic elite competition should be 
analysed in terms of political competition, with a focus on politically relevant 
audiences and resources in the competition, and not be clouded by propaganda 
claims of national unity and protection of national interests.
7 Radosevic, 1996: 76.
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